SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
A-2140-94T3
DORCHESTER MANOR, a New
Jersey Corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant/
Cross-Respondent,
v.
BOROUGH OF NEW MILFORD, a
Municipal Corporation of the
State of New Jersey,
Defendant-Respondent/
Cross-Appellant.
_________________________________________________________________
Argued: December 12, 1995 - Decided: January 23, 1996
Before Judges Dreier and A.M. Stein.
On appeal from the Superior Court of
New Jersey, Law Division, Bergen County.
Gary D. Gordon argued the cause for appellant/
cross-respondent (Feinstein, Raiss & Kelin,
attorneys; Mr. Gordon on the brief).
Paul P. Josephson argued the cause for respondent/
cross-appellant (Sills, Cummis, Zuckerman, Radin
Tischman, Epstein & Gross, attorneys; Mr. Josephson,
of counsel and on the supplemental letter brief;
Ross L. Yustein, of counsel and on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
A.M. STEIN, J.A.D.
The judgment of the Law Division is affirmed substantially for the reasons set forth by Judge Kole in Dorchester Manor v. Borough of New Milford, ___ N.J. Super. ___ (Law Div. 1995).
Judge Kole balanced the critical factors of the Borough's budgetary constraints, the financial effect upon plaintiff and the
effective date of the statute authorizing reimbursement to
property owners who do not receive municipal service for garbage
collection, N.J.S.A. 40:66-1(b), L. 1991, c. 13, § 1, eff. July
23, 1991, and determined that fundamental fairness requires the
Borough of New Milford to reimburse plaintiff apartment complex
owner for the cost of garbage collection and disposal fees
beginning with June 1992. Id. at ___ (slip op. at 12-13). The
concept of fundamental fairness is most appropriate to establish
a commencement date for reimbursement.
New Jersey's doctrine of fundamental fairness "serves
to protect citizens generally against unjust and arbitrary governmental action, and specifically against
governmental procedures that tend to operate arbitrarily. [It] serves, depending on the context, as an
augmentation of existing constitutional protections or
as an independent source of protection against state
action.". . . This unique doctrine is not appropriately
applied in every case but only in those instances where
the interests involved are especially compelling.
"Fundamental fairness is a doctrine to be sparingly
applied. It is appropriately applied in those rare
cases where not to do so will subject [a party] to
oppression, harassment, or egregious deprivation."
[Doe v. Poritz,
142 N.J. 1, 108 (1995) (citations
omitted).]
Affirmed.
:
DORCHESTER MANOR, A New Jersey : SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW
JERSEY
Corporation, : LAW DIVISION: BERGEN
COUNTY
:
Plaintiff, : DOCKET NO. BER-L-16687-91
:
vs. :
:
BOROUGH OF NEW MILFORD, : CIVIL ACTION
A Municipal Corporation of the :
State of New Jersey, : OPINION
:
Defendant. :
:
Decided: November 18, 1994
Gary D. Gordon, for plaintiff
(Feinstein, Raiss & Kelin, attorneys).
Sheri K. Siegelbaum, of counsel, for defendant
(Scarinci & Hollenbeck, attorneys).
KOLE, J.A.D., Retired and
Temporarily Assigned on Recall
Dorchester Manor (Dorchester or plaintiff), instituted this
suit against the Borough of New Milford (the Borough or
defendant), alleging that defendant is guilty of breach of
contract. Plaintiff's cause of action arises from a developer's
agreement (the Agreement) entered into on or about June 12, 1967,
relating to the construction and operation of a two hundred unit
apartment complex in the Borough.
The comprehensive Agreement covered a number of matters that
plaintiff, as developer, was required to perform "in accordance
with the ordinances of the Borough" as a condition of the
Borough's approval of plaintiff's site plan. Among other things,
plaintiff was to construct the apartments, provide necessary
drainage, improve all streets shown on the site plan, and
dedicate all of such streets for public use by deed to the
Borough. There is no evidence as to whether such dedication of
the streets ever occurred.
Section 6 of the agreement states:
The Developer further agrees that in
perpetuity it will provide garbage disposal
facilities for all of the apartments shown on
the Site Plan to be approved by the Board of
Health and the Mayor and Council of the
Borough of New Milford. The Borough of New
Milford will provide garbage removal service
two days a week in accordance with the
present Borough ordinances and regulations,
but it shall be the obligation of the
Developer to provide adequate facilities for
the remaining four days of the week.
