NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1973-08T11973-08T1
CONTINENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
as successor by merger to Fidelity
& Casualty Company of New York and
as successor in interest as to
certain policies issued by Harbor
Insurance Company and London
Guarantee & Accident Company of
New York, NATIONAL FIRE INSURANCE
COMPANY OF HARTFORD, as successor
by merger to Transcontinental
Insurance Company, COLUMBIA
CASUALTY COMPANY and CONTINENTAL
CASUALTY COMPANY,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
v.
HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMUNITIES, INC.,
MAFCO CONSOLIDATED GROUP, INC.,
MACK TRUCKS, INC., PPP CORPORATION,
RESCO HOLDINGS, LLC, RUST
ENGINEERING & CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
RUST INTERNATIONAL, INC., SWINDELL
DRESSLER INTERNATIONAL COMPANY,
WASTE MANAGEMENT HOLDINGS, INC.,
WHEELABRATOR AIR POLLUTION CONTROL,
INC., WHEELABRATOR TECHNOLOGIES,
INC., and UOP LLC,
Defendants-Appellants,
and
ALLIANZ INSURANCE COMPANY, ALLIANZ
UNDERWRITERS, INC., ALLIANZ UNDER-
WRITERS INSURANCE COMPANY, ALLSTATE
INSURANCE COMPANY, as successor in
interest to Northbrook Insurance
Company and Northbrook Excess &
Surplus Insurance Company, AMERICAN
CENTENNIAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE COMPANY,
AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL SPECIALTY
LINES INSURANCE COMPANY, f/k/a
American International Surplus
Lines Insurance Company, AMERICAN
INTERNATIONAL UNDERWRITERS
CORPORATION, AMERICAN MOTORIST
INSURANCE COMPANY, CENTRAL NATIONAL
INSURANCE COMPANY OF OMAHA, CENTURY
INDEMNITY COMPANY, as successor to
California Union Insurance Company
and Insurance Company of North
America, EMPLOYERS INSURANCE
COMPANY OF WAUSAU, as successor
to Employers Mutual Liability
Insurance Company of Wausau,
Wisconsin, EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUALTY
COMPANY, FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
FIREMAN'S FUNDS INSURANCE COMPANY,
FIRST STATE INSURANCE COMPANY,
HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND INDEMNITY
COMPANY, HIGHLANDS INSURANCE COMPANY,
INDUSTRIAL UNDERWRITERS INSURANCE
COMPANY, INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE
STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA, LEXINGTON
INSURANCE COMPANY, CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS
AT LLOYD'S OF LONDON AND THE LLOYD'S
OF LONDON MARKET COMPANIES, NATIONAL
UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF
PITTSBURGH, PA., NATIONWIDE INDEMNITY
COMPANY, as successor to certain
policies issued by Employers Mutual
Liability Insurance Company of
Wisconsin, NORTHERN ASSURANCE COMPANY
OF AMERICA, as successor to Employers'
Surplus Lines Insurance Company,
NORTH RIVER INSURANCE COMPANY,
OLD REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY,
REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY, ST. PAUL
MERCURY INSURANCE COMPANY, TIG
INSURANCE COMPANY, as successor in
interest on certain policies issued
by International Insurance Company,
TRAVELERS CASUALTY AND SURETY
COMPANY, as successor to Aetna
Casualty & Surety Company,
TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY,
TWIN CITY FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY,
UNITED STATES FIRE INSURANCE
COMPANY, WESTCHESTER FIRE INSURANCE
COMPANY, as successor to certain
policies issued by United States
Fire Insurance Company and
International Insurance Company,
and ZURICH INTERNATIONAL (BERMUDA)
LTD.,
Defendants-Respondents,
and
MAFCO CONSOLIDATED GROUP, PULLMAN
PASSENGER CAR CO., and U.S. FILTER
CORPORATION,
Third-Party Defendants.
