(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for
the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please
note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).
(NOTE: This is a companion case to David Rivkin, et al. v. Dover Township Rent Leveling Board
also decided today.)
Argued October 24, 1995 -- Decided February 29, 1996
POLLOCK, J., writing for a unanimous Court.
The issue on appeal is whether General Motors Corporation (GM) may maintain an action under
42 U.S.C.A. 1983 (§ 1983) against the City of Linden; Emanuel Frangella, Linden's tax assessor; and Richard
Chaiken, a property appraiser retained by Frangella (defendants).
On October 1, 1993, GM filed this action against defendants seeking compensatory and punitive
damages under § 1983. GM claims that defendants discriminated against it by assessing GM's automobile
assembly plant in violation of GM's due process rights. Underlying that claim is GM's contention that
defendants reassessed the plant at an excessive value in retaliation for GM's appeals from prior assessments.
GM sought damages of two million dollars plus interest, costs, and counsel fees.
The Union County Board of Taxation affirmed the tax assessment and GM appealed to the Tax
Court, where the matter is still pending. [N.B., On January 4, 1996, the Tax Court issued an interlocutory
decision in this matter that held a section of the Business Retention Act to be unconstitutional under the
Uniformity Clause. That decision is currently pending before the Appellate Division.]
The Law Division granted summary judgment for defendants, thereby dismissing GM's complaint.
In making that determination, the court reasoned that because of the pending Tax Court appeal, it lacked
jurisdiction to entertain GM's § 1983 claim and that defendants enjoyed absolute immunity.
On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed and remanded, holding that the Law Division had
jurisdiction to determine GM's § 1983 claim and that defendants' immunity was not absolute.
Four months later, the United States Supreme Court decided National Private Truck Council v.
Oklahoma Tax Commission. In National Private Truck, the Supreme Court prohibited state courts from
providing relief under a § 1983 if state law provides an adequate remedy for relief from unconstitutional tax
assessments.
The Supreme Court granted defendants' petition for certification.
HELD: State courts are prohibited from providing relief under
42 U.S.C.A.
§1983, if state law provides an
adequate remedy for relief from unconstitutional tax assessments. Because New Jersey provides an
adequate remedy, General Motors Corporation cannot maintain an action under § 1983 against
defendants.
1. Two federal statutes govern this action: § 1983 and 28 U.S.C.A. 1341 (§ 1341), the Tax Injunction Act. Section 1983 provides a cause of action in state or federal courts to redress federal constitutional and statutory violations by state actors. By comparison, § 1341 prohibits federal courts from enjoining the collection of a state tax where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in state court. National Private Truck and its predecessors make it clear that Congress preserved an essential attribute of federalism
by directing federal courts not to interfere in the administration of state tax systems. The Court's reading of
National Private Truck leads it to conclude that the Supreme Court has determined that Congress did not
intend claims involving state tax administration to be actionable under § 1983 in state or federal court,
whether those claims arise from alleged violations of the interstate commerce or due process clauses. Thus,
both state and federal courts must refrain from granting federal relief under § 1983 when there is an
adequate legal remedy. (pp. 5-12)
2. To be adequate, a state remedy need only satisfy minimal procedural criteria; a state remedy merely
needs to provide an opportunity sometime for a "full hearing and judicial determination" at which the
taxpayer may raise all constitutional objections to the tax. The state remedy need not be identical to § 1983
remedies, be the best remedy available, be the most convenient remedy, or be equal to or comparable with
other federal remedies. In New Jersey, there are several opportunities for taxpayers to raise constitutional
objections to an added assessment: 1) a taxpayer may challenge the added assessment by appealing to the
County Board of Taxation on or before December 1st of the year of the assessment; 2) the taxpayer may
appeal the Board's decision to the Tax Court within forty-five days of the Board's judgment; and 3) a
taxpayer may appeal from the Tax Court to the Appellate Division. Therefore, the remedies available under
New Jersey law are adequate to preclude § 1983 suits in either federal or state courts. (pp. 12-18)
3. Because the issue is not before it, the Court need not reach the question whether discrimination, based
on race, religion, gender, or any other suspect class, could constitute a violation of a taxpayer's constitutional
rights. Nonetheless, the Court does not read the decisions of the Supreme Court as legitimizing any form of
invidious discrimination. Furthermore, the Law Against Discrimination assures New Jersey citizens
protection against such discrimination. (p. 18)
4. Important policy considerations also weigh in favor of precluding relief under § 1983 in state tax cases:
the availability of such relief would permit taxpayers to circumvent the December deadline imposed by
statute; to permit a longer statute of limitations in § 1983 tax cases would thwart express legislative intent
and introduce uncertainty into the administration of state tax laws; allowing § 1983 actions in state tax cases
would circumvent the statutory scheme for appealing the assessment; and a tax assessor who violates a
taxpayers' constitutional rights runs the risk of removal. Therefore, there are ample reasons for the decision
not to recognize the § 1983 action challenging the conduct of an assessor. (pp. 18-20)
Judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED to the Law
Division for entry of a judgment and dismissal.
