(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for
the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please
note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).
Argued January 2, 1996 -- Decided May 22, 1996
O'HERN, J., writing for a unanimous Court.
The question posed on this appeal is whether a worker entitled to receive workers' compensation
benefits as an employee of one of the State's bi-state agencies receives those benefits on the same terms and
under the same limitations as would other public employees in the State.
John Bunk is employed by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (the Port Authority).
Bunk lives in New Jersey. On September 6, 1988, he was driving a Port Authority truck in New York City
when the brakes failed and the truck struck a wall and several other vehicles, causing serious injuries to
Bunk. Because of those injuries, Bunk was unable to resume his regular duties with the Port Authority.
Bunk applied for an received Social Security disability benefits. He also applied for and received a disability
retirement pension from the Port Authority. (The Port Authority funds its public employees' retirement
through the New York State and Local Employees Retirement System.)
Bunk also sought compensation for his injuries under the New Jersey Workers' Compensation Act
(Act). A Judge of Compensation, believing she was bound by N.J.S.A. 34:15-43 (Section 43) of the Act,
denied any award for the permanent disability related to the accident. At the time, Section 43 provided that
a former employee who had been retired on pension by reason of injury or disability was not entitled to
compensation benefits for such injury or disability.
Bunk appealed the decision of the Judge of Compensation. The Appellate Division reversed,
concluding that Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. (Hess) had diminished the precedential value of
Wright v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (Wright), which had applied Section 43 to Port
Authority employees. The Hess court held that the Port Authority was not, for purposes of Eleventh
Amendment immunity, a public body of the State.
The Supreme Court granted the Port Authority's petition for certification. The Attorney General
intervenes on behalf of the Second Injury Fund because the combination of this injury and other occupational
diseases may have left Bunk totally and permanently disabled.
HELD: N.J.S.A. 34:15-43 of the Workers' Compensation Act (Section 43), which limits workers'
compensation benefits of public employees receiving a disability pension for the same injury, is
applicable to an employee of the bi-state agency, Port Authority of New York and New Jersey.
1. In 1931, Section 43 was amended to prevent New Jersey state employees from simultaneously obtaining accidental disability pension benefits and workers' compensation benefits for the same injury. In 1951, New York and New Jersey agreed to waive the Port Authority's sovereign immunity and consented to suits, including workers' compensation suits, against the Port Authority. In 1971, the New Jersey Legislature amended various State retirement programs, the general effect of which was to allow New Jersey state employees to receive both workers' compensation and disability retirement benefits, with worker's compensation being offset against the retirement benefits. Against this backdrop, the Court looks to whether the Legislature intended that Section 43 apply to employees of the Port Authority. The Court also
determines whether the application of section 43 to the Port Authority impermissibly infringes on the
independence of that bi-state agency. (pp. 5-7)
2. The Port Authority is a public corporate instrumentality of New Jersey and New York. Neither New
York nor New Jersey may unilaterally impose additional duties, powers, or responsibilities on the Port
Authority. However, the Port Authority may be subject to complementary or parallel state legislation. (pp.
7-8)
3. There is evidence in the record that the provisions between the states are somewhat similar. The
provisions in New York, like New Jersey, reflect a plan to coordinate disability benefits under public
employee retirement and workers' compensation systems. Although a New Jersey state employee may have
the advantage of being able to elect the greater of the benefits (retirement versus workers' compensation)
Bunk may seek workers' compensation benefits under New York law. That opportunity for the exercise of
parallel regulation suggests that each state's laws may be appropriately invoked. (pp. 8-9)
4. Bunk's reliance on Hess is misplaced. Whether the Port Authority enjoys Eleventh Amendment
immunity is different from the question of whether the Port Authority exercises governmental functions as a
state agency and whether Port Authority employees are covered by Section 43. A public body may be
considered a hybrid institution; an agency of the state for some purposes but not for others. (pp. 9-11)
5. One of the central themes of the recent legislation is that there should not be double recovery from two
sources for the same injury; that policy dominates the interpretation of Section 43. Given the mutual
concerns of New York and New Jersey, the Court is satisfied that the Legislature would intend that the
workers' compensation benefits afforded to Port Authority employees under New Jersey law should, at a
minimum, be integrated with the disability retirement benefits afforded to the employee for the same injury.
