(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of
the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity,
portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).
Argued October 26, 1998 -- Decided July 20, 1999
CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ, writing for a unanimous Court.
The issue in this appeal is whether the construction and related borrowing costs associated with building,
renovating and expanding judicial facilities (“capital costs”) are to be assumed by the State under a 1992 amendment to the
New Jersey Constitution, N.J. Const. Art. VI, §VIII, ¶ 1, that governs state funding of the judicial system.
Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 58 (“SCR-58”), later adopted as Article VI, Section VIII, Paragraph 1 of the
New Jersey Constitution, was first proposed on May 21, 1992. Its purpose was to require the State to assume greater
responsibility for the funding of the judicial system. It provided for state assumption of “certain judicial and probation
costs” incurred by the counties. SCR-58 also included a non-exclusive list of particular items of “judicial costs” to be
funded by the State.
As originally proposed, the definition of “judicial costs” did not contain an explicit exclusion for “judicial facility
costs.” On June 8, 1992, the Senate Judiciary Committee amended SCR-58 to “clarify that costs presently borne by the
counties with regard to the operation and maintenance of facilities used by the courts and probation departments would not
be assumed by the State.” “Judicial facility costs” were then defined as “costs borne by the counties prior to July 1, 1993
with regard to the operation and maintenance of facilities used by the courts or judicial employees,” and excluded from the
definition of “judicial costs.” The Committee did not mention capital costs in its revision and did not explain the
significance of the “July 1, 1993” date.
On June 15, 1992, the Committee held a public hearing on SCR-58. Chief Justice Robert N. Wilentz submitted a
Statement in support, as did the New Jersey State Bar Association. Both statements praised the amendment as a critical step
in the administration of “equal justice” for the people of New Jersey, focusing on the substantial benefit to be derived from
unification of the court system through the equalization of funding for the “programs and services” provided by the courts.
Neither statement referred to judicial facilities.
On June 29, 1992, the Legislature approved the revised version of SCR-58, allowing the amendment to be put to a
public vote in the November 1992 general election. Neither the ballot question nor the accompanying interpretative
statement specifically referred to judicial facilities or to capital costs. The proposed amendment was approved by the
electorate and became effective on December 3, 1992.
The Morris, Camden and Bergen County Boards of Chosen Freeholders sought a declaratory judgment to
determine whether the amendment “requires the State or the County to pay for construction costs and capital costs for new
or expanded facilities or judicial facility costs after July 1, 1993.”
The trial court dismissed the action for declaratory judgment and held in favor of the State, reasoning that the term
“certain” judicial costs was ambiguous and that even if the court were to include capital costs within the meaning of
“judicial costs,” the State would not automatically be responsible because the State is required to assume only “certain,” but
not all judicial costs. Thus, the trial court concluded that the amendment had no impact on the responsibility for supplying
physical facilities for the court system, and held that the counties remain responsible for the capital costs of constructing
court facilities for the Law Division and the Family Part pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2B:6-1b.
The Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the trial court, also focusing on the phrase “certain judicial costs.”
Because capital costs were not mentioned in the definition of “judicial costs” or “judicial facility costs,” the Appellate
Division determined that the State's only affirmative obligation was to provide facilities for the Supreme Court, the
Appellate Division, and the Chancery Division.
The Supreme Court granted the Counties' petitions for certification.
HELD: Article VI, Section VIII, Paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution does not require the State to assume the
capital costs of judicial facilities.
1. Because prior to the amendment, counties financed expenditures for judicial services through property taxes, and
because significant disparities existed among the counties' property tax bases, it was not possible to unify management
structures or equalize the allocation of resources throughout the judicial system. (pp. 11-13)
2. Before the amendment, both the Supreme Court Committee on Efficiency in the Operations of the Courts of New Jersey
and the New Jersey County and Municipal Government Study Commission (“Commission”) recommended state financing
of the trial courts to allow for the allocation of resources throughout the total system according to priorities set by the
Judiciary, the Commission specifically recommending that the state pay capital and maintenance expenses. (pp. 13-14)
3. The type of items enumerated in the “judicial cost” definition suggests that the Legislature intended to shift costs
associated with judicial personnel and supplies to the State, and not the capital costs of judicial facilities. (pp. 15-17)
4. Nothing in the legislative history or other extrinsic sources suggests that the Legislature intended that the State finance
the capital costs of judicial facilities. (pp. 17-18)
5. The most sensible reading of the July 1, 1993 date is that the counties will retain responsibility for providing court
facilities for the Law Division and the Family Part, consistent with N.J.S.A. 2B:6-1b. (pp. 18-20)
6. That the Legislature intended to shift only the costs associated with judicial personnel and supplies to the State is
supported by earlier studies of the issue. Although the Commission recommended that the State assume capital and
maintenance expenses, it noted that few states have financed those expenses. In this context, the Legislature's adoption of
the Commission's recommendation for full state support of personnel and supplies and its exclusion of the word “capital”
from the list of enumerated judicial costs to be assumed by the State can be understood only as a rejection of the
Commission's capital costs recommendation. (pp. 20-22)
7. Where a constitutional term is ambiguous, contemporaneous legislative understanding may be helpful in discovering the
meaning of that term. Contemporaneous legislation supports the conclusion that capital costs did not shift from the counties
to the State under the amendment. (pp. 23-24)
8. An ordinary voter presented with the interpretive statement would not understand the amendment to shift the capital costs
of judicial facilities to the State.
The judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED.
JUSTICES HANDLER, POLLOCK, O'HERN, GARIBALDI, STEIN, and COLEMAN join in CHIEF
JUSTICE PORITZ's opinion.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-3/4/
5 September Term 1998
BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS
OF THE COUNTY OF MORRIS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Defendant-Respondent.
BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS
OF THE COUNTY OF CAMDEN,
Plaintiff-Intervenor-
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Defendant-Respondent.
BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS
OF THE COUNTY OF BERGEN,
Plaintiff-Intervenor-
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Defendant-Respondent.
Argued October 26, 1998 -- Decided July 20, 1999
On certification to the Superior Court,
Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported
at
311 N.J. Super. 587 (1998).
Ronald Kevitz, Morris County Counsel, argued
the cause for appellant Board of Chosen
Freeholders of the County of Morris.
Robert G. Millenky, Camden County Counsel,
argued the cause for appellant Board of
Chosen Freeholders of the County of Camden
(Mr. Millenky, attorney; Deborah Silverman
Katz, Assistant County Counsel, on the
brief).
Ellen D. Julis, Bergen County Counsel, argued
the cause for appellant Board of Chosen
Freeholders of the County of Bergen.
Charles Dante DiPirro, Deputy Attorney
General, argued the cause for respondent
(Peter Verniero, Attorney General of New
Jersey, attorney; Jaynee LaVecchia, Former
Assistant Attorney General, on the brief).
David A. Wallace, Warren County Counsel,
argued the cause for amicus curiae, Board of
Chosen Freeholders of the County of Warren.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
PORITZ, C.J.
This appeal raises the question whether the construction and
related borrowing costs associated with building, renovating and
expanding judicial facilities, hereinafter usually referred to as
"capital costs," are to be assumed by the State under a 1992
amendment to the New Jersey Constitution, N.J. Const. art. VI,
§ VIII, ¶ 1, that governs state funding of the judicial system.
Prior to the amendment, the responsibility for financing the
courts was controlled by statute. As enacted in 1991, Title 2B
recodified the division of financial responsibility between the
State and the twenty-one counties that had been in place for many
years. See Law Revision Commission Comment to N.J.S.A. 2B:5-1
(explaining that the new Title 2B "attempt[s] to reflect current
law and practice" with respect to responsibility for judicial
costs).See footnote 11 N.J.S.A. 2B:6-1a allocates to the State the costs of
physical facilities for the Supreme Court, the Appellate Division
of the Superior Court, and the General Equity Part of the
Chancery Division of the Superior Court, whereas N.J.S.A. 2B:6-1b
requires the various counties to pay for housing the Law Division
and the Family Part of the Chancery Division of the Superior
Court. We must now determine the impact, if any, of the
constitutional amendment on the statutory allocation of fiscal
responsibility for judicial facilities between the State and the
twenty-one counties.
I
Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 58 ("SCR-58"), later
adopted by the electorate as Article VI, Section VIII, Paragraph
1 of the New Jersey Constitution, was first proposed on May 21,
1992. The purpose of SCR-58 was to require the State to assume
greater responsibility for the funding of the judicial system.
Toward that end, SCR-58 provided for state assumption of "certain
judicial and probation costs" incurred by the counties.
Constitutional Amendment--Judicial and Probation Costs--Transfer
from Counties to State, S.C.R. No. 58, ¶ 1a(1), 1992 N.J. Sess.
Law Serv. A-3, A-3 (West) (Constitutional Amendment). SCR-58 also
included a non-exclusive list of particular items of "judicial
costs" to be funded by the State. See id. ¶ 1b(3), at A-4.