_________________________________________
HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC., DOCKET NO. A-1976-08T1
A-1978-08T1
Plaintiff-Respondent, A-1979-08T1
A-1981-08T1
v. A-1982-08T1
A-1983-08T1
TRAVELERS CASUALTY AND SURETY A-1984-08T1
COMPANY, as successor-in-interest A-1986-08T1
to AETNA CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY,
HARTFORD ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY
COMPANY, FIRST STATE INSURANCE
COMPANY, NEW ENGLAND REINSURANCE
CORPORATION, TWIN CITY FIRE
INSURANCE COMPANY, CENTURY INDEMNITY
COMPANY, for itself and as successor-
in-interest to INSURANCE COMPANY OF
NORTH AMERICA, WESTCHESTER FIRE
INSURANCE COMPANY, GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY,
EVANSTON INSURANCE COMPANY, ROYAL
INDEMNITY COMPANY, EMPLOYERS MUTUAL
CASUALTY COMPANY, MIDSTATES
REINSURANCE CORPORATION, and
NATIONWIDE INDEMNITY as agent for
and on behalf of EMPLOYERS
INSURANCE COMPANY OF WAUSAU,
Defendants-Appellants,
and
AMERICAN REINSURANCE COMPANY,
CONTINENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY, for
itself and as successor-in-interest
to LONDON GUARANTEE & ACCIDENT
COMPANY OF NEW YORK, DAIRYLAND
INSURANCE COMPANY, FIREMAN'S FUND
INSURANCE COMPANY, INTERNATIONAL
INSURANCE COMPANY, NATIONAL
CASUALTY COMPANY, and REPUBLIC
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants.
_______________________________________________________
Argued February 4, 2009 - Decided
Before Judges Cuff, Fisher and Baxter.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Morris County, Docket Nos. L-133-04 and L-1498-06.
Joseph P. Thacker (Cooper & Walinski) of the Ohio bar, admitted pro hac vice, argued the cause for appellants Resco Holdings, LLC, Rust Engineering & Construction, Inc., Rust International, Inc., Waste Management Holdings, Inc., Wheelabrator Air Pollution Control, Inc., and Wheelabrator Technolo-gies, Inc. in A-1973-08T1 and respondent PPC Corporation in A-1973-08T1 (Greenberg Trau-rig, LLP and Walder, Hayden & Brogan, PA, attorneys; Barry H. Evenchick, Thomas J. Spies and Robert J. Donaher, of counsel and on the briefs; Mr. Thacker and Keven D. Eiber (Brouse McDowell) of the Ohio bar, admitted pro hac vice, on the briefs).
David E. Schoenfeld (Grippo & Elden, LLC) of the Illinois bar, admitted pro hac vice, argued the cause for respondents Continental Insurance Company, National Fire Insurance Company of Hartford, Columbia Casualty Company, and Continental Casualty Company in A-1973-08T1 (Coughlin Duffy, LLP, attor-neys; Suzanne Cocco Midlige, Christopher S. Franges, Mr. Schoenfeld, Marc S. Lauerman (Grippo & Elden, LLC) of the Illinois bar, admitted pro hac vice, and Brian J. Mowbray (Grippo & Elden, LLC) of the Illinois bar, admitted pro hac vice, of counsel and on the briefs).
Robert W. Mauriello, Jr., argued the cause for respondents Travelers Casualty and Sure-ty Company and The Travelers Indemnity Company in A-1973-08T1 (Graham Curtin, attorneys; Mr. Mauriello, on the brief).
Andrew T. Frankel (Simpson, Thacher & Bartlett, LLP) of the New York bar, admitted pro hac vice, argued the cause for appellant Travelers Casualty and Surety Company in A-1976-08T1, 1978-08T1, A-1979-08T1, A-1981-08T1, A-1982-08T1, A-1983-08T1, A-1984-08T1 and A-1986-08T1 (Cuyler Burk, PC, attorneys; Stefano Calogero, Mr. Frankel and Seth A. Ribner (Simpson, Thacher & Bartlett, LLP) of the New York bar, admitted pro hac vice, on the brief).
