(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the
convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that,
in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).
Argued March 3, 1997 -- Decided May 14, 1997
HANDLER, J., writing for a majority of the Court.
Plaintiffs in this action are children attending public schools in various poor urban school districts, the
so-called "special needs," or "Abbott," districts. Previously, the Court determined that they were being denied
their constitutional right to a "thorough and efficient education." In 1994, the Court directed the Legislature to
enact legislation by December 31, 1996, that would assure substantial equivalence, approximating one-hundred
percent parity, in per-pupil educational expenditures between wealthy suburban districts and the special needs
districts by the 1997-1998 school year. The Legislature was also required to provide for the extra-educational
needs of students in plaintiffs' districts. The Court invited applications for relief from any party if at any time
there appeared to be less than a reasonable likelihood of compliance with that order.
In April 1996 plaintiffs filed a motion in aid of litigants' rights contending that there was less than a
reasonable likelihood that the State would address the continued disparity in per-pupil expenditures between
plaintiffs' districts and the wealthy suburban districts, and that the State would likely fail to provide sufficient
supplemental programs for plaintiffs' districts. In September 1996, the Court denied the motion, without
prejudice to its renewal, because the Legislature was actively considering legislation to meet its constitutional
obligation under the thorough and efficient education clause.
The Comprehensive Educational Improvement and Financing Act of 1996 (CEIFA) was enacted into
law on December 20, 1996. CEIFA establishes core curriculum content standards that purport to define the
substantive level of education required by the Constitution, and contains new education funding provisions
purportedly geared toward student achievement at the levels prescribed by the content standards. In addition,
CEIFA provides various forms of need-based aid directed primarily at the special needs districts.
Plaintiffs' renewed their motion on January 6, 1997, contending that CEIFA failed to remedy the
constitutional deprivations present in the special needs districts.
HELD: The regular education funding provisions of CEIFA are unconstitutional as applied to the special
needs districts. Additionally, CEIFA does not adequately address the unique educational disadvantages facing
children attending schools in the poor urban districts. The Legislature therefore is required, as interim
remedial relief, to assure by the commencement of the 1997-1998 school year, that per-pupil expenditures in
the poor urban districts are equivalent to the average per-pupil expenditure in the wealthy suburban districts.
The Commissioner is directed to assure that remedial monies are spent effectively and in furtherance of
CEIFA's content standards. In respect of the act's failure to address plaintiffs' unique educational
disadvantages, the case is remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings.
1. CEIFA provides a dual approach to education reform. The core curriculum content standards -- the
centerpiece of the new statute -- are translated into a per-pupil expenditure through the use of a hypothetical
model school district. That process generates the "T & E amount" -- the per-pupil expenditure purportedly
sufficient to deliver the education defined by the content standards to all students. CEIFA permits expenditures
both below and in excess of the T & E amount, although expenditures in excess of the T & E amount are funded
exclusively by locally raised revenue and labeled unnecessary to the delivery of a thorough and efficient education.
(pp. 16-22)
2. The core curriculum content standards adequately discharge the Legislature's duty to define the content
of a constitutional thorough and efficient education. The content standards represent the first substantial effort
on the part of the legislative and executive branches to define a constitutional education, and therefore warrant
judicial deference. (pp. 23-26)
3. The function of the Court, however, is to ensure that the entire approach, encompassing both content
standards and funding provisions, comports with the Constitution. Without adequate resources, content standards
can have little actual impact on the quality of education. Because the record completely fails to validate the T
& E amount, the CEIFA approach is constitutionally insufficient. CEIFA's premise that wealthy districts'
spending in excess of the T & E amount is wasteful or inefficient and thus irrelevant to the provision of a
constitutional education is undermined by the statute itself, the record, and common sense. (pp. 26-31)
4. The theoretical model district used to generate the T & E amount is incapable of accommodating the
real differences between the wealthy suburban districts and the poor urban districts, and, accordingly, figures
based on it cannot plausibly support a thorough and efficient education in both types of districts. (pp. 27-34)
5. The Court affords the presumption of validity to CEIFA, a legislative enactment founded on
administrative expertise. That presumption is rebuttable, however, and the lack of any foundation for the T &
E amount warrants judicial rejection. (pp. 34-35)
6. The documented needs of children attending school in the poor urban districts vastly exceed the needs
of other school children throughout the State. Those needs must be overcome for the students in the poor urban
districts to achieve a constitutionally thorough and efficient education. (pp. 37-42)
7. CEIFA fails to address sufficiently plaintiffs' extra-educational needs. The Demonstrably Effective
Program Aid (DEPA) component of CEIFA provides need-based aid for a menu of programs, such as class size
reduction programs, parent education programs, and job training programs. The Early Childhood Program Aid
(ECPA) component provides need-based aid for full-day kindergarten, preschool classes, and other childhood
programs and services. Because the State never conducted the study required by the Court's prior orders to
determine the actual needs of children in the special needs districts, the aid amounts provided for by DEPA and
ECPA are necessarily arbitrary and therefore fail to satisfy the Court's orders. (pp. 42-49)
8. The State's constitutional obligations towards public education include providing school facilities that
have an environment conducive to the achievement of a thorough and efficient education. CEIFA fails to
address the documented inadequacies of facilities in plaintiffs' districts and thus fails to meet that component
of the State's constitutional obligations. (pp. 49-53)
9. As interim remedial relief, the Court orders the State to assure, by the commencement of the 1997-1998
school year, equivalent per-pupil expenditures between the poor urban districts and the actual average per-pupil
expenditure in the wealthy suburban districts. The Commissioner of Education is ordered to assure that all
education funding, including and especially the additional funding ordered today, is spent effectively, efficiently,
and in furtherance of the achievement of the core curriculum content standards. (pp. 53-66)
10. The case is remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings. That court shall direct the
Commissioner of Education to study and report on the extra-educational needs of the children in the special
needs districts, the cost of those programs, the Commissioner's plan for implementation of those programs,
together with the facilities needs of plaintiffs' districts. The parties to this action shall be permitted to participate
in any proceedings conducted by the Commissioner and the Superior Court. In its discretion, the court may use
the assistance of a Special Master in reviewing the Commissioner's report. The Superior Court shall render its
decision by December 31, 1997; jurisdiction to review that decision has been retained by the Supreme Court.