As originally proposed, the definition of "judicial costs"
in SCR-58 did not contain an explicit exclusion for "judicial
facility costs." On June 8, 1992, the Senate Judiciary Committee
amended SCR-58 to "clarify that costs presently borne by the
counties with regard to the operation and maintenance of
facilities used by the courts and probation departments would not
be assumed by the State." Senate Judiciary Comm., Statement to
Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 58, at 1 (June 8, 1992).
"Judicial facility costs" were then defined as "costs borne by
the counties prior to July 1, 1993 with regard to the operation
and maintenance of facilities used by the courts or judicial
employees," Constitutional Amendment, supra, ¶ 1b(1), at A-3, and
excluded from the definition of "judicial costs," id. ¶ 1b(3), at
A-4. The Committee did not, however, mention capital costs in
its revision, nor did it explain the significance of the "July 1,
1993" date. As revised, SCR-58 provided, in pertinent part:
1. a. On or before July 1, 1997:
(1) The State shall be required to pay for
certain judicial and probation costs;
(2) All judicial employees and probation
employees shall be employees of the State;
and
(3) Any judicial fees and probation fees
collected shall be paid to the State
Treasury.
b. As used in this section:
(1) "Judicial facility costs" means any
costs borne by the counties prior to July 1,
1993 with regard to the operation and
maintenance of facilities used by the courts
or judicial employees;
(3) "Judicial costs" means the costs
incurred by the county for funding the
judicial system, including but not limited to
the following costs: salaries, health
benefits and pension payments of all judicial
employees, juror fees and library material
costs, except that judicial costs shall not
include costs incurred by employees of the
surrogate's office or judicial facility
costs[.]
[Id. ¶ 1, at A-3 - A-4.]
On June 15, 1992, the Committee held a public hearing on
SCR-58. Chief Justice Robert N. Wilentz submitted a Statement in
support, Public Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Comm. on
Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 58, June 15, 1992, at 70-81
(Wilentz Statement), as did the New Jersey State Bar Association
("NJSBA"), id. at 82-86 (NJSBA Statement). Both Statements
praised the amendment as a critical step in the administration of
"equal justice" for the people of New Jersey. Wilentz Statement,
supra, at 78; see also NJSBA Statement, supra, at 83. In the
words of Chief Justice Wilentz:
As far as I am concerned the greatest
benefit of this constitutional amendment is
its promise of giving us a truly well managed
judiciary for the benefit of our citizens.
It will give them better justice.
This constitutional amendment will also
bring about other substantial improvements.
The judiciary will become fully accountable,
it will no longer be uncertain, both
internally and in its relation to others to
whom it should be accountable, including you,
why its costs in one vicinage far exceed
those in others, why its productivity in one
vicinage falls far short of what it is in
others, why in one vicinage we need twenty
people per judge while in another we need
only ten. The answer today is impossibly
indefinite, ambiguous, uncertain, all because
we have so many different systems, ultimately
all because we cannot rationalize our own
budgets or control our own work force. . . .
The constitutional amendment will
finally, for the first time in our history,
start to bring equal justice to all of our
citizens. Those counties today that devote
more money to justice than others, either
because they are richer or more willing, or
both, usually get what their money pays for,
. . . justice with all of the court-related
programs that are so necessary today, the
availability of complementary dispute
resolution, the services of highly-trained
professional staff, all as compared to the
justice received by those in the less
fortunate counties, threadbare justice with
long waiting lines, lacking many of the
attributes found in other counties.
Neither the Statement of the Chief Justice nor that of the NJSBA
referred to judicial facilities. Rather, both Statements focused
on the substantial benefit to be derived from unification of the
court system through the equalization of funding for the
"programs and services" provided by the courts. NJSBA Statement,
supra, at 83; see also Wilentz Statement, supra, at 76.
On June 29, 1992, the Legislature approved the revised
version of SCR-58, allowing the amendment to be put to a public
vote at the November 1992 general election. The ballot question
read as follows: "Shall the amendment to Article VI, agreed to
by the Legislature requiring the State to assume by July 1, 1997
certain costs now borne by the counties through the county
property tax levy in connection with the judicial system, be
adopted?" In addition, the following interpretative statement
appeared on the ballot:
Adoption of this amendment would require the
State to assume by July 1, 1997 certain costs
now borne by county taxpayers in connection
with the judicial system. County employees
employed by the court system and all
employees of county probation departments
would become State employees by that date.
