(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for
the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please
note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).
The County of Camden v. Verniero (A-60-97)
Argued October 6, 1997 -- Decided December 10, 1997
PER CURIAM
The issue in this case is whether the State must comply with a duly-enacted administrative regulation
that requires the transfer of state-sentenced juveniles from county to state facilities within three days.
The juvenile detention centers in Camden and Hudson Counties are overcrowded. This has led to
the intermingling of state-sentenced and non-sentenced youth in the detention centers. The counties
demanded that the State comply with N.J.A.C. 10:19-4.2(d), which requires the transfer of state-sentenced
juveniles to State facilities within three days. The State refused because its own juvenile facilities were
overcrowded. Instead, the State sought to transfer the juveniles as expeditiously as possible.
The Counties filed notices of appeal. The Appellate Division ruled that the regulation was valid and
enforceable and ordered the State to transfer the juveniles within the three-day time period. The State
petitioned for certification and filed an emergent application for a stay. The Court granted the petition for
certification and granted the motion for a stay except as to the two counties in this litigation.
HELD: The State must adhere to the requirement of its existing regulation governing the transfer of state-sentenced juveniles to State facilities within three working days of being notified of the sentence.
1. In 1989, the Appellate Division determined that State statutes imposed the burden of housing state-sentenced juveniles on the State, not the counties. Accordingly, it ordered the Department of Corrections
(DOC) to promulgate regulations to provide for the removal of those juveniles from county detention
centers. In 1991, the DOC issued the three-day removal regulation. That regulation forms the basis for the
holding of the Appellate Division in this case that the State is required to transfer within three days state-sentenced juveniles from county facilities to State juvenile detention facilities. (pp. 4-5).
2. In 1995, the Legislature established the Juvenile Justice Commission (JJC) to oversee all juvenile justice
matters. The legislation transferred and consolidated the authority over the juvenile justice system from
three separate departments (the DOC, the Department of Law and Public Safety, and the Department of
Human Services) to the JJC. The State argues that the JJC enabling legislation was intended to cover the
entire subject matter of juvenile justice, including the detention and housing of all juveniles. There is,
however, no indication that the Legislature intended to supersede and nullify any existing rules in the absence
of regulatory action by the JJC. In fact, the statute expressly provides that all rules promulgated by the
agencies formerly with authority over the system shall remain in full force and effect. The Court therefore
concludes that the three-day rule remains a valid regulation. (pp. 5-10).
3. The State argues that the JJC has the implied authority to disregard the regulation. Because administrative regulations have the force and effect of statutory law, an agency ordinarily must enforce and adhere to the regulations it has promulgated. The State has not attempted formally to waive the transfer regulations. The informal policy of the JJC to disregard the transfer regulation does not constitute a valid waiver. The JJC has the power to amend, change, or repeal its regulations. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provides the manner by which an agency can amend existing regulations. The APA also enables an agency to adopt an emergency regulation in certain situations. Further, if warranted, the JJC can seek
relief through executive order. Finally, statutes permit the State to contract with counties to prevent
overcrowding. (pp. 10-15).
4. The Court is mindful of the State's evidence relating to overcrowding in State juvenile detention facilities
and of its contention that it lacks resources to comply with the three-day transfer rule. In the exercise of its
equitable discretion, the Court may take into account relevant circumstances in determining the effective date
of its decision regarding the enforceability of the regulation. The Court determines that the effective date of
this ruling shall be sixty days from the date of this decision except that, as to Camden and Hudson Counties,
the three-day transfer regulation shall continue to be enforced consistently with this decision. (pp. 15-16).
The judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED.
JUSTICES HANDLER, POLLOCK, O'HERN, GARIBALDI, STEIN and COLEMAN join in the
PER CURIAM opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ did not participate.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-
60 September Term 1997
THE COUNTY OF HUDSON,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, STATE OF
NEW JERSEY, WILLIAM H. FAUVER,
COMMISSIONER DEPARTMENT OF LAW AND
PUBLIC SAFETY, JUVENILE JUSTICE
COMMISSION, STATE OF NEW JERSEY
DEBORAH T. PORITZ, ATTORNEY
GENERAL,
Defendants-Appellants.
