(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for
the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please
note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).
Argued March 28, 1994 -- Decided June 13, 1994
GARIBALDI, J., writing for a unanimous Court.
The Court addresses whether the ten-year statute of repose, N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.1, prohibits a
homeowner from instituting a lawsuit for defects ten years after the initial construction of a house, but within
ten years of the builder-developer's substantial repairs to the house.
On June 14, 1977, Carl and Mary Horosz purchased a home from Alps Estates, Inc. (Alps), a
builder-developer. In 1981 the Horoszes noticed that cold air was coming into the house from the washroom
in the right rear of the home. The Horoszes contacted Jacob Kurzer, a representative of Alps. Alps began
repair work on the house in October 1982. Thomas E. Tully, a soil engineer, performed test borings of the
soil underneath the right rear of the house and found that that area of the house had been constructed on
fill, thereby causing the house to sink. To prevent any further sinking, Alps inserted concrete and steel in the
ground under the right rear of the house and replaced the foundation. The Horoszes claim that they asked
Alps to underpin the entire house but that Alps assured them that shoring up the fill under part of the house
was sufficient to prevent continued sinking. Alps completed all repair work by April 25, 1983.
In January 1989, the Horoszes again felt cold air blowing through the house and contacted Jacob
Kurzer. He examined the home on May 3, 1989. According to the Horoszes, Kurzer promised to have the
house inspected and to provide a report but never did anything further to help the Horoszes.
The Horoszes' home continued to deteriorate. They hired a company to jack-up the house and to
excavate to determine the source of the problem. That excavation revealed that the sinkage was caused by
fill under the foundation. The excavators discovered fill a few feet away from the spot at which Alps had
stopped its work in April 1983.
The Horoszes filed suit on September 28, 1989, alleging that Alps had negligently repaired the house
in 1983, had knowingly concealed a material fact, had violated the Consumer Fraud Act, and had breached
express and implied warranties. Alps' answer included a defense based on N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.1, the ten-year
statute of repose.
At a hearing prior to trial, the trial court ruled that the statute of repose applied and that the ten
years had begun to run when title passed from Alps to the Horoszes in 1977. Therefore, the court dismissed
the Horoszes' complaint because it was filed more than ten years after title had passed.
On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed and remanded the matter for trial. The Appellate
Division agreed with the trial court that the statute of repose applied, but concluded that because the defect
had arisen from the 1983 repair work and not from original construction, the statute began to run at the time
the repair work was completed in April 1983.
The Supreme Court granted certification.
HELD: When a builder-developer performs repairs that constitute an improvement to real property after the initial construction has been completed, the owner has ten years from completion of the repair work to file an action against the builder-developer for defects relating solely to that repair
work. With respect to defects unrelated to repairs, however, the ten-year statute of repose runs
from the date of the completion of the initial construction of the home. The Horoszes'
complaint alleges that Alps negligently performed the 1983 underpinning; therefore, their claim is
not barred by the ten-year statute of repose.
1. The ten-year statute of repose applies here. Both the original design and construction of the home
and the subsequent repairs in 1983 constitute improvements to real property within the meaning of the
statute. The underpinning performed in 1983 was essential to the continued habitability of the house. Such
repairs are within the scope of the statutory phrase "improvement to real property."
(pp. 4-8)
2. The ten-year statute of repose began to run on completion of the original construction of the house
in 1977. To the extent that the Horoszes' cause of action alleges any deficiency in the initial design and
construction of the house, the statute of repose would bar such claims because litigation was instituted more
than ten years after the completion of construction. However, fairly read, the Horoszes' complaint alleges
that Alps negligently performed the underpinning in 1983. Because the 1983 repairs independently implicate
the statute, and because the Horoszes allege that Alps negligently performed those repairs, the statute of
repose in respect of those repairs began to run on April 23, 1983. Therefore, the Horoszes can maintain a
cause of action for negligent repairs. (pp. 8-11)
Judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED.
JUSTICES CLIFFORD, HANDLER, POLLOCK and O'HERN join in JUSTICE GARIBALDI's
opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE WILENTZ and JUSTICE STEIN did not participate.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-
130 September Term l993
CARL HOROSZ and MARY HOROSZ,
his wife,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
v.
ALPS ESTATES, INC., a New Jersey
Corporation, JACOB KURZER and DAVID
ROSEN, jointly, severally or in
the alternative, individually,
Defendants-Appellants.
_____________________________
Argued March 28, l994 -- Decided June 13, 1994
On certification to the Superior Court,
Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported
at
266 N.J. Super. 382 (l993).
Thomas R. Raimondi argued the cause for
appellants (Diamond, Afflitto and Raimondi,
attorneys).
Edward J. Bowen argued the cause for
respondents.
Dennis A. Estis argued the cause for amicus
curiae, New Jersey Builders Association
(Greenbaum, Rowe, Smith, Ravin & Davis,
attorneys; Mr. Estis and Ellen A. Silver, on
the brief).
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
GARIBALDI, J.
This appeal concerns the narrow question whether N.J.S.A.
2A:14-1.1 prohibits a homeowner from recovering against a
builder-developer for that builder's subsequent repair work.
Specifically, we address whether the ten-year statute of repose
bars a lawsuit brought ten years after the initial construction
of the house, but within ten years of the builder-developer's
substantial repairs to the house.