(pp. 68-70 & Implementing Order)
JUSTICES POLLOCK, O'HERN, STEIN, and COLEMAN join in JUSTICE HANDLER'S opinion.
JUSTICE GARIBALDI has filed a separate dissenting opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ did not participate.
GARIBALDI, J., dissenting, is of the view that the approach taken in CEIFA, which places quality of education
ahead of parity in funding, is facially constitutional. She interprets the thorough and efficient education clause
to mean that the State must provide resources in a manner that optimizes the chance that children will receive
an education that will make them productive members of society. Justice Garibaldi takes the position that the
majority opinion neither recognizes the statutory presumption of validity nor defers to the special expertise of
the Department of Education. She would rely on the Commissioner to exercise the authority provided him by
CEIFA to assure that school districts spend their funds more efficiently. In addition, Justice Garibaldi would
retain jurisdiction and would give the Commissioner until the 1998-1999 school term for the substantial
implementation of the core curriculum.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
M-
622 September Term 1996
RAYMOND ARTHUR ABBOTT, a minor, by
his Guardian Ad Litem, FRANCES
ABBOTT; ARLENE FIGUEROA, FRANCES
FIGUEROA, HECTOR FIGUEROA, ORLANDO
FIGUEROA, and VIVIAN FIGUEROA,
minors, by their Guardian Ad Litem,
BLANCA FIGUEROA; MICHAEL HADLEY, a
minor, by his Guardian Ad Litem,
LOLA MOORE; HENRY STEVENS, JR., a
minor, by his Guardian Ad Litem,
HENRY STEVENS, SR.; CAROLINE JAMES
and JERMAINE JAMES, minors, by
their Guardian Ad Litem, MATTIE
JAMES; DORIAN WAITERS and KHUDAYJA
WAITERS, minors, by their Guardian
Ad Litem, LYNN WAITERS; CHRISTINA
KNOWLES, DANIEL KNOWLES, and GUY
KNOWLES, JR., minors, by their
Guardian Ad Litem, GUY KNOWLES,
SR.; LIANA DIAZ, a minor, by her
Guardian Ad Litem, LUCILA DIAZ;
AISHA HARGROVE and ZAKIA HARGROVE,
minors, by their Guardian Ad Litem,
PATRICIA WATSON; and LAMAR STEPHENS
and LESLIE STEPHENS, minors, by
their Guardian Ad Litem, EDDIE
STEPHENS,
Plaintiffs-Movants,
v.
FRED G. BURKE, COMMISSIONER OF
EDUCATION; EDWARD G. HOFGESANG, NEW
JERSEY DIRECTOR OF BUDGET AND
ACCOUNTING; CLIFFORD A GOLDMAN, NEW
JERSEY STATE TREASURER; and NEW
JERSEY STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION,
Defendants-Respondents.
Argued March 4, 1997 -- Decided May 14, 1997
On motion in aid of litigants' rights from
the judgment of this Court, whose opinions
are reported at
136 N.J. 444 (1994) and
119 N.J. 287 (1990).
David G. Sciarra, Executive Director and Paul
L. Tractenberg argued the cause for movants
(Mr. Sciarra, attorney; Mr. Sciara, Mr.
Tractenberg, Lawrence S. Lustberg, and James
E. Ryan, on the briefs).
Peter G. Verniero, Attorney General of New
Jersey, argued the cause for respondents (Mr.
Verniero, attorney; Jaynee LaVecchia,
Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Nancy
Kaplen, Michelle Lyn Miller, and Peter D.
Wint, Deputy Attorneys General, on the
briefs).
Douglas S. Eakeley argued the cause for
amicus curiae The League of Women Voters of
New Jersey (Lowenstein, Sandler, Kohl, Fisher
& Boylan, attorneys; Mr. Eakeley and Marjorie
A. Adams, on the brief).
Denise Mullens Carter argued the cause for
amicus curiae New Jersey Black Issues
Convention, Inc. (Roche & Carter, attorneys).
Cecilia M. Zalkind submitted a brief on
behalf of amicus curiae Association for
Children of New Jersey (Ms. Zalkind,
attorney; H. Kit Ellenbogen, Nancy D.
Feldman, and Cynthia C. Rice, on the brief).
Paulette Brown submitted a brief on behalf of
amicus curiae Black Ministers Council of New
Jersey (Brown Lofton Childress & Wolfe,
attorneys).
Richard A. Friedman submitted a brief on
behalf of amicus curiae New Jersey Education
Association (Zazzali, Zazzali, Fagella &
Nowak, attorneys; Mr. Friedman and Aileen M.
O'Driscoll, on the brief).
David H. Coates and Vincent C. DeMaio
submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae
Foundation Aid Districts Association (Turp,
Coates, Essl & Diggers and DeMaio & DeMaio,
attorneys).
Ronald I. Bloom submitted a brief on behalf
of amicus curiae Galloway Township (Vasser,
Spitalnick & Bloom, attorneys).
Joseph Charles, Jr., submitted a brief on
behalf of amicus curiae New Jersey
Legislative Black and Latino Caucus.
Michelle Hollar-Gregory, Corporation Counsel,
submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae
City of Newark.
Eugene G. Liss submitted a brief on behalf of
amicus curiae Newark Teachers Union, Local
481 A.F.T., A.F.L.-C.I.O.
Victor E.D. King submitted a brief on behalf
of amicus curiae Board of Education of the
City of Plainfield, Union County (King, King
and Goldsack, attorneys).
Margaret C. Murphy, Counsel, submitted a
brief on behalf of amicus curiae New Jersey
Association of School Administrators.
Cynthia J. Jahn, Director, Legal Department,
submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae
New Jersey School Boards Association (Ms.