THE COUNTY OF CAMDEN, A body
politic of the State of New
Jersey,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
PETER G. VERNIERO, ATTORNEY GENERAL
OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, In his
Official Capacity as Administrator
of THE JUVENILE JUSTICE COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, AND
CHAIR OF THE EXECUTIVE BOARD OF THE
JUVENILE JUSTICE COMMISSION; PAUL
DONNELLY, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE
JUVENILE JUSTICE COMMISSION OF THE
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, In his
Official Capacity; THE JUVENILE
JUSTICE COMMISSION; AND THE STATE
OF NEW JERSEY; WILLIAM FAUVER
COMMISSIONER OF DEPARTMENT OF LAW
AND PUBLIC SAFETY AND DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS,
Defendants-Appellants.
Argued October 6, 1997 -- Decided December 10, 1997
On certification to the Superior Court,
Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported
at
300 N.J. Super. 389 (1997).
Daisy B. Barreto, Deputy Attorney General,
argued the cause for appellants (Peter
Verniero, Attorney General of New Jersey,
attorney; Joseph L. Yannotti, Assistant
Attorney General, of counsel; Ms. Barreto and
Donald M. Palombi, Deputy Attorneys General,
on the briefs).
Robert G. Millenky, County Counsel, argued
the cause for respondent The County of Camden
(Mr. Millenky, attorney; Mr. Millenky and
Donna M. Whiteside, Assistant County Counsel,
on the brief).
Michael A. Cifelli, Assistant County Counsel,
argued the cause for respondent The County of
Hudson (Francis DeLeonardis, Hudson County
Counsel, attorney).
Andrew M. Baron, Assistant County Counsel,
submitted a letter in lieu of brief on behalf
amicus curiae, The County of Union (Jeremiah
D. O'Dwyer, Acting Union County Counsel,
attorney).
PER CURIAM
The issue in this case is whether the State must comply with
a duly-enacted administrative regulation that requires the
transfer of state-sentenced juveniles from county to state
facilities within three days. Two counties challenged the
State's refusal to transfer their juvenile delinquents within the
three-day time period required by the regulation.
The circumstances giving rise to this litigation are that
the juvenile detention centers in both Camden and Hudson Counties
are overcrowded. Overcrowding has resulted in the intermingling
of state-sentenced and non-sentenced youth in the detention
centers. In response to that problem, both counties demanded
that the State comply with the three-day regulation and transfer
the state-sentenced juveniles to State facilities within that
time. The State refused to comply with the regulation because
its own two juvenile facilities were overcrowded. Instead, the
State adopted a policy of transferring the juveniles "as
expeditiously as possible, as circumstances permit, but not
always in compliance with the three day requirement."
Both counties filed notices of appeal with the Appellate
Division. The Appellate Division ruled that the regulation was
valid and enforceable and ordered the State to transfer the
juveniles within the three-day time period as required by the
regulation.
300 N.J. Super. 389 (1997). The State petitioned
for certification and filed an emergent application for a stay of
the court's judgment. The Court granted the petition for
certification and granted the motion for a stay except as to the
two counties involved.
149 N.J. 406 (1997).
We affirm the judgment upholding the validity and
enforceability of the transfer regulation. Except as to Hudson
and Camden Counties, that judgment is stayed for a period of
sixty days from the date of this decision to enable the State to
take necessary measures to comply with the time period of the
transfer regulation, unless that regulation is sooner modified
and superseded by a valid amendatory regulation or other legally
effective State action.
Foreshadowing the current litigation, in 1989 the Appellate Division held unlawful the State's practice of maintaining state-sentenced juveniles in county detention centers after final disposition. County of Monmouth v. Department of Corrections, 236 N.J. Super. 523 (App. Div. 1989). The court determined that under the then-applicable statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-43, -44 (since amended), the burden of housing state-sentenced juveniles was on the State rather than the counties. Accordingly, the court ordered the Department of Corrections (DOC) to effectuate its statutory duty to house state-sentenced juveniles by promulgating regulations to provide for the removal of those juveniles from the county detention centers. County of Monmouth, supra, 236 N.J. Super. at 528. Pursuant to that order, in 1991, the DOC issued the three-day removal regulation, N.J.A.C. 10:19-4.2(d). The regulation provides as follows:
A juvenile who receives a State sentence of incarceration shall be transported to the juvenile intake unit at the New Jersey Training School for Boys no later than three working days after the Department of Corrections receives notification, in the form of a signed commitment order and a presentence or predisposition report, from the county where the juvenile has been sentenced. The three working days shall be exclusive of the date on which the Department of Corrections receives the appropriate and necessary documentation.
