(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for
the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please
note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).
Argued April 28, 1998 -- Decided June 5, 1998
Per Curiam
Don Fisher was convicted in 1995 of endangering a child. He received a five-year prison term with
an eighteen-month parole ineligibility term. In 1996, Fisher sought parole. The Parole Board held a hearing
and denied Fisher's application. He appealed to the Appellate Division and sought leave to proceed as an
indigent. The Appellate Division granted Fisher's motion.
On September 12, 1996, inmate Eric Gibbons was charged with disciplinary infractions. Gibbons
received a disciplinary hearing and on September 30, 1996, was sanctioned. He filed an administrative
appeal. Prison Administrator Scott Faunce upheld the sanction on October 7, 1996. Gibbons appealed to
the Appellate Division and sought leave to proceed as an indigent. The Appellate Division granted the
indigency motion and refused to apply a statute that requires inmates to pay filing fees in “civil actions”
(N.J.S.A. 30:4-16.3).
In both cases, the Attorney General sought leave to appeal from the Supreme Court on the issue of
the application of the statute. The Court granted leave to appeal and remanded the consolidated case to the
Appellate Division to consider the statutory issue on the merits. On July 10, 1997, the Appellate Division
issued its decision, holding that the statute did not apply to appeals from Parole Board decisions or to
appeals from the imposition of prison disciplinary charges.
The Supreme Court granted the Attorney General's motion for leave to appeal from the July 10,
1997, decision of the Appellate Division.
HELD: The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed substantially for the reasons expressed in the
opinion of Judge Michael Patrick King.
1. The issue before the court is one of statutory construction. Interpretation of the text of the statute is
required. There is substantial evidence to support a conclusion that the Legislature intended to apply the
provisions of N.J.S.A. 30:4-16.3 to civil actions for money damages and not to prisoner appeals from parole
decisions or from inmate discipline.
2. Appeals do not involve the “commencement” of an action as described by the statute. They are, in fact,
the conclusion of the process that is begun in an administrative forum and not as a “civil action.”
The judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED.
CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES HANDLER, POLLOCK, O'HERN, STEIN, and
COLEMAN join in the Court's Per Curiam opinion. JUSTICE GARIBALDI has filed a separate
dissenting opinion.
GARIBALDI, J., dissenting, is of the view that the statute plainly and unambiguously includes appeals of
administrative agency decisions.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-
139 September Term 1997
DON P. FISHER,
Appellant-Respondent,
v.
NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD,
Respondent-Appellant.
ERIC GIBBONS,
Appellant-Respondent,
v.
SCOTT FAUNCE, ADMINISTRATOR BAYSIDE
STATE PRISON,
Respondent-Appellant.
Argued April 28, 1998 -- Decided June 5, 1998
On appeal from the Superior Court, Appellate
Division, whose opinion is reported at 303
N.J. Super. 229 (1997).
Dianne M. Moratti, Deputy Attorney General,
argued the cause for appellants (Peter
Verniero, Attorney General of New Jersey,
attorney; Mary C. Jacobson, Assistant
Attorney General, of counsel).
Lawrence S. Lustberg argued the cause for
respondents (Gibbons, Del Deo, Dolan,
Griffinger & Vecchione, attorneys; Mr.
Lustberg and James E. Ryan, on the briefs).
PER CURIAM
The judgment is affirmed, substantially for the reasons
expressed in Judge King's opinion of the Appellate Division,
reported at
303 N.J. Super. 229 (1997).
CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES HANDLER, POLLOCK, O'HERN,
STEIN, and COLEMAN join in this opinion. JUSTICE GARIBALDI has
filed a separate dissenting opinion.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-
139 September Term 1997
DON P. FISHER,
Appellant-Respondent,
v.
NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD,
Respondent-Appellant.
______________________________
ERIC GIBBONS,
Appellant-Respondent,
v.
SCOTT FAUNCE, ADMINISTRATOR,
BAYSIDE STATE PRISON,
Respondent-Appellant.
GARIBALDI, J., dissenting.
Substantially for the reasons expressed by the Appellate Division in Fisher v. State Parole Bd., 303 N.J. Super. 229 (1997), the majority holds that the partial filing fee requirement of N.J.S.A. 30:4-16 does not apply to inmates' appeals from adverse agency determinations in parole and disciplinary matters. I disagree and find that the statute
plainly and unambiguously includes appeals of administrative
agency determinations.
In 1996, the Legislature enacted the Inmate Litigation Act, N.J.S.A. 30:4-16.2 to -16.5. At issue is N.J.S.A. 30:4-16.3, which requires an inmate who "files an action or proceeding in any court of this State and requests a waiver of filing fees on the grounds of indigency" to pay a partial court filing fee in proportion to the funds available in the inmate's institutional account (emphasis added). The filing fee may be waived by the court upon a showing of exceptional circumstances. N.J.S.A. 30:4-16.3(b), (c).
N.J.S.A. 30:4-16.3 plainly and unambiguously includes appeals of administrative agency determinations. The Legislature, by choosing the expansive language "action and proceeding in any court of this State," clearly intended to cover all civil actions brought by inmates in the State. The term "action" includes "all the formal proceedings in a court of justice attendant upon the demand of a right by one person or another in such court, including an adjudication upon the right and its enforcement or denial by the court." Black's Law Dictionary 26 (5th ed. 1979). Moreover, "proceeding" means "any application to a court of justice, however made, for aid in the enforcement of rights, for relief, for redress of injuries, for damages, or for any remedial object." Id. at 1083-84.