Jahn, attorney; Michael F. Kaelber and Donna
M. Kaye, on the brief).
Stephen Eisdorfer submitted a statement in
lieu of brief on behalf of amici curiae
Middlesex Somerset Mercer Regional Council,
Affordable Housing Network of New Jersey,
Association of New Jersey Environmental
Commissions, Civic League of Greater New
Brunswick, Isles, Inc., New Jersey Chapter of
the American Planning Association, and New
Jersey Environmental Lobby (Hill Wallack,
attorneys).
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
HANDLER, J.
Plaintiffs are children attending public schools in school
districts located in poor urban areas, classified as "special
needs districts." For many years they have been denied their
constitutional right to a thorough and efficient education. We
previously held that in the absence of legislation that would
assure a constitutionally adequate education, these school
children are entitled to judicial relief directed toward the
improvement of the educational opportunity available to them.
Plaintiffs contend that recently-enacted legislation, the
Comprehensive Educational Improvement and Financing Act of 1996,
fails to assure them a thorough and efficient education. They
seek by motion, in this action, the judicial relief to which they
are entitled. The act prescribes educational standards that
define and assess a thorough and efficient education. The act
also provides funding for both regular education, as defined by
the educational standards, and supplemental programs that are
essential to a thorough and efficient education in the special
needs districts. The State claims that the Comprehensive
Educational Improvement and Financing Act is a new and
comprehensive approach to public education that provides children
in the special needs districts with the opportunity to achieve a
thorough and efficient education, and thus obviates the need for
judicial relief.
The Comprehensive Educational Improvement and Financing Act
may someday result in the improvement of the educational
opportunity available to all New Jersey public school students.
We conclude, however, that the new act is incapable of assuring
that opportunity for children in the special needs districts for
any time in the foreseeable future. Although the educational
content standards prescribed by the new act are an essential
component of a thorough and efficient education, the primary
infirmity of the new act inheres in its funding provisions that
fail to assure expenditures sufficient to enable students in the
special needs districts to meet those standards. Furthermore,
the supplemental aid provided by the new act bears no
demonstrable relationship to the real needs of the disadvantaged
children attending school in the special needs districts. Those
needs must be met to provide students in the deprived districts
with the opportunity to achieve a thorough and efficient
education.
We hold that the Comprehensive Educational Improvement and
Financing Act of 1996 is unconstitutional as applied to the
special needs districts. The remedial relief that we order is
directed to those constitutional deficiencies. We do not disturb
the substantive and performance educational standards. In the
absence of adequate funding realistically geared to such
educational standards, however, we require that funding for
regular education in the special needs districts be increased and
that measures be taken to assure the proper and efficient use of
expenditures to maximize educational resources and benefits in
those districts. We further order the State to study, identify,
fund, and implement the supplemental programs required to redress
the disadvantages of public school children in the special needs
districts.
The New Jersey Constitution mandates that:
The Legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of free public schools for the instruction of all the children in the State between the ages of five and eighteen years.
Since 1973, students in poor urban school districts have
sought fulfillment of that constitutional right.See footnote 1 This action
began in 1981, when children attending public schools in Camden,
East Orange, Irvington, and Jersey City filed a complaint in the
Superior Court, Chancery Division, challenging the
constitutionality of the Public School Education Act of 1975
(1975 Act). L. 1975, c. 212 (codified at N.J.S.A. 18A:7A-1 to -33 (repealed)).
In September 1983, following extensive pretrial discovery
proceedings in the case challenging the 1975 Act, defendants
filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that
plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies.See footnote 2
That motion was granted in November 1983. Plaintiffs filed a
notice of appeal, and following our order denying direct
certification, the Appellate Division reversed the trial court's
decision and remanded the case for a plenary hearing. Abbott v.
Burke,
195 N.J. Super. 59 (1984). We granted defendants'
petition for certification,
97 N.J. 669 (1984), and rendered our
first decision in this action. Abbott v. Burke,
100 N.J. 269
(1985) (Abbott I).
In Abbott I, we determined that the ultimate constitutional
issues were especially fact-sensitive and related primarily to
specialized areas of education and administrative expertise. Id.
at 301. Accordingly, we concluded that the issues should be
resolved only on the basis of a comprehensive factual record.
Ibid. We remanded the matter to the Commissioner of Education
(the Commissioner). Ibid. Because the Commissioner was a
defendant in Abbott I, however, we ordered that the initial
hearing and fact-finding take place before an Administrative Law
Judge (ALJ). Id. at 302.
On August 24, 1988, after extensive hearings and other
proceedings spanning a period of over eight months, the ALJ
issued a lengthy decision that concluded
that evidence of substantial disparities in
educational input (such as course offerings,
teacher staffing, and per pupil expenditures)
were related to disparities in school
district wealth; that the plaintiffs'
districts, and others, were not providing the
constitutionally mandated thorough and
efficient education; that the inequality of
educational opportunity statewide itself
constituted a denial of a thorough and
efficient education; that the failure was
systemic; and that the statute and its
funding were unconstitutional.
[Abbott v. Burke, No. EDU 5581-88
(OAL 1988) (ALJ Decision) (quoted
in Abbott v. Burke,
119 N.J. 287,
297 (1990) (Abbott II)).]
The Commissioner declined to accept the ALJ's recommendations,
and the State Board of Education (State Board) affirmed the
Commissioner's determination.
We directly certified plaintiffs' appeal.
117 N.J. 51
(1989). On June 5, 1990, we reversed the decision of the State
Board and declared the 1975 Act unconstitutional as applied to
twenty-eight poorer urban districts classified within District
Factor Groups (DFGs) A & B.See footnote 3 Abbott II, supra,
119 N.J. 287.
We compared at length the quality of education delivered in those
special needs districts (SNDs) with the education delivered in
the more affluent DFG I & J districts and concluded that the SNDs
uniformly provided an inferior educational opportunity. Id. at
357-68. We determined that "the level of education offered to
students in some of the poorer urban districts is tragically
inadequate. Many opportunities offered to students in richer
suburban districts are denied them." Id. at 359.
We adopted substantially the material factual findings made
by the ALJ, including determinations that: poorer urban districts
could not offer important courses; the SNDs provided a deficient
education in many essential curriculum areas; and the SNDs
operated schools that, due to their age and lack of maintenance,
were crumbling and did not provide an environment in which
children could learn. Id. at 359-63.