That regulation forms the basis for the holding of the Appellate Division in this case that the State is required to
transfer within three days state-sentenced juveniles from county
facilities to State juvenile detention facilities. The Appellate
Division determined that legislation that substantially revised
the juvenile justice system, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-169 to -178, and
created a new agency with complete authority over the housing of
juveniles in the juvenile justice system did not, as argued by
the State, repeal the three-day transfer regulation, and that
regulation remained valid and fully enforceable. 300 N.J. Super.
at 392-94. We affirm the judgment substantially for the reasons
of the Appellate Division as expressed by Judge Shebell.
In 1995, the Legislature enacted N.J.S.A. 52:17B-169 to
-178. That statute established the Juvenile Justice Commission
(JJC) to oversee all juvenile justice matters. N.J.S.A. 52:17B-170a. The State argues that the 1995 legislation creating the
JJC completely revamped the entire juvenile justice system and
effectively displaced the three-day transfer regulation, N.J.A.C.
10:19-4.2(d), which, as noted, the DOC had promulgated in 1991.
Prior to the establishment of the JJC, three State agencies
were responsible for the juvenile justice system: the DOC, the
Department of Law and Public Safety, and the Department of Human
Services. N.J.S.A. 52:17B-169d. With the creation of the JJC
under N.J.S.A. 52:17B-170a, the State established a single agency
"responsible for developing a Statewide plan for effective
provision of juvenile justice services and sanctions at the
State, county and local level . . . ." N.J.S.A. 52:17B-169k.
The Governor hailed the new legislation as "overhauling the
entire system" and bringing about an "efficient, unified juvenile
justice system . . . ." Remarks of Governor Christine Todd
Whitman-Juvenile Justice Bill Signing (Dec. 15, 1995).
The Legislature, in effect, transferred and consolidated the
authority over the juvenile justice system previously exercised
by the three separate executive departments. Under N.J.S.A.
52:17B-176, the Legislature placed in the JJC all of the powers
and responsibilities the other three agencies had in respect of
juveniles. The Legislature empowered the JJC to establish
standards for the "care, treatment, government and discipline of
juveniles" adjudicated delinquent, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-170e(6), to
assume the custody and care of juveniles committed to it by law,
N.J.S.A. 52:17B-170e(7), to formulate and adopt standards and
rules for the efficient running of the commission and its
facilities, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-170e(14), and to promulgate rules and
regulations necessary to effectuate the purposes of the
commission, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-170e(22).
Within the JJC's enabling legislation, the Legislature
specifically provided for the continuation of any regulations
promulgated by the other agencies. N.J.S.A. 52:17B-177b(3)
provides as follows:
All rules and regulations promulgated by the
Commissioner of Corrections or the
Commissioner of Human Services pertaining to
functions, powers, duties and authority
transferred to the commission pursuant to
[52:17B-176] shall be considered rules or
regulations of the commission and, as such,
shall remain in full force and effect until
expiration or modification by the commission
in accordance with law.
The State argues that the JJC enabling legislation was
intended to cover the entire subject matter of juvenile justice,
including the detention and housing of all juveniles coming into
the juvenile justice system and charged with and sentenced for
delinquency. Consequently, the State contends, this
comprehensive legislative scheme supersedes any prior enactments
concerning juvenile justice. The State acknowledges the
statutory delegation to the JJC of the power to amend any
previously-enacted regulations, along with the delegation of all
prior statutory and regulatory power. Nevertheless, it argues
that the existing rules, even if unrepealed and unamended by the
JJC, are ineffective and unenforceable.