The State would be responsible for their
salaries, health benefits and pension
payments. As of that date, all judicial fees
and probation fees would be paid to the State
Treasury.
The proposed amendment was approved by the electorate and became
effective on December 3, 1992.
Subsequently, the Administrative Office of the Courts asked
the Attorney General to advise the courts whether, by virtue of
the adoption of the amendment, the State had assumed
responsibility for the costs of operating, maintaining,
constructing and/or expanding court facilities. On September 23,
1996, the Attorney General issued an informal opinion
interpreting the amendment. Letter from Peter Verniero, Attorney
General of the State of New Jersey, to James J. Ciancia,
Director, Administrative Office of the Courts (Sept. 23, 1996).
The Attorney General understood "certain" judicial costs to
signify that the State was required to assume "some, but not all,
judicial costs." Id. at 2. Concerning the "judicial facility
costs" exclusion, the opinion concluded that the July, 1, 1993
date was intended merely to indicate "the kinds of costs for
which the counties will remain responsible." Id. at 3. By this
reasoning, the counties remained responsible for costs incurred
in "operating, maintaining, constructing, expanding and
renovating" current and future court facilities for the Law
Division and the Family Part. Id. at 7.
Plaintiff Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of
Morris, joined by the Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County
of Camden and the Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of
Bergen, sought a declaratory judgment to determine whether the
amendment "requires the State or the County to pay for
construction costs and capital costs for new or expanded
facilities or judicial facility costs after July 1, 1993."
Judge Stanton entertained motions for summary judgment from
the parties and issued a decision in which he dismissed with
prejudice the declaratory action and held in favor of the State.
He reasoned that "certain" judicial costs was ambiguous, as it
failed to indicate precisely which costs the State would assume,
and observed that neither the definition of "judicial costs" nor
the definition of excluded "judicial facility costs" contained in
the amendment referred to the capital costs of constructing court
facilities. Board of Chosen Freeholders v. State,
311 N.J.
Super. 637, 642-43 (Law Div. 1997). The Counties argued that
capital costs should be included within the definition of
"judicial costs" because they are not included in the definition
of excluded "judicial facility costs." Id. at 643. The court
considered, however, that even if it were to include capital
costs within the meaning of "judicial costs," the State would not
automatically be responsible because the State is not required to
assume all judicial costs, but only "certain" judicial costs.
Id. at 644.
After a careful review of the legislative history of the
amendment, and of contemporaneous legislation, Judge Stanton
concluded that the amendment had "no impact whatever upon the
responsibility for supplying physical facilities for the court
system." Id. at 648. He held that the counties remain
responsible for the capital costs of constructing court
facilities for the Law Division and the Family Part pursuant to
N.J.S.A. 2B:6-1b. Id. at 649-50.
On appeal by Morris, Camden and Bergen CountiesSee footnote 22, the
Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Board of Chosen Freeholders v. State,
311 N.J. Super. 587, 589
(App. Div. 1998). The panel also focused on the phrase "certain
judicial costs." See ibid. Because the capital costs necessary
for the construction, renovation or expansion of court facilities
were not mentioned in the definitions of "judicial costs" or
"judicial facility costs," the Appellate Division determined that
the State's "only affirmative obligation" is to provide
facilities for the Supreme Court, the Appellate Division, and the
Chancery Division other than the Family Part, pursuant to
N.J.S.A. 2B:6-1a. Ibid.
Morris, Camden and Bergen Counties filed petitions for
certification, which we granted on September 11, 1998.
156 N.J. 405.
II
It is helpful to first place the amendment in its historical
context by examining the events leading up to SCR-58. Over the
past three decades, the New Jersey trial courts have gradually
moved from a county- to a state-based system. The Judicial
Article of the New Jersey Constitution of 1947 specifically
provided for county courts. N.J. Const. art. VI, § I, ¶ 1
(stating that "[t]he judicial power shall be vested in a Supreme
Court, a Superior Court, County Courts and inferior courts of
limited jurisdiction") (amended in 1978 to omit reference to
"County Courts"). These courts were historically funded at the
local level. In 1978 and 1983, the voters approved two
constitutional amendments and took a giant step toward
unification of the State Judiciary. The 1978 amendment abolished
the County Courts and transferred the County Court judges to the
State Superior Court system. See Assembly Concurrent Resolution
No. 38 (filed July 25, 1978). The 1983 amendment transferred the
County District Court judges and the County Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court judges to the Superior Court system by abolishing
the County District Courts, and by replacing the County Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court with the Family Part of the Chancery
Division. See Assembly Concurrent Resolution No. 84 (filed Feb.