We also considered the special needs of the children in the
SNDs, needs that palpably undercut their capacity to learn; we
found those needs to be vastly greater than any extra-educational
needs of the students in the DFG I & J districts:
The difference is monumental, no matter how
it is measured. Those needs go beyond
educational needs, they include food,
clothing and shelter, and extend to lack of
close family and community ties and support
and lack of helpful role models. They
include the needs that arise from a life led
in an environment of violence, poverty, and
despair. Urban youth are often isolated from
the mainstream of society. Education forms
only a small part of their home life,
sometimes no part of their school life, and
the dropout rate is almost the norm . . . .
The goal is to motivate them, to wipe out
their disadvantages as much as a school
district can, and to give them an educational
opportunity that will enable them to use
their innate ability.
We concluded that "in order to achieve the constitutional
standard for the student[s] from these poorer urban districts -
the ability to function in that society entered by their
relatively advantaged peers -- the totality of the districts'
educational offering must contain elements over and above those
found in the affluent suburban district." Id. at 374.
Responding both to the disparity in regular education
funding and the special needs of children attending school in the
SNDs, we formulated a two-part approach for remediating the
constitutional deprivation. We first ordered that "[t]he Act
must be amended, or new legislation passed, so as to assure that
poorer urban districts' educational funding is substantially
equal to that of property-rich districts." Id. at 384. To that
end, we required that the assured per-pupil funding in the poorer
urban districts should be substantially equivalent to that spent
in those districts providing the kind of education that those
students needed -- funding that approximated the average net
expense budget of school districts in DFGs I & J. Id. at 386.
We further ordered that "[t]he level of funding must also be
adequate to provide for the special educational needs of these
poorer urban districts in order to redress their extreme
disadvantages." Id. at 295.
Implementation of the remedy for the constitutional
violation was left to the Legislature. We made clear, however,
that the remedy could not depend on how much a poorer urban
school district was willing to tax itself. Id. at 386. We also
stated that the Legislature could choose to equalize per-pupil
expenditures for all districts at any level that it determined
would achieve a thorough and efficient education -- the level did
not necessarily have to be the average of the affluent suburban
districts. Id. at 387.
In response to Abbott II, the Legislature enacted the
Quality of Education Act of 1990 (QEA). L. 1990, c. 52 (codified
at N.J.S.A. 18A:7D-1 to -37 (repealed)). The QEA specified that
for the 1991-1992 school year, the cost of a "quality education"
would be $6,640 per elementary school pupil (the foundation
amount). N.J.S.A. 18A:7D-6(b) (repealed). The act also
purported to provide for equalized per-pupil expenditures.
Under the QEA, equalized per-pupil expenditures would be
achieved by increasing State aid to the SNDs, while restricting
State aid to the DFG I & J districts until the respective per-pupil expenditures were substantially the same. The QEA
increased the amount of State aid to the SNDs through the use of
a multiplier, termed the special needs weight, that applied only
to those districts. Thus, for the first year of the QEA, the
special needs weight added five percent to the amount of
education aid an SND would receive from the State. N.J.S.A.
18A:7D-6 (repealed). The five-percent weight was an arbitrarily
assigned number in that, as stipulated by the parties, the
Legislature selected that percentage without relying on any study
of the level of funding actually needed for the SNDs to achieve
parity. The QEA authorized the Governor to increase the special
needs weight, subject to the Legislature's disapproval. N.J.S.A.
18A:7D-13 (repealed). The special needs weight was the mechanism
that theoretically would have enabled the SNDs to increase their
budgets beyond the foundation amount to achieve parity with the
wealthier districts.
The QEA also addressed that part of the Abbott remedy
dealing with special, extra-educational needs by creating a new
aid program for the at-risk students in the SNDs. N.J.S.A.
18A:7D-32 (repealed). At-risk aid was calculated by multiplying
the State foundation aid amount by the number of "pupil units"
for at-risk students. The number of pupil units was determined
by multiplying the number of students eligible for free meals or
milk under the National School Lunch Act or the Child Nutrition
Act of 1966 by a legislatively-determined factor termed the at-risk weight. N.J.S.A. 18A:7D-3, -20 (repealed). As with the
special needs weight, the at-risk weights were chosen arbitrarily
in that the Legislature did not perform any study of the
additional costs associated with providing services to at-risk
children.
On June 12, 1991, plaintiffs made an application for this
Court to assume jurisdiction and to declare the QEA
unconstitutional on its face. The Court declined to hear the
matter directly but remanded it to the Chancery Division.
On August 31, 1993, the Chancery Division, in an unpublished
opinion, held that the QEA failed to assure that funding for
regular education in the thirty SNDs would be substantially
similar to that of the DFG I & J districts within a reasonable
time period.See footnote 4 Abbott v. Burke, No. 91-C-00150, 1
993 WL 379818,
at *14 (N.J. Ch. Div. Aug. 31, 1993). The court also determined
that the at-risk aid program was insufficient to address the
special needs of disadvantaged children identified in Abbott II.
Ibid.
We affirmed the judgment of the Chancery Division and
declared the QEA unconstitutional as applied to the special needs
districts. Abbott v. Burke,
136 N.J. 444 (1994) (per curiam)
(Abbott III). We found the QEA unconstitutional because of its
"failure to assure parity of regular education expenditures
between the special needs districts and the more affluent
districts," id. at 446-47, and because of its failure adequately
to address the unique needs of children in the SNDs, id. at 452-54.
The basic deficiency in the QEA in relation to regular
education was its failure to tie the amount that an SND would
have to spend to achieve parity, referred to as the equity
spending cap, to the amount of State aid the district would
receive. Id. at 451. We recognized that the QEA theoretically
could permit, through the equity spending cap, and pay for,
through increases in the special needs weight, substantial
equivalence. We found, however, that such a result would depend
on discretionary action and "fail[ed] to guarantee adequate
funding for [the special needs] districts." Ibid.