CHIEF JUSTICE WILENTZ and JUSTICES HANDLER, O'HERN, GARIBALDI, STEIN and
COLEMAN join in JUSTICE POLLOCK's opinion.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-66/
109 September Term 1995
GENERAL MOTORS CORP.,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
CITY OF LINDEN and THE
ASSESSOR OF LINDEN,
Defendants-Appellants
and Cross-Respondents,
and
RICHARD CHAIKEN, Agent, Servant
or Employee of the City of
Linden,
Defendant-Respondent
and Cross-Appellant.
Argued October 24, 1995 - Decided February 29, 1996
On certification to Superior Court, Appellate
Division, whose opinion is reported at
279 N.J. Super. 449 (1995).
Donald P. Jacobs argued the cause for
appellants and cross-respondents, City of
Linden and the Assessor of Linden (Budd
Larner Gross Rosenbaum Greenberg & Sade,
attorneys; Mr. Jacobs and Carl Greenberg, on
the briefs).
Michael H. Cohen argued the cause for
respondent and cross-appellant (Morgan,
Melhuish, Monaghan, Arvidson, Abrutyn &
Lisowski, attorneys; Mr. Cohen and Meredith
Kaplan Stoma, on the briefs).
Kenneth S. Geller, a member of the District
of Columbia bar, argued the cause for
respondent (Garippa & Davenport, attorneys;
Howard Friedlaender, a member of the Michigan
bar, of counsel; John E. Garippa and Philip
J. Giannuario, on the brief).
John R. Lloyd argued the cause for amicus
curiae Association of Municipal Assessors of
New Jersey (Rosenblum Wolf & Lloyd,
attorneys).
Julian F. Gorelli, Deputy Attorney General,
argued the cause for amicus curiae Director,
Division of Taxation (Deborah T. Poritz,
Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney;
Joseph L. Yannotti, Assistant Attorney
General, of counsel).
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
POLLOCK, J.
The dispositive issue is whether General Motors Corporation (GM) may maintain an action under 42 U.S.C.A. 1983 (section 1983)See footnote 1 against defendants: City of Linden; Emanuel Frangella, Linden's tax assessor; and Richard Chaiken, a property appraiser retained by Frangella. Essentially, GM claims that defendants discriminated against it by assessing GM's automobile assembly plant in violation of GM's due process rights. Underlying that claim is GM's contention that defendants reassessed the plant at
an excessive value in retaliation for GM's appeals from prior
assessments.
The Law Division granted summary judgment for defendants,
reasoning that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain GM's section
1983 action and that defendants enjoyed absolute immunity. The
Appellate Division reversed and remanded, holding that the Law
Division had jurisdiction of the claim and that defendants'
immunity was not absolute.
279 N.J. Super. 449 (1995). We
granted defendants' petition for certification,
142 N. J. 454
(1995).
In the interim, the United States Supreme Court decided
National Private Truck Council v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, ___
U.S. ___,
115 S. Ct. 2351,
132 L. Ed.2d 509 (1995), which
prohibits state courts from providing relief under section 1983,
if state law provides an adequate remedy for relief from
unconstitutional tax assessments. New Jersey's system provides
such a remedy. Consistent with National Private Truck, we
reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division and reinstate the
judgment dismissing GM's complaint.