The injured worker should be able to receive the more advantageous of the benefits payable under the
respective statutory provisions. The only way to integrate the statutory provisions is to apply Section 43 to
this case. (pp. 12-17)
6. The recent amendments to Section 43 reaffirm the Legislature's intention to integrate workers'
compensation and retirement-disability benefits. Because New Jersey cannot effectively control the New
York retirement allowances granted to Port Authority employees, the practical method of integration of
benefits is to reduce dollar-for-dollar the Jersey workers' compensation awards for Port Authority employees
by the amount of the New York disability retirement allowances for the same injury. (pp. 17-19)
7. Because the Legislature intended the 1996 amendment apply to claims pending at the time of its
enactment, Bunk is to continue the pending proceedings. He has the obligation to obtain the certified
statement of benefits under New York law as a condition of any obligation for payment of workers'
compensation benefits under New Jersey law. Those disability-retirement benefits shall be deducted from
the workers' compensation award. (pp. 19-21)
The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED. The matter is REMANDED to the Division
of Workers' Compensation for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
CHIEF JUSTICE WILENTZ and JUSTICES HANDLER, POLLOCK, GARIBALDI, STEIN, and
COLEMAN join in JUSTICE O'HERN's opinion.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-53/
54 September Term 1995
JOHN R. BUNK,
Petitioner-Respondent,
v.
THE PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK
AND NEW JERSEY,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
SECOND INJURY FUND,
Respondent-Appellant.
Argued January 2, 1996 -- Decided May 22, 1996
On certification to the Superior Court,
Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported
at
279 N.J. Super. 613 (1995).
Michael D. Driscoll, New Jersey Solicitor,
argued the cause for appellant The Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey (Hugh H.
Welsh, Deputy General Counsel, attorney; Mr.
Welsh, of counsel; Christopher J. Neumann and
George P. Cook, on the briefs).
Bertram P. Goltz, Jr., Deputy Attorney
General, argued the cause for appellant
Second Injury Fund (Deborah T. Poritz,
Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney;
Joseph L. Yannotti, Assistant Attorney
General, of counsel).
Alfred G. Osterweil argued the cause for
respondent (Cynthia A. Rollenhagen, attorney;
Mr. Osterweil and D. John McAusland, on the
briefs).
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
O'HERN, J.
The question in this appeal is whether a worker entitled to
receive workers' compensation benefits as an employee of one of
the State's bi-state agencies receives those benefits on the same
terms and under the same limitations as would other public
employees in the State. We hold applicable to an employee of the
bi-state agency the provisions of N.J.S.A. 34:15-43 (Section 43)
that limit workers' compensation benefits of public employees
receiving a disability pension for the same injury.