Plaintiff maintains that the purpose of this section was to
ensure that plaintiff received the same municipal garbage
collection services as all other residential property owners in
the Borough, including both single family residences and
apartment complexes.
Despite the agreement, defendant has never provided garbage
collection services to plaintiff. However, on or about November
20, 1990, plaintiff--motivated, in part, by large increases in
tipping fees and other costs resulting in escalating collection
expenses--demanded, for the first time, reimbursement in lieu of
defendant's obligation to provide collection services in
accordance with section 6 of the Agreement. This demand was made
even though prior to 1990, plaintiff never requested defendant
either to collect garbage or pay for such services in accordance
with section 6. Instead, as hereafter indicated, plaintiff
accepted payments from the Borough annually based on a unit price
having no relationship to plaintiff's costs of garbage collection
or the two days per week formula set forth in the Agreement.
In an effort to resolve the matter, defendant offered to
collect garbage generated at Dorchester provided that such
garbage be stored in curbside dumpsters in accordance with
Chapter XVI, Section 16-1.5i, of the current Borough ordinance,
adopted in 1991. Plaintiff, however, refused to place its
garbage curbside.
Defendant also offered, as an alternative, to pay plaintiff
the cost of one-third of its collection services. Plaintiff
refused this offer, claiming it was entitled, under the
Agreement, to two-thirds of its garbage collection costs since
1986. Plaintiff collected its garbage three times per week. On
this thesis, plaintiff showed that since January 1, 1986, it has
paid $270,693.18 for garbage removal and tipping and other costs
and $750 for 1991 recycling expenses. Consequently, plaintiff
seeks a judgment in the amount of $223,012.90 to cover one
hundred percent of tipping fees, two-thirds of garbage collection
and trucking fees, related taxes and surcharges, and unreimbursed
recycling costs.
Although a municipality may, in its discretion, provide
garbage collection and disposal services, it has long been
recognized that "it is the duty, primarily, of a person on whose
premises are garbage and refuse material, to see to it, by proper
diligence, that no nuisance arises therefrom which endangers the
public health.... He may [be] required, at his own expense, to
make, from time to time, such disposition of obnoxious substances
originating on premises occupied by him as [is] necessary in
order to guard the public health." Pleasure Bay Apts. v. City of
Long Branch,
66 N.J. 79, 84 (1974).
The New Jersey courts have long recognized that the
collection and control of garbage are indispensable to the public
health and safety. Pleasure Bay, supra, 66 N.J. at 85. As a
result, municipalities may enact or adopt necessary and
reasonable ordinances or other regulations governing the
collection, removal and disposal of garbage and other refuse to
the extent they have been granted that power by the Legislature.
Pleasure Bay, supra, 66 N.J. at 85; 7 McQuillin Municipal
Corporations section 24.252 (3rd ed. 1968).
Although the defendant had the power to contract with
plaintiff for the collection and disposal of garbage, defendant
asserts that section 6 created an obligation for the Borough in
perpetuity and so is void as against public policy. The court
need not go so far. That a municipality's contract is by its
terms perpetual does not necessarily make it void as against
public policy, provided it is made pursuant to express statutory
authority delegated to municipalities and the statute may be
properly construed as containing no limitation with respect to
length of time for which an agreement may be made. Borough of
West Caldwell v. Borough of Caldwell,
26 N.J. 9, 31 (1958); 10A
McQuillin Municipal Corporations section 29.102 (3rd ed. 1968).
In West Caldwell, supra, the Court stated that a municipality
cannot bind itself by a perpetual contract or a contract of
unreasonable duration, unless by legislative sanction; and that
this is true particularly where the subject matter of the
contract involves the exercise of police power in the vital area
of health and sanitation. There is no express statutory
authority here for the Borough to collect garbage or reimburse
for the collection thereof in perpetuity.
The provision of section 6 of the Agreement that Dorchester
was required "in perpetuity" to provide garbage disposal
facilities for the apartments would appear to be unassailable,
since the imposition of such a perpetual duty to collect and
dispose of garbage and other waste is required by law for public
health reasons. Pleasure Bay, supra, 66 N.J. at 84. This duty
extends to at least the six days per week contemplated by the
Agreement. The Agreement's requirement that the developer
provide adequate facilities for the remaining four days of the
week (beyond the two days provided by the Borough) is merely a
reiteration of the settled legal responsibility of the apartment
complex owners with respect to garbage disposal and collection.
