SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
A-2549-00T1
EMOTION BLACKWELL,
Appellant,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Respondent.
_____________________________________
Submitted January 29, 2002 -- Decided
February 20, 2002
Before Judges Pressler, Ciancia and Parrillo.
On appeal from the Department of Corrections.
Appellant filed a pro se brief.
David Samson, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent (Patrick DeAlmeida, Deputy
Attorney General, of counsel; Lisa A.
Puglisi, Deputy Attorney General, on the
brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
CIANCIA, J.A.D.
This is a prison disciplinary appeal. Emotion Blackwell, an
inmate currently confined at New Jersey State Prison in Trenton,
appeals a final determination of the Department of Corrections
(DOC) finding that he committed prohibited act .256, refusing to
obey an order of any staff member, and prohibited act *.306,
conduct that disrupts or interferes with the security or orderly
running of the correctional facility, both in violation of
N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1. We now reverse the final agency decision, in
part because of inadequate findings by the DOC and in part
because of an apparent lack of credible evidence to support the
*.306 charge.
From the record before us we are able to ascertain the
following. On November 3, 2000, inmates were participating in an
Islamic prayer service in the "south compound visit hall" (SCVH).
At the end of the service, the inmates were released back to
living areas based upon geographic designation. Blackwell lived
in the south compound, but did not leave when that area was
called. He claims that he and another inmate were putting away
prayer rugs and impliedly did not hear the call for south
compound inmates. When he realized that he had missed the call,
he exited when inmates from the north and west compounds were
released. Blackwell apparently returned to the south compound
without incident.
Blackwell was charged on November 4, 2000 with refusing to
obey an order of any staff member, the .256 charge. On November
5, 2000, Blackwell was charged with conduct that disrupts or
interferes with the security or orderly running of the
correctional facility, the *.306 charge. As far as the record
reveals, both charges were based solely upon the conduct
previously described. Blackwell was found guilty of both charges
after a courtline hearing. He appealed the decision to the
prison administrator and it was affirmed by the assistant
superintendent.
The DOC is not required to provide a verbatim record of
disciplinary proceedings, McDonald v. Pinchak,
139 N.J. 188, 201-
202 (1995); Daley v. Department of Corrections,
331 N.J. Super. 344 (App. Div. 2000), and none is available to us in the present
case. We also have only a limited recitation of what evidence
was presented at that hearing. It appears Blackwell gave his
version of events, and it may be that the charging officer, or
perhaps an investigating officer, also gave a version of events.
The disciplinary reports were apparently reviewed.
The disciplinary report charging the .256 infraction states,
"[o]n the above date and approx. time I/M Blackwell, . . . was
ordered to exit the S.C.V.H., said I/M refused and didn't exit
the S.C.V.H. until the North and West compound was called out."
The findings on that charge by the hearing officer are: "[b]ody
of charge is supported by officers report, i/m failed to comply
with order to move with right compound, H/O notes i/m's witness
is same as person who wrote the charge, no evidence to discredit
the officers report, all relied on to determine guilt."
The disciplinary report charging the *.306 infraction
states, "Blackwell . . . did refuse . . . order to exit the s/c
visit hall at the end of Islamic services . . . . I/M exited the
visit hall with the north & west compound. I/M action interfere
with the security & orderly running of the correctional
facility." The findings on the *.306 charge by the hearing
officer are: "[b]ody of charge is supported by officers report,
officer has no reason to fabricate the charge, no evidence to
discredit the officer report, support the i/m, all relied on to
determine guilt."
As indicated, Blackwell appealed both adjudications to the
prison administrator. As part of that appeal, defendant, through
his designated inmate legal assistant, set forth a narrative of
his position concerning both charges. In denying the appeal, the
assistant superintendent stated, "[t]here was compliance with the
New Jersey Administrative Code on inmate discipline which
prescribes procedural safeguards. The decision of the Hearing
Officer was based upon substantial evidence." There is no
recitation of what that substantial evidence was.
It is now well-settled that prison inmates do not enjoy the
full spectrum of due process rights, but such rights are to be
abridged only to the extent necessary to accommodate the
institutional needs and objectives of prisons. McDonald, supra,
139 N.J. at 194. Prisoners remain entitled to certain basic due
process protections, Daley, supra, 331 N.J. Super. at 346,
including a written statement of factfindings and a statement of
reasons for the disciplinary action taken, unless providing that
information would jeopardize institutional security. Avant v.
Clifford,
67 N.J. 496, 533 (1975) (quoting with approval the New
Jersey Standards on the Inmate Discipline Program and finding
them "compatible with constitution and law").
More broadly, an agency's obligation to adequately set forth
its rationale in support of a final determination is now beyond
cavil:
However, when an administrative body
renders a decision and fails to make adequate
findings of fact and give an expression of
reasoning which, when applied to the found
facts, led to the conclusion below, the
decision cannot stand. In N.J. Bell Tel. Co.
v. Communications Workers of America,
5 N.J. 354 (1950), the Court stated:
It has been said that it is a
fundamental of fair play that an
administrative judge express a
reasoned conclusion. . . . A
conclusion requires evidence to
support it and findings of
appropriate definiteness to express
it. [Id. at 375 (citations
omitted).]
And the findings must be:
. . . sufficiently specific under
the circumstances of the particular
case to enable the reviewing court
to intelligently review an
administrative decision and
ascertain if the facts upon which
the order is based afford a
reasonable basis for such order.
