(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for
the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please
note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).
Argued November 4, 1996 -- Decided March 25, 1997
Coleman, J., writing for a unanimous Court.
This appeal raises two issues: 1) whether the owner of a single-family rental property is under a duty
to install one or more smoke detectors in the rented home when not required by law; and 2) whether an
owner who installs one smoke detector in such a home can be held liable for injuries caused by a fire when
the alleged breach of duty is based on the placement of the smoke detector.
Ronald and Catherine Boczkowski (the owners) purchased a two-story single-family home in
Lawrenceville, New Jersey in 1978. The home had been built in 1960. The owners did not live in the home;
instead, they used it as rental property. Before renting the house, the owners had installed a smoke detector
on the second floor level where the bedrooms are located. If the smoke detector was removed by an
outgoing tenant, the owners would install another smoke detector before the next tenant took possession of
the home.
William and Susan Dowler became tenants under a lease on January 19, 1988. The lease did not
contain any provision concerning a smoke detector. Prior to the Dowlers taking possession, the owners had
relocated the smoke detector to a downstairs hallway. The smoke detector was battery operated and was
designed to beep when the battery was weak. After the Dowlers took possession of the home, neither they
nor the owners performed any maintenance on the smoke detector.
On June 23, 1988, one of Mr. Dowler's partially extinguished cigarettes was accidentally thrown into
the a trash container by Mrs. Dowler. The cigarette ignited the trash container while Mr. Dowler was
asleep. A fire spread and Mr. Dowler sustained serious burn injuries. Mrs. Dowler claims that the smoke
detector did not activate.
On February 27, 1989, the Dowlers filed a personal injury action against the owners, alleging that the
owners negligently failed to provide a fire protection system to warn the tenants of fire. On a motion for
summary judgment filed by the owners, the trial court dismissed the complaint as a matter of law, concluding
that there was no duty on the part of the owners to provide a fire protection system.
On appeal, a majority of the Appellate Division reversed the decision of the trial court, viewing the
case as one involving the negligent repair of a smoke detector based on the owners' change of the location
of the smoke detector to the downstairs. The court determined that, although a landlord is not liable for
nonfeasance when there is no duty to repair, once the landlord voluntarily undertakes a repair, he or she may
be liable for not doing enough. The majority found that a jury question existed as to whether the owners
were negligent in placing a smoke detector in the first floor hallway rather than near the second floor
bedrooms. One member of the appellate panel dissented, finding that there was no authority to impose a
duty on the landlord of a single-family home to install smoke detectors when the landlord has relinquished
the entire premises to the tenant. The dissent also concluded that the majority had misapplied Bauer v. 141-149 Cedar Lane Holding Co..
This matter comes before the Court as an appeal as of right based on the dissent in the Appellate
Division.
HELD: The covenant of habitability and livability did not require the installation of smoke detectors in
single-family homes before the obligation was created by statute and implementing regulations.
Because no law required a smoke detector in the home that the Dowlers were renting, the
placement by the landlord of the smoke detector away from the bedroom area was not negligent as
a matter of law.
