(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of
the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity,
portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).
Argued October 23, 2001 -- Decided December 5, 2001
COLEMAN, J., writing for a unanimous Court.
The issue in this appeal concerns the enforceability of a notice requirement contained in a partnership agreement.
Plaintiff, Garrett M. Heher, was a partner in the law firm of Smith, Stratton, Wise, Heher, and Brennan (Smith
Srattton or “the firm”) from 1966 to August 4, 1986, when he voluntarily withdrew from the firm. He had helped to
negotiate and draft a partnership agreement (agreement) that was in effect between June 1, 1983 and August 1987. The
agreement provided for certain benefits (“stated” and “supplemental” benefits) for a partner who did not compete with the
law firm in any way following his or her departure from the firm. Article IV of the agreement provided for arbitration of
all disputes arising under the agreement or the partnership relationship.
On two occasions in November 1986 and once in October and December 1987, Heher filed notice of his intent to
arbitrate his claim to partnership profits, access to records, and various issues arising out of his withdrawal from the firm.
He did not request arbitration related to the stated or supplemental benefits in view of the non-competition restriction in the
agreement (some of the firm's clients had chosen to follow him). Although there were some subsequent settlement
discussions between Heher's attorney and counsel for the firm, no further action was taken regarding the notices of intent
to arbitrate until August 1992.
In May 1992, the Supreme Court decided Jacob v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, in which it held that a
restrictive covenant, such as the one contained in the Smith Stratton agreement, was prohibited by the Rules of Professional
Conduct, and were unenforceable as violative of public policy.
On August 3, 1992, some two months after the Court rendered its decision in Jacob, Heher filed a complaint in the
Chancery Division contending that the restrictive covenant contained in the agreement was unenforceable based on the
Court's decision in Jacob. Heher alleged that he was entitled to the stated benefits provided in the agreement, and further
that because the restrictive agreement was violative of public policy, he could not be required to submit to binding
arbitration as required by Article IV of the agreement. Thus, he sought a permanent injunction preventing Smith Stratton
from arbitrating the issue of his entitlement to the stated benefit under the agreement; judgment in an amount equal to the
stated benefit, together with prejudgment interest, attorneys' fees and costs; and an order requiring Smith Stratton to
provide an accounting of gross fees received by the firm to permit Heher to determine whether he was entitled to assert a
claim for the supplemental benefit.
The Chancery Division concluded that the restrictive covenant and forfeiture provisions of the agreement were
void and, therefore, not arbitrable. The court further found that because the firm conceded that Heher accurately had stated
his earnings for the years in question, on which the stated benefit rate was based, the uncontested stated benefit due to
Heher under the agreement was $143,355. However, the court ordered arbitration of all other contested issues, including
whether the stated benefit should be adjusted to account for loss of goodwill based on the agreement. The court
specifically found that Heher's claim to benefits was timely filed. Both parties cross-appealed the Chancery Division's
decision and sought a stay of the arbitration pending that appeal. In its appeal, the firm continued to challenge the
timeliness of Heher's claim for stated and supplemental benefits.
In an unpublished opinion, the Appellate Division reversed, concluding that the Chancery Division litigation
should be stayed pending arbitration, and ordered the arbitration to proceed forthwith. That holding did not alter the
Chancery Division's conclusion that the claims for stated and supplemental benefits were not time-barred. The Appellate
Division also required the arbitrators to issue a written opinion setting forth its factual findings and legal conclusions to
facilitate judicial review.
The Supreme Court granted Heher's petition for certification. In that appeal, Smith Stratton urged the Court to
affirm the Appellate Division's judgment and to require arbitration on all issues. It did not mention the thirty-day notice
defense in its brief filed with the Court. Heher, on the other hand, continued to challenge all aspects of the Appellate
Division's findings, ultimately asserting that he was entitled to the stated benefit because there was no material issue left to
arbitrate. The Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division's judgment, but cautioned that the arbitrator's disposition
would be subjected to an enhanced level of review to afford relief from an arbitration award that obviously would frustrate
a clear mandate of public policy.
