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THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
___________________________
Original
No. LD-99-004
SHERIDAN’S CASE
September 6, 2001
McNeill, Taylor & Gallo, P.A., of Dover (Robert J. Gallo on the brief and orally), for the professional conduct committee.
William C. Sheridan, by brief and orally, pro se.
BRODERICK, J. In August 1999, the Supreme Court Committee on Professional Conduct (Committee) filed a petition with this court seeking a public censure against the respondent, William C. Sheridan. The petition was referred to a Judicial Referee (O’Neil, J.) for hearing and recommendation. By agreement, the matter was submitted to the referee on the pleadings, an agreed statement of facts and memoranda of law. The respondent did not contest that his conduct in the handling of a probate estate violated various rules of professional conduct, but argued that a public censure was not justified and that the complaint against him was barred by the statute of limitations and laches.
The referee found by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent had violated New Hampshire Rules of Professional Conduct (Rules) 1.1(a), 1.1(b)(1), 1.1(b)(5), 1.1(c)(4), 1.3(a) and 8.4(a), and that the applicable statute of limitations had not expired. He recommended that the respondent be publicly censured, assessed all expenses incurred by the Committee and required to complete the practical skills course within twelve months. We adopt the referee’s recommendations.
The record reveals the following undisputed facts. In June 1992, Gene Levigne III died, and in August of the same year, his widow, Norma Levigne, was appointed executrix of his estate. The respondent was retained by the executrix as counsel for the estate. On June 30, 1993, the Hillsborough County Probate Court appointed him to serve as Commissioner of the then insolvent estate. See RSA 557:1 (1997). Thereafter, the respondent failed to file any accounts on behalf of the executrix, the first of which was due in 1993, and neglected to perform any of his duties as Commissioner between June 30, 1993, and June 30, 1994.
In January 1996, the probate court notified the respondent of his numerous defaults, and he subsequently sought and was granted an extension of time to satisfy his obligations. Although the respondent had secured an extension of time to meet his obligations to the estate, he nonetheless neglected to meet those obligations. In February 1997, not having cured the defaults, the respondent was removed as counsel to the estate and a new Commissioner was appointed. The probate judge subsequently filed a professional conduct complaint with the Committee against the respondent.
The respondent admits that between June 30, 1993, and June 30, 1994, he failed to file any accounts for the estate in his capacity as counsel, and did not, as Commissioner, post and send notices to the creditors, receive claims from creditors, or file a report detailing which claims he believed should be allowed or disallowed. To explain his lapses, he contends that until June 1993 his associate was handling the representation of the estate. He alleges that he was not informed of the various defaults until January 1996, after the dissolution of his law partnership and after he sustained debilitating injuries in August 1994 and in March 1995. He further contends that his representation of the estate, while admittedly deficient, was due in part to the illness and subsequent death of the executrix in August 1996.
The respondent argues that his failure to make timely filings in the probate court prior to 1996 is insufficient misconduct, by itself, to warrant public censure. He contends that only his failure to file accounts after receiving an extension of time coupled with his failure to file those accounts previously would justify such a sanction. He asserts, however, that because he was recovering from serious injury during the period of the extension, which he believes offers him some protection under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), see 42 U.S.C.