(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for
the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please
note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).
Argued February 18, 1998 -- Decided April 7, 1998
PER CURIAM
This appeal arises from emergency regulatory actions taken by the New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection (DEP) regarding the harvesting of horseshoe crabs. Horseshoe crabs, which have
been in existence for 300 million years, once were considered useful for fertilizer and little else, but recently
have become the target of commercial fishermen as enough uses of the creatures have been discovered to
make harvesting them profitable. The largest concentration of Atlantic horseshoe crabs is in Delaware Bay,
but during the five years preceding 1997, the number of crabs on some Delaware Bay beaches declined
ninety percent.
Concerned about the harmful effect the reported decline in horseshoe crabs would have on the
migratory bird population that relies on plentiful supplies of horseshoe crab eggs on New Jersey's Delaware
Bay beaches for replenishment of energy reserves each spring, the DEP adopted on May 30, 1997, an
emergency rule ("Shorebird Emergency Rule") that banned completely the harvesting of horseshoe crabs.
Under New Jersey's Administrative Procedure Act (APA), an emergency rule or regulation may be
effective for a period of no more than sixty days, unless each house of the Legislature passes a resolution
concurring in its extension for a period of not more than sixty days. Thus, the Shorebird Emergency Rule
would expire on July 29, 1997, without legislative action. The executive branch did not seek a legislative
extension of the Shorebird Emergency Rule and neither house passed a resolution to extend.
During the harvesting ban, the DEP conducted studies of the horseshoe crab population. The data
collected showed a serious decline in that population. Believing on the basis of the studies that resumption
of trawling and dredging for horseshoe crabs would have a devastating effect on the species and on the
horseshoe crab fishery, the DEP adopted another emergency rule ("Horseshoe Crab Emergency Rule")
effective July 29, 1997, that completely banned the taking of horseshoe crabs until May 1, 1998, and
eliminated the year-long harvest for horseshoe crabs by various means that previously had been permitted.
At the same time it adopted the Emergency regulation of July 29, 1997, the DEP proposed a permanent
regulation for the harvesting of horseshoe crabs and began the administrative rulemaking process.
After the DEP adopted the Horseshoe Crab Emergency Rule, the Delaware Bay Waterman's
Association (DBWA), a group that represents individuals engaged in the harvesting and taking of horseshoe
crabs for commercial gain, challenged the emergency rule in the courts as an impermissible extension of the
May emergency regulation for an additional sixty days. The DBWA contended that the July rule was invalid
because the Legislature did not pass a resolution concurring in the extension of the May emergency rule.
The Appellate Division accelerated the appeal by the DBWA and filed an opinion holding that the
emergency rule of July 29, 1997, violated Section 4(c) of the APA because the DEP had failed to obtain the
necessary approval of both houses of the Legislature. The court concluded that although the DEP had
articulated different reasons for the two emergency rules, because both had the same cause and the same
result, there was but one emergency.
The DEP filed a petition for certification of the Appellate Division judgment and sought a stay of
the judgment of the Appellate Division pending disposition of the petition for certification. The Court
granted the petition for certification and stayed the Appellate Division's judgment pending appeal. The
request of the DBWA to expedite consideration of the appeal, or in the alternative, to vacate the stay of the
Appellate Division judgment was denied. The effect of these actions was that the emergency ban on
harvesting of horseshoe crabs would expire by its own terms on September 27, 1997.
On September 25, 1997, at the conclusion of the rulemaking process, the DEP adopted a permanent
rule governing the harvesting of horseshoe crabs. Thereafter, the DEP moved to dismiss the appeal on the
grounds of mootness and to vacate the judgment of the Appellate Division. The Court reserved decision on
the motion of the DEP pending argument of the appeal.
HELD: An administrative agency that perceives a genuinely distinct and separate emergency from that for
which an emergency regulation is currently in place is not precluded from responding to the new
emergency with another sixty-day regulation even if the second regulation has the same effect on the
regulated public as did the first. In this case, because there no longer is a need to debate whether
in fact there were two distinct emergencies, the appeal is moot.