The basic deficiency in the at-risk component of the QEA was
its failure to meet the special, extra-educational needs of the
children in the SNDs. We reiterated our holding in Abbott II:
[S]tudents in the special needs districts
have distinct and specific requirements for
supplemental educational and educationally-related programs and services that are unique
to those students, not required in wealthier
districts, and that represent an educational
cost not included within the amounts expended
for regular education.
We also expressed our concern about the "need for supervision of
the use of additional funds for the special needs districts, and
the need for the State to identify and implement supplemental
programs and services targeted to the needs of school children in
the special needs districts." Id. at 451. We found that the
Commissioner had failed to study which programs and services were
needed to aid disadvantaged students as required by Abbott II.
Id. at 453. We further determined that the QEA's at-risk weights
were not based on any study of the actual costs associated with
providing services to at-risk students. Ibid. Lastly, we found
that there was no mechanism in place to control, regulate, or
monitor the use of the additional funding made available to the
SNDs under the act. Id. at 451.
Notwithstanding the conclusion that the statute was
constitutionally deficient, we declined to direct any immediate,
affirmative remedial relief. We withheld relief because there
had been a substantial increase in State aid to the thirty
special needs districts since the Abbott II decision.See footnote 5 Id. at
447. Consequently, we declared that we would not intervene on
behalf of the plaintiffs if the State achieved "substantial
equivalence" in funding between property-rich and property-poor
districts by the 1997-1998 school year and provided for the
special educational needs of students in the SNDs. Ibid. If,
however, "a law assuring such substantial equivalence,
approximating 100%, for school year 1997-1998 and providing as
well for special educational needs is not adopted by September
1996," we indicated that we would consider applications for
relief. Id. at 447-48.
In April 1996, plaintiffs filed a Motion in Aid of
Litigants' Rights contending that the State had failed to
discharge its duty to "further address" the sixteen-percent
relative disparity in funding and that the State would fail to
provide sufficient supplemental programs for the special needs
districts. On September 10, 1996, we denied the motion because
the Legislature was actively considering legislation to address
its obligation to effectuate the thorough and efficient clause.
We denied the motion "without prejudice to its renewal should the
Legislature and the Governor fail to enact appropriate
legislation on or before December 31, 1996." The Comprehensive
Educational Improvement and Financing Act of 1996 (CEIFA), L.
1996, c. 138 (codified at N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-1 to -33), is the
legislative response to Abbott III. After its passage,
plaintiffs renewed their motion.
CEIFA embodies the legislative determination that a thorough and efficient education can be provided to every public elementary, middle, and high school student in New Jersey in accordance with specific substantive standards that define the content of a constitutionally sufficient education and in accordance with performance assessments that measure levels of educational achievement. The substantive requirements are specified by the core curriculum content standards (content standards or standards), and are intended to implement the thoroughness component of the constitutionally mandated thorough and efficient education.
The substantive educational standards are the centerpiece of the new statute. They were first proposed by the Governor in January 1995, along with an expanded student assessment program that would monitor the progress of students at grades four, eight, and eleven. The formulation process began in February 1995. Several draft versions of the standards were disseminated prior to May 1, 1996, when the Department of Education formally adopted them. See Core Curriculum Content Standards (May 1996). The standards provide achievement goals applicable to all
students in seven core academic areas: visual and performing
arts, comprehensive health and physical education, language-arts
literacy, mathematics, science, social studies, and world
languages.See footnote 6 Infused throughout the seven core academic areas
are five "cross-content workplace readiness standards," which are
designed to incorporate career-planning skills, technology
skills, critical-thinking skills, decision-making and problem-solving skills, self-management, and safety principles. The
standards are not a curriculum; rather, they define the results
expected without prescribing specific strategies or educational
methodologies to ensure that students actually meet those
expectations. The development of a curriculum to deliver the
educational achievement levels required by the standards is left
to the local districts.See footnote 7
Performance indicators are also incorporated in the act. An
improved statewide assessment program, based on the standards, is
scheduled to be phased in over the next six years. At present,
New Jersey students are not evaluated by the State prior to the
eighth-grade level; under the proposed system, students will be
evaluated at the fourth-grade level (the Elementary School
Proficiency Assessment, or "ESPA"), the eighth-grade level (the
Early Warning Test, or "EWT"), and the eleventh-grade level (the
High School Proficiency Test, or "HSPT"). The proposed
evaluation system is essential to the success of the standards-based approach effectuated by CEIFA, for it is designed to
measure student progress toward achievement of the substantive
standards and to provide educators and administrators with the
information necessary to take corrective action in those areas
where students are failing to achieve at the prescribed levels.See footnote 8
CEIFA includes funding provisions that purport to implement
the efficiency component of the constitutional thorough and
efficient education. The statute determines that the educational
opportunity, as defined by the standards, can and should be
provided at a fixed per-pupil cost. The prescribed amount,
referred to as the "T & E amount," purports to be the cost that
is sufficient to ensure that a thorough and efficient education
may be achieved in all districts. Unlike the QEA, which ascribed
an arbitrary per-pupil cost for a "quality education" that was
not defined, CEIFA correlates educational funding with
educational achievement through the T & E amount. Expenditures
in excess of the prescribed T & E amount are deemed to be
unnecessary to achieve a thorough and efficient education. The
funding provisions of CEIFA remain the central focus of our
constitutional inquiry because they determine the types and
amounts of resources that will be available to enable students to
achieve a thorough and efficient education, as defined by the
content standards.
The fiscal standards were developed simultaneously with the
content standards. The funding scheme is derived from a
hypothetical school district that serves as the model for all
school districts. The model district contains an elementary
school of 500 students, a middle school of 675 students, a high
school of 900 students, and a district central office. The model
is based on assumptions about the number of teachers, teacher's
aides, instructional minutes, professional and technical staff,
administrative staff, textbooks, supplies, and equipment required
to provide and to deliver efficiently an education conforming to
the content standards. The Commissioner then determined, based
on statewide averages, the actual costs of those educational
inputs. The final step was to apply the actual costs to the
assumed efficient level of inputs. The DOE released the final
efficiency standards derived from the model school district in
May 1996. Comprehensive Plan for Educational Improvement and
Financing (May 1996) ("May 1996 Plan").