Plaintiff, John Bunk, is an employee of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (the Port Authority or PA). We may also refer to him as he would be known in the compensation proceedings, as the "petitioner." Bunk is a resident of the State of New Jersey. On September 6, 1988, he was driving a Port Authority truck in New York City. The brakes of the truck failed. The truck struck a wall and several other vehicles, causing serious injuries to Mr. Bunk. The injuries left him unable to resume his regular employment with the Port Authority. Bunk applied for and received Social Security disability benefits. He also applied for and received a disability retirement pension from the Port Authority. (The Port Authority has elected to fund its public employees' retirement system through the New York State and Local Employees Retirement
System.) The petitioner has also sought compensation for his
injuries under the New Jersey workers' compensation system,
N.J.S.A. 34:15-1 to -128. As a resident of New Jersey, Bunk can
bring his action in New Jersey. See Parks v. Johnson Motor
Lines,
156 N.J. Super. 177, 181 (App. Div. 1978). The
Compensation Judge would have awarded any necessary medical
expenses for the petitioner but, believing that she was bound by
Section 43, denied any award for the permanent disability related
to the accident. When these proceedings commenced, Section 43
provided, in relevant part:
Every officer, appointed or elected, and
every employee of the State, county,
municipality or any board of commission, or
any other governing body, including boards of
education, and governing bodies of service
districts, individuals who are under the
general supervision of the Palisades
Interstate Park Commission and who work in
that part of the Palisades Interstate Park
which is located in this State, and also
[other designated persons such as volunteer
firefighters] who may be injured in line of
duty shall be compensated under and by virtue
of the provisions of this article and article
2 of this chapter (R.S. 34:15-7 et seq.). No
former employee who has been retired on
pension by reason of injury or disability
shall be entitled under this section to
compensation for such injury or disability;
provided, however, that such employee,
despite retirement, shall, nevertheless, be
entitled to the medical, surgical and other
treatment and hospital services as set forth
in R.S. 34:15-15.
Nothing herein contained shall be construed as affecting or changing in any way the provisions of any statute providing for
sick, disability, vacation or other leave for
public employees or any provision of any
retirement or pension fund provided by law.
On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed. It concluded
that Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp., ___ U.S. ___,
115 S. Ct. 394,
130 L. Ed.2d 245 (1994), had diminished the
precedential value of Wright v. Port Authority of New York and
New Jersey,
263 N.J. Super. 6 (App. Div.), certif. denied,
133 N.J. 442 (1993), which had applied Section 43 to PA employees.
Hess held that the PA was not, for purposes of Eleventh Amendment
immunity, a public body of the State. We granted the Port
Authority's petition for certification,
141 N.J. 99 (1995). The
Attorney General has intervened on behalf of the Second Injury
Fund because the combination of this injury and other
occupational diseases may have left Bunk totally and permanently
disabled.
We draw upon the history set forth in the petitioner's briefs to place the issues in this case in perspective. This review is not intended as a digest of pension or workers' compensation law but only to provide a general background to the issues before us.
1911 - New Jersey passed its Workers' Compensation Law.
L. 1911, c. 95.
1913 - The Legislature passed the predecessor to Section 43
for the purpose of waiving the State's sovereign immunity to
suits for workers' compensation benefits. At that time, the
doctrine of sovereign immunity immunized public bodies from many
forms of liability. The Legislature extended workers'
compensation coverage to "[e]very employee who shall be in the
employ of the State, county, municipality or any board of
commission, or any other governing body . . . ." L. 1913, c.
145. Obviously, the Legislature did not then contemplate whether
PA employees would be covered by the Act. The PA did not exist.
1921 - The Port Authority was created by compact between
New York and New Jersey. L. 1921, c. 151. As a bi-state agency,
however, its employees were not covered by the workers'
compensation laws of either state.See footnote 2
1931 - Language was added to Section 43 to prevent State
employees from receiving disability pension benefits and later
receiving workers' compensation benefits for the same injury.
The text of that 1931 amendment read:
The provisions of this act shall not apply to
. . . any former employee who has been
injured or disabled in line of duty and has
been retired on pension by reason of such
injury of disability. Nothing herein
contained shall be construed as affecting or
changing in any way . . . any provision of
any retirement or pension fund now or
hereafter provided by law.
No intent may be ascribed to the 1931 Legislature because
the PA's employees were not yet covered by workers' compensation.
1951 - New York and New Jersey agreed to waive the PA's
sovereign immunity and consented to suits, including workers'
compensation suits, against the PA. L. 1951, c. 204, now
codified at N.J.S.A. 32:1-157.
