SYLLABUS
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has
been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the
reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please
note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not
have been summarized).
Submitted November 7, 2005 -- Decided November 23, 2005
PER CURIAM .
Glenda Retana Juarez brought suit for damages arising out of an August 7, 1999, automobile accident. Defendants successfully sought summary judgment, and Juarez appealed. On July 21, 2005, the Appellate Division affirmed the grant of summary judgment. This Court granted Juarez’ petition for certification and dispensed with oral argument, in order to expeditiously address the issue.
HELD: We are compelled to reverse; the appellate panel has superimposed the same
serious injury standard that we disapproved of in Serrano; we state once again
that a plaintiff need only provide that her injuries satisfy one of the
threshold categories in AICRA.
In DiProspero v. Penn and Serrano v. Serrano, we held that an automobile
accident victim subject to the limitation on lawsuit threshold need only prove that
her injuries satisfy one of the six statutorily defined categories in the Automobile
Insurance Cost Reduction Act (AICRA) to sue for pain and suffering damages. We
noted that the Legislature considered the injuries defined in AICRA to be serious
by their very nature. (p. 2)
2. In Serrano, we reversed the Appellate Division’s judgment. We concluded that in order
to recover noneconomic damages, an accident victim has to prove only an injury
as defined in AICRA and does not have to clear the additional hurdle
of proving a serious injury. (pp. 2-3)
3. We are compelled to reverse the Appellate Division in this case. The appellate
panel has superimposed the same serious injury standard that we disapproved of in
Serrano. (p. 3)
We state once again that a plaintiff need only prove that her injuries
satisfy one of the threshold categories in AICRA. Juarez was required only to
prove by objective credible evidence that she suffered a permanent injury. (pp. 3-4)
The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED
to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and ASSOCIATE JUSTICES LONG, LaVECCHIA, ZAZZALI, ALBIN, WALLACE and RIVERA-SOTO
join in this opinion.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-
66 September Term 2005
GLENDA RETANA JUAREZ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
J.A. SALERNO & SONS, INC., JAMES A. SALERNO and BALTAZAR ALVARADO MARTINEZ,
Defendants-Respondents,
and
JOHN DOE CORPORATION 1-5,
Defendant.
Submitted November 7, 2005 -– Decided November 23, 2005
On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at
379 N.J.Super. 91 (2005).
Daniel E. Chase submitted a brief on behalf of appellant (Hartsough Kenny &
Chase, attorneys).
Francis X. Ryan and Alexa J. Nasta submitted a brief on behalf of
respondent Baltazar Alvarado Martinez (Green, Lundgren & Ryan, attorneys).
Thomas P. Argentieri submitted a letter in lieu of brief on behalf of
respondents J.A. Salerno & Sons, Inc. and James A. Salerno (Charles Peter Hopkins,
II, attorney).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff brought suit for damages arising out of an August 7, 1999, automobile
accident. Defendants successfully sought summary judgment, and plaintiff appealed. On July 21, 2005,
the Appellate Division affirmed the grant of summary judgment. Juarez v. J.A. Salerno
& Sons,
379 N.J. Super. 91 (App. Div. 2005).
After considering the briefs of the parties, the Court has decided to grant
plaintiff’s petition for certification. The Court has elected to dispense with oral argument
pursuant to Rule 2:11-1(b), and address the issue raised on an expedited basis.
In DiProspero v. Penn,
183 N.J. 477 (2005), and Serrano v. Serrano,
183 N.J. 508 (2005), we held “that an automobile accident victim subject to the
limitation on lawsuit threshold need only prove that her injuries satisfy one of
the six statutorily defined threshold categories in the Automobile Insurance Cost Reduction Act
(AICRA) to sue for pain and suffering damages.” Serrano, supra, 183 N.J. at
509 (citing DiProspero, supra, 183 N.J. at 480-82). In those cases, we noted
that “the Legislature considered the injuries defined in N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a) to be serious
by their very nature.” Id. at 510 (citing DiProspero, supra, 183 N.J. at
497-98).
In Serrano, supra, we reversed because the Appellate Division held that in addition
to proving that an accident victim suffered a permanent injury, the plaintiff had
to prove that she suffered a “serious injury.” Ibid. In that case, we
concluded “that in order to recover noneconomic damages, an accident victim has to
prove only an injury defined in N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a), and does not have to
clear the additional hurdle of proving a ‘serious injury.’” Ibid.
We are compelled to reverse the Appellate Division in this case. In affirming
a grant of summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s personal injury lawsuit, the appellate panel
has superimposed, perhaps inadvertently, the same serious injury standard that we disapproved of
in Serrano, supra. The following excerpt makes clear that the appellate panel apparently
misread our recent decisions in interpreting AICRA:
We discern nothing in the Supreme Court’s recent holdings in DiProspero v. Penn,
183 N.J. 477,
874 A.2d 1039 (2005), and Serrano v. Serrano,
183 N.J. 508,
874 A.2d 1058 (2005), that modifies plaintiff’s obligation under Oswin to make
a prima facie showing that any injury she sustained was sufficiently serious as
a matter of objective evaluation -- as well as permanent -- to warrant
inclusion under the bargained-for “limitation-on-lawsuit” coverage available under the statutory verbal threshold.
[Juarez, supra, 379 N.J. Super. at 94 (emphasis added).]
We state once again that a plaintiff need only prove that her injuries
satisfy one of the threshold categories in AICRA. In this case, plaintiff was
required only to prove by objective credible evidence that she suffered a permanent
injury. N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a). Accordingly, the judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed, and
the matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion, Serrano, supra, and DiProspero, supra.
CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and ASSOCIATE JUSTICES LONG, LaVECCHIA, ZAZZALI, ALBIN, WALLACE and RIVERA-SOTO
join in this opinion.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
NO. A-66 SEPTEMBER TERM 2005
ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court
GLENDA RETANA JUAREZ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
J.A. SALERNO & SONS, INC.
JAMES A. SALERNO and BALTAZAR
ALVARADO MARTINEZ,
Defendants-Respondents.
and
JOHN DOE CORPORATION 1-5,
Defendant.
DECIDED November 23, 2005
Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING
OPINION BY Per Curiam
CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINIONS BY
DISSENTING OPINION BY
CHECKLIST