SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
A-0625-94T2
ELLEN FRANCEY,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF
SALEM, SALEM COUNTY,
Respondent-Respondent.
_______________________________________________
Argued December 18, 1995 - Decided January 9,
1996
Before Judges Havey, D'Annunzio and Conley.
On appeal from the State Board of Education.
Steven R. Cohen argued the cause for
appellant (Selikoff & Cohen, P.A., attorneys;
Mr. Cohen, of counsel; Mr. Cohen and Keith
Waldman, on the brief).
John T. Barbour argued the cause for
respondent Board of Education of the City of
Salem (John T. Barbour, P.A., attorney; Mr.
Barbour, on the brief).
Arlene G. Lutz, Deputy Attorney General
argued the cause for respondent State Board
of Education (Deborah T. Poritz, Attorney
General, attorney; Mary C. Jacobson,
Assistant Attorney General, of counsel;
Marlene Zuberman, Deputy Attorney General, on
the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
CONLEY, J.A.D.
Petitioner, a home economics teacher who acquired tenure with the Salem City Board of Education, was laid off when her
position was abolished in a reduction in force (RIF) in 1989.
Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:28-12, she was placed on a preferred
reemployment list. In April 1991, petitioner received an
endorsement on her teaching certificate for elementary education.
Several vacancies thereafter arose in the Salem City school
system for elementary school teaching positions. Petitioner
applied, asserting a right to preferred employment from the
reemployment list. Disagreeing that her after-acquired
endorsement for elementary education entitled her to preference
pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:28-12, the local board of education
hired, instead, nontenured teachers to fill the vacancies. Both
the Acting Commissioner of Education and the State Board of
Education affirmed that decision, construing N.J.S.A. 18A:28-12
to accord preferred reemployment rights based upon the scope of
the RIF'd tenured teacher's teaching certificate and endorsements
thereon as of the date of the lay-off determination.
Although a contrary interpretation of the statute is
possible, we agree with the administrative agencies'
interpretation. In so agreeing, we acknowledge that when the
issue is one of statutory interpretation, we are not bound to
accept an administrative agency's interpretation. But we do,
nonetheless, accord an agency's expertise "considerable weight."
E.g., Mayflower Sec. Co., Inc. v. Bureau of Sec.,
64 N.J. 85, 93
(1973); Bassett v. Board of Educ. of Oakland, Bergen County,
223 N.J. Super. 136, 142 (App. Div. 1988). And see Dennery v. Board
of Educ. of Passaic County,
131 N.J. 626, 642-43 (1993). We also
recognize that when the meaning of a statute is plain on its
face, ordinarily that meaning governs. See Lammers v. Board of
Educ. of Point Pleasant,
134 N.J. 264, 272 (1993).
Here, the statute not only does not plainly mean what
petitioner says it does, but it is entirely silent as to whether
the reemployment protections it accords are to be fixed as of the
date of the RIF decision or may thereafter be expanded by the
addition of subsequent endorsements on a teacher's teaching
certificate. Given the absence of a contrary legislative
directive, we give considerable weight to the Commissioner's and
State Board's expertise, particularly since we think their
interpretation is well-supported by cogent education policy
considerations and is not discordant with the underlying
legislative objectives to be served by the Tenure Act. Cf. Board
of Educ. of Manchester, Ocean County v. Raubinger,
78 N.J. Super. 90, 99-100 (App. Div. 1963).
N.J.S.A. 18A:28-12 provides in pertinent part:
If any teaching staff member shall be
dismissed as a result of ... [a reduction in
force], such person shall be and remain upon
a preferred eligible list in the order of
seniority for reemployment whenever a vacancy
occurs in a position for which such person
shall be qualified and he shall be reemployed
by the body causing dismissal, if and when
such vacancy occurs.
[Emphasis added].