James P. Ruggeri (Hogan & Hartson) of the Washington, D.C. bar, admitted pro hac vice, argued the cause for appellants Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company, First State Insurance Company, New England Reinsurance Corporation and Twin City Fire Insurance Company in A-1976-08T1, A-1978-08T1, A-1979-08T1, A-1981-08T1, A-1982-08T1, A-1983-08T1, A-1984-08T1, and A-1986-08T1 (Carroll, McNulty & Kull, LLC, attorneys; Gary S. Kull, Mr. Ruggeri, William J. Bowman (Hogan & Hartson) of the Washington, D.C. bar, admitted pro hace vice, and James G. Christiansen (Hogan & Hartson) of the Washington, D.C. bar, admitted pro hac vice, on the brief).
Michael J. Lynch (K&L Gates, LLP) of the Pennsylvania bar, admitted pro hace vice, argued the cause for appellant in A-1973-08T1 and respondent Honeywell International in A-1976-08T1, A-1978-08T1, A-1979-08T1, A-1981-08T1, A-1982-08T1, A-1983-08T1, A-1984-08T1 and A-1986-08T1 (K&L Gates, LLP, attorneys; Mr. Lynch, Donald E. Seymour (K&L Gates) of the Pennsylvania bar, admitted pro hace vice, and John T. Waldron, III (K&L Gates) of the Pennsylvania bar, admitted pro hac vice, of counsel and on the brief; and Donald W. Kiel and Robert F. Pawlowski, on the brief).
White & Williams, attorneys for appellants Century Indemnity Company, Westchester First Insurance Company, Republic Insurance Company and Government Employees Insurance Company in A-1976-08T1, A-1978-08T1, A-1979-08T1, A-1981-08T1, A-1982-08T1, A-1983-08T1, A-1984-08T1, and A-1986-08T1, and respondents Northern Assurance Company of America and Republic Insurance Company in A-1973-08T1, join in the brief of appellants.
Traub, Lieberman, Straus & Shrewsberry, LLP, attorneys for appellant Evanston Insurance Company in A-1976-08T1, A-1978-08T1, A-1979-08T1, A-1981-08T1, A-1982-08T1, A-1983-08T1, A-1984-08T1 and A-1986-08T1, join in the brief of appellants.
Christie, Pabarue, Mortensen & Young, attorneys for appellant Royal Indemnity Company in A-1976-08T1, A-1978-08T1, A-1979-08T1, A-1981-08T1, A-1982-08T1, A-1983-08T1, A-1984-08T1 and A-1986-08T1, join in the brief of appellants.
Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, LLP, attorneys for appellant MidStates Reinsurance Corporation in A-1976-08T1, A-1978-08T1, A-1979-08T1, A-1981-08T1, A-1982-08T1, A-1983-08T1, A-1984-08T1 and A-1986-08T1, join in the brief of appellants.
Smith, Stratton, Wise, Heher & Brennan, LLP, attorneys for appellant Employers Mutual Casualty Company in A-1973-08T1, A-1976-08T1, A-1978-08T1, A-1979-08T1, A-1981-08T1, A-1982-08T1, A-1983-08T1, A-1984-08T1 and A-1986-08T1, join in the brief of appellants.
Schwartz, Simon, Edelstein, Celso & Kessler, LLP, attorneys for appellants Employers Insurance Company of Wausau and National Casualty Company in A-1976-08T1, A-1978-08T1, A-1979-08T1, A-1981-08T1, A-1982-08T1, A-1983-08T1, A-1984-08T1 and A-1986-08T1, join in the brief of appellants.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
FISHER, J.A.D.