1951 to 1971 - A number of amendments to the retirement
provisions created, over the years, a dilemma for the State's
public employees. A worker could retire immediately but could
collect no workers' compensation benefits. In the alternative, a
worker could collect workers' compensation benefits immediately
but would be prevented from collecting disability benefits until
the completion of the compensation award. Conklin v. City of
East Orange,
73 N.J. 198, 203 (1977). The employee could not
know in advance which award would be greater but would be limited
to the option chosen initially. Ibid.
1971 - The Legislature amended various State retirement
programs, the general effect of which was to allow State
employees to receive both workers' compensation and disability
retirement benefits with workers' compensation being offset
against the retirement benefits. See, e.g., L. 1971, c. 213.
Thus, over the course of time the employee would receive the
maximum possible award while still protecting the State's
treasury against paying both awards in full.
The issues posed for decision against this background are:
(1) whether the Legislature intends that the provisions of
Section 43 that bar state employees from simultaneously obtaining
accidental disability pension benefits and workers' compensation
benefits apply to employees of the Port Authority, and (2) would
the application of that state law to the bi-state agency
impermissibly infringe on the independence of the bi-state
agency.
The principles of decision are familiar, involving statutory construction and an understanding of the law dealing with bi-state agencies. We deal with the latter issue first.
The Port Authority is not the agency of a single state but rather a public corporate instrumentality of New Jersey and New York. It follows that neither creator state may unilaterally impose additional duties, powers, or responsibility upon the Authority. Nardi v. Delaware River Port Auth., 490 A.2d 949, 950 (Pa. Commw. 1985) (citing C.T. Hellmuth & Associates, Inc. v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 414 F. Supp. 408 (D.Md. 1976)). The corollary of the proposition that neither state may unilaterally impose its legislative will on the bi-state agency is that the agency may be subject to complementary or parallel state legislation. Cf. Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge Comm'n v. Colburn, 310 U.S. 419, 60 S. Ct. 1039, 84 L. Ed. 1287 (1940) (where compact prescribed procedure for land acquisition in each
state, no unilateral departure could be made by agency). The
illustration of parallelism that we gave in Eastern Paralyzed
Veterans Ass'n v. City of Camden,
111 N.J. 389 (1988) (deciding
whether complementary provisions for providing handicapped access
existed in both states), was that employees of the Delaware River
Port Authority must observe stop lights in New Jersey because
Pennsylvania and New Jersey have similar legislation in this
regard. See Nardi, supra, 490 A.
2d at 951-52 (stating that if
disability pay enactments of New Jersey and Pennsylvania were
substantially similar, court could find agreement by states
concerning extent of disability pay).
Applying these principles of parallelism to this case
requires us to consider briefly provisions of New York law. As
noted, New York could not compel the Port Authority to provide a
pension for its employees. Indeed, it probably could not compel
the Port Authority to provide workers' compensation benefits.
The Port Authority, however, has agreed to provide these benefits
and it has permitted its employees, to some extent, to pick and
choose among those benefits. The question in this case is
whether the provisions in each state for picking and choosing the
benefits are parallel and complementary. Ibid.
We do not profess to decide the exact contours of New York
law with respect to the simultaneous receipt of disability
pension and workers' compensation benefits. There is evidence in
the record, however, that the provisions are somewhat similar.
New York State pension law specifically reduces accidental
disability pension installments by the amount of any concurrent
New York workers' compensation award. N.Y. Retire. & Soc. Sec.
Law § 364 (McKinney 1995). An accidental disability benefit is
75 per cent of final average salary. Bunk's ordinary disability
pension of 33-1/3 per cent of final average salary is not,
however, subject to a statutory setoff for workers' compensation
benefits for the same disability.
However, these provisions of New York law, like New
Jersey's, reflect a plan to coordinate disability benefits under
public employee retirement and workers' compensation systems.
The independent status of the PA does not prevent the application
of parallel provisions of law. Although a New Jersey employee
might have the advantage of being able to elect the greater of
the benefits (retirement vs. workers' compensation), we have been
informed that Bunk may seek workers' compensation benefits under
New York law. That opportunity for the exercise of parallel (if
not identical) regulation suggests that each state's laws may
appropriately be invoked.