There is, however, no indication that the Legislature
intended to supersede and nullify any existing rules, including
the transfer rule, in the absence of any regulatory action by the
JJC serving to repeal or modify such rules. Rather, the opposite
inference is irresistible. As noted, the statute expressly
provides that, as related to the responsibility delegated to the
JJC over the juvenile justice system, "[a]ll rules and
regulations promulgated by the [agencies formerly with authority
over the juvenile justice system] shall be considered rules or
regulations of the [JJC] and, as such, shall remain in full force
and effect until expiration or modification by the [JJC]."
N.J.S.A. 52:17B-177b(3). The statute thus expressly mandates the
continuation, not the termination, of existing rules and
regulations.
It is clear that the Legislature intended, both before and
after the creation of the JJC, to place the responsibility for
housing state-sentenced juvenile offenders on the State.
However, the Legislature did not provide for or mandate a time
frame for removal of such delinquents from county facilities.
The Legislature's silence in that regard cannot be ascribed to
oversight or inadvertence. Clearly, it knew how to provide for
removal because it enacted such a provision for state-sentenced
adult offenders. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-10. The Legislature and
Executive have dealt continuously with that serious situation.
See, e.g., L. 1994, c.12 (declaring prison overcrowding an
emergency and authorizing Governor to issue executive orders to
address "the crowding problem"); L. 1996, c.9 (extending
Governor's executive authority under 1994 law for two more
years); see also County of Morris v. Fauver,
296 N.J. Super. 26
(App. Div.) (construing contract between Department of
Corrections and Counties providing housing for state inmates in
county facilities with appropriate per diem compensation),
certif. granted,
149 N.J. 142 (1997). Further, the Legislature
has witnessed a continuing struggle between the counties and the
State over the housing, removal, and transfer of adult offenders.
E.g., compare Worthington v. Fauver,
88 N.J. 183 (1982) (holding
that use of executive emergency power to deal with overcrowding
of adult prison population was lawful) with County of Gloucester
v. State,
132 N.J. 141 (1993) (holding that repeated use of
executive emergency power for over twelve years was beyond the
scope of enabling statute). It is thus not possible to believe
that the Legislature was unaware of or indifferent to the
overcrowding of juveniles in county detention facilities. As
summarized by Judge Shebell, "the problems with overcrowding
specifically caused by the detention of State-sentenced offenders
in these County Youth Detention Centers are well-documented."
300 N.J. Super. at 393. Indeed, the Council report and Senate
hearings on the juvenile justice legislation both expressed
frustration with the State's prior handling of its duties and the
State's failure to adhere to what they saw as a mandatory removal
requirement of the three-day transfer regulation. Governor's
Advisory Council on Juvenile Justice, Final Report (Dec. 30,
1994) (stating, with approval, that "juveniles who are committed
to the authority of the Department of Corrections or the Division
of Justice Services in the Department of Human Services must, as
a matter of law, be removed from county detention within 72 hours
of disposition"); Juvenile Justice System: Hearings on S.B. 2211
Before the Senate Law and Public Safety Committee (Sept. 11,
1995).
The omission of a comparable time-specific transfer
provision in the statute, when considered with the broad
authority granted to the JJC, underscores the legislative
decision to leave all aspects of the housing of juveniles to the
discretion of the governing agency. Thus, the JJC's delegated
power to deal with the removal and transfer of juvenile prisoners
encompasses the authority to allow the existing three-day
transfer regulation to continue as a valid regulation. It has
effectively continued the transfer regulation by not enacting new
regulations repealing or amending that regulation.
Consistent with the JJC's statutory power to promulgate new
regulations and amend existing regulations, it is clearly
inferable that the Legislature did not intend by the passage of
the comprehensive juvenile justice reform act to supersede and
nullify the regulation for the transfer of state-sentenced
juveniles in the absence of an exercise by the JJC of its
statutory authority to change that regulation. See N.J.S.A.
52:17B-177b(3); cf. Kemp v. State,
147 N.J. 294, 307 (1997)
(noting that if inconsistency between successive statutes is not
fatal to the operation of either, no repeal will be effected).
Based on the statutory provision providing for the
continuing effect of the prior rules and regulations in light of
its legislative history, we conclude that N.J.A.C. 10:19-4.2(d)
remains a valid regulation.
The State argues that the JJC has the implied authority to disregard the regulation governing the time for the transfer of state-sentenced juvenile offenders.