Based on the final content standards and the final fiscal
provisions, the DOE concluded that it would cost $6,720, plus or
minus $336,See footnote 9 to provide the constitutionally required
educational opportunity to every New Jersey elementary school
pupil in 1997-1998.See footnote 10 That number, the T & E amount, was
incorporated by the Legislature into CEIFA. See N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-12. Both the T & E amount and the flexible amount will be
adjusted by the CPI for the 1998-1999 school year, and
established biennially by the Commissioner thereafter. Ibid.
The T & E amount is neither the minimum nor the maximum
amount that a school district is permitted to spend perpupil.
See N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-5(d). Like all of the predecessor statutes,
CEIFA requires each school district to raise locally a portion of
the per-pupil expenditure. Similar to the QEA, the required
local share under CEIFA is dependent on local property taxes. It
is calculated based on local district property wealth and the
average income of district taxpayers; in short, the required
local share is based on the districts' ability to pay. N.J.S.A.
18A:7F-5(b). State aid makes up the difference between the
required local share and the T & E amount (multiplied by student
enrollment). Every district is permitted to raise locally and to
spend in excess of the T & E amount, but a district's total
budget may not increase from its prior year's budget by more than
the "spending growth limitation."See footnote 11 N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-5(d). The
statute also provides an avenue for increased local spending
notwithstanding the spending growth limitation. See N.J.S.A.
18A:7F-5(d)(9) (providing for additional local spending pursuant
to separate proposals submitted for approval at the annual school
budget election).
The State contends that, for the first time, New Jersey has
a comprehensive approach to the provision of a thorough and
efficient education that correlates funding with substantive
education. School funding determinations now will be based on
how much it actually costs to provide students with an
opportunity to meet defined achievement levels that equate with a
thorough and efficient education. The State acknowledges that
discretionary amounts can be spent in excess of the T & E amount,
at least by the wealthier school districts. It contends,
however, that such expenditures are inefficient and therefore
unnecessary in achieving a thorough and efficient education, as
defined by the statute's content standards. For that reason,
according to the State, such excess spending by the wealthier
districts is immaterial to the inquiry into whether students in
the special needs districts are receiving a thorough and
efficient education. In other words, the State asserts that
CEIFA permits disparate per-pupil expenditures because those
students who receive more educational resources are receiving
superfluous and unneeded educational benefits, and those students
who receive less educational resources nevertheless will receive
that which is needed to provide a thorough and efficient
education.
The State's argument in defense of the new approach thus
frames the inquiry -- CEIFA must stand or fall based on the
validity of its premise that the T & E amount is sufficient to
provide a thorough and efficient education for all students and
that spending in excess of that amount in the wealthier districts
is nothing more than expenditure that is inefficient and
unnecessary for a thorough and efficient education.
With the promulgation and adoption of substantive standards that define a thorough and efficient education, New Jersey joins a trend in favor of a standards-based approach to the improvement of public education. The movement for standards-based reform
began in the late 1980s, and emerged as the principal strategy of
educators in the early 1990s. See Lynn Olson, Keeping Tabs on
Quality, Education Week: Quality Counts, Jan. 22, 1997, at 7-14.
Plaintiffs do not challenge the constitutionality or
validity of the content standards. We fully acknowledge the
substantial efforts of the coordinate branches to develop and to
establish a comprehensive statutory and administrative system for
public education founded on standards that define the substantive
meaning of education and that provide for measures of educational
performance and achievement. We conclude that the statutory
standards are consistent with the Constitution's education
clause.
In interpreting the constitutional meaning of a thorough and
efficient education, the Court has consistently recognized that
the Legislature is charged with the primary responsibility for
public education. The Court has stressed repeatedly that "[t]he
Legislature's role in education is fundamental and primary," and,
"[t]he definition of the constitutional provision by this Court,
therefore, must allow the fullest scope to the exercise of the
Legislature's legitimate power." Abbott II, supra, 119 N.J. at
304.
At its core, a constitutionally adequate education has been
defined as an education that will prepare public school children
for a meaningful role in society, one that will enable them to
compete effectively in the economy and to contribute and to
participate as citizens and members of their communities. See
Abbott I, supra, 100 N.J. at 280-81 (noting that the Constitution
requires "that educational opportunity which is needed in the
contemporary setting to equip a child for his role as a citizen
and as a competitor in the labor market" (citing Robinson I,
supra, 62 N.J. at 515)); Landis v. School Dist. No. 44,
57 N.J.L. 509, 512 (Sup. Ct. 1895) (stating that a constitutionally
adequate education must be "capable of affording to every child
such instruction as is necessary to fit it for the ordinary
duties of citizenship").
In Abbott II, the Court, was confronted with a clearly-demonstrated violation of the constitutional right to a thorough
and efficient education for public school children in the poor
urban districts, and was therefore impelled to find appropriate
remedial relief. In the absence of legislative or administrative
guidance, the Court looked to those districts that most likely
were providing a level of education consistent with the
Constitution. The Court concluded that, as a partial remedy for
the constitutional deprivation, the State would have to assure a
per-pupil expenditure for regular education in the SNDs that was
substantially equivalent to the average per-pupil expenditure in
the successful, DFG I & J districts. Abbott II, supra, 119 N.J.
at 385. The Court's remedial order, though pragmatic in nature
and necessarily incomplete and limited, was designed to further
the achievement of an education that imparts those "critically
important" skills needed to compete in the labor market, and that
bestows the capacity to function as a citizen -- as a
contributing and participating member of society and one's
community. Id. at 363.