Because New Jersey law may apply to the issue, the next
question is does it apply? We believe that petitioner's reliance
on Hess to affect the meaning of Section 43 is misplaced. In
that case, the Supreme Court, observing that the Port Authority
was conceived as a financially independent body with funds
derived primarily from private investors and that its obligations
are not liabilities of the two founding states, held that the
Port Authority should not be deemed to enjoy Eleventh Amendment
immunity because its operations do not expose either of the
compact states to financial liability. Hess, supra, ___ U.S.
___, 115 S. Ct. at 406, 130 L. Ed.
2d at 263. Whether the Port
Authority enjoys Eleventh Amendment immunity, however, is
different from the question of whether the Port Authority
exercises governmental functions as an agency of the State of New
Jersey and whether the PA employees are covered by Section 43.
A public body may be considered an agency of the State for
some purposes but not for others. For example, Rutgers
University is not an arm of the State entitled to Eleventh
Amendment immunity. Kovats v. Rutgers, The State Univ.,
822 F.2d 1303, 1312 (3d Cir. 1987). Yet Rutgers has been recognized to be
a State agency for purposes of immunity from local land use
regulations, Rutgers v. Piluso,
60 N.J. 142, 158 (1972), and
immunity from local property taxation. Rutgers v. Piscataway
Township,
1 N.J. Tax 164, 171 (1980).
As noted above, the Port Authority is also not an arm of the
State entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Yet the Port
Authority has been recognized as "a state agency performing
functions on behalf of the state." Port Auth. Police Benevolent
Ass'n v. Port Auth. of New York & New Jersey,
819 F.2d 413, 415
(3d Cir.), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 953,
108 S. Ct. 344,
98 L. Ed.2d 370 (1987). The Port Authority has the power of eminent
domain, N.J.S.A. 32:1-35.22, the income from its bonds and other
obligations is exempt from state and local taxation, N.J.S.A.
32:1-33, and its property is exempt from state and local
taxation. See Port of New York Auth. v. City of Newark,
20 N.J. 386 (1956). The Port Authority, like Rutgers, may thus be viewed
as a "hybrid institution," Trustees of Rutgers College v.
Richman,
41 N.J. Super. 259, 289 (Ch. Div. 1956) -- at one and
the same time an agency of the State and not an agency of the
State.
In Brown v. Port Authority Police Superior Officers
Association,
283 N.J. Super. 122, 130-31 (App. Div. 1995),
decided after Hess, the court focused on "the control that the
governors and legislatures of [New York and New Jersey] exercise
over the Port Authority's operations and the extensive
governmental responsibilities it performs" to conclude that the
Authority, as "an administrative arm of the governments" of the
compact states, was a "political subdivision" of the State and
thus exempt from the provisions of the National Labor Relations
Act,
29 U.S.C. §141 to § 187. The court noted that its
conclusion was supported by various decisions of the lower
federal courts that have held that governmental agencies similar
to the Port Authority are political subdivisions. 283 N.J.
Super. at 131 (citations omitted).
In Wright v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey,
supra, 263 N.J. Super. at 15-16, the court had concluded that the
Port Authority was an agency of the States of New York and New
Jersey and that the Port Authority was included in the "other
governing body" language of Section 43. This would make
employees of the Port Authority subject, as are other State
employees, to the Section 43 bar to simultaneous recovery of
disability retirement benefits and workers' compensation
benefits. There is, however, this difference. In Wright the
worker was receiving an accidental disability pension benefit of
75 per cent of final compensation, whereas in this case Bunk is
receiving an ordinary disability pension of approximately 33-1/3
per cent of final compensation.