Because administrative regulations that apply to the regulated public have the force and effect of statutory law, an
administrative agency ordinarily must enforce and adhere to, and
may not disregard, the regulations it has promulgated. In re
Waterfront Development Permit,
244 N.J. Super. 426, 434 (App.
Div. 1990) (quoting Pacific Molasses Co. v. F.T.C.,
356 F.2d 386,
389-90 (5th Cir. 1966), for the proposition that when an agency
“promulgates rules to govern its proceedings, these rules must be
scrupulously observed. . . . [O]nce an agency exercises its
discretion and creates the procedural rules under which it
desires to have its actions judged, it denies itself the right to
violate these rules."), certif. denied,
126 N.J 320 (1991);
County of Monmouth, supra, 236 N.J. Super. at 525 (stating in
dicta that agency action in violation of its own regulations is
arbitrary and capricious); 1 Charles H. Koch, Jr., Administrative
Law and Practice § 3.73 (1985 & Supp. 1997) (concluding that
agency generally must follow its own legislative rules); 2
Kenneth C. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 7:21 (2d ed. 1979
& Supp. 1989) (concluding that legislative rules are “clearly”
binding on issuing agency because valid legislative rules have
effect of a statute).
Administrative agencies possess wide discretion and
authority to select the means and procedures by which to meet
their statutory objectives; an agency itself is best suited to
review its own regulations and, in deciding whether or not to
change them, to choose the means by which to proceed. Texter v.
Department of Human Servs.,
88 N.J. 376, 383, 385-87 (1982).
Nevertheless, although an administrative agency may change its
regulations, so long as they are in force the agency is bound by
them. In re Waterfront Development Permit, supra, 244 N.J.
Super. at 434; Iuppo v. Burke,
162 N.J. Super. 538, 548-50 (App.
Div.) (stating that Commissioner of Education was “bound by duly
promulgated rules and regulations” and that he improperly
suspended them without formal amendment procedures), certif.
denied,
79 N.J. 462 (1978).
The State has not attempted formally to waive the transfer
regulations. Absent a statute or regulation authorizing the
waiver of otherwise valid and enforceable administrative
regulations, an agency generally should not waive its own duly-enacted regulations by disregarding them. Dougherty v.
Department of Human Servs.,
91 N.J. 1, 8, 12 (1982) (reversing
attempted waiver of agency's reimbursement regulation on grounds
that agency should first consider grounds for waiver of that
regulation); see also SMB Assocs. v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl.
Protection,
264 N.J. Super 38 (App. Div. 1993) (holding that
waiver of DEP regulations may not be granted to party in absence
of duly promulgated regulation setting standards for such
waivers), aff'd on other grounds,
137 N.J. 58 (1994).
We conclude that the State must adhere to the requirement of
its existing regulation governing the transfer of state-sentenced
juveniles to State facilities within three working days of being
notified of the sentence as provided therein.
That conclusion in no way forecloses or inhibits the State
from taking appropriate action in respect of the housing of
juveniles coming into the juvenile justice system. In general,
an agency has the authority to amend, change, or repeal its
regulations, especially in response to changing conditions. See
Dougherty, supra, 91 N.J. at 10 ("[T]he Legislature has delegated
to the agencies the authority to adopt, revise and enforce
implementing regulations . . . ."). An agency has the power, and
sometimes the obligation, to amend existing policies and
regulations. See Saint Joseph's Hospital & Medical Center v.
Finley,
153 N.J. Super 214, 224-25 (App. Div. 1977) (holding that
so long as agency acts reasonably, “an administrative agency may
pass regulations in the light of present and future requirements
of the public interest in its field despite a prior determination
to the contrary"), certif. denied,
75 N.J. 595 (1978). While
N.J.S.A. 52:17B-177b(3) states that previous regulations of the
DOC are now the rules of the JJC, it also provides that those
rules may be modified or amended by the JJC.
Here the JJC has purported to adopt informally a policy
that, in effect, disregards the provisions of its transfer
regulation. Under the general rule requiring a regulation
providing for waiver authority, that policy alone cannot
constitute a valid waiver of the transfer regulation.
Consequently, that policy cannot be a valid basis for the State's
exercise of its statutory juvenile removal and transfer
authority.
