BETTY SIMON, TRUSTEE, L.L.C.,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
CHICAGO TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant-Respondent,
v.
TOWNSHIP OF LITTLE EGG HARBOR,
Third-Party Defendant-
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Argued October 1, 2003 - Decided November 6, 2003
Before Judges King, Lintner and Lisa.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Atlantic County,
L-1292-01.
Lawrence L. McIver argued the cause for appellant (Gilmore & Monahan, attorneys; Charles
W. Hutchinson, on the brief).
John-Paul Madden argued the cause for respondents, Betty Simon and Chicago Title Insurance
Co. (Madden, Madden & Del Duca, attorneys; Mr. Madden, on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
LISA, J.A.D.
Defendant, Little Egg Harbor Township, appeals from a summary judgment awarding damages of
$23,323.63 plus interest to plaintiff, Betty Simon and third-party plaintiff, Chicago Title Insurance
Company. The judgment is for a refund of the amount paid by Simon
for the purchase of a tax title lien covering Block 44, Lot 3,
issued by Little Egg Harbor, and the payment of subsequent taxes on the
property, where the tax title lien was later found to be invalid. We
affirm.
The State of New Jersey acquired title to Block 44, Lot 3 in
1969 from Vernon and Theresa Stompler. The property was thereafter carried on the
tax exempt list. N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.3. In 1994, the assessor received a letter dated
July 22, 1994 from the New Jersey Attorney General's office, stating in its
entirety:
Please be advised that Block 44, Lot 3 and Block 46, Lot 13
were not conveyed to the State of New Jersey from Citibank. As our
investigation indicated there was a one-half interest in a William A. Inman and
one-half interest in a Nina Rutler, Helen Banard and Marjorie Methot.
Neither party is able to inform us what generated this apparent response to
the assessor. What is clear, however, from a careful reading of the letter
is that it does not say that the State does not own the
property or that the named private individuals do own it. It is undisputed
that the State has indeed continued to own the property throughout the years
in question. The assessor apparently interpreted the letter to indicate current ownership by
the individuals mentioned and assessed the property to them as taxable property in
1995 and 1996. Specifically, the property was assessed to "Inman, William A., et
al, unknown address." This was a mistake. Predictably, the taxes were not paid.
Because of the unpaid taxes, the Township offered for sale a tax title
lien, which Simon purchased on September 12, 1996. After holding the certificate and
paying all accruing taxes for more than two years, Simon initiated an in
personam tax foreclosure action. She eventually obtained a judgment by default on May
8, 2000. Simon thereafter learned that her title was no good because of
the State's ongoing ownership of the property. Simon initiated this action against her
title insurer, Chicago Title, which brought a third-party complaint against the Township. Chicago
Title settled with Simon and continued the action against the Township.
The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Judge Higbee found from the undisputed
facts that the taxes assessed against the property were erroneously assessed due to
the assessor's mistake, the sale of the tax title lien to Simon was
void, and Simon and Chicago Title were entitled to a refund. We agree.
The Township argues that plaintiffs' claim for reimbursement is time-barred by N.J.S.A. 54:3-21.
A taxpayer "feeling aggrieved by the assessed valuation of the taxpayer's property" must
appeal the assessment by April 1 of the tax year. Ibid. In essence,
therefore, the Township contends it was incumbent on the aggrieved party to timely
file an appeal to contest the classification of the property as taxable rather
than exempt. West Milford Township v. Garfield Recreation Comm.,
194 N.J. Super. 148,
157 (Law Div. 1983). The aggrieved party, according to the Township, is the
State of New Jersey, which it claims should have timely appealed to restore
the property's status to tax exempt.
In support of its position, the Township relies on the Supreme Court's holding
in New Jersey Transit Corp. v. Borough of Somerville,
139 N.J. 582 (1995),
that State agencies are taxpayers within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 54:3-21 and must
meet the April 1 deadline to assert a claim that their property is
exempt from local taxation. Id. at 588, 592. There the state agency (Transit)
acquired property in 1978. However, because of confusion over ownership of various parcels,
Somerville continued to classify the property as taxable and continued to assess it
as such to its prior owner, Conrail. In 1990, Somerville attempted to collect
back taxes from Transit for the years 1981 to 1990. Transit then contested
the assessments, contending the property should have been tax exempt during those years.
The Court rejected Transit's assertion that as a public entity it was not
bound by the deadline requirement of N.J.S.A. 54:3-21. The Court explained that the
issue would not often arise because the State and its agencies will not
"often be called upon to pay tax bills, provided they file their exemptions
and appeals in a timely fashion." Somerville, supra, 139 N.J. at 591.
We find the Township's reliance on Somerville unpersuasive. In that case the state
agency was the owner of the property and engaged in contacts with the
local assessor between 1979 and 1990 regarding its ownership status. In 1990, when
the municipality determined that Transit indeed owned the property, it sought to collect
back taxes from Transit, which owned the property during the years of delinquency.
During those years, the property had been assessed as taxable. In view of
the confusion regarding the ownership of the parcel, Transit failed to make certain
that this parcel was included on the municipality's exempt tax list for the
years in question. Therefore, Transit was held accountable for its inaction regarding property
it knew or should have known it had acquired.
Knowledge by a state agency of its obligation to act was not an
issue in Somerville, and the Court's holding did not turn on that issue.