[Id. at 377.]
See also Van Realty, Inc. v. City of Passaic,
117 N.J. Super. 425, 430-431 (App. Div.
1971).
Thus, a mere cataloging of evidence
followed by an ultimate conclusion of
liability, without a reasoned explanation
based on specific findings of basic facts,
does not satisfy the requirements of the
adjudicatory process because it does not
enable us to properly perform our review
function within the guidelines of Close,
supra. Oszmanski v. Bergen Point Brass
Foundry, Inc.,
95 N.J. Super. 92, 95 (App.
Div. 1967), certif. den.
51 N.J. 181 (1968).
In Benjamin Moore & Co. v. City of Newark,
133 N.J. Super. 427, 429 (App. Div. 1975) we
reiterated that warning. See also St.
Vincent's Hospital v. Finley,
154 N.J. Super. 24, 31 (App. Div. 1977).
[Lister v. J.B. Eurell Co.,
234 N.J. Super. 64, 73 (App. Div. 1989).]
The DOC is not immune from these requirements, although in
prison disciplinary matters we have not traditionally required
elaborate written decisions. As we said in Williams v.
Department of Corrections,
330 N.J. Super. 197, 203-204 (App.
Div. 2000), although the determination of an administrative
agency is entitled to deference, our appellate obligation
requires more than a perfunctory review.
While our scope of review is limited, we
cannot be relegated to a mere rubber-stamp of
agency action. State-Operated School
District of the City of Newark v. Gaines,
309 N.J. Super. 327, 332,
707 A.2d 165 (App.
Div.), certif. denied,
156 N.J. 381,
718 A.2d 1210 (1998); Chou v. Rutgers,
283 N.J. Super. 524, 539,
662 A.2d 986 (App. Div. 1995),
certif. denied,
145 N.J. 374,
678 A.2d 714
(1996). Here, were we to accept the naked
conclusion of the senior investigator, we
would merely be rubber-stamping the
Department's opinion, for it provides no real
guidance to the conclusion it reached. That
we cannot, and will not, do.
[Id. at 204.]
We reach the same conclusion in the present case. The .256
charge against Blackwell turned largely on credibility. He was
accused of intentionally disregarding an order. We do not know
from this record if the charging officer was a witness at the
hearing, although there is some indication that he may have been
called by Blackwell. We do know that the charging officer's
report was considered and that report asserted that Blackwell
"was ordered to exit S.C.V.H., said I/M refused and didn't exit
the S.C.V.H. until the north and west compound was called out."
Blackwell's version, as written in his request for an
administrative appeal and, we assume, as presented at the
hearing, was significantly different. He stated the incident was
a misunderstanding. He and another inmate were placing prayer
rugs back in storage and they returned from that task only to
find that south compound had already been called.
Exactly what circumstances surrounded Blackwell's conduct on
the day in question are never set forth by the hearing officer,
even assuming there was sufficient evidence at the hearing to
allow such findings. One obvious question is whether Blackwell
even heard the order he allegedly disobeyed. Why the hearing
officer found the report of the charging officer more persuasive
than Blackwell's testimony is unknown. Our concluding comments
in Decker v. New Jersey Department of Corrections,
331 N.J.
Super. 353, 359 (App. Div. 2000), are applicable here as well:
This is not a case involving either a
confidential informant or prisoner witnesses
offered by the institution to sustain its
case. It is a case that turns on whether the
complaining officer is correct or incorrect
in charging an inmate with conduct that was
intentional. Stated differently, the hearing
officer had to decide whether the inmate was
credible in contending that the conduct was
accidental. This is not the type of case
that can be resolved exclusively by reference
to the charging officer's report and his
supplementary report designed to answer the
inmate's defense. In these circumstances,
the inmate is entitled to challenge the
officer's perceptions by developing why the
officer thought the incident was purposeful
as opposed to accidental.
Here, too, Blackwell should have been afforded the opportunity to
challenge the charging officer's perceptions concerning the
events surrounding his alleged disobedience of the order to leave
the prayer services. There is no indication he was afforded that
opportunity or, if so afforded, how that evidence was evaluated.
See Gross v. New Jersey Department of Corrections,
167 N.J. 626
(2001) (remanding disciplinary adjudication to allow cross-
examination of correction officers by prisoner, and citing
Decker). Accordingly, the determination on the .256 charge is
vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
Adjudication of the *.306 charge suffers from the same
deficiencies as the .256 charge, plus the additional problem that
we can find no basis in the record for adding this charge onto
the initial .256 charge. The disciplinary report setting forth a
description of the alleged *.306 infraction merely states that
Blackwell refused an order to exit the hall and he exited the
hall with the north and west compounds. It concludes that
Blackwell's action "interfered with the orderly running of the
correctional facility," but that, of course, is the ultimate
issue. It is nowhere asserted by the DOC that breach of .256
automatically entails a breach of *.306, nor does logic lead to
such a conclusion. We can find no basis in this record for an
assertion, much less a conclusion, that Blackwell's conduct had
disrupted or interfered with prison security or the orderly
running of the correctional facility. We note the investigating
officer's written comment that he "cannot support this charge on
the evidence." In these circumstances, the absence of any
evidential basis for the *.306 charge must result not only in
vacation of the adjudication, but in dismissal of that charge.
The final determination on the .256 charge is vacated and
that matter is remanded for further proceedings. The
adjudication on the *.306 charge is vacated and the charge is
dismissed.