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(NOTE: The status of this decision is Unpublished.)
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4529-10T4
DORIS S. HUGGINS and ROBERT
L. HUGGINS,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
MAURICE W. ARMSTRONG and BILLIE
R. DUNHAM,
Defendants-Respondents.
May 14, 2012
Submitted April 30, 2012 - Decided
Before Judges Ashrafi and Fasciale.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Mercer County,
Docket No. L-670-07.
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a4529-10.opn.html
Doris S. Huggins and Robert L. Huggins, appellants pro se.
Respondents have not filed briefs.
PER CURIAM
Plaintiffs appeal from an April 4, 2011 order denying their motion to reinstate their complaint. We affirm.
On March 16, 2005, Mrs. Huggins1 was stopped in traffic on a bridge on-ramp in Trenton, when a van,
operated by defendant Armstrong,2 struck the passenger side of her vehicle. As Armstrong attempted to
drive away, Mrs. Huggins pursued, beeping her horn until he pulled over. Police arrived, confirmed that
Armstrong had two outstanding arrest warrants and did not possess a valid drivers' license, and arrested
him. Mrs. Huggins complained of back pain and requested an ambulance, but then decided to go to the
hospital on her own.
Plaintiffs obtained legal representation, and on March 12, 2007, filed a complaint alleging negligence
and loss of consortium. On June 26, 2007, plaintiffs succeeded in serving Dunham. However, they were
unsuccessful in attempts to serve Armstrong. On July 23, 2007, the judge entered an order relieving
plaintiffs' attorneys as counsel of record for plaintiffs.3 The attorneys communicated this to plaintiffs by
letter dated August 4, 2007.
On June 28, 2008, the court administratively dismissed the complaint. On March 15, 2011, plaintiffs
filed a motion to reinstate their complaint. On April 1, 2011, the judge conducted a motion hearing, heard
oral argument from Mrs. Huggins, and issued an oral decision. On April 4, 2011, the judge entered an order
denying plaintiffs' motion to reinstate the complaint. On May 18, 2011, plaintiffs filed this appeal.4
We review a trial judge's denial of a motion to reinstate a complaint under the abuse of discretion
standard. Baskett v. Kwokleung Cheung, 422 N.J. Super. 377, 382 (App. Div. 2011).
Rule 1:13-7(a) is "an administrative rule designed to clear the docket of cases that cannot, for
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a4529-10.opn.html
various reasons, be prosecuted to completion." Mason v. Nabisco Brands, Inc., 233 N.J. Super. 263, 267
(App. Div. 1989). As Judge Keefe explained in Mason:
Often notice . . . of the court's intention to dismiss the action will serve to
stimulate a renewed interest in the case. The problem which generates the
notice is usually resolved and the case is not dismissed. When the notice does
not have that salutary affect, the case is dismissed.
[Ibid.]
The rule itself provides, in pertinent part:
[W]henever an action has been pending for four months . . . without a required
proceeding having been taken therein . . ., the court shall issue written notice to
the plaintiff advising that the action as to any or all defendants will be dismissed
without prejudice 60 days following the date of the notice . . . unless, within said
period, action . . . is taken. If no such action is taken, the court shall enter an
order of dismissal without prejudice . . .
[R. 1:13-7(a).]
After dismissal, a plaintiff can reinstate an action by submitting a consent order within 60 days; otherwise,
"a motion for reinstatement shall be required." Ibid. "The motion shall be granted on good cause shown if
filed within 90 days of the order of dismissal, and thereafter shall be granted only on a showing of
exceptional circumstances." Ibid.
Here, the court administratively dismissed plaintiffs' complaint on June 28, 2008. On March 15, 2011,
almost three years later, plaintiffs filed their motion for reinstatement. Because that motion was not filed
within 90 days of the dismissal, plaintiffs needed to show exceptional circumstances to have the complaint
reinstated.
The judge found, after listening patiently to Mrs. Huggins' arguments, that plaintiffs had not shown
good cause, a less stringent standard, for reinstatement or provided "any evidence of due diligence with
regard to the prosecution of this matter." He explained that too much time had passed between the
dismissal and the motion for reinstatement, that plaintiffs had failed to provide proof of service with respect
to Armstrong, and that they had not diligently pursued the action against Dunham.
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These findings are clearly supported on the record before us. Plaintiffs contend, as they did before
the trial judge, that they never received notice of the dismissal because they twice changed residences.
However, plaintiffs did not notify the court. Nonetheless, as the trial judge also recognized, this action did
not remain dormant merely for a matter of months, but rather for a matter of years.
A
ffirmed.
1 Plaintiffs are married.
2 Plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that the van was owned by defendant Dunham.
3 The record reflects that plaintiffs thereafter briefly retained subsequent counsel.
4 On the same day, May 18, 2011, plaintiffs also filed a motion with the Law Division to stay the judgment
and reinstate their complaint. On June 17, 2011, the judge denied this motion because plaintiffs had filed
an appeal and the trial court was therefore without jurisdiction.
This archive is a service of Rutgers School of Law - Camden.
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