1. In Bauer, this Court held that in the absence of an agreement providing otherwise, a landlord is under no
obligation to make repairs or remedy defects that either existed at the beginning of the tenancy or developed
thereafter. However, when the landlord voluntarily undertakes to perform a repair, the landlord is obligated
to perform the work in a reasonably careful manner and is liable in damages for a failure to do so. Here,
the Appellate Division was mistaken when it characterized the installation of the smoke detector as a repair
for the purposes of applying Bauer. This is not a defective repair case; there is no evidence that the smoke
detector malfunctioned because of the way in which it was installed. Furthermore, based on the definitions
and usage of the term “repair,” the addition of a smoke detector to a single-family home does not constitute
a repair. Moreover, Bauer does not control because the smoke detector was installed prior to the Dowlers'
tenancy. (pp. 4-10)
2. There was no representation or assurance by the owner/landlord that the premises contained an early
alert smoke detector and fire alarm system. The location of the detector was obvious to the Dowlers and did
not create either a latent or dangerous condition. Therefore, this is also not a latent defect case. (p. 10)
3. There is an implied covenant of habitability and livability for residential dwellings. This covenant gives
the tenant an additional remedy of remaining in possession, making the repairs, and deducting the cost of the
repairs from future rents. A breach of this covenant may expose the landlord to liability for personal injuries
caused by the breach. Here, the alleged negligent installation of the smoke detector did not affect the
habitability of the home as defined by relevant case law. The absence of the smoke detector on the second
floor was readily apparent to the Dowlers. They chose not to make the change and deduct the cost from
future rent. (pp. 10-13)
4. The provision of the BOCA Code requiring smoke detectors in all residential dwelling units constructed
after January 1, 1977 does not apply here because this dwelling was built in 1960. Moreover, the amendment
to the Hotel and Multiple Dwelling Law requiring the installation of smoke detectors is inapplicable because
the home in question is not a multiple dwelling as defined in the statute. The Uniform Fire and Safety Act
was amended in 1991 to extend the obligation for the installation of smoke detectors to existing one- and
two-family dwellings built before January 1, 1997. However, this statute affords no basis of relief because at
the time of the fire, the statute did not require smoke detectors in single-family rentals. Therefore, no law
required a smoke detector or otherwise regulated the placement of smoke detectors in the Dowler residence
in 1988. (pp. 13-14)
Judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the judgment of the trial court dismissing the
complaint is REINSTATED.
CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES HANDLER, POLLOCK, O'HERN, GARIBALDI and
STEIN join in the opinion of JUSTICE COLEMAN.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-
44 September Term 1996
WILLIAM DOWLER and SUSAN DOWLER,
his wife,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
v.
RONALD BOCZKOWSKI and CATHERINE
BOCZKOWSKI,
Defendants-Appellants.
Argued November 4, 1996 -- Decided March 25, 1997
On appeal from the Superior Court, Appellate
Division.
Jonathan Robinson argued the cause for
appellants (Schragger, Lavine and Nagy,
attorneys).
Richard Galex argued the cause for
respondents (Galex, Tortoreti and Tomes,
attorneys).
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
COLEMAN, J.
This appeal raises two issues: (1) whether the owner of a
single-family rental property is under a duty to install one or
more smoke detectors in the rented home when not required by law
and (2) whether an owner who installs one smoke detector in such
a home can be held liable for injuries caused by a fire when the
breach of duty alleged is based on the placement of that smoke
detector.
The trial court granted summary judgment dismissing the
complaint as a matter of law. A divided Appellate Division
reversed in an unpublished opinion. The dissent agreed with the
trial court that the owner breached no duty as a matter of law.
This appeal is before the Court by virtue of the dissent. R.
2:2-1(a)(2). We now reverse.
Defendants Ronald and Catherine Boczkowski purchased a two-story single-family house in Lawrenceville, New Jersey in 1978.
The house had been constructed in 1960. Soon after purchasing
the home, it was rented to a family other than plaintiffs.
Before renting the house, however, defendants installed a smoke
detector on the second floor level where the bedrooms are
located. As tenants moved out from time-to-time, the smoke
detector frequently disappeared with them. Defendants replaced
the smoke detector before the next tenant took possession.
Plaintiffs William and Susan Dowler became tenants under a
lease on January 19, 1988. Before their first inspection of the
premises, the owner had relocated the smoke detector to the
downstairs hallway that is adjacent to the furnace and the
kitchen. The smoke detector was battery operated and was
designed to beep when the battery was weak. After plaintiffs
took possession of the premises, neither defendants nor
plaintiffs performed any maintenance on the smoke detector such
as changing the battery. The lease contains no provision
regarding the smoke detector.
A fire occurred in the house on June 23, 1988, approximately
six months after plaintiffs had taken exclusive possession of the
premises. On the day of the fire, Mr. Dowler came home at about
5:30 p.m. after drinking a few beers. He took a shower and fell
asleep. The fire was started when one of Mr. Dowler's partially
extinguished cigarettes was accidentally transferred by Mrs.
Dowler from an ashtray to a paper trash container in the
bathroom. The cigarette ignited the trash container while Mr.
Dowler was asleep. He was rescued by the local fire department
only after he had sustained significant injuries. Mrs. Dowler
maintains that the smoke detector was not activated.