Moreover, its policy cannot be deemed a valid amendment of
the transfer regulation. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA),
N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 to -15, provides the manner by which an agency
can amend existing regulations. See N.J.S.A. 52:14B-4a. Thus,
under the APA, the JJC can adopt an amendatory regulation through
the same notice and comment procedures that it used to adopt the
regulation in the first place. Ibid. The JJC has already
embarked on this course with its proposal to modify the transfer
time period. See
29 N.J.R. 1667(a) (May 5, 1997) (proposing to
delete N.J.A.C. 10:19-4.2(d), (e) and replace them with N.J.A.C.
13:90-4.1, -4.2 providing for a sixty-day transfer period for
1997, a forty-five-day transfer period for 1998, and a thirty-day
transfer period for 1999 and later).
The APA also enables an agency to adopt an emergency
regulation if it "finds that an imminent peril to the public
health, safety, or welfare requires adoption of a rule" without
strict notice and comment procedures. N.J.S.A. 52:14B-4c. Such
an emergency rule, if appropriate, would have effect for only a
limited period of time, see ibid., but it would give the JJC more
time to address the problem.
Further, if warranted by exigent circumstances, the JJC can
seek relief through executive order. Under the Civil Defense and
Disaster Control Act, N.J.S.A. App.A:9-30 to -63, the Governor
can employ the resources of the counties to assist in an
emergency facing the State as a whole. Such powers have been
used in the past to handle overcrowding of adult prisoners, see,
e.g., Worthington v. Fauver, supra,
88 N.J. 183 (upholding use of
executive emergency power to deal with overcrowding of adult
prison population), and can be invoked if this situation rises to
the level of an emergency and the proper procedures are followed.
Finally, as pointed out by the Appellate Division in this
case, N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-44.1, which was enacted following the
Monmouth decision of the Appellate Division, "permit[s]
agreements between the State and Counties and provid[es]
safeguards to prevent overcrowding." 300 N.J. Super. at 393.
That opportunity to contract remains open to the State.
We affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division. We are mindful of the State's evidence relating to overcrowding in juvenile detention facilities and of the State's contention that it lacks resources to comply with the three-day transfer rule. As noted, the State is currently in the process of amending the transfer rule, and, in accordance with its provisions, transfers of juvenile delinquents from county facilities under the proposed rule will not be required within three days but will be effectuated over longer periods. We cannot, however, authorize the State to disregard the current transfer regulation, particularly when, as explained in this opinion, it has other avenues to take legally effective action to relieve itself of the burden in complying with the three-day transfer requirement. Nevertheless, this Court may, in the exercise of equitable discretion, take into account relevant circumstances in determining the effective date of its decision regarding the
enforceability of the regulatory enactment. See, e.g., Salorio
v. Glaser,
93 N.J. 447, 467 (1983) (noting "our concern for the
fiscal and administrative problems that would be engendered if
the State were compelled [to comply immediately]" with judicial
decision invalidating tax statute). A postponement of the
effective date of our decision is appropriate here given the
current overcrowding of State juvenile detention centers and the
importance of adequately providing for the housing of juveniles.
Cf. County of Gloucester, supra, 132 N.J. at 153 (giving State
one year to comply with Court's ruling that executive emergency
orders delaying transfer of State prisoners were invalid).
However, that postponement shall be only temporary to enable the
State to take alternative action. Accordingly, we determine that
the effective date of our ruling that the State must comply with
the three-day transfer regulation shall be sixty days from the
date of this decision except that, as to Camden and Hudson
Counties, the three-day transfer regulation shall continue to be
enforced consistently with this decision.
So ordered.
JUSTICES HANDLER, POLLOCK, O'HERN, GARIBALDI, STEIN and COLEMAN join in the PER CURIAM opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ did not participate.
NO. A-60 SEPTEMBER TERM 1997
ON APPEAL FROM
ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court
THE COUNTY OF HUDSON,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, etc.,
et al.,
Defendants-Appellants.
THE COUNTY OF CAMDEN, etc.,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
PETER G. VERNIERO, etc., et al.,
Defendants-Appellants.
DECIDED December 10, 1997
Justice Handler PRESIDING
OPINION BY PER CURIAM
CONCURRING OPINION BY
DISSENTING OPINION BY