10, 1983). As a result, the State assumed responsibility for the
salaries of all state judges.
Although there were no longer any county courts or county
judges, the trial court system continued to be primarily staffed
by county employees and funded by county governments. Judicial
costs were allocated as follows: the counties bore the costs of
providing the salaries of judicial personnel, resources and
supplies, and facilities for the Law Division and the Family
Part; the State was responsible for the other parts of the
Superior Court and the Supreme Court. See Law Revision
Commission Comment to N.J.S.A. 2B:5-1. The counties financed
expenditures for judicial services through property taxes, but
competing demands for monies raised locally adversely affected
the courts. Moreover, the 1976 "CAP" law generally prohibited
property tax increases in excess of five percent of the previous
year's tax levy. See N.J.S.A. 40A:4-45.4. Most important,
significant disparities existed among the counties' property tax
bases resulting in varying levels of support for the courts and
seriously affecting the provision of uniform, quality judicial
services across the State. Under multicounty funding it was not
possible to unify management structures or equalize the
allocation of resources throughout the judicial system.
In an effort to address these concerns even before the 1983
amendment, Chief Justice Wilentz created the Supreme Court
Committee on Efficiency in the Operations of the Courts of New
Jersey. The Committee was established in 1980 and presented its
final report in May 1982. Final Report of the Supreme Court
Committee on Efficiency in the Operations of the Courts of New
Jersey (1982) (Efficiency Committee Report). In its report, the
Committee described the New Jersey trial court system as
fragmented, lacking "single, centralized control over the
allocation or use of court resources." Id. at iv. The Committee
recommended state financing of the trial courts to "allow the
Chief Justice to allocate resources throughout the total system
according to priorities set by the Judiciary." Id. at 117.
Five years later, in July 1987, the State of New Jersey
County and Municipal Government Study Commission submitted its
own comprehensive report also recommending administrative and
financial unification of the state trial court system. State of
New Jersey County and Municipal Government Study Commission,
Judicial Unification (July 1987). The Commission advised that
"all of the county operating costs except those of the county
clerks and the surrogates [should] be transferred to the State in
the first year of the program, and that the counties [should] pay
to the State in successive years a constantly declining share of
the costs of financing the Trial Court System." Id. at 63.
Capital and maintenance expenses were specifically addressed by a
recommendation that those "costs be paid by the State to the
counties." Id. at 58. It was thought that state funding of the
trial court system would afford property tax relief, improve the
quality of judicial services through the elimination of staffing
disparities, and reduce court costs, over time, by means of the
consolidation of administrative responsibilities. Id. at 65.
The Legislature incorporated many of the Commission's
recommendations into SCR-58.
III
"'The polestar of constitutional construction is always the
intent and purpose of the particular provision.'" State v.
Apportionment Comm'n,
125 N.J. 375, 382 (1991) (quoting Gormley
v. Lan,
88 N.J. 26, 37 (1981)). We seek in construing the
language of our Constitution "to give effect to the intent of the
people in adopting it." Gangemi v. Berry,
25 N.J. 1, 10 (1957).
This means that, generally, where the language is unambiguous or
unequivocal, the words of a constitutional provision should be
given their plain meaning. Ibid. Where the text is unclear or
ambiguous, however, a court may look to sources beyond the
Constitution itself to ascertain the fundamental purpose
underlying the language. Lloyd v. Vermeulen,
22 N.J. 200, 206
(1956). Moreover, even when the words appear to be clear and
unambiguous, if the "'true sense and meaning of the language
used'" suggests a different meaning, that meaning will prevail.
Apportionment Comm'n, supra, 125 N.J. at 381-82 (quoting Lloyd,
supra, 22 N.J. at 206).
We begin our analysis by turning to the plain language of
the 1992 amendment. The amendment requires the State to assume
"certain" judicial costs, N.J. Const. art. VI, § VIII, ¶ 1a(1),
but not all judicial costs. Immediately we find ambiguity, which
lies in the uncertain identity of those "certain" judicial costs.
