The plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration is granted in part and denied in part.

Upon reconsideration, the slip opinion issued on May 21, 2001, is amended as follows. On page 11 of the opinion we delete the following: "The Right-to-Know Law applies only to meetings of a quorum of members of a public body, not to conversations among individual members outside of such meetings. See RSA 91-A:2, I (Supp. 2000)." We insert the following in its place:

The Right-to-Know Law does not apply to isolated conversations among individual members outside of public meetings, unless the conversations were "planned [or] intended for the purpose of discussing matters relating to official business" and the public entity made decisions during them. See RSA 91-A:2, I (Supp. 2000). Although Sanderson alleged that the conversations were intended to discuss matters related to official business, she did not allege that any decisions were made during them.

The court substantively addressed all but one of the plaintiffs’ remaining arguments for reconsideration in its slip opinion. The court observes that even if the plaintiffs’ due process argument was preserved, it was not reviewable on appeal because it was undeveloped. See State v. Chick, 141 N.H. 503, 504 (1996) (passing reference to constitutional claim renders argument waived); Keenan v. Fearon, 130 N.H. 494, 499 (1988) ("off-hand invocations" of constitutional rights supported by neither argument nor authority warrant no extended consideration).

The plaintiffs’ motion to supplement the record is denied. That Flint Road was designated as a scenic road in March 2001 has no bearing upon whether the planning board’s decisions issued in 1998 and 1999 were lawful.

Brock, C.J., and Broderick, Dalianis and Duggan, JJ., concurred.

Date of clerk’s notice of decision: August 28, 2001