In 1985-86, GM, at a cost of approximately $350 million, renovated and added 200,000 square feet to its 2.4 million
square-foot plant in Linden. Linden retained Chaiken to assist
Frangella in reassessing the property for 1986. Based on
Chaiken's recommendation, Frangella increased the 1986 assessment
by $17.69 million. The increase resulted in a prorated
assessment for the last four months of 1986 in the amount of
$5,896,667. On GM's appeal, the Union County Board of Taxation
affirmed the assessment. GM appealed to the Tax Court, where the
matter remains pending.
On October 1, 1987, GM filed this action seeking
compensatory and punitive damages under section 1983. The
complaint alleged that Chaiken and Frangella ("the individual
defendants") had engaged in discriminatory, arbitrary, and
unconstitutional conduct in reassessing GM's property. GM sought
damages of $2 million, plus interest, costs, and attorneys fees.
Because of the appeal pending in the Tax Court, the Law
Division held that the entire-controversy doctrine deprived it of
jurisdiction to determine GM's section 1983 claim. The Law
Division also declared that the individual defendants enjoyed
absolute immunity. It dismissed the complaint against Linden,
reasoning that it was not subject to liability for Frangella's
alleged violation of GM's due process rights.
In reversing and remanding, the Appellate Division held that
the Law Division had jurisdiction of GM's section 1983 claim.
The court further stated that the individual defendants were not
entitled to absolute immunity. Finally, it reversed the
dismissal of the complaint in favor of Linden, asserting that
because Frangella was the final policy maker on tax matters,
Linden could be liable for his conduct.
Four months later, the United States Supreme Court decided
National Private Truck, supra, ___ U.S. ____,
115 S. Ct. 2351,
132 L.Ed.2d 509. That decision renders moot the issues that
divided the lower courts: whether the Law Division had
jurisdiction of GM's section 1983 action and whether the
individual defendants were entitled to immunity.
Two federal statutes govern this action, section 1983 and 28 U.S.C.A. 1341 (section 1341),See footnote 2 the Tax Injunction Act. Generally speaking, section 1983 provides a cause of action in state or federal courts to redress federal constitutional and statutory violations by state actors. By comparison, section
1341 prohibits federal courts from enjoining the collection of a
state tax "where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had
in the courts of such State." GM's claim arises at the
intersection of the two statutes.
Decisions of the United States Supreme Court, most notably
National Private Truck and its predecessors, guide our reading of
the statutes. As those decisions make clear, Congress preserved
an essential attribute of federalism by directing federal courts
not to interfere in the administration of state tax systems.
Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary,
454 U.S. 100,
103,
102 S. Ct. 177, 179,
70 L. Ed.2d 271, 275 (1981). Relying
on the principle of comity, the United States Supreme Court has
held that federal courts must refrain from interfering with state
tax systems whether the taxpayer seeks an injunction,
28 U.S.C.A.
§1341; declaratory relief, Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v.
Huffman,
319 U.S. 293, 299,
63 S. Ct. 1070, 1073,
87 L. Ed. 1407,
1412 (1943); or damages, Fair Assessment, supra, 454 U.S. at 113,
102 S. Ct. at 184, 70 L. Ed.
2d at 281-82.
In Fair Assessment, a taxpayers association filed a federal
court action challenging the assessment of real estate in
Missouri. Claiming that the assessment violated their equal
protection and due process rights, the taxpayers sought damages.
In rejecting their claim, the United States Supreme Court held
that taxpayers are barred by the principle of
comity from asserting § 1983 actions against
the validity of state tax systems in federal
courts. Such taxpayers must seek protection
of their federal rights by state remedies,
provided of course that those remedies are
plain, adequate and complete, and may
ultimately seek review of the state decisions
in this Court.
[454 U.S. at 116, 102 S. Ct. at 186, 70 L.
Ed.
2d at 283.]