The amendment provides a nonexclusive list of costs, including
"salaries, health benefits and pension payments of all judicial
employees, juror fees and library material costs," id. ¶ 1b(3),
that are to be covered by the State. As Judge Stanton
recognized, however, the definition of "judicial costs" is
"not . . . airtight," Board of Chosen Freeholders, supra, 311
N.J. Super. at 643 (Law Div.), because the expansive language
"including, but not limited to" indicates that other items may be
includable, even though not specifically enumerated in the
statute. Nonetheless, the definition provides "some meaningful
indication of what is included." Ibid. Under the ejusdem
generis principle of statutory construction, when specific words
follow more general words in a statutory enumeration, we can
consider what additional items might also be included by asking
whether those items are similar to those enumerated. See 2A
Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction
§ 47.17 (5th ed. 1992). Applying this principle, the general
term "judicial costs" would be limited to costs similar in nature
to "salaries, health benefits and pension payments of all
judicial employees, juror fees and library material costs." N.J.
Const. art. VI, § VIII, ¶ 1b(3). The type of items enumerated in
the "judicial costs" definition suggests that the Legislature
intended to shift costs associated with judicial personnel and
supplies to the State, and not the capital costs of judicial
facilities.
As noted earlier, the amendment also explicitly excludes
"judicial facility costs," defined as "any costs borne by the
counties prior to July 1, 1993 with regard to the operation and
maintenance of facilities used by the courts or judicial
employees," from the definition of "judicial costs." Id.
¶ 1b(1), (3). The definition of excluded "judicial facility
costs" does not refer to the capital costs of constructing court
facilities. The question therefore arises whether the capital
costs of constructing, expanding and renovating court facilities
qualify as "judicial facility costs" and are therefore not the
State's responsibility.
The Counties assert that, because the Legislature failed to
explicitly exclude "capital costs" from the definition of
"judicial costs," the fiscal responsibility for those costs
shifts to the State.See footnote 33 We disagree. Although capital costs may
be considered distinct from operating and maintenance costs, and
thus not covered by the "judicial facility costs" exclusion, we
must still determine whether the Legislature intended to include
capital costs in those "certain" judicial costs that the State is
to assume, despite the absence of an explicit reference to
capital costs in the amendment. Courts may supply terms omitted
by the Legislature only where it is abundantly clear that the
addition is necessary to manifest the Legislature's intent.
Klink v. Township Council,
181 N.J. Super. 25, 30 (App. Div.
1981). As discussed below, infra at ___ (slip op. at 20-26),
nothing in the legislative history or other extrinsic sources
suggests that the Legislature intended that the State finance the
capital costs of judicial facilities.
The parties also dispute the relevance of the "July 1, 1993"
date in the definition of "judicial facility costs." The
Counties argue that they retain financial responsibility for
judicial facilities that existed on July 1, 1993, except when
renovation or expansion is required.See footnote 44 In contrast, the State
contends that the date was intended merely to signify the types
of costs for which the counties remain responsible under N.J.S.A.
2B:6-1b, i.e., the judicial facility costs of the Law Division
and the Family Part. The Counties answer that the State's
interpretation "would render the reference to July 1, 1993
inoperative." In the Counties' view, the Legislature's decision
to employ the language "any costs," rather than "types of costs,"
implies that the Legislature meant costs, not types of costs.
Judge Stanton concluded that July 1, 1993, "was used to
indicate the type of costs borne by the counties, and was not
meant to identify on a perpetual basis any actual facilities."
Board of Chosen Freeholders, supra, 311 N.J. Super. at 648 (Law
Div.). We find Judge Stanton's analysis most persuasive and
concur that the most sensible reading of the July 1, 1993 date is
that the counties will retain responsibility for providing court
facilities for the Law Division and the Family Part, consistent
with N.J.S.A. 2B:6-1b.
IV
Recognizing that "words are inexact tools at best," we have
stated that in construing constitutional provisions, "resort may
freely be had to the pertinent constitutional and legislative
history for aid in ascertaining the true sense and meaning of the
language used." Lloyd, supra, 22 N.J. at 206; see also Atlantic
City Racing Ass'n v. Attorney General,
98 N.J. 535, 542 (1985);
New Jersey Pharm. Ass'n v. Furman,
33 N.J. 121, 130 (1960). One
piece of legislative history discussing the amendment is the
Committee Statement included with the revision to SCR-58. The
Statement explained that the "judicial facility costs" exclusion
was designed to "clarify that costs presently borne by the
counties with regard to the operation and maintenance of
facilities used by the courts and probation departments would not
be assumed by the State." Senate Judiciary Comm., Statement to
Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 58, at 1 (June 8, 1992). Judge
Stanton observed that capital costs are simply not mentioned.
Board of Chosen Freeholders, supra, 311 N.J. Super. at 645 (Law
Div.). For that reason, the Statement provides no evidence that
the Legislature intended state assumption of the capital costs of
judicial facilities under the amendment.