However, the provision of section 6 stating that the Borough
will provide "garbage services two days per week in accordance
with the present Borough ordinances and regulations" cannot
legally bind the Borough perpetually. (Emphasis supplied.) To
the extent it may be so construed, it is ultra vires and void.
West Caldwell, supra.
Since perpetual contractual performance is not favored in
the law, in order to uphold the validity of similar agreements,
courts have held that a contract without a time limit may be
construed as binding for a reasonable time. West Caldwell,
supra, 26 N.J. at 28-30. "What constitutes a 'reasonable time'
is usually an implication of fact, and not of law, derivable from
the language used by the parties considered in the context of the
subject matter and the attendant circumstances, in aid of the
apparent intention." Ibid. In the present case, defendant's
obligation at best is a duty imposed for a reasonable period of
time after June 12, 1967 (the date of the Agreement), or until
there is a significant change in the applicable Borough
ordinances or reasonable practices by the Borough relating to
garbage collection, or there is a subsequent expression by the
Legislature, by way of statute, as to policy or municipal
authority in this area. Pleasure Bay, supra, 66 N.J. at 85-91.
It is clear from the evidence that the purpose of the
provisions in the Agreement as to two days of collection by the
Borough was the Borough's recognition, through its attorney, that
it was legally required to treat garden apartments the same as
other residential dwellings with respect to garbage collection.
This view of the law was subsequently adopted by the courts.
Boulevard Apts., Inc. v. Mayor of Lodi,
110 N.J. Super. 406 (App.
Div. 1970). As of the date of the Agreement, defendant was
collecting garbage from residential dwellings two days per week.
But curbside collection was later deemed sufficient for garden
apartment complexes. Pleasure Bay, supra; Property Owners v.
Mayor of Parsippany-Troy Hills,
264 N.J. Super. 538 (App. Div.
1993).
Defendant, however, asserts that section 6 of the Agreement
was abandoned by the parties and, as a result, is unenforceable.
As a general rule, a contract will be treated as abandoned where
one party acts in a manner inconsistent with the existence of the
contract and the other party acquiesces in that behavior.
Mossberg v. Standard Oil Co. of N.J.,
98 N.J.Super. 393, 406-07
(Law Div. 1967); 17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts section 543 (1991).
This basic contract principle can be appropriately applied
to the present case. Defendant never actually did collect
garbage from the Dorchester complex; and from the time plaintiff
commenced business through 1986, defendant annually reimbursed
plaintiff based on a unit cost amount from $7.60 to $7.80 per
apartment. The unit cost apparently varied, depending on the
terms of the contract with the garbage collector hired by the
Borough.See footnote 1 The amounts so paid were accepted by plaintiff
without protest until 1988See footnote 2 even though they apparently bore no
relationship to the amount actually paid by Dorchester for
garbage collection. This conduct for twenty years after the
execution of the Agreement constitutes an abandonment by both
parties of that portion of section 6 of the Agreement which
places any obligation on the Borough for garbage collection for
two days per week, and thus renders it unenforceable.
Defendant also asserts that plaintiff's claim for
reimbursement should be barred by the equitable doctrine of
laches. The policy behind this doctrine is to discourage stale
claims. Gladden v. Board of Trustees,
171 N.J. Super. 363 (App.
Div. 1979); Flammia v. Maller,
66 N.J. Super. 440 (App. Div.
1961). To this end, laches has been found where there is
unexplainable and inexcusable delay in enforcing a known right
whereby prejudice has resulted to the other party because of such
delay. Gladden, supra; Flammia, supra; see also Good v.
Lackawanna Leather Co.,
96 N.J. Super. 439 (Ch. Div. 1964); Clark
v. Judge,
84 N.J. Super. 35, aff'd,
44 N.J. 550 (1965).
It is assumed that the party to whom laches is imputed has
knowledge of his rights, and sufficient opportunity to assert
them in the proper forum. However, by reason of his delay, the
adverse party has a justifiable reason to believe that the
alleged rights are meritless or have been abandoned. Because of
the change in condition of relations during this period of delay,
it would be unjust to permit those rights now to be asserted.
Flammia, supra;
27 Am. Jur. 2d Equity section 162.
A number of factors have been considered to determine
whether a claim is barred by laches. Such factors include length
of delay, whether the delay was reasonable or unreasonable, and
changing conditions of either or both parties during the delay.