The Supreme Court recently observed that "our federal system requires that courts of sister states, when appropriate, extend comity to one another," and reiterated its adherence to the general rule that, when substantially similar suits are filed in separate jurisdictions, the court that first acquires jurisdiction takes precedence in the absence of special equities. Sensient Colors Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 193 N.J. 373, 378 (2008). We granted leave to consider the trial court's application of comity principles in these two matters; although the two matters have not been consolidated, we listed them back-to-back and now decide the issues in both matters by way of this single opinion.
In the first action, Continental v. Resco, the trial judge permanently enjoined those who have been referred to as the Resco defendants from prosecuting suits they had commenced in Texas, Ohio and Indiana after the trial judge permitted the expansion of the scope of Continental v. Resco to include all the claims previously asserted in the actions pending in those states. Because, in these convoluted circumstances, the right to claim Continental v. Resco as the first-filed action is uncertain at best, and because the special equities favor our deferral to the courts of our sister states, we reverse the injunction.
In the second action, which, unlike Continental v. Resco, presents a circumstance similar to the conflicts between jurisdictions experienced in the past, we reverse the denial of a motion to dismiss or stay Honeywell v. Travelers because a New York action filed by Travelers in the Supreme Court of New York eight days earlier than Honeywell v. Travelers is entitled to first-filed status.
I
CONTINENTAL v. RESCO
A. Procedural History
In considering the propriety of the anti-suit injunction entered in Continental v. Resco, we necessarily start with an examination of what is claimed to be the first-filed action. The first of the complaints filed in the competing suits in question was filed in the Law Division on January 12, 2004. Continental filed the action against what it referred to as the successor defendants of The Signal Companies, Inc. (Signal), an entity which Continental referred to as "a conglomerate with numerous subsidiaries," as well as the subsidiaries of one of Signal's subsidiaries, Kellogg Rust, Inc. (Kellogg Rust). Continental acknowledged it had provided liability insurance coverage to Signal and Kellogg Rust between April 1, 1982 and April 1, 1986.
Continental alleged that the successor defendants -- Honeywell International, Inc., Waste Management, Inc., California Coastal Communities, Inc., Mafco Consolidated Group, Inc., Swindell Dressler International Company, Pullman Passenger Car Company, Wheelabrator Air Pollution Control, Inc., U.S. Filter Corp., and Aquilex Services Corp. -- had been the targets of bodily injury claims caused by the claimants' exposure to asbestos and silica. Continental asserted in its complaint that these successor defendants "have sought or threatened to seek coverage" under the policies in effect between 1982 and 1986. The stated purpose of this suit, at its inception, was to declare whether the successor defendants had the right to coverage under the specified policies or whether they were strangers to the policies. On May 30, 2006, more than twenty-eight months after the filing of the complaint, Continental filed a first amended complaint, which joined as additional "successor defendants," PPC Corporation, Resco Holdings, LLC, Rust Engineering & Construction, Inc., and Rust International, Inc.; these entities as well as the previously-named Wheelabrator Technologies and Waste Management Holdings, Inc. are what we have already referred to as the Resco defendants.
The claims asserted in Continental v. Resco revolved around the facts that, in 1985, Signal and Allied Corporation merged to create Allied Signal, and, in 1986, Allied Signal, in a series of transactions prompted by antitrust considerations, divested several of its former businesses, and conveyed them to other entities, including Honeywell, which was formed in 1999 when Honeywell, Inc. merged into Allied Signal. As the complaint and amended complaint reveal, the chief purpose of the suit was to resolve whether Signal had permissibly assigned or otherwise conveyed its rights to the Continental policies to the so-called successor defendants, including the Resco defendants. The only other insurers joined to the action at that time were insurers that had issued policies to Signal and Kellogg Rust during the same period, or were primary carriers for Signal and Kellogg Rust for the periods of time immediately before and immediately after the 1982-1986 period during which Continental provided coverage.
The parties acknowledge that their energies in the case were aimed primarily, if not exclusively, at resolving personal jurisdiction disputes, which were not finally put to rest until the fall of 2007. The successorship issues at the heart of the suit -- that is, whether the successor defendants are, by nature of their relationship to Signal or Kellogg Rust, entitled to the benefits of the policies in question -- have yet to be resolved.