Drawing on principles underlying section 1341, the Court
explained:
"The statute `has its root in equity practice
in principles of federalism, and in
recognition of the imperative need of a State
to administer its own fiscal operations.'
Tully v. Griffin, Inc., 429 U.S. [68], 73 [
97 S. Ct. 219, 222,
50 L. Ed.2d 227 (1976)].
This last consideration was the principal
motivating force behind the Act: this
legislation was first and foremost a vehicle
to limit drastically federal district court
jurisdiction to interfere with so important a
local concern as the collection of taxes.
81 Cong. Rec. 1415 (1937) (remarks of Sen. Bone)
. . . ."
[Fair Assessment, supra, 454 U.S. at 110, 102
S. Ct. at 183, 70 L. Ed.
2d at 279-80
(quoting Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank,
450 U.S. 503, 522,
101 S. Ct. 1221, 1233,
67 L.
Ed.2d 464 (1981) (footnote omitted)).]
The Court reasoned that the award of damages, like the issuance of an injunction, would unduly interfere with the collection of
state taxes. Fair Assessment, supra, 454 U.S. at 111, 102 S. Ct.
at 184, 70 L. Ed.
2d at 280.
Last year, the Court extended the principle of non-interference. It held that when an adequate state remedy is
available, section 1983 does not provide a cause of action in
state courts. National Private Truck, supra, ___ U.S. at __, 115
S. Ct. at 2355, 132 L. Ed.
2d at 517. In National Private Truck,
non-resident motor carriers for truckers successfully challenged
an Oklahoma tax as a violation of the commerce and privileges and
immunities clauses of the United States Constitution. The
truckers alleged that Oklahoma imposed the tax in retaliation for
taxes imposed by twenty-five other states on trucks registered in
Oklahoma. In addition to seeking a tax refund under Oklahoma
law, the truckers sought declaratory and injunctive relief under
section 1983.
Earlier, the Oklahoma Supreme Court had concluded that the
truckers were not entitled to relief under section 1983. The
United States Supreme Court had vacated the Oklahoma Supreme
Court's opinion and remanded for further consideration in light
of Dennis v. Higgins,
498 U.S. 439,
111 S. Ct. 865,
112 L. Ed.2d 969 (1991).
In Dennis, the Court recognized a trucker's challenge to a
Nebraska truck tax under section 1983 as violative of the
commerce clause. The Court held that commerce clause violations
can give rise to a cause of action under section 1983. It
explained that section 1983 "`provide[s] a remedy, to be broadly
construed, against all forms of official violation of federally
protected rights.'" Id. at 445, 111 S. Ct. at 869, 112 L. Ed.
2d
at 977 (quoting Morell v. Department of Social Services,
436 U.S. 658, 700-01,
98 S. Ct. 2018, 2044,
56 L. Ed.2d 611, 641 (1978)).
The Court stated that "the Nebraska Supreme Court erred in
holding that petitioner's claim could not be brought under
42 U.S.C.
§1983." Id. at 451, 111 S. Ct. at 873, 112 L. Ed.
2d at
981.
Notwithstanding the holding in Dennis, the Oklahoma Supreme Court on remand denied relief under section 1983. Without discussing Dennis, the United States Supreme Court affirmed. The absence of any discussion of Dennis renders National Private Truck somewhat enigmatic. Our reading of National Private Truck leads us to conclude that the Court has determined that Congress did not intend claims involving state tax administration to be actionable under section 1983 in state or federal court, whether those claims arise from alleged violations of the interstate commerce or due process clauses. The United States Supreme Court has recognized an exception under section 1983 for challenges to
a state tax system when a state provides a plain, adequate, and
complete remedy.
As the Court explained in National Private Truck, "the
background presumption that federal law generally will not
interfere with administration of state taxes leads us to conclude
that Congress did not authorize injunctive or declaratory relief
under § 1983 in state tax cases." ___ U.S. at ___, 115 S. Ct. at
2355, 132 L. Ed.
2d at 517.