It is a close question whether the Wright holding should
apply in the case of an ordinary New York disability pension. As
the Appellate Division pointed out in this case, there is no
setoff from that pension under New York law for related workers'
compensation benefits. 279 N.J. Super. at 623 n.2. We may
presume, however, that New York's statutory scheme reflects the
proper legislative balance for integrating workers' compensation
benefits with related pension benefits. We have not the same
assurance that the allowance of New York pension and New Jersey
workers' compensation benefits would reflect the same balance.
Petitioner argues that the Legislature's only concern in
Section 43 was to protect the State's pension programs (not, as
here, the New York State pension program). He emphasizes that
the Legislature made amendments to all State retirement programs
in 1971 that allowed State employees to receive both workers'
compensation and disability retirement benefits, with workers'
compensation being offset against the benefits. Conklin, supra,
73 N.J. at 204. Thus, over the course of time the employee would
receive the maximum possible award while still protecting the
State Treasury against employees receiving both awards in full.
Given the intertwined histories of Section 43 and the
State's disability pension plan, petitioner argues that the
Legislature regarded State furnished workers' compensation and
State disability pensions as interchangeable parts in the State
employees' benefits system.
A fair conclusion to be drawn from N.J.S.A.
34:15-43 and the cases construing it is that
the Legislature intended to prohibit recovery
of work[ers'] compensation if the injured
employee has already been retired on an
accident disability pension under N.J.S.A.
43:16A-7.
[In re Smith, supra, 57 N.J. at 375.]
Thus, petitioner argues that this Court recognized in Smith that
Section 43 was meant to apply only to those persons participating
in New Jersey pension plans. See also Conklin, supra, 73 N.J. at
204 (holding that Section 43's ban on recovery of workers'
compensation following receipt of disability pension benefits was
so closely intertwined with the State pension system that the
Legislature's modification of the pension system by implication
also modified Section 43).
Because those cases concerned only the State pension system,
they do not answer the question posed in this case. We think,
however, that there is a corollary to the idea of integration of
benefits, "the net effect [of which] is that the retired public
employee is entitled to receive the more advantageous of the
benefits payable under the respective statutory provisions,"
ibid. (emphasis added), and thus perhaps not both benefits.
Although petitioner's pension is a New York State pension,
it need not have been so. (The PA elected to join the New York
system for convenience.) A private pension could have provided a
setoff. "[A]n underlying theme of the workers' compensation law
is that there should not be duplicate payments for the same
disability." Young v. Western Electric Co.,
96 N.J. 220, 231
(1984). Granted, there is no provision in the PA pension
requiring or allowing setoff, the question to us is one of
legislative intent.
One of the central themes of recent Legislatures is that
there should not be double recovery from two sources for the same
injury. See N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(e) (barring any recovery in tort for
losses covered by collateral sources); see also Frazier v. New
Jersey Manufacturers Ins. Co.,
142 N.J. 590 (1995) (holding that
proceeds of an attorney malpractice claim represent substitute
for recovery from third-party tortfeasor subject to workers'
compensation lien). Concededly this benefit package did not
exceed (as in Wright) the worker's final compensation. On
balance, however, we believe that policy to be the dominant
policy here in interpreting Section 43.
Petitioner's final contention is that the Legislature could
not have intended for Section 43 to apply to employees of the PA
because the PA did not yet exist when the Legislature adopted
Section 43 and because the Legislature has since included within
the statute organizations such as the Palisades Interstate Park
Commission while it has made no mention of the PA. That the Port
Authority did not exist when Section 43 was enacted does not
necessarily mean that the PA is not covered by the Section.
[Events] that were unforeseen at the time of
initial legislative action, have [often]
required the reinterpretation and fresh
application of relevant statutory law in
order to avoid the inadvertent and unintended
creation of a statutory anomaly or hiatus and
to preserve for such legislation a sensible
place in the contemporary scene.
[Renz v. Penn Central Corp., 87 N.J.
437, 458 (1981).]
And that the Legislature has since made specific reference only
to the Palisades Interstate Park Commission (PIPC) in Section 43
is not expressive of an intention to exclude the Port
Authority.See footnote 3 Canons of construction, such as inclusio unius est
exclusio alterius, the inclusion of one is the exclusion of
another, must yield to the paramount canon -- that of legislative
intent.