That the Legislature intended to shift only the costs
associated with judicial personnel and supplies to the State is
supported by earlier studies of this issue. As far back as May
1982, the Supreme Court Committee on Efficiency in the Operations
of the Courts of New Jersey recommended state financing of the
trial courts to "allow the Chief Justice to allocate resources
throughout the total system according to priorities set by the
Judiciary." Efficiency Committee Report, supra, at 117. Five
years later, the State of New Jersey County and Municipal
Government Study Commission recommended that all of the operating
costs of the courts should be assumed by the State. Judicial
Unification, supra, at 63. The Commission also said that the
State should assume capital and maintenance expenses, id. at 58,
at the same time noting that few states financed those expenses,
id. at 4. Indeed, as of 1987, only six states were responsible
for the costs of capital and maintenance, and four of those
states either did not have county governments or had never
provided for county-governed courts. Id. at 58. The assumption
of capital and maintenance costs, in the view of the Commission,
is
the most complex form of assumption, and it is
also very costly to the state. It involves
facility surveys to determine the relationship
between space occupied by the courts and space
occupied by other agencies, the divergent need
for improvement or expansion of facilities in
each of the counties, and endless negotiations
with local governments and state officials as
to the "best" way to accomplish the transfer.
In drafting SCR-58, the Legislature adopted the Commission's recommendation in respect of personnel and supplies, that is, full state support for those costs. The Legislature's exclusion of the word "capital" from the list of enumerated judicial costs to be assumed by the State, however, can be understood only as a rejection of the capital costs recommendation in the Commission's report.
More recently, the Statements of Chief Justice Wilentz and the NJSBA at the public hearing on SCR-58 were directed at the benefits to be derived from state assumption of the costs associated with personnel and supplies. We again find significant the lack of any discussion about capital costs, especially because of the large amounts involved in financing capital construction. Such costs would have been a critical component of the proposed amendment, both to the Legislature and to the public.
V
In addition to legislative history, we have considered
statutory enactments that were adopted at about the same time as
the constitutional provision at issue in order to determine the
purpose and intent of the provision. Atlantic City Raceway
Ass'n, supra, 98 N.J. at 548; New Jersey Pharm. Ass'n, supra, 33
N.J. at 130; Lloyd, supra, 22 N.J. at 210. Where a
constitutional term is ambiguous, contemporaneous legislative
understanding may be helpful in discovering the meaning of that
term. Lloyd, supra, 22 N.J. at 210.
Contemporaneous legislation supports our conclusion that
capital costs did not shift from the counties to the State under
the amendment. The State Judicial Unification Act, N.J.S.A.
2B:10-1 to -9, ("Unification Act"), enacted on December 6, 1993
to implement the amendment, requires the State to assume
"judicial costs" by January 1, 1995, N.J.S.A. 2B:10-4a. The
Unification Act defines "judicial costs" as "the costs incurred
by the county for funding the judicial system, including but not
limited to the following: salaries, health benefits and pension
costs of all judicial employees, juror fees, library material
costs, and centrally-budgeted items such as printing, supplies,
and mail services." N.J.S.A. 2B:10-3c. N.J.S.A. 2B:10-7a, in
turn, provides that each county and the State should jointly
develop a list of "the furnishings and office equipment currently
used by the courts which shall become the property of the State
on January 1, 1995." The Legislature once again did not include
judicial facility costs within the State's assigned costs
although the furnishings and office equipment that shifted to
state ownership were specifically mentioned.
As Judge Stanton observed, although the Unification Act
mandated that the State assume responsibility for furnishings,
office equipment and supplies used by the court system, the Act
was "totally silent" concerning which entity, the State or each
county, was to provide courtrooms, chambers, and other facilities
for all the courts.See footnote 55 Board of Chosen Freeholders, supra, 311
N.J. Super. at 649 (Law Div.). The silence of the Legislature
can be read only as an exclusion. To suggest otherwise would
result in the allocation of a substantial fiscal responsibility
to the State without any explicit declaration of an intent to do
so.