When the matter proceeded to arbitration, Smith Stratton challenged the timeliness of Heher's request for
arbitration. A majority of the arbitration panel concluded that Heher had not timely filed his arbitration request as required
by Article V of the agreement and that there were no extraordinary circumstances or countervailing equities that would
relieve him of the obligation to file the requisite thirty-day notice required by the agreement. However, in order to avoid a
remand should its notice finding be reversed on appeal, the arbitration panel set forth its substantive findings, including its
finding that Smith Stratton should be entitled to pursue at a plenary hearing the loss of goodwill arising from the departure
of nine firm clients, who followed Heher when he withdrew from the firm. One of the arbitrators dissented, concluding
among other things, that there were unique and extraordinary circumstances and equitable principles that would excuse
compliance with the thirty-day notice requirement, and further that enforcement of the requirement in these circumstances
would be violative of the public policy declared by and protected in Jacob.
The parties filed cross-motions in the Chancery Division to vacate and to confirm the arbitrators' award. The
Chancery Division granted Smith Stratton's motion and confirmed the award. The Chancery Division specifically found
that the arbitrators had resolved the public policy question reasonably and fairly. In an unpublished opinion, the Appellate
Division affirmed.
The Supreme Court granted Heher's petition for certification.
HELD: Based on the special circumstances and equities reflected in the procedural history of this case, Smith Sratton is
estopped from relying on the provision contained in its partnership agreement, which requires notice of intent to arbitrate
issues arising under that agreement or the partnership relationship .
1. Although there is no question that arbitration is a preferred method of dispute resolution because it combines advantages
of privacy and efficiency, the critical issue raised in this case nevertheless is whether the firm should now be precluded
from raising the thirty-day notice defense after previously urging the Supreme Court to require the parties to submit to
merits arbitration. Smith Stratton should not be permitted to have the benefits of a covenant that is against public policy
and unenforceable. To prevent that result, it is estopped from relying on the notice provision after successfully persuading
the Supreme Court that the parties should be required to arbitrate their disputes. (pp. 10-11)
2. If not for the invalid covenant contained in the agreement, no issue of notice would have arisen because Heher's right to
the stated benefit would have been clear. Thus, Heher's claim for benefits filed within sixty-seven days of the Jacob
decision is timely notwithstanding the notice provision contained in the agreement. (p. 11)
3. Because nowhere in the agreement is there a contractual basis for the firm to assert a claim against Heher's stated or
supplemental benefit based on the alleged loss of firm goodwill, that portion of the arbitrators' award requiring discovery
and a plenary hearing in respect of the loss of goodwill is vacated. (pp. 11-12)
4. The matter is remanded to the Chancery Division to enter judgment for the stated benefit and prejudgment interest. The
Chancery Division is to then remand the matter to the arbitrators to determine, after appropriate discovery, the extent of
any supplemental benefit due Heher under the agreement, without any set-off based on the alleged loss of firm goodwill.
Judgment of The Appellate Division is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED to the Chancery Division for
further proceedings in accordance with the Court's opinion.
CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES STEIN, LONG, LaVECCHIA and ZAZZALI join in JUSTICE
COLEMAN's opinion. JUSTICE VERNIERO did not participate.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-
83 September Term 2000
GARRETT M. HEHER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
SMITH, STRATTON, WISE, HEHER
and BRENNAN, A New Jersey
general partnership, WILLIAM J.
BRENNAN, III, HUGH D. WISE,
JR., HENRY S. BROAD, JOHN
ROBERT HEHER, ARTHUR S. LANE,
CHRISTOPHER S. TARR, ANN
REICHELDERFER, ALEXANDER P.
WAUGH, JR., WENDY L. MAGER,
RICHARD J. PINTO, BRIAN P.
SULLIVAN, SUZANNE M. McSORLEY,
MARSHA E. NOVICK, ROBERT C.
JOHNSTON, PETER R. FREED,
THOMAS E. HASTINGS, ELIZABETH
R. SALASKO, DOROTHY FECHT
LUNTEY, DAVID J. SORIN, JAMES
SCOTT HILL, ROBERT P. GORMAN,
EDWIN B. KAGAN, ROBERT D.
FRAWLEY, DIANE M. FRENIER,
ELLEN O'CONNELL, PAUL H. SHUR,
WILLIAM E. McGRATH, JR., THOMAS
E. SCHORR, YALE H. BOHN and
GERALD D. WIXTED,
Defendants-Respondents,
and
TODD D. JOHNSTON, ROBERT A.
WHITE, EDWARD J. GEOGHEGAN and
JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, said
names being fictitious,
Defendants.