The situation here is quite different. The State had filed the required statement
of exemption, N.J.S.A. 54:4-4.4, and perfected its tax exempt status for the subject
property many years before the assessor's action in 1994. The municipality does not
assert that it notified the State of the change in status of the
property from exempt to taxable.
Subsequent to the tax years involved in Somerville (1981 to 1990), the Legislature
amended N.J.S.A. 54:3-21 by what is commonly referred to as "Chapter 75." L.
1991, c. 75. This legislation added a new requirement, not previously part of
New Jersey local property tax law, that "[e]very assessor, prior to February 1,
shall notify by mail each taxpayer of the current assessment and preceding year's
taxes." N.J.S.A. 54:4-38.1; L. 1991, c. 75, § 32. See Centorino v. Tewksbury Tp.,
18 N.J. Tax 303, 310 (Tax 1999). The legislation added a corresponding provision
to N.J.S.A. 54:3-21, requiring appeals to be filed on or before April 1,
"or 45 days from the date the bulk mailing of notification of assessment
is completed in the taxing district, whichever is later." L. 1991, c. 75,
§ 28.
Thus, beginning with tax year 1992, the Legislature imposed this mandatory notice of
assessment requirement "to provide ample notice for taxpayers to preserve their appeal rights."
Centorino, supra, 18 N.J. Tax at 310-11. This procedure is designed to preclude
the violation of a taxpayer's right to appeal an increased or changed assessment
of which it had no knowledge. Id. at 313. In Somerville, the court
applied the pre-amendment version of N.J.S.A. 54:3-21. See Somerville, supra, 139 N.J. at
588. The Chapter 75 provisions were not applicable in that case, and, as
we have stated, notice to the property owner (the state agency) of the
assessment for the years in question was not an issue. Somerville is not
controlling.
In the case before us, the State was out of the loop. It
was not "called upon to pay tax bills." It received none. Nor did
it receive notice of a change in assessment status. Acceptance of the Township's
argument would require the State to scour the assessment records each year of
every municipality in which it owns property to assure itself that local assessors
have not incorrectly assessed its property to third parties and file an appeal
in any such instance. There is no basis to impose such an obligation
on the State or other public entities to protect against assessors' mistakes.
In Somerville, the Court noted the public policy underlying N.J.S.A. 54:3-21, to protect
municipalities from having their finances unsettled by retroactive tax appeals. Somerville, supra, 139
N.J. at 590. By requiring disputes regarding the exemption of property from taxation,
along with other disputes affecting revenues to be anticipated from local property taxes,
to be resolved promptly, municipalities can fix their budgets and conduct their fiscal
affairs sensibly and effectively. Ibid. This important public policy precludes taxpayers from sitting
on their rights to the detriment of local governments. Here, however, because the
State was not on notice that its right to tax exempt status was
implicated, it cannot be said that the State sat on its rights. It
is also in the public interest to encourage parties to purchase tax title
liens to enable municipalities to receive their lost tax revenues. Lonsk v. Pennefather,
168 N.J. Super. 178, 182 (App. Div. 1979), certif. denied,
82 N.J. 285
(1980). This public policy is advanced by our decision in this case.
The tax title lien at issue here was void in its inception. It
was based on an assessment against purported owners who held no interest in
the property and on purported delinquent taxes which were incorrectly assessed against this
tax exempt property. "The assessment herein being void, the tax sale held upon
such an assessment is equally void." Pioneer Gun Club v. Tp. of Bass
River,
61 N.J. Super. 104, 108 (Ch. Div. 1960).
The Legislature has contemplated that in appropriate circumstances a tax sale may be
set aside: "If the sale shall be set aside, the municipality shall refund
to the purchaser the price paid by him on the sale, with lawful
interest . . . ." N.J.S.A. 54:5-43. In Pioneer Gun Club, the Chancery
Division applied the statute to order a refund with interest where the United
States acquired the subject property in 1949, but the assessor apparently did not
receive or overlooked the abstract of the deed from the county clerk. The
assessor thus continued to assess the property as taxable and the municipality sold
a tax title lien for taxes assessed from 1952 to 1954. The court
reasoned:
[T]he property was owned by the United States of America when the property
was assessed for taxes . . . , and w[as] . . .
exempt from taxation; therefore, the assessment was void and of no effect and,
. . . there was no valid tax lien sale. It matters little
that the assessor may not have received a copy of the abstract from
the county clerk to put him on notice of the sale [to the
United States]. The fact must control and not the acts based thereon.
[Pioneer Gun Club, supra, 61 N.J. Super. at 108.]
We applied similar reasoning in Tontodonati v. City of Paterson,
229 N.J. Super. 475 (App. Div.), certif. denied,
117 N.J. 35 (1989). There the municipality assigned
two tax sale certificates to the plaintiff by private sale. However, at the
time of assignment, both were invalid, one because the municipality had accepted payment
of the taxes, and the other because the property had never been in
arrears. Id. at 478. We held that under those circumstances N.J.S.A. 54:5-43 entitled
the plaintiff to a refund of the purchase price plus interest from the
date of sale. Id. at 485.
No one suggests that the assessor's action in this case was anything other
than an honest mistake made in the good faith exercise of the assessor's
duties. There is no basis, however, upon which the Township should receive a
windfall for taxes to which it was never entitled.
Affirmed.