Lavin v. Board of Educ.,
90 N.J. 145 (1982); Enfield v. FWL,
Inc.,
256 N.J. Super. 502 (Law Div. 1991), aff'd,
256 N.J. Super. 466 (App. Div.), certif. denied,
130 N.J. 9 (1992).
Dorchester asserted at trial that it made no claim for
reimbursement before 1990, since it did not want to antagonize
the Borough, hoping that the Borough would act favorably on rent
control matters in which Dorchester was interested. This
strategic business decision does not justify the long period of
delay in asserting its rights against the Borough under the
Agreement.
Moreover, Judge Stark, upon motion by defendant, barred
plaintiff, pursuant to the statute of limitations, N.J.S.A.
2A:14-1, from claiming any damages prior to six years from the
date that the original complaint was filed. This does not
prevent laches from barring recovery for garbage collection costs
accrued within the statutorily limited period. In Lavin, the
Supreme Court held that "where there has been an unreasonable
delay, laches has been applied to defeat a claim despite the fact
that the time fixed by the analogous statute of limitations has
not passed." Id. at 152 n.1.
Plaintiff, however, maintains that Judge Stark impliedly
rejected defendant's laches argument. That argument is
inaccurate both factually and as a matter of law. Where laches
is asserted by the defendant and is raised as an issue in the
case, a full factual hearing on both sides is usually required.
See Urban League v. Mayor of Carteret,
115 N.J. 536, 554 (1989);
27 Am. Jur. 2d Equity section 173 (1966). Certainly, in this
case, laches is essentially a factual matter requiring a hearing.
After carefully considering all of the evidence, the court
finds plaintiff's delay in asserting its rights to be
unreasonable and inexcusable. The twenty year delay by
Dorchester in endeavoring to enforce the Agreement, under the
circumstances of this case, plainly constitutes laches barring
not only its enforcement, but also enforcement of whatever rights
Dorchester has apart from the Agreement. This is so,
particularly in view of the peculiar annual cash-basis ("pay as
you go") budgetary requirements applicable to municipalities,
which may preclude recovery against the Borough even during the
six year statute of limitations period. Lavin, supra, 90 N.J. at
153-54; DeHay v. West New York,
189 N.J. Super. 340, 346-47 (App.
Div.), certif. denied,
94 N.J. 591 (1983).
In 1991, effective July 23, a statute was enacted, N.J.S.A.
40:66-1b (the 1991 statute), giving municipalities discretionary
power to limit garbage collection service to curbside collection
along public streets. It also permitted municipalities to
reimburse property owners who elect not to receive municipal
collection service. That statute provides:
A municipal governing body that establishes a
system for the collection or disposal of
solid waste pursuant to subsection a. of this
section, in its discretion, may limit service
furnished by it to curbside collection along
public streets or roads that have been
dedicated to and accepted by the
municipality. The municipal governing body
may also refuse to enter upon private
property to remove solid waste from dumpsters
or other containers. The municipal governing
body, in its sole discretion, may choose to
reimburse those property owners who do not
receive the municipal services, but such
reimbursement shall not exceed the cost that
would be incurred by the municipality in
providing the collection or disposal service
directly.
The Borough's ordinance, apparently adopted under the
authority of this statute, provides for curbside collection only
for apartment complexes from their dumpsters; there is no
provision for reimbursement of owners who elect not to receive
municipal collection service. The dumpsters must be surrounded
by a fence as high as the dumpster and secured by a lock
accessible only by the owner and the garbage collector.
Dorchester maintains that compliance with the ordinance is
not only difficult, but also not at all practical. Hence, it
refused to comply therewith and seeks, instead, reimbursement for
garbage collection. Even though the Borough, in this action, as
indicated, has offered to pay plaintiff one-third of its
collection services, by law the Borough is not required to make
any such payment.
However, such reimbursement is permissible--at least where
an ordinance so provides. Property Owners, supra. In Property
Owners, Judge Coleman held that the 1991 statute was
constitutional and did not deny equal protection to garden
apartment owners. He stated:
Contrary to the wishes of plaintiffs, the
statute simply does not mandate that a
municipality offer the type of "customized
service" (collection from dumpsters) sought
by plaintiffs.
[Id. at 543.]