Plaintiffs instituted the present litigation on February 27,
1989. They allege that defendants negligently failed to provide
a fire protection system to warn them of fire. The trial court
found that there was no such duty. In reversing that
determination, the Appellate Division viewed the case as one
involving a negligent repair of a smoke detector based on
defendants' changing the location of the smoke detector. The
Appellate Division reasoned that although "a landlord is not
liable for nonfeasance where there is no duty to repair, if he
voluntarily undertakes a repair he may be held liable for not
doing enough." It concluded that a jury question was presented
with respect to whether defendants were negligent in placing a
single smoke detector in the first floor hallway rather than near
the bedrooms located on the second floor. The majority relied on
Bauer v. 141-149 Cedar Lane Holding Co.,
24 N.J. 139 (1957). The
dissenting member of the panel found no authority to impose a
duty on the landlord of a single-family dwelling to install smoke
detectors when the landlord has relinquished the entire premises
to the tenant. The dissenting member of the panel also found
that the majority was mistaken in relying on Bauer.
Defendants contend that the Appellate Division's reliance on
Bauer was misplaced. We agree.
In Bauer, the defendant was the owner of five adjoining
stores. Id. at 141. The plaintiffs were tenants in one of the
stores who had problems with flooding in the basement. Ibid.
They kept their goods raised on platforms to protect them from
water damage. Ibid. After the plaintiffs endured the water
problem for about a year, the landlord voluntarily undertook to
alleviate the flooding. Id. at 141-42. The landlord painted a
waterproofing compound on the basement walls, installed sump
pumps, paved the area to the rear of the stores, and rebuilt a
trough at the rear of the stores. Id. at 142. The flooding,
nonetheless, continued. Ibid.
After two hurricanes caused more flooding and damages, the
tenants instituted suit for damages caused by the flooding. Id.
at 142-43. They maintained that the landlord was liable because
it voluntarily undertook repairs to remediate the flooding and
that the repairs were negligently performed. Id. at 143-44.
This Court held that in the absence of an agreement that
provides otherwise, a landlord is under no obligation to the
tenant to make repairs or remedy defects that either existed at
the beginning of the tenancy or developed thereafter. Id. at
145. However, when the landlord voluntarily undertakes to
perform a repair, the landlord "is obligated to perform the work
in a reasonably careful manner and is liable in damages for his
failure to do so." Ibid. The Court further stated:
[T]hough a landlord is not liable for
nonfeasance where there is no duty to repair,
if he voluntarily undertakes a repair he may
be held liable for not doing enough only
where his conduct in such circumstances
amounts to negligence.
[Id. at 149.]
The Court found that the facts of the case indicated that
the landlord was not negligent. Ibid. The landlord never
assured the tenant that the condition causing the flooding had
been corrected. Ibid. It was observed that even if there was an
assurance, it was dispelled prior to the first hurricane. Ibid.
There was no indication that the plaintiffs had been lulled into
any false belief that they would not have any more water
problems. Id. at 149-50.
It is clear that Bauer involved repairs voluntarily
undertaken by a landlord after the tenant was in possession of
the premises. Thus, the Appellate Division was mistaken when it
characterized the installation of the smoke detector as a
"repair" for purposes of applying Bauer. This is not a defective
repair case. There is no evidence in the record that the smoke
detector malfunctioned because of the manner in which it was
installed.
The Bauer Court intended the word "repair" to be accorded
its ordinary meaning. Black's Law Dictionary defines "repair"
as:
To mend, remedy, restore, renovate. To
restore to a sound or good state after decay,
injury, dilapidation, or partial destruction.
The word "repair" contemplates an existing
structure or thing which has become
imperfect, and means to supply in the
original existing structure that which is
lost or destroyed, and thereby restore it to
the condition in which it originally existed,
as near as may be.
[Black's Law Dictionary 1298 (6th ed. 1990)
(citation omitted).]
Webster's Third New International Dictionary similarly
defines "repair" as "the act or process of repairing:
restoration to a state of soundness, efficiency, or health."
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1923 (1993).
In light of those definitions and the common usage of the
term "repair," the addition of a smoke detector to a single-family home does not constitute a repair. The installation of a
smoke detector simply does not involve a restoration or
alteration of something that is imperfect.
Apart from whether installation of a smoke detector may
constitute a repair under some circumstances, Bauer does not
control this case because the smoke detector was installed prior
to plaintiffs' tenancy. This is not a latent defect case.