1. Although the parties disagreed as to whether on the record in this case there was one emergency or
two, all agreed that under the APA, the executive branch possesses extraordinary powers to deal with
emergent circumstances. The exercise of that authority, limited to appropriate circumstances, must not be
circumscribed as to prevent a proper response by the head of an agency and the Governor to address distinct
emergent circumstances. (pp. 8-9)
2. Because the appeal is moot, there is no need for the Court to decide whether it agrees with the
assessment of the Appellate Division that there was only one emergency, a determination the Appellate
Division made in a limited time period on its accelerated appeal. There is no need to vacate the judgment
of the Appellate Division. (p. 9)
The appeal is DISMISSED as moot.
CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES HANDLER, POLLOCK, O'HERN, GARIBALDI,
STEIN, and COLEMAN join in this PER CURIAM opinion.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-
102 September Term 1997
DELAWARE BAY WATERMAN'S ASSOCIATION
OF NEW JERSEY, a Non-Profit
Corporation, CHARLES F. BURKE, JR.,
JOHN KING, FRED LAYTON, JR.,
KENNETH W. BAILEY, ROBERT BATEMAN,
JAMES J. NASH, JEFFREY W. NACE,
ALEXANDER T. OGDEN, III and LANCE
NAYLOR,
Appellants-Respondents,
v.
NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION,
Respondent-Appellant.
Argued February 18, 1998 -- Decided April 7, 1998
On certification to the Superior Court,
Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported
at
304 N.J. Super. 20 (1997).
Jaynee LaVecchia, Assistant Attorney General,
argued the cause for appellant (Peter
Verniero, Attorney General of New Jersey,
attorney; Ms. LaVecchia and Joseph L.
Yannotti, Assistant Attorney General, of
counsel; Howard L. Geduldig, Catherine A.
Tormey and Judeth Piccinini Yeany, Deputy
Attorneys General, on the briefs).
Richard M. Hluchan argued the cause for
respondents (Levin & Hluchan, attorneys;
Richard S. Morrison, on the brief).
Senator James S. Cafiero, Assemblyman
Nicholas Asselta and Assemblyman John C.
Gibson submitted a brief on behalf of amici
curiae pro se.
PER CURIAM
This appeal concerns a ban on the harvesting of horseshoe
crabs imposed by the New Jersey Department of Environmental
Protection (DEP) on July 29, 1997. This ungainly creature is one
of nature's marvels.
Ugliness is nature's great gift to the
horseshoe crab. It looks like a cross
between a lobster and a Sherman tank, with a
steel helmet of a shell and enough barbs and
spikes to deter most predators. Get past the
armor and there's little to eat; fishermen
long viewed the crabs as a nuisance, barely
worth the few pennies they'd fetch at the
fertilizer plant.
This singular unattractiveness, wrapped in a
remarkably sturdy biological package, enabled
the crab to survive for 300 million years.
Ice ages and meteor explosions that wiped out
dinosaurs rolled off its armor-plated back.
[Joby Warrick, Ugly Horseshoe Crab May Have a
Future to Match on Delaware Bay, Washington
Post, Aug. 4, 1997, at A3.]
Despite the crab's durability, humankind today poses a
serious threat to the survival of the horseshoe crab.
Fishermen have discovered a market for the
crabs as bait for a growing eel fishery, and
suddenly one of [the] ocean's great survivors
is floundering. In the Delaware Bay, home of
the largest concentration of Atlantic
horseshoe crabs, its numbers on some beaches
are down 90 percent in five years.
The drop is coinciding with a new awareness
of the creature's ecological value. In the
bay, fewer horseshoe crabs means fewer
horseshoe crab eggs, a dietary staple for
migratory shore birds that flock to local
beaches each spring . . . [endangering] the
$30 million-a-year bird-watching industry
that has grown up around it.
"You pull at one thread," observes [the] . .
. refuge manager for Cape May National Park,
"and everything starts to come undone."
Ironically, the crab is becoming imperiled
just as scientists are fully realizing its
potential for improving human health. The
horseshoe crab's unique blue blood is the
world's only source of a compound called
limulus amoebocyte lysate, which is used
widely to test for bacterial contaminants in
drugs. The nearly pure form of a substance
in the crab's shell--chitin--is being
explored as a possible dressing for burns
that promotes faster healing.
The DEP's action took the form of an emergency rule
regulating the commercial harvesting of horseshoe crabs, N.J.A.C.