"Qualified," in its ordinary sense, means: "[to have] complied with the specific requirements or precedent conditions...." Webster's Third New International Dictionary Unabridged 1858 (3d ed. 1981). It is, moreover, well evident that possession of the appropriate certification deems one
"qualified" for a vacancy within the context of N.J.S.A. 18A:28-12. See Mirandi v. Board of Educ. of West Orange, 1
989 S.L.D. 3057, 3062; Bodine v. Board of Educ. of Burlington, Burlington
County, 1
989 S.L.D. 1053, 1058, aff'd by State Bd. of Educ., 1
989 S.L.D. 1064. It is, further, by now clear that "qualified"
within the scope of tenure rights means qualified as to the
particular position in which a teacher has attained tenure and
all other positions within the scope of the teacher's teaching
certificate and endorsements thereto, Dennery v. Board of Educ.
of Passaic County, supra, 131 N.J. at 634, 638; Ellicott v. Board
of Educ. of Frankford, Sussex County,
251 N.J. Super. 342, 348
(App. Div. 1991), regardless of whether one has actual experience
in that area, id. at 348-50; Capodilupo v. Board of Educ. of West
Orange Tp., Essex County,
218 N.J. Super. 510, 513-15 (App.
Div.), certif. denied,
109 N.J. 514 (1987).
That does not, however, address at what point the teacher
must "qualify" for preferred rights to a vacancy. Petitioner
argues that the use of the verb "shall" has a futuristic
connotation. We cannot discern that from the language of the
statute. "Shall" frequently is used by the Legislature to
connote a mandate. No Illegal Points, Citizens for Drivers
Rights, Inc. v. Florio,
264 N.J. Super. 318, 329 (App. Div.),
certif. denied,
134 N.J. 479 (1993). That is consistent with the
overall mandatory tone of the statute here. "Shall" has also
been used to designate a tense or time. See Student Pub.
Interest Research Group of N.J. v. Byrne,
86 N.J. 592, 598-99
(1981) ("shall have been" in the context of the New Jersey
constitutional provision concerning salary increases for
legislators during their term of office is the use of the future
perfect tense identifying "that which must occur before the
future event."). But as a commentator on statutory construction
has observed:
"Shall," as used in statutes, is not only, in
many cases, superfluous from the standpoint
of good writing, but has too many meanings to
make its unnecessary use safe. The courts,
in following their well-defined policy of
looking to the intent, rather than to the
language, have variously held that "shall" is
imperative, is directory, means "may,"
expresses a mandate, either permissive or
peremptory, applies to the past, to the
future, and to the present.
[Dale E. Sutton, Use of "Shall" in Statutes,
4 J. Marshall L.Q. 204 (1938), reprinted in 2
Sutherland, Statutory Construction, at 763
(5th ed. 1992)].
Moreover, N.J.S.A. 18A:28-12 is a reemployment statute. It looks
to the reestablishment of a prior employment relationship. That
relationship does not logically exist for additional endorsements
or teaching certifications acquired after the employment
relationship ends.
We acknowledge that, generally, a liberal interpretation of
the Tenure Act is favored. E.g., Spiewak v. Rutherford Bd. of
Educ.,
90 N.J. 63, 74 (1982). Such liberal interpretation is
favored so as to properly effectuate the Act's beneficial
purposes. Ibid; Bednar v. Westwood Bd. of Educ.,
221 N.J. Super. 239, 241 (App. Div. 1987), certif. denied,
110 N.J. 512 (1988).
When enacting the tenure laws for teachers, the Legislature was
responding to concerns regarding those teachers who had devoted
their efforts to an employment relationship with a local school
district, and sought to protect such teachers from an arbitrary
termination of that relationship. Such statutory rights were
perceived to foster "a competent and efficient school system by
affording to principals and teachers a measure of security in the
ranks they hold after years of service." E.g., Viemester v.