Absent other requirements of law or the terms of a lease, no
reported New Jersey case has imposed liability for patent
conditions that predate the residential tenancy. All of the
cases have focused on the landlord's liability for post-tenancy
repairs rather than pre-tenancy repairs. See, e.g., Bauer,
supra, 24 N.J. at 139; Freddi-Gail, Inc. v. Royal Holding Corp.,
45 N.J. Super. 471 (App. Div.), certif. denied,
25 N.J. 56
(1957); Caruso v. Monschein,
24 N.J. Super. 55 (App. Div. 1952).
Indeed, the relevant cases cited in Bauer all involved repairs by
a landlord after the tenant had taken possession of the premises.
See, e.g., Grugan v. Shore Hotels Fin. & Exch. Corp.,
126 N.J.L. 257 (E. & A. 1941); LaBrasca v. Hinchman,
81 N.J.L. 367 (Sup. Ct.
1911).
The Restatement (Second) of Property provides:
A landlord who, by purporting to make repairs
on the leased property while it is in the
possession of his tenant, or by the negligent
manner in which he makes the repairs, has, as
the tenant neither knows nor should know,
made the leased property more dangerous for
use or given it a deceptive appearance of
safety, is subject to liability for physical
harm caused by the condition to the tenant or
to others upon the leased property with the
consent of the tenant or subtenant.
[Restatement (Second) of Property § 17.7
(1977).]
The reporter's note to that section states, “[i]t is of no consequence whether the condition which the landlord repairs was present at the time of leasing or arises thereafter. . . . It
should be noted, however, that the landlord is not responsible
under the rule of this section for negligent repairs that were
made before the tenant's occupancy.” Id. at § 17.7 note 6; see
also 52 C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant § 417(12)(b), at 81-83 (1968)
(“[W]here the landlord is under no obligation to make repairs,
but undertakes to make them gratuitously, he is under a duty to
use reasonable care . . . . The principles governing the
landlord's liability do not apply to repairs made before the
relationship of landlord and tenant begins.").
In Casey v. Estes,
657 So.2d 845 (Ala. 1995), a prior
tenant installed an above ground gas line to provide fuel to a
gas clothes dryer. Id. at 847. Before the new tenants moved in,
the landlord inspected the gas pipe for defects. Ibid. Seven
months after moving in, the plaintiffs were injured when a flash
fire erupted as they were lighting a gas heater. Id. at 848.
The plaintiffs argued that even if the landlord had no duty to
inspect and repair latent defects, he should be liable for
negligent inspection and repair because the landlord voluntarily
undertook the duty. Ibid. The Alabama Supreme Court held that
the rule urged by the plaintiffs "applies only to repairs made
after the relationship of landlord and tenant begins." Ibid.
Because the landlord inspected the lines before leasing the
premises, he could not be liable. Ibid.
Courts in other jurisdictions have imposed a similar duty on
landlords for their voluntary conduct, but only in cases
involving repairs performed after the tenant has occupied the
premises. In Nichols v. Marsden,
483 A.2d 341 (Me. 1984), the
plaintiff fell through the front steps of a house she was renting
and injured herself. Id. at 343. On two occasions prior to the
letting, while the landlords-defendants lived in the house,
defendant Robert Marsden re-nailed the top board of one of the
front steps because it had pulled loose from the frame. Ibid.
After the letting, the plaintiff and the landlord became aware
that the front steps needed additional repairs. Ibid. Maine's
Supreme Judicial Court acknowledged that a landlord can be held
liable if the landlord gratuitously, but negligently, undertakes
to repair the leased premises. Ibid. In Nichols, however, the
court held that the landlords could not be held liable under that
theory because they "did not attempt to repair the steps while
the premises were in the Plaintiff's possession." Ibid.
In Allaire v. United States Trust Co.,
478 F. Supp. 826
(D.V.I. 1979), there was a rectangular opening in the corner of a
porch floor, intended to be a design feature. Id. at 827. The
landlord placed several large flower pots around the opening
because of its potential danger. Ibid. The landlord pointed out
the opening to the tenants before the house was rented. Ibid.