In cases such as this, where it is clear that
the drafters of a statute did not consider or
even contemplate a specific situation, this
Court has adopted as an established rule of
statutory construction the policy of
interpreting the statute "consonant with the
probable intent of the draftsman `had he
anticipated the situation at hand.'" J.C.
Chap. Prop. Owner's etc. Assoc. v. City
Council,
55 N.J. 86, 101 (1969) (quoting
Dvorkin v. Dover Tp.,
29 N.J. 303, 315
(1959)); Safeway Trails, Inc. v. Furman,
41 N.J. 467, appeal dismissed and cert. den.,
379 U.S. 14,
85 S.Ct. 144,
13 L.Ed.2d 84
(1964). Such an interpretation will not
"turn on literalisms, technisms or the so-called rules of interpretation; [rather] it
will justly turn on the breadth of the
objectives of the legislation and the
commonsense of the situation." J.C. Chap.
Prop. Owner's, 55 N.J. at 100.
[AMN, Inc. v. South Brunswick Township Rent
Leveling Bd.,
93 N.J. 518, 525 (1983).]
The point has been made that our Legislature would not be
concerned about the fiscal well-being of the Port Authority. As
the Appellate Division noted below, the Port Authority has
elected to join the New York pension system and "New Jersey bears
absolutely no financial or administrative responsibility [for the
Port Authority] at all." Bunk, supra, 279 N.J. Super. at 619.
But the Port Authority is a vital partner in the economic well
being of New Jersey. The Newark International Airport, the Port
Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation (PATH), and the Journal Square
Transportation Center are signs of that commitment in New Jersey.
New Jersey citizens undoubtedly pay a significant share of the
bridge and tunnel tolls that sustain the Authority. New Jersey
legislators are hard pressed to avoid the controversy when those
tolls are raised. The governors of each state have veto power
over the minutes of the agency. N.J.S.A. 32:2-6. Elected
officials in both states often seek oversight of the fiscal
practices of the Port Authority. See Neil MacFarguhar, City is
to Study Port Unit, N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1996, at B5 (Mayor of
New York City seeks review of Port Authority expenditures).
Given the mutual concerns of the two founder states, we are
satisfied that our Legislature would intend that the workers'
compensation benefits afforded to PA employees under New Jersey
law should, at a minimum, be integrated with the disability
retirement benefits afforded to the public employee for the same
injury. We would hesitate to hold the Section 43 bar applicable
were it not possible for petitioner to resume the processing of
his workers' compensation claim in New York. Workers'
compensation laws are to be liberally construed. Panzino v.
Continental Can Co.,
71 N.J. 298, 303 (1976). However, the
dominant theme that appears from our legislation and case law is
that the injured worker should be able to receive "the more
advantageous of the benefits payable under the respective
statutory provisions." Conklin, supra, 73 N.J. at 73. In this
case we believe that the Legislature would intend that the
statutory provisions be integrated. The only way to integrate
the provisions in this case is to apply Section 43.
Whatever doubt that we may have had about the proper integration of the two forms of benefits has been further clarified by the recent amendment to Section 43. As noted, section five of Law 1995, chapter 369 replaces the flat ban on recovery of workers' compensation benefits by a retiree on a disability pension with what amounts to a dollar-for-dollar
setoff from the retirement allowance.See footnote 4 These amendments appear
to be a recognition of the gradual developments in case law that
permitted employees to select the more advantageous of the
benefits. We asked the parties to furnish us with supplemental
briefs concerning the effect of the changes.
The Port Authority argues that the recent amendments to
N.J.S.A. 34:15-43 merely clarify existing case law and were not
intended to rescind the longstanding equitable bar against double
recovery. It relies on the Assembly Appropriations Committee
Statement to A-1977:
For consistency with court decisions and the
pension systems' offset provisions, the
amendments delete from the workers'
compensation law a sentence which prohibits
altogether the receipt of workers'
compensation benefits by a retirant receiving
a disability retirement allowance.