The court further held, in words that apply to the instant case:
Plaintiffs further claim that they are
entitled to damages for money they paid for
private garbage collection from April 1988,
the date of plaintiffs' first written demand
for services from the Township. In the
alternative, plaintiffs seek the tipping fees
they incurred in disposing of the garbage.
We agree with the Township that plaintiffs
are not entitled to damages because, under
Pleasure Bay, it had no obligation to enter
private property to collect garbage.
In Pleasure Bay, the apartment complex owners
were denied damages for money spent for
collection of garbage by private scavengers
from the date the municipality rejected their
demand that it furnish on-site service. Id.,
66 N.J. at 82,
328 A.2d 593. Where the
owners were not entitled to such services,
there was no basis for a claim for damages.
Similarly, in this case, because plaintiffs
are not entitled to on-site collection, they
are not entitled to collect damages.
[Id. at 548.]
The court does, however, find that plaintiff is entitled to
limited reimbursement, as set forth hereafter, based on
fundamental principles of fairness, despite the fact that section
6 of the Agreement is deemed abandoned and recovery for
reimbursement thereunder would ordinarily be denied by reason of
laches. Fairness requires that Dorchester presently be afforded
the same rights with respect to garbage collection vis-a-vis the
Borough as Brookchester and New Milford Village, the two other
garden apartments in the Borough.
In 1990, Dorchester endeavored to discuss the matter of
payment with the Borough, including the fact that the Borough
appeared to have been paying the other garden apartment complexes
in town tipping fees, whereas Dorchester was not being paid such
fees. Such discussions did not produce any results.
Accordingly, on November 20, 1990, its attorney wrote the Borough
asserting, for the first time, that it expressly relied on
section 6 of the Agreement. The letter stated:
In accordance with section 6 of an Agreement dated June
12, 1967 between the Borough and our client, the
Borough agreed to provide garbage removal services two
days a week in accordance with the present Borough's
ordinances and regulations. In light of the foregoing,
we would appreciate if you would forward to our client
its reimbursement for 1990. We trust that when you
make your calculations that you will base same upon the
existing agreement with Joe DiRese & Sons, Inc. that
pertains to Brookchester Apartments and New Milford
Village including not only the basic service costs but
all tipping and other landfill charges.
This written demand sought only reimbursement for 1990 for basic service costs, as well as tipping and other landfill charges, in accordance with the existing agreement between Joe DiRese and Sons, Inc. (DiRese), the municipal garbage collector, and the Borough, relating to Brookchester Apartments and New Milford Village. In the earlier garbage collection contract with DiRese of December 10, 1984 (the 1984 Agreement), it agreed, for $39,900, to remove and dispose of all garbage from dumpsters at Brookchester and New Milford Village for three years--January 1, 1985 to December 31, 1987--in accordance with Proposal 6.See footnote 3 The 1984 Agreement further provided that the Borough shall pay the State recycling charge, the State closure charge and the
Hackensack Meadowlands Development Commission (HMDC) surcharge
(of $1.82 per cubic yard.)
In a subsequent agreement dated December 3, 1987, covering
the period of January 1, 1988 to December 31, 1990, DiRese agreed
to collect all garbage stored in dumpsters from Brookchester and
New Milford Village for $55,912.50 for the three-year period.
Under this agreement, the Borough was responsible for "all
dumping fees, including...State Recycling fees, State Closure
Charges, and the [HMDC] Rate Averaging Surcharge." Defendant
produced evidence from the Administrator and Chief Financial
Officer of the Borough indicating that the Borough has paid only
one-third of total tipping and dumping fees associated with
collection and disposal of garbage at both apartment complexes.
This evidence, although unsubstantiated, was submitted without
objection and is found to be credible.
The provisions of both garbage collection agreements on
their face may seem to indicate that the Borough is responsible
for all of the tipping and dumping fees. But this is not at all
clear, in light of the other provisions dealing with what appears
to be a one-third payment for garbage collection. In any event,
the actual and practical construction of the contracts show that
the Borough--and apparently the other two garden apartment
projects--construed them as requiring it to pay only one-third of
those fees, which it did. Michaels v. Brookchester, Inc.,
26 N.J. 379, 388 (1958); Journeymen Barbers v. Pollino,
22 N.J. 389,
395 (1956); Joseph Hilton and Assoc., Inc. v. Evans,
201 N.J.
Super. 156, 171 (App. Div.), certif. denied,
101 N.J. 326 (1985).
On March 14, 1990, the Borough entered into an agreement
with Browning Ferris Industries of North Jersey (Browning) which
provided that Browning would "collect, remove and dispose of all
garbage, trash and bulky waste from each residential and
municipal property within Municipality [sic] two days per week"
for three years. Residential property is defined as consisting
of no more than four family units in a single structure and
specifically excludes multi-family garden apartments. Although
there is no provision for collection within any garden apartment
complex, it appears that the Borough has continued to pay one-third of all garbage collection, tipping and other charges for
Brookchester and New Milford Village, but not for Dorchester.
