(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for
the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please
note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).
(NOTE: The Court wrote no full opinion in this case. Rather, the Court's affirmance of the judgment of the Appellate Division is based substantially on the reasons expressed in Judge Landau's written opinion below.)
Argued September 9, 1997 -- Decided October 6, 1997
PER CURIAM
According to the facts as recited in the Appellate Division opinion, Louis Aversano filed a complaint
in the Law Division against his automobile insurance carrier, Atlantic Employers Insurance Company
(Atlantic),asserting that the carrier had wrongfully denied personal injury protection (PIP) benefits mandated
by N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4 (section 4). Aversano was injured when he stepped into a pothole in a parking lot as he
was walking towards his car. He had the car key in his hand and his right arm extended, reaching for the
door lock. Aversano's wife had almost reached the passenger door. Aversano claims that he first made
contact with his car on his way down to the ground as he fell.
Atlantic moved for summary judgment based on Section 4, which requires that every automobile
insurance policy provide PIP benefits to the named insured and family members of the named insured
residing in the household who sustain bodily injury as a result of an accident while occupying, entering into,
alighting from or using an automobile. Aversano argued that Section 4 must be interpreted to provide
coverage for his injuries. The trial court disagreed, granting summary judgment in favor of Atlantic. The
court found that because the vehicle doors were closed and locked and the keys had not yet been inserted
into the keyhole, Aversano could not be deemed, pursuant to the statutory language, to be entering the
automobile. The court found no causal link between the accident and the vehicle to permit PIP benefits,
noting that the mere fact that an automobile is in the vicinity of an accident does not transform it into one
for which PIP benefits are available.
On leave to appeal granted, Aversano argued before the Appellate Division that the trial court's
analysis was erroneous because the clear intent of the Legislature in using the words “entering into...an
automobile” was to broaden the statute to include coverages for his injuries.
A majority of the Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the trial court, reasoning that, although
the New Jersey Automobile Reparation Reform Act is to be liberally construed, the 1983 amendment to
Section 4 was intended to restrict coverage to accidents that arise out of the use of an automobile.
According to the panel, given the clearly restrictive intent of the 1983 amendment, the language of section 4
precludes judicial interpretation that Aversano's accident was legislatively intended to be covered by the PIP
provisions of the statute.
The majority held that the term “while entering into” was intended by the Legislature to denote a
process of entry that begins, at the earliest, when physical contact with the vehicle is made with intent to
enter. The panel found that Aversano's accident occurred prior to entry and that his later incidental contact
with the car came not during entry but as a result of his fall.
Judge Humphreys dissented, finding the majority's holding contrary to fundamental principles governing the construction of the Act as well as to the reasonable expectations of the insured. According to the dissent, the mechanistic approach relied on by the majority is not in accord with the guiding principle
that courts must favor the insured and find coverage if possible. Moreover, the ordinary and reasonable
expectation of the insured would be that when he was about to insert his key into the lock, he was entering
the vehicle and, therefore, is entitled to PIP coverage.
Aversano appealed to the Supreme Court as of right based on the dissent in the Appellate Division.
HELD: Judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed for the reasons expressed in Judge Landau's
majority opinion. The “while entering into” language of the PIP statute was intended by the
Legislature to denote a process of entry that begins, at the earliest, when physical contact with the
vehicle is made with intent to enter.
Judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED.
CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES HANDLER, POLLOCK, O'HERN, GARIBALDI,
STEIN and COLEMAN join in the PER CURIAM opinion.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-
20 September Term 1997
LOUIS F. AVERSANO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ATLANTIC EMPLOYERS INSURANCE CO.,
Defendant-Respondent.
Argued September 9, 1997 -- Decided October 6, 1997
On appeal from the Superior Court, Appellate
Division, whose opinion is reported at
290 N.J. Super. 570 (1996).
Lawrence S. Grossman argued the cause for
appellant (Grossman, Warren & Shaw,
attorneys).
Mark T. Connell argued the cause for
respondent (Kelaher, Garvey, Ballou & Van
Dyke, attorneys).
PER CURIAM
The judgment is affirmed, substantially for the reasons
expressed in Judge Landau's opinion of the Appellate Division,
reported at 290 N.J. Super. 570 (1996).
CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES HANDLER, POLLOCK, O'HERN, GARIBALDI, STEIN and COLEMAN join in this opinion.
NO. A-20 SEPTEMBER TERM 1997
ON APPEAL FROM Appellate Division, Superior Court
ON CERTIFICATION TO
LOUIS F. AVERSANO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ATLANTIC EMPLOYERS INSURANCE CO.,
Defendant-Respondent.
DECIDED October 6, 1997
Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING
OPINION BY Per Curiam
CONCURRING OPINION BY
DISSENTING OPINION BY