The Court explained further:
Just as Fair Assessment relied upon a
background principle in interpreting § 1983
to preclude damage actions in tax cases
brought in federal court, so we rely on the
same principle in interpreting § 1983 to
provide no basis for courts to award
injunctive relief when an adequate legal
remedy exists. Our interpretation is
supported not only by the background
principle of federal non-interference
discussed in Fair Assessment, but also by the
principles of equitable restraint discussed
at length in that case. Whether a suit is
brought in federal or state court, Congress
simply did not authorize the disruption of
state tax administration in this case.
[National Private Truck, supra, ___ U.S. at
___, 115 S. Ct. at 2356, 132 L. Ed.
2d at
518.]
Before National Private Truck, some state courts had
interpreted Fair Assessment as limiting federal court
jurisdiction. See Burrell v. Mississippi State Tax Comm'n,
536 So.2d 848, 864 (Miss. 1988) (stating that notwithstanding
jurisdictional bar on federal courts in Fair Assessment, state
court must hear section 1983 suits); Bung's Bar & Grill, Inc. v.
Township Council,
206 N.J. Super. 432, 459-61 (1985) (noting that
neither Tax Injunction Act nor Fair Assessment prohibits section
1983 access to state courts); see also Note, Clarifying Comity:
State Court Jurisdiction and Section 1983 State Tax Challenges,
103 Harv. L. Rev. 1888, 1902-03 (1990) (observing that limits on
federal jurisdiction in Fair Assessment do not extend to state
courts, which must hear section 1983 state tax challenges). Some
federal courts also understood Fair Assessment as limiting their
jurisdiction and specifically acknowledged the availability of
section 1983 state tax suits in state courts. See Bernard v.
Village of Spring Valley,
30 F.3d 294, 297 (2d Cir. 1994)
(dismissing section 1983 tax suit in federal court because
adequate remedies "such as a § 1983 suit in state court" are
available); Long Island Lighting Co. v. Brookhaven (LILCO),
889 F.2d 428, 432-33 (2d Cir. 1989) (same).
Other state courts, anticipating the holding in National Private Truck, interpreted Fair Assessment to preclude section 1983 actions in any forum so long as the state provides an
adequate legal remedy. See Harlan Sprague Dawley, Inc. v.
Indiana Dep't of State Revenue,
583 N.E.2d 214, 221 (Ind. Tax
1991) (holding that principle of equitable restraint in Fair
Assessment would bar state courts from hearing section 1983 state
tax challenges if state remedy were adequate). These state
courts, without relying explicitly on principles of comity,
followed the federal courts' deference to state tax
administration and declined to entertain the section 1983
actions. See, e.g., Zizka v. Water Pollution Control Auth.,
490 A.2d 509, 514 (Conn. 1985) (applying rationale in Fair Assessment
to conclude that availability of adequate state remedy
"forecloses the plaintiff's § 1983 claims . . . in state court");
Stufflebaum v. Panathiere,
691 S.W.2d 271, 273 (Mo. 1985)
(stating that "the teaching of McNary is that, given a plain,
adequate and complete remedy [under state law], taxpayers may not
seek relief under § 1983"); Hanson v. Quill Corp.,
500 N.W.2d 196, 197 (N.D. 1993) (finding that policies underlying federal
bar to section 1983 state tax suits in Tax Injunction Act and
Fair Assessment apply equally to section 1983 actions in state
courts); Hogan v. Musolf,
471 N.W.2d 216, 222 (Wis. 1991) (same),
cert. denied,
502 U.S. 1030,
112 S. Ct. 867,
116 L. Ed.2d 773
(1992).
When read in light of National Private Truck, we believe that Fair Assessment is best understood as limiting not the
jurisdiction of federal courts, but the availability of section
1983 actions in any court, federal or state. As we read it,
National Private Truck states that a violation of the United
States Constitution arising out of an assessment of a state tax
generally will not give rise to a section 1983 action when the
state has provided an adequate legal remedy. In sum, both state
and federal courts "must refrain from granting federal relief
under § 1983 when there is an adequate legal remedy." ___ U.S.
at ___, 115 S. Ct. at 2357, 132 L. Ed.
2d at 519.