Instead, out of a concern about a conflict with certain out-of-state lawsuits, which we will momentarily describe, Continental sought an injunction that would prohibit the Resco defendants from prosecuting those other suits. Although the trial judge acknowledged the lack of any serious conflict when the application for temporary restraints was heard, the judge then invited Continental to amend its complaint to include the claims asserted in the out-of-state suits. Continental filed a second amended complaint on April 2, 2008, and a third amended complaint on May 7, 2008, which incorporated the claims previously asserted in the out-of-state suits commenced approximately two years earlier by the Resco defendants. This generated the very conflict that then prompted the judge to impose the anti-suit injunction in question.
B. The Out-of-State Lawsuits
As Continental v. Resco remained limited to a dispute about whether or to what extent Continental might be responsible to provide coverage to subsidiaries and successors of its named insureds, the Resco defendants filed coverage actions in other jurisdictions, namely, Ohio, Indiana and Texas.
1. Ohio
Resco filed a complaint in the Ohio Court of Common Pleas, Cayahoga County, on June 20, 2006, seeking coverage for asbestos claims and liabilities arising from its so-called "Rust businesses," including Rust Engineering Co. and Swindell-Dressler. The record on appeal reveals that this coverage suit relates to over 35,000 asbestos claims that have been filed against the Rust businesses. The action joined more than fifty insurers and concerned 165 insurance policies and their applicability to asbestos exposure between 1940 and 1988.
By way of a comity motion, the Ohio court dismissed Resco's claims with respect to one of the policies, which was included within Continental v. Resco, on January 14, 2008. The Ohio court stayed the action on March 26, 2008 in order to permit mediation. However, the mediation process has been stalled because the Resco defendants were prohibited from proceeding in that action by the anti-suit injunction that is the subject of this appeal.
2. Indiana
Two actions are presently pending in Indiana, suits that have been referred to as the "U.S. Filter" case and the "Baghouse Litigation."
a. The U.S. Filter Case
The first of the two relevant Indiana actions, which related to the production of Wheelabrator blast machines, was commenced on June 18, 2004, in the Indiana Circuit Court, Marion County.
The action concerns a dispute between U.S. Filter Corporation and primary, umbrella and excess insurers that issued policies relevant to the manufacture of blast machines. Some of the Resco defendants intervened in that action in December 2004. On January 20, 2006, the Indiana court dismissed claims filed by those Resco defendants under three policies that were duplicative of the claims then at issue in the New Jersey action.
At the time Continental v. Resco was expanded through the filing of Continental's second and third amended complaints in the spring of 2008, the U.S. Filter action involved thirty-one insurers that had issued ninety-three insurance policies between 1954 and 1997.
b. The Baghouse Litigation
A second suit, known as the "Baghouse Litigation," was filed in the Superior Court of Indiana, Marion County, on March 9, 2007. In that action the Resco defendants sought coverage from twenty-eight insurers who issued 171 policies during the fifty-year period between 1954 and 2004.
On June 27, 2007, Continental filed a comity motion, which was denied by the Indiana court on October 31, 2007. The judge there reasoned that a far longer period of coverage was in dispute; he also commented on the limited progress in the New Jersey action since it was commenced in 2004:
Moreover, although the New Jersey case was filed in January 2004, most of the effort in that case so far has been dedicated to identifying and adding other necessary or desirable parties, and litigating jurisdictional issues. . . . There is no evidence that the New Jersey case is anywhere near resolution on the merits, either in general or as to the baghouse claims in particular.
In addition, the judge found that Indiana presented the only forum where the claims asserted in the Baghouse Litigation, which was commenced more than one year before Continental amended its complaint in Continental v. Resco to include those claims, could be completely adjudicated.