Despite the statute's plain language, the majority claims it is ambiguous. Consequently, the majority relies on legislative
history that it asserts establishes that the Legislature intended
only to require filing fees to deter inmates from filing
frivolous civil lawsuits seeking money damages or injunctive
relief against government entities and their agents. Underlying
the majority's holding is a belief that actions regarding parole
and disciplinary matters are not frivolous. Such an assumption
is unwarranted, as the facts in these cases disclose.
In the first case, plaintiff Fisher was sentenced in 1995 to
a five-year prison term with a mandatory minimum of eighteen
months for endangering the welfare of a child. After determining
that there was a substantial likelihood that, if released,
Fisher would commit another crime, the Parole Board denied him
parole release and imposed a twenty-month future eligibility
term. The Board affirmed its decision on reconsideration.
Fisher appealed the Parole Board's decision to the Appellate
Division and filed motions to proceed as an indigent and for the
assignment of counsel. The Appellate Division granted the motion
to proceed as an indigent and denied the motion for counsel.
Subsequently, the Appellate Division dismissed Fisher's appeal
for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. If N.J.S.A.
30:4-16.3 were applied to Fisher, he would be required to pay
$10.93 as a fee for filing his appeal with the Appellate
Division. The regular fee for filing an appeal is $175.
In the second case presented to the Court, plaintiff Gibbons
received an on-the-spot sanction by a corrections officer for
yelling and kicking his cell door. The sanction was four hours
of extra work. The next day, Gibbons received a disciplinary
charge for threatening that officer with bodily harm, a violation
of N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a). After a disciplinary hearing, the
hearing officer concluded that there was substantial evidence to
support the charge and imposed a sanction of fifteen days
detention, 180 days administrative segregation, and 180 days loss
of commutation time. Gibbons filed an administrative appeal,
which was denied. He then filed an appeal to the Appellate
Division with a motion to proceed as an indigent. The Appellate
Division granted Gibbons's motion, but declined to apply N.J.S.A.
30:4-16.3 to the proceeding. Subsequently, the Appellate
Division dismissed Gibbons's appeal for failure to prosecute. If
Gibbons were required to pay a portion of the $175 filing fee,
under N.J.S.A. 30:4-16.3, his financial obligation would be
$21.08 (20" of the average deposits of $105.42).
I doubt that the Legislature intended to exclude from the
partial filing fee requirement a dispute that arose from an
inmate being disciplined for yelling and kicking his cell door.
Indeed, the only proposition that the legislative history clearly
supports is that the Legislature intended to deter frivolous
litigation by inmates, including appeals to the Appellate
Division from adverse agency determinations in parole and
disciplinary matters.
N.J.S.A. 30:4-16.3 does not deny inmates the right to appeal. Instead, inmates, like other citizens, will be required to accept the fiscal responsibility for filing legal actions, including judicial review of adverse agency determinations. The
partial filing fee to be paid is 20" of the greater of the
average monthly balance in the inmate's account or the average
deposits to the account. N.J.S.A. 30:4-16.3(a). "Inmates may
spend the money in their fund accounts in a variety of ways,
including purchasing goods from the inmate commissary and from
outside sources such as catalogues, or depositing it into savings
accounts outside of prison." Fisher, supra, 303 N.J. Super. at
234. I do not think it is a hardship for an inmate to use his
funds to pursue an appeal. Other citizens have to make those
decisions. However, unlike other citizens, inmates who request a
waiver under N.J.S.A. 30:4-16.3 are only compelled to pay a
portion of their inmate accounts to meet this obligation.
N.J.S.A. 30:4-16.3 is consistent with the medical co-payment
statute, N.J.S.A. 30:7E-1 to -6, which requires inmates to
shoulder a minimal financial obligation for the choices they
make.
The Legislature enacted the statute to compel inmates to shoulder some portion of the financial burden for civil actions they institute and to reduce the number of frivolous cases brought in the courts by inmates. Affirming the judgment of the Appellate Division will cause irreparable harm and will frustrate the public interest. The records of the Attorney General show that 199 appeals from inmate disciplinary and parole decisons were filed in 1996. Inmates also file appeals from other administrative decisions, such as those affecting conditions of incarceration, the desire to have access to computers, and
visitation. The number of cases that will be affected by the
majority's holding highlights the importance of this decision.
To discourage the filing of frivolous actions, the
Legislature intended that inmates should bear some of the costs
of litigation. That requirement applies to all civil actions and
proceedings, including appeals.
I would reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division.
NO. A-139 SEPTEMBER TERM 1997
ON APPEAL FROM Appellate Division, Superior Court
ON CERTIFICATION TO
DON P. FISHER,
Appellant-Respondent,
v.
NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD,
Respondent-Appellant.
---------------------------------------
ERIC GIBBONS,
Appellant-Respondent,
v.
SCOTT FAUNCE, ADMINISTRATOR BAYSIDE
STATE PRISON
Respondent-Appellant.
DECIDED June 5, 1998
Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING
OPINION BY PER CURIAM
CONCURRING OPINION BY
DISSENTING OPINION BY Justice Garibaldi