GM seeks to distinguish National Private Truck on the
grounds that it seeks compensatory and punitive damages, not
merely a refund or declaratory relief, as the taxpayers sought in
National Private Truck. We reject the distinction. In Fair
Assessment, as in the present case, the taxpayers sought damages.
Nonetheless, the Court held that when a state provides an
adequate remedy, a federal court may not entertain an action for
damages. The Court reasoned that a damage award would first
require a declaration that the state officials had violated the
taxpayers' constitutional rights. 454 U.S. at 113, 102 S. Ct. at
184, 70 L. Ed.
2d at 281-82. A taxpayer's right to seek damages
would disrupt the tax system as much as the right to seek
declaratory relief. Ibid. In brief, the Court focused not on
the nature of the relief requested, but on the possible
interference of any relief in the administration of the state tax
system. Thus, neither state nor federal courts may award damages
or grant either injunctive or declaratory relief when a state
provides an adequate remedy.
To be adequate, a state remedy need only satisfy "minimal
procedural criteria." Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank,
450 U.S. 503, 512,
101 S. Ct. 1221, 1228-29,
67 L. Ed.2d 464, 473 (1981).
Courts measure the adequacy of a state remedy by procedural, not
substantive, criteria. Id. at 512, 101 S. Ct. at 1229, 67 L. Ed.
2d at 473. Further, courts should construe narrowly the
exception to the requirements of an adequate remedy. California
v. Grace Brethren Church,
457 U.S. 393, 413,
102 S. Ct. 2498,
2510,
73 L. Ed.2d 93, 109 (1982).
In Rosewell, the taxpayer sought injunctive relief in a
section 1983 suit involving a tax assessment of her property.
She alleged due process and equal protection violations, claiming
that disparities in assessments were based on race and that the
excessive assessment of her property was in retaliation for
challenging prior assessments. 450 U.S. at 507, 101 S. Ct. at
1226, 67 L. Ed.
2d at 470. The municipality contended that the
suit was not cognizable under section 1983 because the state's
refund procedure provided an adequate remedy. Id. at 510-11, 101
S. Ct. at 1228, 67 L. Ed.
2d at 472.
In accepting that contention, the Court concluded that the
municipality could require the taxpayer to pay the tax and seek a
refund afterward. Id. at 512, 101 S. Ct. at 1228-29, 67 L. Ed.
2d at 473; see also McKesson v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages,
496 U.S. 39-40 & n.21,
110 S. Ct. 2238 & n.21,
110 L. Ed.2d 17,
37-38 & n.21 (1991) (noting that due process requires only that
state provide either pre-deprivation process, e.g., a hearing, or
post-deprivation process, e.g., a tax refund). To be adequate, a
state remedy merely needs to provide an opportunity sometime for
a "full hearing and judicial determination" at which the taxpayer
may raise all constitutional objections to the tax. Rosewell,
supra, 450 U.S. at 515 & n.19, 101 S. Ct. at 1230 & n.19, 67 L.
Ed.
2d at 475 & n.19.
In other contexts, when plaintiffs have alleged substantive due process or other constitutional violations involving tax matters, courts consistently have analyzed the adequacy of the remedy in terms of the process afforded by the state. See, e.g., Grace Brethren Church, supra, 457 U.S. at 415-17, 102 S. Ct. at 2511-12, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 111-12 (observing that First Amendment claim could be adequately addressed in challenge to constitutionality of unemployment tax in state court); Fair Assessment, supra, 454 U.S. at 116, 102 S. Ct. at 186, 70 L. Ed. 2d at 283-84 (finding that allegations of retaliatory tax increase to penalize taxpayers who appealed prior assessments
could be adequately remedied in state court); Rosewell, supra,
450 U.S. at 528, 101 S. Ct. at 1237, 67 L. Ed.
2d at 483 (stating
that allegations that tax assessor taxed minority-owned buildings
at higher rate were adequately addressed in state's refund
procedure); LILCO, supra, 889 F.
2d at 431 (determining that
refund was adequate to remedy allegation of discriminatory tax);
Garret v. Bamford,
582 F.2d 810 (3d Cir. 1978) (stating that
equal protection claim alleging disparate property assessments
was properly addressed through adequate administrative and
judicial review in state court); Moore v. Trippe,
743 F. Supp. 201 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (finding refund adequate to address
allegations of religious discrimination as evidenced by unfair
tax assessment).