Board of Educ. of Prospect Park, Passaic County,
5 N.J. Super. 215, 218 (App. Div. 1949). And see Wright v. Board of Educ. of
East Orange, Essex County,
99 N.J. 112, 118 (1985) ("tenure
`prevents school boards from abusing their superior bargaining
power ... in contract negotiations'. Spiewak v. Rutherford Bd.
of Educ.,
90 N.J. 63, 74 (1982). It protects employees from
dismissal for `unfounded, flimsy or political reasons.'
Zimmerman v. Newark Bd. of Educ.,
38 N.J. 65, 71 (1962), cert.
denied,
371 U.S. 956,
83 S.Ct. 508,
9 L. Ed.2d 502 (1963). Once
the status of tenure is earned, it provides a measure of job
security to those who continue to perform their jobs properly. .
. .").
These concerns govern a tenured teacher's rights while in
the employment of a school board and afford protection thereafter
for rights attained during that relationship. Whether the same
considerations arise so as to extend tenure protection to an
expansion of the scope of a teacher's teaching certificate, after
the employment relationship has ended, is plainly a matter of
policy. The Legislature has been less than clear and the
education agencies have, accordingly, filled the void. We cannot
say their policy choice is arbitrary or capricious and without
educational foundation. Cf. Ellicott v. Board of Educ. of
Frankford, Sussex County, supra, 251 N.J. Super. at 351;
Capodilupo v. Board of Educ. of West Orange Tp., Essex County,
supra, 218 N.J. Super. at 515-16. As we perceive them, the
tenure protections afforded by the Act are designed to apply to,
and protect, a teacher's employment efforts over a period of time
with a particular school board of education. Thus, on the one
hand, when a teacher is RIF'd, but, during employment with the
school board, has earned tenure rights within the scope of a
teaching certificate and all endorsements thereon, the teacher is
entitled to preferred reemployment only to positions within that
certificate and endorsements. On the other hand, like a
distinct, separate teaching certificate, subsequently acquired
endorsements do not fall within the scope of the needed
protection. Cf. Dennery v. Board of Educ. of Passaic County,
supra, 131 N.J. at 641-42 (reemployment rights of a RIF'd teacher
do not apply to a teaching certificate that is separate from and
unrelated to the certificate and endorsements thereon for which
the teacher obtained tenure); N.J.S.A. 18A:28-4 ("[n]o teaching
staff member shall acquire tenure in any position in the public
schools in any school district or under any board of education,
who is not the holder of an appropriate certificate for ... [the]
position. . . .").
We note, too, the observations expressed by the Acting
Commissioner in terms of the administrative concerns:
the date of an employee's RIF can be the only
reasonable date certain on which the
employee's rights can be reckoned for future
entitlement purposes. To deprive boards of
this certainty by permitting riffed staff to
continually revise and expand their
entitlements at will would at the very least
pose an unreasonable administrative burden on
the district, and, of more concern, would
likely lead to amassing of endorsements
following RIF, reduce to chaos any attempt by
a district to ascertain its legal
responsibilities upon the arising of a
vacancy, and unduly restrict boards in their
efforts to provide a thorough and efficient
education by choosing the most qualified
staff for open positions.
These concerns arise from the Commissioner's overall
responsibility to ensure a fair, yet effective and efficient
educational system. We can not say that such concerns are not
entitled to some weight.
Finally, we address petitioner's reliance upon our decisions
in Ellicott v. Board of Educ. of Frankford, Sussex County, supra,
and Capodilupo v. Board of Educ. of West Orange Tp., Essex
County, supra. Neither of these cases are dispositive of the
precise issue here. All we held in Ellicott and Capodilupo, as
had the State Board, was that a RIF'd tenured teacher, at the
time of her RIF, has tenure rights to a vacancy in a position
that is within the scope of the teacher's certificate and
endorsements thereon as of the date of the RIF. Neither of those
cases concerned endorsements acquired after the date of a RIF.
Our affirmance here, therefore, of the Acting Commissioner's and
the State Board's denial of N.J.S.A. 18A:28-12 reemployment
rights based on such after acquired endorsements is not
contraindicated by those cases.
Affirmed.