[Assembly Appropriations Committee, Statement
to A-1977 (December 8, 1994).]
We agree that the recent amendments reaffirm the
Legislature's intention to integrate workers' compensation and
retirement-disability benefits. Because New Jersey cannot
effectively control the New York retirement allowances granted to
Port Authority employees, the practical method of integration of
benefits is to reduce dollar-for-dollar the New Jersey workers'
compensation awards for PA employees by the amount of the New
York disability retirement allowance for the same injury. As a
condition of the obligation of the PA to make workers'
compensation payments, the worker shall procure a certified
statement from the New York pension authorities setting forth the
disability retirement benefits paid to the worker.
The final question is whether this recent amendment should
apply to Bunk's case. We have adopted a straightforward test to
determine whether legislation should be given prospective or
retroactive effect. In Twiss v. State, Department of Treasury,
124 N.J. 461, 467 (1991), we applied a two-part test to determine
whether a statute could be applied retroactively. First we
asked whether the Legislature intended to give the statute
retroactive application. Ibid. (citing Gibbons v. Gibbons,
86 N.J. 515, 522 (1981). If the Legislature intended retroactive
application, the second question is whether retroactive
application of the statute results in an unconstitutional
interference with vested rights or a manifest injustice. Ibid.
(citing State, Dep't of Envtl. Protection v. Ventron Corp.,
94 N.J. 473, 498-99 (1983)).
Traditionally, when searching for probable legislative
intent, we have looked to the statute's plain language. If the
language is plain and clearly reveals the statute's meaning, the
court's sole function is to enforce the statute in accordance
with the language. In Phillips v. Curiale,
128 N.J. 608, 611
(1992), we considered a statute that specifically stated that it
applied to "all actions and proceedings that accrue, are pending
or are filed after June 1, 1986." In this case, the legislation
simply stated that it would take effect immediately. L. 1995, c.
369. We have no clear indication of whether it was intended to
apply to claims that were pending on the date of its enactment.
In Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
121 N.J. 69 (1990),
we noted that "a statute that changes the settled law and relates
to substantive rights is prospective only, unless there is an
unequivocal expression of contrary legislative intent." Id. at
95 (quoting Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines v. Rosenthal,
14 N.J. 372, 381 (1954)). As noted, the Port Authority interprets the
amendments primarily to be a clarification of existing law, not a
change in settled law.
On balance, we believe that the Legislature intends the 1996
amendment to apply to claims pending at the time of the law's
enactment. Rather than require petitioner to initiate new
proceedings in New York to recover workers' compensation benefits
to which he is entitled, the simpler solution is to continue the
pending proceedings. Petitioner has undoubtedly retained expert
witnesses in New Jersey and the matter can be quite readily
resolved. Petitioner has the obligation to obtain the certified
statement of benefits under New York law as a condition of any
obligation for payment of workers' compensation benefits under
New Jersey law. Those disability-retirement benefits shall be
deducted from the workers' compensation award.
The judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed. The
matter is remanded to the Division of Workers' Compensation for
further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
CHIEF JUSTICE WILENTZ and JUSTICES HANDLER, POLLOCK, GARIBALDI, STEIN, and COLEMAN join in JUSTICE O'HERN's opinion.
NO. A-53/54 SEPTEMBER TERM 1995
ON APPEAL FROM
ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court
JOHN R. BUNK,
Petitioner-Respondent,
v.
THE PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK
AND NEW JERSEY,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
SECOND INJURY FUND,
Respondent-Appellant.
DECIDED May 22, 1996
Chief Justice Wilentz PRESIDING
OPINION BY Justice O'Hern
CONCURRING OPINION BY
DISSENTING OPINION BY
Footnote: 1By an amendment dated January 5, 1996, the Legislature