Concerning the exercise of the power to tax, "the States are afforded great flexibility in satisfying the requirements of due process." National Private Truck, supra, ___ U.S. at ___, 115 S. Ct. at 2355, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 516. A state remedy need not be identical to section 1983 remedies. Sipe v. Amerada Hess Corp., 689 F.2d 396, 407 (3rd Cir. 1982). It need not be the best remedy available, Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Collins, 921 F.2d 1237, 1245 (11th Cir. 1991); Mendel v. Hutchinson, 494 F.2d 364, 367 (9th Cir. 1974); the most convenient remedy, Behe v. Chester County Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 952 F.2d 66, 68 (3rd Cir. 1991); or equal to or comparable with federal remedies, Colonial
Pipeline Co., supra, 921 F.
2d at 1245; Mendel, supra, 494 F.
2d at
367. A requirement that plaintiffs exhaust administrative
remedies before filing section 1983 actions does not render the
state remedy inadequate. See Grace Brethren Church, supra,
457 U.S. 416 n.35, 102 S. Ct. at 2512 n.35, 73 L. Ed.
2d at 112 n.35.
Finally, a taxpayer's failure to resort to available state
procedures does not render those procedures insufficient. Burris
v. City of Little Rock,
941 F.2d 717, 721 n.4 (8th Cir. 1991).
Here, the tax is an ad valorem real property tax
administered by municipal officials. Although commonly described
as a local property tax, the tax constitutes a state tax for
purposes of determining the availability of section 1983 relief.
See New Jersey State League of Municipalities v. Kimmelman,
105 N.J. 422, 429 (1987) (stating that "[a]ll taxes are state taxes
even though levied for county or municipal purposes").
New Jersey law provides several opportunities for taxpayers to raise constitutional objections to an added assessment. A taxpayer may challenge the added assessment by appealing to the County Board of Taxation on or before December 1st of the year of the assessment. N.J.S.A. 54:4-63.11. The County Board must hear the appeal and render judgment within one month after the last day for filing such appeals. Ibid. If the taxpayer is still dissatisfied, he or she may appeal the Board's decision to the
Tax Court within forty-five days of the Board judgment. Ibid.
In the Tax Court, the taxpayer is entitled to a de novo hearing
before a tax court judge with expertise in the field of real
property valuation. N.J.S.A. 2B:13-3(b); see Union City Ass'n.
v. City of Union City,
115 N.J. 17, 23 (1989) (stating that Tax
Court provides de novo review).
Even before the recent amendment to N.J.S.A. 2B:13-2, which
expands Tax Court jurisdiction to hear any tax-related matters
over which the Superior Court would have jurisdiction, the Tax
Court could correct an unconstitutional assessment. See, e.g.,
Township of West Milford v. Van Decker,
120 N.J. 354 (1990)
(plaintiffs successfully challenged imposition of property tax on
grounds tax violated their federal equal protection rights). In
brief, a taxpayer may challenge the constitutionality of a state
tax without proceeding under section 1983. See Salorio v.
Glaser,
82 N.J. 482, cert. denied,
449 U.S. 874,
101 S. Ct. 215,
66 L. Ed.2d 94 (1980).
A taxpayer may appeal from the Tax Court to the Appellate Division. N.J.S.A. 2B:3-4. If the taxpayer succeeds at any level, the taxing district must refund the excess taxes plus five-percent interest within sixty days of the final judgment. N.J.S.A. 54:3-27.2; see Rosewell, supra, 450 U.S. at 528, 101 S. Ct. at 1237, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 483 (stating that refund without
interest can be adequate to preclude federal court relief).
Based on the Supreme Court's "minimal procedural criteria,"
Rosewell, supra, 450 U.S. at 512, 101 S. Ct. at 1229, 67 L. Ed.
2d at 473, we believe that the remedies under New Jersey law are
adequate to preclude section 1983 suits in either federal or
state courts.