More than a year after moving in, the tenant fell through the
opening and was injured. Ibid. The District Court held that
even if the placing of the flower pots around the opening was
considered a negligent repair, the landlord could not be held
liable because the action was taken before the plaintiffs entered
into possession. Ibid.
We thus conclude that the Appellate Division misapplied
Bauer in two respects. First, placement of the smoke detector in
the first floor hallway near the kitchen was not a repair.
Second, even if the placement were deemed a repair, the landlord
breached no duty owed to plaintiffs, who were in exclusive
possession of the premises, because the alleged negligence
occurred before the tenancy commenced. In addition, there was no
representation or assurance by the landlord that the premises
contained an early-alert smoke detector and fire alarm system.
The location of the single smoke detector was obvious to
plaintiffs and did not create either a latent or dangerous
condition. See Faber v. Creswick,
31 N.J. 234, 242 (1959)
(holding that landlord who has knowledge of deceptively concealed
dangerous condition has duty to disclose it to tenant prior to or
after tenant takes possession).
Defendants argue that the dissenting member of the Appellate Division panel was correct in concluding that an implied warranty of habitability or covenant to repair cannot be extended to impose upon a landlord of a single-family dwelling a duty to install or maintain a smoke detector absent a statute, ordinance, regulation, or decisional law. The Appellate Division majority opinion acknowledged that because a duty was imposed upon defendants pursuant to Bauer, it declined to "address the broader
questions of whether a landlord has a duty to install a smoke
detector in a single-family house, or whether the landlord's
implied warranty of habitability applies." Nevertheless, the
dissenting member of the panel felt compelled to respond to
plaintiffs' contention that the landlord had a duty to install
the proper number of smoke detectors at appropriate locations
based on the implied warranty of habitability.
In Marini v. Ireland,
56 N.J. 130 (1970), the Court
recognized an implied covenant of habitability and livability
fitness for residential dwellings. It was characterized as:
a covenant that at the inception of the
lease, there are no latent defects in
facilities vital to the use of the premises
for residential purposes because of faulty
original construction or deterioration from
age or normal usage. And further it is a
covenant that these facilities will remain in
usable condition during the entire term of
the lease. In performance of this covenant
the landlord is required to maintain those
facilities in a condition which renders the
property livable.
[Id. at 144.]
The purpose of the covenant is to bestow upon a tenant an
additional remedy for a breach. Historically, if a landlord did
not honor his or her obligation to make repairs, the tenant's
remedy was to claim breach of the covenant to make repairs. Id.
at 145. In view of the tenant's mutual covenant to pay rent, the
tenant had to either claim constructive eviction and vacate the
premises or seek to compel the landlord to make the repairs. Id.
at 145-46. Thus, Marini afforded tenants the additional remedy
of "terminating the cause of the constructive eviction where
. . . the cause is the failure to make reasonable repairs." Id.
at 146. The added remedy permits the tenant to remain in
possession, make reasonable repairs, and deduct the cost of the
repairs from future rents. Ibid. The tenant's recourse to self-help has been extended to permit a reduction in the rent until
repairs are made. Berzito v. Gambino,
63 N.J. 460, 469 (1973).
A breach of the covenant may also expose the landlord to
liability for personal injuries caused by the breach. This Court
has recognized that the failure to provide proper security in
common areas of multiple-dwelling housing may violate the
landlord's implied warranty of habitability and livability.
Trentacost v. Brussel,
82 N.J. 214, 228 (1980). A breach of that
covenant may expose the landlord to liability for personal
injuries caused by criminal assaults. Ibid.
The alleged negligent installation of a smoke detector,
however, in no way affected the habitability of the home as
defined by the relevant caselaw. There can be no doubt that
smoke detectors enhance the safety of a dwelling. But like a
loose tread on a stair, the absence of a smoke detector at a
given location is readily apparent to a tenant. Plaintiffs never
complained to the landlord about the lack of smoke detectors or
the placement of the existing smoke detector. Even if they
thought additional smoke detectors were required, or the location
should be changed, they elected not to make the change and deduct
the costs from future rents as Marini permitted.