On August 27, 2008, the Baghouse Litigation was stayed by the Indiana trial judge pending the outcome of anticipated rulings in the U.S. Filter case. In his order of that date, the judge indicated that he had conferred with the trial judge in Continental v. Resco about the anti-suit injunction now under review here. The Indiana judge stated that he would, following certain rulings in the U.S. Filter case, "address the propriety of this litigation in light of the New Jersey proceeding and the issues of policy limits as they affect the various defendants in both pieces of litigation."
3. Texas
Resco filed suit on September 28, 2007 in the District Court of Wharton County, Texas, seeking coverage from twenty-six insurers, five of which are also parties to Continental v. Resco, on policies issued between 1946 and 1988 relating to claims involving the manufacture of railcars, power plant construction, and the industrial engineering and construction operations of PPC Corporation and M.W. Kellogg Co.
On December 5, 2007, Continental moved to dismiss Resco's claims in this action on comity grounds. The Texas court denied that motion on February 7, 2008. The record reveals that when the application for injunctive relief was filed, the Texas trial judge reached out to the trial judge in Continental v. Resco, indicating he had hopes of settling the Texas case. Even though the trial judge here then entered the anti-suit injunction that restrained Resco from further prosecuting the Texas suit, the Texas court has proceeded undeterred.
A trial in the Texas action is now scheduled to commence on March 30, 2009.
C. Continental's Applications For
a Temporary Restraining Order
and a Permanent Injunction
On December 4, 2007, Continental moved for the entry of an order that would "restrain[] the Resco [d]efendants from pursuing duplicative litigation." During the oral argument that followed, the trial judge recognized the narrow scope of the New Jersey suit as it then existed:
I do not see how this case, in its present posture, can decide anything except for the line of corporate succession; which we have been trying to resolve for the last almost four years -- three-and-a-half years, cer-tainly.
The judge further acknowledged that the parties chose not to include the many other issues pled in the out-of-state cases even though, in an early case management order in Continental v. Resco, "everybody was invited to bring in everybody else, any entity, any carrier that they felt was necessary to resolve the issues."
Notwithstanding the undisputed and well-understood limitations of the New Jersey case as it then existed, the trial judge restrained the Resco defendants for thirty days from filing "any suit that could pertain to this action, in order to allow either Resco or any other party to bring additional parties into this action that are necessary for a resolution of the issues." The judge held that "anything that's going to affect the allocation proceeding in this case belongs before this [c]ourt," and provided the parties with additional time to amend the pleadings.
As we have mentioned, in April and May 2008, Continental filed second and third amended complaints that named as parties all the insurers in the out-of-state cases that had not previously been named in Continental v. Resco. With that, Continental sought a permanent injunction, arguing that "[n]ow that all of the satellite insurers have been brought into this case, the satellite suits are entirely duplicative of this action and thus, completely unnecessary."
On July 24, 2008, the trial judge heard argument and, for reasons expressed in an oral decision, granted Continental's application for a permanent injunction. Despite the care the courts of our sister states had taken to ensure that the Resco defendants would not litigate in their courts claims that had previously been asserted in Continental v. Resco, the trial judge here took the extraordinary steps of first creating a conflict with the pending out-of-state lawsuits and then issuing an anti-suit injunction in an attempt to shut down those other lawsuits.
Not surprisingly, problems arose with enforcement of the temporary restraints imposed even before the permanent injunction was entered on August 13, 2008. A few weeks earlier, the Resco defendants sought leave from the temporary restraining order so that they could submit additional written argument to the Indiana Supreme Court in the U.S. Filter case. A month later, the Resco defendants sought permission to respond to an order to show cause that had been issued by the Indiana Supreme Court in that case. Later still, the Resco defendants wrote to the trial judge seeking guidance in light of continuing developments in both the Texas suit and the Indiana Baghouse suit. In response, the trial judge wrote to counsel, stating:
This court will not be put into the position of ad hoc advice on various events that arise in litigations that the Resco [d]efendants have been restrained from pursuing. I believe that you have a copy of the order, as do counsel who are involved on behalf of the Resco [d]efendants in litigations in other states. I believe that the order is clear and I will not be engaging in a continuous re-interpretation of the order.