As already indicated, plaintiff seeks reimbursement for one
hundred percent of tipping fees and two-thirds of garbage
collection and trucking fees incurred since January 1986. This
amount is contrary to the Borough's standard practice of
reimbursing only one-third of both tipping, garbage collection,
trucking and related fees. Furthermore, despite the statute of
limitations, laches may bar plaintiff from being reimbursed for
fees incurred since 1986 by reason of the peculiar legal
budgetary constraints facing the Borough as a municipality.
The Borough, however, has budgeted $10,000 each year for the
last few years for garbage collection and disposal at Dorchester.
Furthermore, the Borough administrator and financial officer
testified that the Borough had a budgetary surplus in 1993 of
approximately $100,000. This is not to suggest that these funds
are presently available; the Borough may have already allocated
them for some other municipal purpose. Nevertheless, the court
has considered the recent Borough budget and surplus in
determining the extent to which reimbursement to Dorchester may
be justified on principles of fairness.
It is clear from the evidence that Dorchester should be
placed on an equal footing with the other garden apartment
complexes in the Borough with respect to municipal garbage
collection and disposal, provided this is done in an equitable
fashion, in light of the budgetary requirements applicable to
municipalities, including the applicability of laches. The court
has concluded that, in view of the foregoing, an appropriate
balance of these considerations requires that Dorchester be
reimbursed for one-third of all garbage collection and disposal
fees (including tipping and trucking) since June 1992--i.e., for
two and one-third years--as set forth in the table below:
Total Adjusted
Category (1/86 - 9/94) (6/92 - 9/94) 1/3 of
Adjusted
Taxes
Landfill $294.08 $0 $0
Resource 2,092.56 430.50 143.50
Host 2,650.04 1,241.24 413.75
Resource 711.98 0 0
Recycling 5,373.80 1,629.60 543.20See footnote 4
Tipping Fees 123,560.37 44,703.90 14,901.30
Trucking Fees 87,580.07See footnote 5 26,235.30See footnote 6 13,117.65See footnote 7
TOTAL REIMBURSEMENT $29,119.40
These amounts are taken from plaintiff's evidence, which was
admitted without objection. The sum of $29,119.40 takes into
consideration the six-year statute of limitations, the equitable
doctrine of laches, the 1984 and 1987 garbage collection
agreements, and the Borough practice during and after these
agreements. Cf. DeHay, supra, 189 N.J. at 344-46 (court refused
to apply laches, but reduced employee's four-year back-pay
entitlement by five percent in recognition of Cap law mandate).
Since laches bars reimbursement of fees before June 1992,
plaintiff is not entitled to recover the $750 recycling costs it
incurred in 1991. Admittedly, the Borough has provided recycling
to Dorchester since 1991.
A judgment will be entered in favor of plaintiff and against
defendant for $29,119.40. The judgment is enclosed.
Footnote: 1For example, the sum of $1,520 was paid for 1986; $2,130
was paid for 1987.
Footnote: 2A formal protest and demand was made in November 1990.
Footnote: 3Proposal 6 provided that DiRese would collect garbage,
which was placed in dumpsters, from Brookchester and New Milford
Village, two times per week for the sum of $22.80 per apartment.
Both apartment complexes were required to provide garbage removal
services the remaining four days per week. The combined total
municipal cost charged for garbage collection at both apartment
complexes was $39,900.
Footnote: 4This amount for recycling taxes probably should not be
allowed, since recycling was provided by the Borough commencing
in 1992; but defendant has not raised any objection thereto.
Footnote: 5This dollar amount reflects two-thirds of the total
trucking fees between 1/86 and 9/94. Dorchester is seeking
recovery of only two-thirds of the total.
Footnote: 6This dollar amount reflects two-thirds of the trucking fees
incurred between 6/92 and 9/94.
Footnote: 7This dollar amount is derived by dividing the adjusted two-thirds amount ($26,235.30) by two.