Finally, questions put to the voters must be accompanied by
an interpretive statement that serves as an aid to understanding
the matter under consideration. See N.J.S.A. 19:3-6 (mandating
"brief statement interpreting the . . . [constitutional
amendment] and setting forth the true purpose of the matter being
voted upon"); see also Gormley v. Lan,
88 N.J. 26, 37 (1981)
(stating interpretative statement is designed to "help the voter
understand more about the amendment than the public question
tells him, for the purpose of aiding him in his decision"). The
interpretative statement should "get to the heart of the matter
as understood by those who are knowledgeable about it." Gormley,
supra, 88 N.J. at 37. Put another way, the interpretive
statement should always be informative and fair. Id. at 37-38;
Kimmelman v. Burgio,
204 N.J. Super. 44, 53 (App. Div. 1985); see
also Guernsey v. Allan,
63 N.J. Super. 270, 275 (App. Div. 1960)
(striking interpretative statement from ballot because language
used "exceeded the limits of propriety" by "advising the voter on
the face of the ballot to cast an affirmative vote").
Consistent with what we have observed throughout our
discussion of the language and the legislative history of the
amendment, the allocation of capital costs was not mentioned in
the statement provided to the voters in the November 1992
election. If the Legislature intended to shift entire
responsibility for the capital costs of constructing judicial
facilities to the State, we would expect that that information
would have been conveyed to the voters in the interpretative
statement. It was not. In construing a constitutional
provision, courts should "inquire as to the meaning the symbols
of expression would most naturally and plainly convey, the sense
most obvious to the common understanding . . . [for] [t]he
Constitution was written 'to be understood by the voters.'"
Gangemi, supra, 25 N.J. at 16 (quoting United States v. Sprague,
282 U.S. 716, 731,
51 S. Ct. 220, 222,
75 L. Ed. 640, 644
(1931)). An ordinary voter presented with the interpretative
statement would not understand the amendment to shift the capital
costs of judicial facilities to the State.
We hold that Article VI, Section VIII, Paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution does not require the State to assume the capital costs of judicial facilities.
The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed.
JUSTICES HANDLER, POLLOCK, O'HERN, GARIBALDI, STEIN, and COLEMAN join in CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ's opinion.
NO. A-3/4/5 SEPTEMBER TERM 1998
ON APPEAL FROM
ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court
BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS
OF THE COUNTY OF MORRIS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Defendant-Respondent.
BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS
OF THE COUNTY OF CAMDEN,
Plaintiff-Intervenor-Appellant,
v.
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Defendant-Respondent.
BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS
OF THE COUNTY OF BERGEN,
Plaintiff-Intervenor-Appellant,
v.
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Defendant-Respondent.
DECIDED July 20, 1999
Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING
OPINION BY Chief Justice Poritz
CONCURRING OPINION BY
DISSENTING OPINIONS BY
Footnote: 1 1Before recodification, provision for funding the court
system could be found at scattered sections of Title 2A.
Footnote: 2 2Warren County was permitted to participate as amicus curiae
in the Appellate Division.
Footnote: 3 3Bergen County offers an additional argument in support of
state assumption of capital costs. The courthouse in Bergen
County, like that in Morris County, is classified as a historic
structure, and as such, is subject to stricter and costlier
construction controls. For example, counties with historic
courthouses must retain a certified architect in historical
structures and obtain state approval prior to making any
improvements. Bergen County believes that when the State
mandates expensive capital improvements because of the historic
status of a courthouse, the State should bear the costs.
The Department of Environmental Protection, through the New
Jersey Register of Historic Places Act, N.J.S.A. 13:1B-15.128 to
15.132, regulates the preservation of historic sites. This
regulatory system is not related to judicial funding issues.
Footnote: 4 4In support of this interpretation, the Counties rely upon a
fiscal estimate to SCR-58 prepared by the Office of Legislative
Services on July 16, 1992, stating that "[t]he operational and
maintenance costs of . . . [judicial] facilities created after
July 1, 1993 would be a State fiscal responsibility."
Legislative Fiscal Estimate to Senate Concurrent Resolution No.
58 (July 16, 1992). We agree with Judge Stanton that because the
fiscal estimate was prepared 18 days after SCR-58 was enacted, it
provides no assistance in discerning legislative intent. See
Board of Chosen Freeholders, supra, 311 N.J. Super. at 645 (Law
Div.).
Footnote: 5 5The only reference to facility costs in the Unification Act
is found at N.J.S.A. 2B:10-7c(1)(f), which requires the counties
to report to the Administrative Office of the Courts "plans for
all facilities and construction and age information on the
facilities required by the companies currently insuring the
contents" -- a provision relating to insurance coverage, rather
than the allocation of judicial facility costs. N.J.S.A. 2B:10
7b(1)(b) addresses service agreements relating to "debt service
or lease payments for furnishings and office equipment." If
agreements concerning facilities were involved, we presume the
Legislature would have mentioned facilities.