I have attempted to contact [the Texas judge], who has chosen not to return my phone calls. [The Texas judge] is apparently of a different view than am I as to the propriety of the Texas litigation. That is simply a problem that the Resco [d]efendants will have to face, in light of their obvious refusal to dismiss the Texas action, as well as actions pending in other states.
On October 7, 2008, the trial judge denied the Resco defendants' motion for reconsideration and denied a request for a stay of the injunction pending their anticipated motion for leave to appeal.
On December 17, 2008, we granted the motions filed by the Resco defendants for leave to appeal the permanent injunction. We expedited the perfection of the appeal as well as the scheduling of oral argument in this case as well as in the companion case, Honeywell v. Travelers. We now reverse the permanent injunction.
D. Legal Analysis
Our Supreme Court has cautioned that the power to impose an anti-suit injunction to bar a litigant from prosecuting a suit pending in another state is "delicate" and should only be exercised "whenever the true interests of justice so require." Trustees of Princeton Univ. v. Trust Co. of N.J., 22 N.J. 587, 598 (1956); see also O'Loughlin v. O'Loughlin, 6 N.J. 170, 179 (1951). As the process was generally described by Justice Proctor, in writing for the Court in Applestein v. United Board & Carton Corp., 35 N.J. 343, 357 (1961) (citations omitted), "an anti-suit injunction must issue with an acute awareness that the power to enjoin prosecution of a foreign proceeding ought to be exercised sparingly, but that it should be conscientiously exercised whenever equity and justice require."
In approaching such problems, our courts have "long adhered to 'the general rule that the court which first acquires jurisdiction has precedence in the absence of special equities.'" Sensient Colors, supra, 193 N.J. at 386 (quoting Yancoskie v. Del. River Port Auth., 78 N.J. 321, 324 (1978)). Although preservation of the court's jurisdiction has been cited as a basis for imposing such an injunction, our courts have recognized that the first-filed rule was "established . . . primarily for the benefit of the suitor, rather than for the protection of the dignity of the court." Bigelow, supra, 74 N.J. Eq. at 474. As a result, the power to enjoin is generally limited to circumstances where it is necessary "to avoid the vexation and oppression incident to multiple litigation in different jurisdictions," or "to preserve the court's prior jurisdiction over a particular controversy and avoid the spectacle of an unseem[ly] race resulting perhaps in conflicting judicial determinations." Trs. of Princeton, supra, 22 N.J. at 598. See also Bass v. De Vink, 336 N.J. Super. 450, 455-56 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 168 N.J. 292 (2001); Am. Employers' Ins. Co. v. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc., 280 N.J. Super. 601, 610 (App. Div. 1995).
The general principles that guide our hand were summarized in the Supreme Court's recent decision in Sensient Colors:
If we are to have harmonious relations with our sister states, absent extenuating cir-cumstances sufficient to qualify as special equities, comity and common sense counsel that a New Jersey court should not interfere with a similar, earlier-filed case in another jurisdiction that is "capable of affording adequate relief and doing complete justice." The litigation of substantially similar lawsuits in multiple jurisdictions with opposing parties racing to acquire the first judgment is not only wasteful of judicial resources, but anathema in a federal system that contemplates cooperation among the states. Thus, any comity analysis should begin with a presumption in favor of the earlier-filed action.
[193 N.J. at 387 (footnote and citations omitted) (quoting O'Loughlin, supra, 6 N.J. at 179).]
In applying these principles here, with the understanding that the first-filed presumption is not inflexible, ibid., we conclude: (1) there is, at least, considerable doubt about Continental's right to claim first-filed status for Continental v. Resco; (2) the prior rulings of our sister states in considering the propriety of comity stays or dismissals in their courts were entitled to weight; (3) the injunction under review does not