In characterizing GM's allegations as procedural, we
recognize that GM alleges that defendants intentionally
discriminated against it in violation of GM's substantive due
process rights. GM's pending appeal in the Tax Court provides an
adequate remedy for any alleged violation of its federal rights.
In that proceeding, GM may also seek to introduce evidence to
overcome the presumptive validity of the assessment. Pantasote
Co. v. City of Passaic,
100 N.J. 408, 417 (1985).
We need not reach the question whether discrimination, based
on race, religion, gender, or the like, could constitute a
violation of a taxpayer's constitutional rights. The issue is
not before us. Suffice it to state that we do not read the
decisions of the United States Supreme Court as legitimizing any
form of invidious discrimination. Furthermore, the Law Against
Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to 5-42, assures New Jersey
citizens protection against any such discrimination.
Although not essential to our decision, we note that
important policy considerations also weigh in favor of precluding
relief under section 1983 in state tax cases. First, the
availability of section 1983 in state tax cases would permit
taxpayers to circumvent the December deadline imposed by N.J.S.A.
54:4-63.11. As discussed above, the time permitted to file a tax
appeal is shorter than other personal injury actions. The
statute of limitations for personal injury claims based on
negligence, including section 1983 claims, is two years. See
Wilson v. Garcia,
471 U.S. 261,
105 S. Ct. 1938,
85 L. Ed.2d 254
(1985) (stating that statute of limitations for section 1983
actions is the state's statute of limitations for personal injury
actions). As this Court has previously stated:
"The policy of applying strict time
limitations to tax matters is based upon the
very nature of our administrative tax
structure. . . . Throughout our tax
legislation, it is clear that our legislature
has attempted to set out a well organized
time-table for the purpose of enabling a
municipality to ascertain the amount of
taxable ratables within the jurisdiction in
order that it might adopt a responsible and
fairly accurate budget.
[F.M.C. Stores Co. v. Borough of Morris
Plains,
100 N.J. 418, 425 (quoting Township
of Galloway v. Petkevis, 2 N.J. Tax 85
(1980)).]
To permit a longer statute of limitations in section 1983 tax
cases would thwart the express intent of the Legislature and
introduce uncertainty into the administration of the state tax
laws. Additionally, allowing section 1983 actions in state tax
cases would circumvent the statutory scheme, which requires that
a taxpayer challenging an added assessment appeal first to the
County Board pursuant to N.J.S.A. 54:4-63.11, then to the Tax
Court, and, if necessary, to the Appellate Division. See
N.J.S.A. 54:4-63.11; R. 2:2-3(a)(1).
Finally, the Director of the Division of Taxation, who
certifies all municipal assessors, may suspend an assessor or
revoke the assessor's certification "for dishonest practices, or
willful or intentional failure, neglect or refusal to comply with
the constitution and laws relating to the assessment and
collection of taxes or other good cause." N.J.S.A. 54:1-35.29.
Thus, a tax assessor who violates taxpayers' constitutional
rights runs the risk of removal. In sum, ample reasons support
the decision not to recognize a section 1983 action challenging
the conduct of an assessor.
The judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed, and the
matter is remanded to the Law Division for entry of a judgment of
dismissal.
CHIEF JUSTICE WILENTZ and JUSTICES HANDLER, O'HERN,
GARIBALDI, STEIN and COLEMAN join in JUSTICE POLLOCK's opinion.
NO. A-66/109 SEPTEMBER TERM 1995
ON APPEAL FROM
ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court
GENERAL MOTORS CORP.,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
CITY OF LINDEN and THE
ASSESSOR OF LINDEN,
Defendants-Appellants
and Cross-Respondents,
and
RICHARD CHAIKEN, Agent, Servant
or Employee of the City of
Linden,
Defendant-Respondent
and Cross-Appellant.
DECIDED February 29, 1996
Chief Justice Wilentz PRESIDING
OPINION BY Justice Pollock
CONCURRING OPINION BY
DISSENTING OPINION BY
Footnote: 1Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Footnote: 2
28 U.S.C.A. 1341 provides:
The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain
the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law
where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the
courts of such State.