Argued October 23, 2001 -- Decided December 5, 2001
On certification to the Superior Court,
Appellate Division.
John J. Francis, Jr., argued the cause for
appellant (Drinker, Biddle & Shanley,
attorneys; Garrett M. Heher, pro se, on the
briefs).
William B. McGuire argued the cause for
respondents (Tompkins, McGuire, Wachenfeld &
Barry, attorneys; Marianne M. DeMarco, on
the letter in lieu of brief).
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
COLEMAN, J.
The issue presented in this appeal is whether a notice
defense contained in a law firm's Partnership Agreement
(Agreement) should be disallowed based on special circumstances
and equities reflected in the long and torturous procedural
history of the case. We hold that, on this record, the notice
requirement in the Agreement is not enforceable.
Plaintiff, Garrett M. Heher, was a partner in the law firm of Smith, Stratton, Wise, Heher, and Brennan (SSWH & B) from 1966 to August 4, 1986 when he voluntarily withdrew from the firm. As a partner, he helped to negotiate and draft the Agreement that was in effect between June 1, 1983 and August 1987.
Article IV (4) of the Agreement provided that a departing partner who had been a partner for five years and who did not thereafter compete with the firm in any way would be entitled to “a stated benefit” and “a supplemental benefit.” The “stated benefit” was defined as “an amount equal to the average of the partner's annual compensation from the firm . . . for five (5) consecutive years next before the firm year in which his interest in the firm was terminated.” The Agreement provided that the stated benefits would be paid in eight equal quarterly installments commencing in the first quarter following the partner's termination. The “supplemental benefit,” which was to be paid in each of three years following the year in which the last stated benefit was made, was defined as “twenty percent (20%) of the gross fees received in each such year from the clients of the terminated partner.”
Article IV of the Agreement also provided for arbitration of all disputes arising under the Agreement or the partnership relationship, reflecting an intention that arbitration was to be the sole forum for the resolution of any such disputes. Heher v. Smith, Stratton, Wise, Heher and Brennan (Heher I), 143 N.J. 448, 451-53 (1996). On November 17 and 26, 1986, October 5 and December 4, 1987, Heher filed notices of his intent to arbitrate his claim to partnership profits, access to records, and various issues arising out of his withdrawal from the firm. In view of the non- competition restriction in the agreement, however, he did not request arbitration related to the stated and supplemental benefits. In furtherance of the request to arbitrate, Heher and the firm each designated an arbitrator. A third arbitrator was never selected. Consequently, no arbitration hearing was ever held. In early 1987, the firm's attorney communicated with Heher's attorney in an attempt to resolve the dispute over the 1985-86 division of partnership shares and access to the firm records for that year. Correspondence was exchanged on February 12 and March 27, 1987. However, no further action was taken regarding the 1986 or 1987 notices of intent to arbitrate until August 1992.
On May 28, 1992, this Court decided Jacob v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, 128 N.J. 10. There, the Court held that a restrictive covenant, such as the one contained in the present Agreement, was prohibited by the Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC), RPC 5.6. Id. at 22. The Court determined that the financial disincentive and the direct restrictive covenant were unenforceable as violative of public policy. Id. at 23. The Court found that such terms created a disincentive for the departing lawyer to represent those clients who wish to choose that lawyer as his or her counsel. Id. at 25.
On August 3, 1992, sixty-seven days after the Court rendered its decision in Jacob, Heher filed a complaint in the Chancery Division contending that the restrictive covenant and the financial disincentive aspects of the Agreement were unenforceable based on the Court's decision in Jacob. Heher alleged that he was entitled to the stated benefits provided in the Agreement, and because the restrictive covenant provision was void as a matter of public policy, its effect could not be subject to a binding non-appealable arbitration as required by Article IV of the Agreement. In addition, Heher sought: (1) a permanent injunction preventing SSWH & B from arbitrating the issue of his entitlement to the stated benefit under the Agreement; (2) judgment in an amount equal to the stated benefit, together with prejudgment interest, attorneys fees and costs; (3) and an order requiring SSWH & B to provide an accounting of gross fees received by the firm to permit Heher to determine whether he was entitled to assert a claim for the supplemental benefit provided under the Agreement. Heher I, supra, 143 N.J. at 454- 55.