7:25-18.16. The effect of the July 29, 1997 rule was to create a
sixty-day extension to a complete ban on the taking of horseshoe
crabs imposed by a prior emergency rule adopted sixty days
earlier, on May 30, 1997. The July emergency rule completely
banned the taking of horseshoe crabs until May 1, 1998. In
addition, the emergency rule eliminated a previously existing,
year-long horseshoe crab harvest allowing, instead, horseshoe
crabs to be taken by hand on two days per week in May and June to
the extent of one hundred crabs per person, per day. Trawling
for crabs was prohibited.
Plaintiff, Delaware Bay Waterman's Association (DBWA),
represents individuals engaged in the harvesting and taking of
horseshoe crabs for commercial gain. DBWA contended that the
July 29, 1997 emergency rule was the functional equivalent of the
May emergency rule and impermissibly extended the May emergency
regulation for an additional sixty days. It contended that DEP
adopted the emergency rule in violation of section 4(c) of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), N.J.S.A. 52:14B-4(c), which
provides that an emergency rule or regulation may be effective
for a period of not more than sixty days, unless each house of
the Legislature passes a resolution concurring in its extension
for a period of not more than sixty days. Neither house passed
such a resolution. DBWA contended that DEP's failure to comply
with the APA requirement rendered the July rule invalid.
On August 14, 1997, DBWA sought, in the Appellate Division,
a temporary stay of the July 29, 1997 emergency rule. Following
a hearing on the stay application, the Appellate Division
concluded that because of the fleeting nature of the issues, the
court had to accelerate the substantive appeal.
304 N.J. Super. 20, 23-24 (1997). On August 20, 1997, the Appellate Division
invalidated the ban, finding that the emergency regulation
violated section 4(c) because DEP had failed to obtain the
necessary approval of both houses of the Legislature. Id. at 25.
DEP sought a stay of the Appellate Division's decision
pending certification in and further order of this Court. On
September 4, 1997, we granted DEP's petition for certification,
151 N.J. 469 (1997), and stayed the Appellate Division's
judgment. DBWA sought expedited consideration of this matter or,
in the alternative, to vacate the stay of the judgment of the
Appellate Division. DBWA's motion was denied. The net effect of
the Supreme Court actions was that the emergency ban on
harvesting of horseshoe crabs remained in place for an additional
sixty days until it would expire by its own terms on September
27, 1997.
Concurrently with its adoption of the emergency regulation
on July 29, 1997, DEP proposed a permanent regulation for the
harvesting of horseshoe crabs. Following notice and opportunity
to be heard, DEP adopted the permanent rule on September 25,
1997. Provisions of the new regulation reduce the harvesting
season to two months a year, eliminate trawling or dredging as a
means of harvest, and limit hand-harvest during the two-month
season to two days a week. N.J.A.C. 7:25-18.16.
Following the adoption of the permanent rule, with some
matters reserved, DEP moved to dismiss this appeal on grounds of
mootness and to vacate the August 20, 1997 judgment of the
Appellate Division. We reserved decision on that motion pending
argument of the appeal before us. DBWA opposed the grant of the
motion reasoning that the issue before the Court was one of
significant public policy that was likely to occur again and
would evade review in the future. The Appellate Division had
recognized that "in light of the normal length of time required
for the appellate process, the dispositive issue here could
forever evade review." 304 N.J. Super. at 23-24. Because an
emergency regulation may be in effect for only sixty days, the
time period may be insufficient in the normal course for a
challenge to the back-to-back adoption of emergency rules to work
its way through the courts to the Supreme Court.
At oral argument, the parties were in agreement on the
substantive principle of law involved, namely that an executive
agency of government may not adopt, without the concurrence of
the Legislature, back-to-back emergency regulations in excess of
sixty days. The point on which the parties differed was whether
the two emergency regulations, the May 1997 regulation and the
July 1997 regulation, were, in fact, the same. DEP contended
that there were two separate emergencies and two distinct rules.
It described the first rule as the "Shorebird Emergency Rule."
It argued that by the spring of 1997 a potential shortage in eggs
deposited by horseshoe crabs on the shores of the Delaware Bay
threatened the food sources needed to replenish the energy
reserves of migratory shore birds making a seasonal stop in New
Jersey. The May regulation was adopted in response to this
emergency. The rule was designed to put a halt to further crab
harvesting that would interfere with the shore birds' ability to
feed while traveling on their migratory path.