The Court, without any valid legislative implementation of
the constitutional education clause, has labored to devise
appropriate remedies to ameliorate the deprivation of an adequate
education in the special needs districts. Cf. Robinson I, supra,
62 N.J. at 519 (specifically noting that a determination of the
adequacy of public education was complicated by the fact that
"the State has never spelled out the content of the
constitutionally mandated educational opportunity"). The
Legislature has now taken a major step to spell out and explain
the meaning of a constitutional education. The content and
performance standards prescribed by the new statute represent the
first real effort on the part of the legislative and executive
branches to define and to implement the educational opportunity
required by the Constitution. It is an effort that strongly
warrants judicial deference. Cf. Hills Dev. Co. v. Bernards
Twp.,
103 N.J. 1 (1986) (upholding Fair Housing Act, N.J.S.A.
52:27D-301 to -328, as an adequate and valid legislative response
to this Court's fair-housing decisions). We therefore conclude
that the standards are facially adequate as a reasonable
legislative definition of a constitutional thorough and efficient
education.See footnote 12
Our function, however, is to determine whether the new
approach encompassing content and performance standards, together
with funding measures, comports with the constitutional guarantee
of a thorough and efficient education for all New Jersey school
children. The standards themselves do not ensure any substantive
level of achievement. Real improvement still depends on the
sufficiency of educational resources, successful teaching,
effective supervision, efficient administration, and a variety of
other academic, environmental, and societal factors needed to
assure a sound education. Content standards, therefore, cannot
answer the fundamental inquiry of whether the new statute assures
the level of resources needed to provide a thorough and efficient
education to children in the special needs districts.
The funding provisions of the new statute purport to link
educational inputs to the attainment of the content standards.
Although a majority of states have moved toward a standards-based
approach to public education,See footnote 13 New Jersey appears to be the
first state to try to base funding determinations on achievement
standards. The dual strategy adopted by the State must be
measured against the standard of the thorough and efficient
education clause. Because CEIFA does not in any concrete way
attempt to link the content standards to the actual funding
needed to deliver that content, we conclude that this strategy,
as implemented by CEIFA, is clearly inadequate and thus
unconstitutional as applied to the special needs districts.
The efficiency standards undergirding the statute's funding
provisions are derived from a model district that has few, if
any, characteristics of any of the State's successful districts.
The State contends that it would be inappropriate to require
funding determinations to be based on those districts because,
despite their educational success, they have "notable
inefficiencies" in their spending practices and, for that reason,
the amount that they spend on education cannot serve as the
measure of the amount necessary to achieve a constitutionally
adequate education.
Neither CEIFA itself, the record in this case, empirical
evidence, common experience, nor intuition supports the State's
position that inefficiencies explain why successful districts'
spending levels exceed what the State asserts is the amount
needed to provide a thorough and efficient education.
The legislative history of CEIFA strongly undermines the
argument that the wealthier districts' spending in excess of the
T & E amount represents moneys dissipated in waste and
inefficiency. As initially proposed, CEIFA would have required a
separate public vote for any spending in excess of the maximum T
& E amount; the proposed bill thus would have required higher-spending school districts to defend spending amounts that the
Legislature had determined to be unnecessary. That proposal
generated a strong reaction from educators and others in the
wealthier districts, who clearly did not consider amounts spent
in excess of the T & E amount to be educationally unnecessary;
they labeled the proposal a "dumbing-down" approach to the school
finance problem, and eventually it was abandoned. That rejection
indirectly confirms the general perception and widespread belief
that the level of spending for education in the wealthier
districts is not attributable solely to inefficiency or directed
to educational luxuries.
The statute further validates such "excess" spending. As
enacted, CEIFA provides that a district may spend in excess of
the maximum T & E amount, so long as the total budget does not
exceed the prebudget year net budget by more than the spending
growth limitation.See footnote 14 Furthermore, Section 5(d)(9) of the Act,
not in the original bill, was added to permit spending in excess
of the amount permitted by the spending growth limitation, so
long as the voters specifically approve a local general fund levy
for such purposes. See also N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-5(d)(10) (providing
that the voters must be informed prior to the annual school
budget hearing that the district has proposed "programs and
services in addition to the core curriculum content standards
adopted by the State Board of Education").
The fact that educators, interest groups, and the public
convinced the Legislature to alter the proposed bill indicates
that they were seeking something more than the right to waste
money. Moreover, the fact that DFG I & J districts have
continued to spend at levels above the T & E amount even though
each year the budget must be approved by the local voters further
confirms the common understanding that those expenditures secure
genuine educational benefits. The fact that the State itself
predicts that the wealthier districts will continue to spend in
excess of the T & E amount undermines the claim that such
spending reflects mere inefficiency.See footnote 15 See Abbott II, supra,
119 N.J. at 368 ("[I]f [expenditures] are not related to the
quality of education, why are the richer districts willing to
spend so much for them?").
There simply is no evidence to support the State's assertion
that all amounts spent by Livingston, Princeton, Millburn, and
the other successful districts in excess of the T & E amount constitute educational inefficiency. Inefficiency in public education has more to do with the way money is spent than the amount of money spent. Clearly the delivery of an adequate education requires efficiency in spending. The need to eliminate waste, to increase efficiency, and to maximize the education dollar -- a need that is believed to be more acute in the special needs districts -- does not lessen the need for resources. Both additional money and reformation of the way in which that money is spent are required to improve the conditions in failing school districts. See, e.g., Ronald F. Ferguson, Paying for Public Education: New Evidence on How and Why Money Matters, 28 Harv. J. on Legis. 465 (1991) (concluding that both the amount of money spent and the way it is spent are important and correlate with achievement levels); see discussion infra at __-__ (slip op. at 58-61). Undoubtedly there are inefficiencies in the spending practices of the wealthier and higher-spending districts, as there are in all districts.See footnote 16 It has not been shown, however,
that the undeniably enhanced level of education in the successful
districts can be characterized as inefficient or redundant
education.See footnote 17
The model district also was not based on the characteristics
of the special needs districts. Not one of the twenty-eight SNDs
conforms with the model district, and CEIFA does not provide the
funding necessary to enable those districts to achieve
conformity. The model district thus assumes, as the basis for
its resource allocations and cost projections, conditions that do
not, and simply cannot, exist in these failing districts.
The fallacy in the use of a hypothetical model school
district is that it can furnish only an aspirational standard.
It rests on the unrealistic assumption that, in effectuating the
imperative of a thorough and efficient education, all school
districts can be treated alike and in isolation from the
realities of their surrounding environment. For example, the
model district assumes that one security guard is sufficient for
a 900 pupil "model" high school. The model district therefore
would provide funding for only 3.3 guards in the 3000 pupil
Trenton High School. Presently, however, approximately twenty
security guards are required to ensure the safety of high school
students in Trenton. Surely the State would not contend that the
seventeen additional security guards presently employed by
Trenton High are unnecessary and mere constitutional excess.