In lieu of an answer, SSWH & B filed a motion seeking to dismiss or, in the alternative, to stay the litigation and refer the matter to arbitration. The Chancery Division, however, concluded that the restrictive covenant and forfeiture provisions of the Agreement were void and, therefore, not arbitrable. The court also held that Heher's action was timely because it was filed within three months of the Jacob decision. The court further found that because the law firm conceded that Heher had accurately stated his earnings for the years 1982 through 1986 inclusive, the uncontested amount of the stated benefit due to Heher under the Agreement was $143,355. The court ordered arbitration of all other contested issues, including whether Heher was entitled to prejudgment interest and, if so, from what date, and whether Heher's stated benefit of $143,355 should be adjusted to account for loss of goodwill based on the Agreement.
Heher appealed and sought a stay of the arbitration pending that appeal. SSWH & B cross-appealed, challenging, among other things, the timeliness of Heher's action. The Chancery Division stayed arbitration pending disposition of the appeal. The Appellate Division reversed in an unpublished opinion. The court held that “[a]s to the Heher complaint and related issues we reverse the judgment denying the firm's motion to stay the Chancery Division litigation pending arbitration, and order the arbitration to proceed forthwith.” Arguably, that holding did not alter the Chancery Division's determination that the claims for stated and supplemented benefits were not time-barred. The Appellate Division also required the arbitrators to issue a written opinion setting forth findings of fact and legal conclusions to facilitate judicial review.
We granted Heher's petition for certification. In that appeal SSWH & B urged the Court to affirm the Appellate Division's judgment and require arbitration on all issues. SSWH & B did not mention the thirty-day notice defense in its brief filed with this Court. Heher, on the other hand, contended that the invalidity of the forfeiture provision in the Agreement was not arbitrable, that an offset for loss of goodwill was not appropriate under the Agreement, and that the amount of prejudgment interest due on the stated benefit was not disputed. He therefore asserted that he was entitled to the stated benefit of $143,355 because there was no material issue left to arbitrate. This Court affirmed the Appellate Division's judgment, Heher I, supra, 143 N.J. at 460-61, but cautioned that “the arbitrator's disposition will be subjected to an enhanced level of judicial review in order to afford relief from an arbitration award that obviously would frustrate a clear mandate of public policy.” Id. at 459 (emphasis added).
When the matter proceeded to arbitration pursuant to our decision, SSWH & B challenged the timeliness of Heher's request for arbitration. The two-person majority of the arbitration panel concluded that Heher had not filed a timely claim as required by the Agreement, and that there were no extraordinary circumstances or countervailing equities that would relieve Heher of the obligation to file the requisite thirty-day notice required by Article V(3) of the Agreement. The majority decided that, in order to avoid a remand should the notice requirement be reversed on appeal,
we could conclude that SSWH & B is entitled to pursue at a plenary hearing, after expedited and reasonable discovery, the loss of goodwill arising from nine of the firm's major clients[] leaving with Heher when he withdrew from the firm. In our view the firm should be entitled to attempt to establish the effect of any decrease in the value of its goodwill in assessing the amount of any “stated” or “supplemental” benefits to be paid to Heher.
One of the arbitrators disagreed and filed a dissenting
opinion. The dissent concluded that “the key policy interest[s]
that were vindicated in Jacob and Weiss[ v. Carpenter, Bennett &
Morrissey,
143 N.J. 420 (1996)] are the clients' freedom to
choose their attorneys and the attorneys' freedom to leave their
firms, and the decisions made to further those interests.” The
dissent also found that there were unique and extraordinary
circumstances and equitable principles that would excuse the
thirty-day notice requirement, and that, in any event, Heher had
substantially complied with the thirty-day notice requirement.
Finally, the dissent concluded that enforcing the thirty-day
notice requirement in the present circumstances would be
violative of the public policy declared by and protected in
Jacob and Weiss.
Cross-motions were filed in the Chancery Division to confirm
and to vacate the arbitrators' award. The Chancery Division
granted the firm's motion and confirmed the award pursuant to
N.J.S.A. 2A:24-7 by applying the following standard: “if the
correctness of the award, including its resolution of the public
policy question is reasonably debatable, judicial intervention is
unwarranted.” Under that standard, the court found that the
arbitrators resolved the public policy question reasonably and
fairly. In an unpublished opinion the Appellate Division
affirmed. We granted Heher's petition for certification,
167 N.J. 635 (2001), and now reverse.
Heher argues that the arbitrators award should not have been confirmed because the thirty-day notice provision of the Agreement was invalid to the extent that it thwarted his attempt to vindicate the public policy interests embodied in RPC 5.6. He maintains that the arbitrator elevated the “sanctity of contracts” over that of the public policy considerations underlying RPC 5.6. Finally, he argues that SSWH & B should be barred from raising the thirty-day notice defense at this stage of the litigation.
