SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
A-6393-95T5
GAY FAWCETT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT
SYSTEM,
Defendant-Respondent.
Argued January 6, 1998 - Decided January
27, 1998
Before Judges Long, Kleiner and Kimmelman.
On appeal from the Board of Trustees of the
Public Employees' Retirement System,
Department of the Treasury.
David H. Lande argued the cause for appellant
(Michael J. Glassman, attorney; Mr. Glassman,
on the brief).
Sherrie L. Gibble argued the cause for
respondent (Peter Verniero, Attorney General;
Mary C. Jacobson, Assistant Attorney General,
of counsel; Ms. Gibble, on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
KLEINER, J.A.D.
This is an appeal from the denial of an application for
accidental disability benefits from the Public Employees'
Retirement System (PERS).
On November 30, 1993, petitioner, Gay Fawcett, was employed
as a Medical Relations Specialist II for the Division Of
Disability Determinations in the New Jersey Department of Labor.
On that date, another Department of Labor employee, Alvin Walker,
drove a State vehicle from the parking lot of the Division of
Vocational Rehabilitation in Camden to the front of that office
building intending to meet petitioner. Walker stopped the car at
the curb, opened the passenger door, and petitioner, who uses a
cane to ambulate, entered into the front-passenger seat. As
Walker was pulling away from the curb at a normal rate of speed,
estimated between five and ten miles per hour, the seat in which
petitioner was sitting suddenly slid all the way to the rear of
its range adjustment, where it stopped abruptly at the end of the
track, causing petitioner to strike her head against the seat
back and the headrest. Petitioner's sudden movement startled
Walker, who rapidly applied his brakes causing the front
passenger seat to lurch forward. Petitioner's body along with
the seat moved with uncontrolled force in a forward direction.
Apparently the rachet mechanism on the front seat track had
failed. Petitioner's cane, which she was holding in her right
hand, struck the front firewall of the car. As a result of this
incident, petitioner sustained injuries to her back and right
hand which permanently and totally disabled her from performing
her regular and assigned duties.
Although petitioner's injuries were deemed permanent and
totally disabling, her application for an accidental disability
retirement pension was denied by the Board of Trustees of the
PERS (the Board) on the ground that the accident did not
constitute a "traumatic event" within the ambit of N.J.S.A.
43:15A-43, which provides, in pertinent part:
A member who has not attained age 65
shall, upon the application of the head of
the department in which he is employed or
upon his own application or the application
of one acting in his behalf, be retired by
the board of trustees, if said employee is
permanently and totally disabled as a result
of a traumatic event occurring during and as
a result of the performance of his regular or
assigned duties, on an accidental disability
allowance. . . . (emphasis added).
Petitioner requested an administrative hearing. An
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found, based upon the evidence
presented at the hearing, that the incident resulting in
petitioner's injuries constituted a traumatic event.See footnote 1 The
Deputy Attorney General representing the Board filed exceptions
to the ALJ's recommended decision and petitioner's counsel filed
cross-exceptions. The Board rejected the ALJ's recommended
decision and incorporated by reference the "the factual and legal
discussion of the Deputy Attorney General['s] . . . exception
letter," reaffirming its decision denying petitioner's
application.
As we noted in Flores v. Board of Trustees of the Pub.
Employees Retirement Sys.,
287 N.J. Super. 274 (App. Div. 1996),
The phrase "traumatic event," as used in
statutes defining a public employee's
eligibility for retirement on an accidental
disability pension, refers to "a mishap or
accident involving the application of some
kind of external force to the body or the
violent exposure of the body to some external
force." For an accident to constitute a
traumatic event,
a worker must demonstrate (1) that his
injuries were not induced by the stress
or strain of the normal work effort;
(2) that he met involuntarily with the
object or matter that was the source of
the harm; and (3) that the source of the
injury itself was a great rush of force
or uncontrollable power.
[Kane v. Board of Trustees, Police &
Firemen's Retirement Sys.,
100 N.J. 651,
663 (1985).]
[Id. at 277-78 (citation omitted).]
As part of her findings of fact, the ALJ stated:
Mr. Walker described appellant's
instantaneous rearward and then forward
motion as resembling that of a "crash test
dummy," the unexpected motion of the seat
flying backwards on its adjustment track
shocked both Mr. Walker and appellant.
We are satisfied that petitioner's accident constituted a
traumatic event under the tests set forth in Kane. The force or
power that caused petitioner's injury was completely external to
petitioner. She neither caused the malfunction of the seat
mechanism nor knew of the defect before entering the automobile.
Nor did she cause her co-employee to suddenly react and apply his
brakes in a manner so as to cause her to be flung forward
striking the interior front firewall of the car.
The Board's reliance on Mazza v. Board of Trustees, Police &
Firemen's Retirement Sys.,
143 N.J. 22 (1995), is not persuasive.
As we noted in Flores, "the accident in Mazza did not involve a
completely external force but rather the interaction between a
mounted policeman and his horse." Flores, supra, 287 N.J. Super.
at 279. Here, the forces which propelled petitioner both
backward and forward were totally external and independent of any
act on petitioner's part. Additionally, as noted by the ALJ,
unlike in Mazza, where there was no impact, but merely a twisting
of the officer's back as his horse reared up, here petitioner's
body, and particularly her right hand which held the cane,
actually impacted with the firewall and interior of the
automobile.
We fully realize, as we did in Flores, that the phrase
"traumatic event" has been interpreted differently in a line of
cases dealing with slip and fall-type accidents. Id. at 278.
However, petitioner's injury clearly was not sustained in a slip
and fall incident, and we are not bound to an analysis of
"traumatic event" applicable to such occurrences.
We also are not persuaded by the Board's contention that
there was no traumatic event because petitioner's body only moved
a short distance within the interior of the automobile. Just as
in Flores, we perceive of no reason why a short moving distance
before impact is dispositive. Id. at 280. Here, both petitioner
and Walker described the movement of plaintiff as sudden and
unexpected and, as noted, the cause of her body's movement was
external.
The Board's final decision denying petitioner's application
for an accidental disability pension is reversed.
Footnote: 1 The ALJ's recommended decision was issued prior to our decision in Flores v. Board of Trustees of the Pub. Employees Retirement Sys., 287 N.J. Super. 274 (App Div. 1996). After Flores was published, and prior to the Board's final decision, the ALJ supplemented her decision citing Flores.