Although 3.3 security guards may be sufficient -- or even
excessive -- in one of the wealthier suburban high schools, the
State cannot base funding decisions on the assumption that the
same is true in the inner city.
The same flaw inheres in other allocations of the model
district. The model district assumes a uniform per-pupil amount
for the construction and renovation of physical facilities: $133.
Again, however, the model is insensitive to the conditions that
actually exist in the special needs districts. It does not take
into consideration the fact that the facilities in the SNDs are
collectively much older and far more in need of repair than those
in the other districts. See discussion infra at __ - __ (slip
op. at 49-52). The same amount of money cannot possibly be
sufficient in all districts without taking into consideration the
age and present condition of the facilities. The same may be
said of the operation and maintenance allocation, where the model
district assumes the same amount per pupil in both the wealthy
districts, with relatively newer facilities, and the SNDs, which
contain most of the State's century-old buildings.
Finally, the model district assumes that all children are
equally capable of taking advantage of educational opportunity,
although the reality, of course, is that they are not. Because
CEIFA clearly fails to provide the special and extra-educational
programs and services required, see discussion infra at __ - __
(slip op. at 37-49), and because the model assumes that all
students will be equally able to seize the educational
opportunity, the inputs provided by the model cannot possibly
assure an educational opportunity for the students in the SNDs
comparable to that of the students in the DFG I & J districts.
The actuality is that under the new statute the wealthier
districts will raise more locally and will spend more on
relatively advantaged children than will the SNDs, which will
spend less on disadvantaged children.
CEIFA prescribes that $6,720, the T & E amount for
elementary school education, will be sufficient to enable the
failing SNDs to make the needed improvements and adjustments to
achieve a through and efficient education. The T & E amount of
$6,720 per elementary school pupil differs from the QEA
foundation amount by only eighty dollars per elementary school
pupil. In Abbott III, we found the QEA amount to be unfounded,
arbitrary, and patently insufficient to provide a thorough and
efficient education to students in the special needs districts.
Thus, it is difficult to fathom how eighty dollars could solve
the constitutional problem. In fact, CEIFA's T & E amount
applicable to a high school student is significantly less than
the QEA's foundation amount applicable to those students. Under
the QEA, a quality education in 1994-1995 purportedly could have
been delivered to a high school student for $8,632; under CEIFA,
a T & E education in 1997-1998 allegedly can be delivered for
$8,400.See footnote 18
We do not discount or minimize the State's contention that,
as a legislative enactment, CEIFA is entitled to a presumption of
validity. In re C.V.S. Pharmacy Wayne,
116 N.J. 490, 497 (1989),
cert. denied,
493 U.S. 1045,
110 S. Ct. 841,
107 L. Ed.2d 836
(1990). We likewise do not depart from the principle that
deference is afforded to determinations that are the product of
administrative expertise. Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec.,
64 N.J. 85, 92-93 (1973). We differ, however, from the dissent,
which regards the presumption of validity as impenetrable because
the statute's provisions allegedly rest on the opinions of
experts. Post at __ (slip op. at 17-18). The factors we have
recounted that bear on the adequacy of the statute's funding
provisions thoroughly refute the State's fundamental contention
that there is any basis for the conclusion that the T & E amount
is adequate to provide the basic thorough and efficient education
and that all spending in excess of the T & E amount in the
wealthy and successful districts is educational waste; those
considerations undermine any presumption in favor of the validity
of the statute's funding measures.
The net effect of CEIFA's funding mechanism is to label both
the DFG I & J districts and the SNDs inefficient. The successful
DFG I & J districts allegedly are inefficient because they spend
more than the T & E amount per pupil. The SNDs, compared to the
optimally efficient hypothetical model school district, allegedly
are inefficient because they will be unable to achieve a thorough
and efficient education at the T & E amount. Further, CEIFA
permits the DFG I & J districts to raise additional funds and to
continue to spend inefficiently through local taxation. That
outlet, however, is, in reality, closed to the SNDs. CEIFA
effectively caps the poorer districts at an amount that by
definition will be insufficient to provide a thorough and
efficient education. On its own terms, therefore, CEIFA will be
incapable of assuring a thorough and efficient education in the
special needs districts. CEIFA will perpetuate a two-tiered
school system in which the students in the wealthier districts
will have the resources necessary either to meet or to exceed the
standards, and in which the poorer urban districts will be asked
to do the same or more with less. That system began to emerge on
April 15, 1997, when a majority of suburban districts approved
school budgets that dramatically exceeded CEIFA's T & E amount.
See Robert Hanley, New Jersey Voters Approve Extra Local School
Spending, N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 1997, at B4 ("[V]oters in a
sampling of districts in five suburban counties seemed generally
willing to accept both the basic main budgets and [the] so-called
second budgets authorizing more spending than state guidelines
provided."); Jeff May, Towns Buck the Trends, The Star-Ledger,
Apr. 16, 1997 at A1, 7.See footnote 19
The Court recognizes that CEIFA has provided a new, facially
valid definition of the substantive educational opportunity
required by the Constitution. We endorse the legislative
judgment that the act's detailed standards embody the substantive
content of a thorough and efficient education. We are, however,
still without any constitutional measuring stick against which to
gauge the resources needed to provide that educational
opportunity other than the inputs in the DFG I & J districts. We
reject the State's invitation to turn a blind-eye to the most
successful districts in the State. We are unimpressed by the
dissent's implicit suggestion that the so-called "middle
districts," which will spend, on average, $7,144 per pupil in the
current school year, can serve as a more appropriate measure of
relief. See post at __ (slip op. at 14). Without any
information or experience regarding achievement levels in those
districts -- either in terms of the content standards or any
other standard -- it is difficult to infer that those districts represent the most appropriate barometer of a basic thorough and efficient education. The DFG I & J districts are achieving and undoubtedly will continue to achieve at high levels, and it is thus eminently reasonable that the Court continue to focus on their recipe for success