Enabling legislation to require smoke detectors in New
Jersey was first enacted in 1975 when the State Uniform
Construction Code Act ("Construction Act") became law. L. 1975,
c. 217 (codified at N.J.S.A. 52:27D-119 to -141). Pursuant to
the Construction Act the Commissioner of the Department of
Community Affairs ("the Commissioner") adopted with modifications
as the building subcode for New Jersey the model code of the
Building Officials and Code Administrators International, Inc.,
known as the "BOCA Basic Building Code/1975" ("BOCA Code").
N.J.A.C. 5:23-3.4 (Supp. Nov. 22, 1976). The BOCA Code became
effective, with modifications, January 1, 1977. See N.J.A.C.
5:23 Chapter Historical Note. Section 1216.3.4 of the BOCA Code
required smoke detectors in all residential dwelling units
constructed after January 1, 1977. The number, manner of
installation, and location of the smoke detectors were also
controlled by the BOCA Code. As noted earlier, the house
involved in this case was constructed in 1960. This provision,
therefore, would not have required defendants to install or
maintain a smoke detector in the house.
Because the BOCA Code applied only to residential units
constructed after January 1, 1977, the Legislature acted to fill
the void. In 1979, the Hotel and Multiple Dwelling Law, N.J.S.A.
55:13A-1 to -28, was amended to require every hotel and multiple
dwelling unit to be equipped "with smoke detectors or smoke
alarms or both." L. 1979, c. 419, § 1 (codified at N.J.S.A.
55:13A-7.1). That amendment was approved February 8, 1980, but
its effective date was delayed until sixty days after the
Commissioner promulgated implementing regulations. L. 1979, c.
419, § 3. The single-family home involved in the present case is
not a multiple dwelling, defined to mean three or more units of
dwelling space. N.J.S.A. 55:13A-3(k). This amendment,
therefore, would not have imposed a duty on defendants to install
or maintain a smoke detector in the leased premises.
In 1991, the Legislature extended the obligation for
installation of smoke detectors to existing one- and two-family
dwellings constructed before January 1, 1977, when it amended the
Uniform Fire Safety Act, N.J.S.A. 52:27D-192 to -213. L. 1991,
c. 92, §1. Since that amendment became effective on June 8,
1991, one- and two-family dwellings have been required to "have a
smoke-sensitive alarm device on each level of the structure and
outside each separate sleeping area in the immediate vicinity of
the bedrooms and located on or near the ceiling." N.J.S.A.
52:27D-198.1. Pursuant to implementing regulations, that statute
is triggered whenever there is a change in ownership or occupancy
of a one- or two-family home constructed before January 1, 1977.
N.J.A.C. 5:18-2.3.
Although the Uniform Fire Safety Act was enacted in
1983, L. 1983, c. 383, that statute affords no basis for relief
to plaintiffs. At the time of the fire in this case, that
statute did not require smoke detectors in single-family rentals.
Consequently, this is an idiosyncratic case. The fire
occurred in 1988 in a single-family house that was constructed in
1960, purchased by defendants in 1978, and leased to plaintiffs
in 1988. It was not until 1991, some three years after the fire,
that the Legislature required smoke detectors in single-family
homes built before 1977. Although the Construction Act and the
Hotel and Multiple Dwelling Law were in effect when plaintiffs
signed the lease, no law required a smoke detector or otherwise
regulated the placement of smoke detectors in plaintiffs' single-family home at the time of the fire.
We hold that under the most liberal reading of Marini, the
covenant of habitability and livability did not require the
installation of smoke detectors in single-family homes before the
obligation was created by statute and implementing regulations.
Because no law required a smoke detector in plaintiffs' home, the
placement of a smoke detector away from the bedroom area was not
negligent as a matter of law.
The judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed. The
judgment of the trial court dismissing the complaint is
reinstated.
CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES HANDLER, POLLOCK, O'HERN, GARIBALDI and STEIN join in the opinion of JUSTICE COLEMAN.
NO. A-44 SEPTEMBER TERM 1996
ON APPEAL FROM Appellate Division, Superior Court
ON CERTIFICATION TO
WILLIAM DOWLER and SUSAN DOWLER,
his wife,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
v.
RONALD BOCZKOWSKI and CATHERINE
BOCZKOWSKI,
Defendants-Appellants.
DECIDED March 25, 1997
Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING
OPINION BY Justice Coleman
CONCURRING OPINION BY
DISSENTING OPINION BY