Further studies conducted by DEP between May and the end of
July disclosed a much greater concern than that for the shore
birds. The data indicated a serious decline in horseshoe crab
population. DEP determined that the resumption of trawling and
dredging for horseshoe crabs would have a devastating effect on
both the species itself and the horseshoe crab fishery. The
horseshoe crab commercial fishery provides bait for other
fisheries and also serves as the sole source for a chemical
compound derivative of horseshoe crab blood that is used in the
detection and elimination of bacterial toxins in the treatment of
diseases such as spinal meningitis. In response to what it
perceived to be a new threat to the horseshoe crab fishery
itself, DEP prepared a proposal for a permanent rule amending the
horseshoe crab harvesting regulations. It feared otherwise a
complete depletion of the horseshoe crab population.
DWBA contended that these were not two distinct emergencies;
it was always one emergency, a shortage of horseshoe crabs. DEP
had ample opportunity to seek a legislative extension of the May
Shorebird Emergency Rule rather than promulgating a second
emergency rule. DEP explained, however, that it could not have
obtained a legislative extension of the July rule because it
could not extend, by resolution of both houses, an emergency rule
that was significantly different in purpose and intent from the
earlier emergency rule. DEP argues that the Legislature would
never have intended that the APA tie the hands of government to
respond to emergency circumstances not foreseen at the time of
the adoption of an earlier administrative emergency regulation.
DEP agrees, however, that it cannot make the same emergency into
a different emergency simply by saying it is so. An agency of
state government may not, by the pretextual declaration that an
emergency is new, extend its statutory authority to circumvent a
sixty-day limit on emergency regulations.
The Appellate Division found that
the two separate emergency amendments have
the same cause, namely the shortage of
horseshoe crabs, and the same result, namely
the total ban on the taking of horseshoe
crabs. While the DEP offered two different
reasons for the two emergency amendments, we
find that the same cause and the same result
makes for the same emergency. The fact that
the DEP can articulate different reasons for
the two amendments does not make them
sufficiently different to treat them as two
separate emergencies.
Although the principle appears correct in the abstract, it may
prove to be incorrect in the concrete circumstances that often
confront government. To take the argument to an extreme: If use
of an insecticide were banned for sixty days because of a
possible effect on wildlife, and intervening research disclosed
that the product posed a profound danger to human health, we
doubt that the Legislature intended that the agency not be
allowed to respond to the new emergency. We thus agree with DEP
that if there is a genuinely distinct and separate emergency,
even if a second regulation has the same effect on the regulated
public (such as the ban on the insecticide), the agency is not
precluded from responding to the emergency with a sixty-day
regulation.
Although, then, the parties might disagree as to whether on
this record there was one emergency or two, all are in agreement
that when there are two distinct and separate emergencies the APA
confers extraordinary powers on the executive branch to deal with
the circumstances. Although that authority is to be used only in
appropriate circumstances, its exercise must not be so
circumscribed as to prevent a proper response by an agency head
and the Governor when such distinct emergent circumstances
present themselves. What is in dispute in this case is whether
there were, in fact, two distinct and separate emergencies.
There is no longer any need in this case to debate what was
essentially a factual issue. Nor is there any need to vacate the
judgment of the Appellate Division that, correctly understood,
reflects an attempt to determine, in a limited period of time,
whether the factual record sustained a finding that there were
two separate emergencies or one emergency. The law being clear,
we agree with DEP that the case is moot and does not require us
to decide whether we might or might not agree with the Appellate
Division's assessment of this record.
The appeal is dismissed as moot.
CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES HANDLER, POLLOCK, O'HERN, GARIBALDI, STEIN, and COLEMAN join in this PER CURIAM opinion.
NO. A-102 SEPTEMBER TERM 1997
ON APPEAL FROM
ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court
DELAWARE BAY WATERMAN'S ASSOCIATION
OF NEW JERSEY, etc., et al.,
Appellants-Respondents,
v.
NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION,
Respondent-Appellant.
DECIDED April 7, 1998
Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING
OPINION BY PER CURIAM
CONCURRING OPINION BY
DISSENTING OPINION BY