Article V(3) of the Agreement provides: “Any partner [or] former partner . . . who disputes an action taken by the firm shall serve a written notice of intention to arbitrate upon the firm within thirty (30) days after the date on which the disputed action was taken.” There is no question that arbitration is a preferred method of dispute resolution because, among other reasons, it “combines the advantages of privacy and efficiency.” Weiss, supra, 143 N.J. at 440. The critical issue raised in this appeal is whether the firm should now be precluded from raising the thirty-day notice defense after previously urging this Court to require the parties to submit to merits arbitration.
We note that in Heher I, SSWH & B, while vigorously asserting that arbitration remained an available and appropriate forum notwithstanding the public policy issues implicated by the restrictive covenant in its partnership Agreement, never informed this Court that if its arguments prevailed it nevertheless would seek to bar arbitration on the merits because of a failure to comply with the notice provision. Had the firm done so, the Court would have considered the issue of notice then and much of the subsequent litigation would have been unnecessary. In these circumstances, the firm should not be permitted to have “the benefits of a covenant that is against public policy and unenforceable.” Jacob, supra, 128 N.J. at 35. To prevent that result, we hold that SSWH & B is estopped from relying on the notice provision after successfully persuading this Court that the parties should be required to arbitrate their dispute. Moreover, there is an inextricable connection between the notice provision and the restrictive covenant invalidated by Jacob: if not for the invalid covenant, no issue of notice would have arisen because Heher's right to his stated benefit would have been clear. We conclude, therefore, that Heher's claim for benefits filed within sixty-seven days of the Jacob decision is timely notwithstanding the notice provision in the Agreement.
Heher also contends that the firm is not entitled to pursue a claim for loss of goodwill based on the departure of nine of the firm's major clients with Heher. The basis for the loss of goodwill claim is Article IV(8) of the Agreement. It provides:
“The benefits provided in this Article IV represent payments for a former partner's interest in partnership goodwill, and as such are made for said partner's interest in partnership property under I.R.C. section 736(b)(2)(B) entitling said partner or the successor in interest of a deceased partner to capital gains treatment.”
As noted previously, Article IV provides for two types of
benefits: a stated benefit and a supplemental benefit. Nowhere
in the Agreement is there a contractual basis for the firm to
assert a claim against Heher's stated or supplemental benefit
based on an alleged loss in firm goodwill. We now hold, as we
suggested in Heher I, that Article IV(8) “relates only to the tax
treatment of benefits received under the Agreement.” Heher I,
143 N.J. at 455. Therefore, that portion of the arbitrators'
award requiring discovery and a plenary hearing in respect of the
loss of goodwill is vacated.
Finally, Heher argues that he is entitled to the undisputed
stated benefits of $143,355. He also seeks prejudgment interest
pursuant to Rule 4:42-11(a). We agree that Heher is entitled to
his stated benefit with prejudgment interest to be computed from
August 3, 1992 when the complaint was filed.
We remand the matter to the Chancery Division to enter
judgment for the stated benefit and prejudgment interest. The
Chancery Division should then remand the matter to the
arbitrators to determine, after appropriate discovery, the extent
of any supplemental benefit due Heher under the Agreement. There
is to be no set-off against any supplemental benefit based on
alleged loss in firm goodwill.
The judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed and the matter is remanded to the Chancery Division for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES STEIN, LONG, LaVECCHIA, and ZAZZALI join in JUSTICE COLEMAN's opinion. JUSTICE VERNIERO did not participate.
NO. A-83 SEPTEMBER TERM 2000
ON APPEAL FROM
ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court
GARRETT M. HEHER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
SMITH, STRATTON, WISE, HEHER
and BRENNAN, A New Jersey
general partnership, etc., et al.
Defendants-Respondents.
DECIDED December 5, 2001
Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING
OPINION BY Justice Coleman
CONCURRING OPINION BY
DISSENTING OPINION BY