On June 14, 1977, plaintiffs, Carl and Mary Horosz, purchased a home at l9 Stagg Road, Wayne, New Jersey, from defendant Alps Estates, Inc. ("Alps"), a builder-developer. In l98l, the Horoszes experienced problems with the house. In particular, they felt cold air coming into the house from the washroom in the right rear of the dwelling. As a result, the Horoszes contacted Jacob Kurzer, a representative of Alps.
Alps began repair work on the house in October l982. Thomas E. Tully, a "soil engineer," performed "test borings" of the soil underneath the right rear of the house. Tully discovered that that section of the house had been constructed on fill, thereby causing the house to sink. To prevent the house from sinking further, Alps inserted concrete and steel in the ground under that part of the house and replaced the foundation. Alps did not insert concrete and steel under the entire house. The Horoszes claim that they asked Alps to underpin the entire house but that Alps assured them that shoring up the fill under part of the house was sufficient to prevent continued sinkage. Alps completed that "underpinning" process on January 26, l983, and
all related work by April 25, l983, and did not charge the
Horoszes for the work.
The Horoszes and Alps did not communicate further until
January l989 when the Horoszes once again felt cold air blowing
through the house. Mrs. Horosz discovered that the wind was
coming from a bedroom window that would not close because one
side of the window frame tilted below the other. Mrs. Horosz
also noticed that the garage doors were not properly aligned and
that the floors in two of the bedrooms slanted downward from
right to left.
The Horoszes again communicated with Jacob Kurzer, the Alps
representative, and he examined the premises on May 3, l989.
According to the Horoszes, Kurzer promised to have the house
inspected and to provide a report within two weeks. Alps,
however, did nothing further.
The house continued to deteriorate. The Horoszes hired a
company to jack-up the house and to excavate to determine the
source of the problem. The excavation revealed that the source
of the sinkage was fill under the foundation. The excavators
discovered the fill a few feet away from the spot at which Alps
had stopped its work in April l983.
The Horoszes initiated this lawsuit on September 28, l989,
alleging that Alps had negligently repaired the house in l983,
knowingly concealed a material fact, violated the Consumer Fraud
Act, and had breached express and implied warranties. Alps'
answer included a defense based on N.J.S.A. 2A:l4-l.l, the ten-year statute of repose.
Prior to trial, the trial court, after a hearing on the
applicability of N.J.S.A. 2A:l4-l.l, ruled that the statute
applied and that the ten years had begun to run when title passed
from Alps to the Horozes in l977. The trial court therefore
dismissed the complaint.
On the Horoszes' appeal, the Appellate Division reversed and
remanded the case for trial.
266 N.J. Super. 382 (l993). The
Appellate Division agreed with the trial court that the statute
of repose applied. However, it concluded that because the defect
had arisen from the 1983 repair work and not from the original
construction completed in 1977, the statute had started to run in
April l983 at the conclusion of Alps's repairs. Id. at 385. We
granted defendants' petition for certification, ___ N.J. ___
(l993), and now affirm.
As the trial court and the Appellate Division held, N.J.S.A. 2A:l4-l.l, the ten-year statute of repose, applies. N.J.S.A. 2A:l4-l was enacted in l967, L. l967, c. 59, ¶ l, and is similar to legislation enacted in thirty other states. See Newark Beth Israel Hosp. v. Gruzen, l 24 N.J. 357, 362 (l99l). The purpose of the statute of repose was to limit the expanding liability of contractors, builders, planners, and designers, see id. at 362 (stating, "we have concluded that the Legislature enacted the statute in response to the expanding application of the 'discovery rule' . . ., the abandonment of the 'completed and accepted rule' . . ., and the expansion of strict liability in tort for personal injuries caused by defects in new homes to builder/sellers of those homes"); see also E.A. Williams, Inc. v. Russo Dev. Corp., 82 N.J. l60, l64-65 (l980) (discussing history and purpose of statute); O'Connor v. Altus, 67 N.J. l06, ll7 (l975) (same); Rosenberg v. Town of N. Bergen, 6l N.J. 190, l95-98 (1972) (same). Based on that legislative purpose, we have tended to read the statute broadly. See, e.g., Newark Beth Israel Hosp., supra, l24 N.J. at 363; Rosenberg, supra, 6l N.J. at l98.
N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.1 provides:
No action whether in contract, in tort, or otherwise to recover damages for any deficiency in the design, planning, supervision or construction of an improvement to real property, or for an injury to property, real or personal, or for an injury to the person, or for bodily injury or wrongful death, arising out of the defective and unsafe condition of an improvement to real property, nor any action for contribution or indemnity for damages sustained on account of such injury, shall be brought against any person performing or furnishing the design, planning, supervision of construction or construction of such improvement to real property, more than l0 years after the performance or furnishing of such services and construction.
Both the original design and construction of the home and
the subsequent repair in l983 constituted "improvements to real
property" within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.1. Neither of
the parties disputes that. Accordingly, neither party disputes
that any liability related to the sinking of the house that arose
from the original design and construction of the house is within
the ambit of the ten-year statute of repose.
Similarly, the l983 repair work amounted to an independent
"improvement to real property" within the meaning of N.J.S.A.
2A:l4-l.l. The l983 repairs were substantial in nature. The
house was lifted off its original foundation and a steel
framework was constructed beneath part of the house to prevent
continued sinkage. That "underpinning" was essential to the
continued habitability of the house. Those significant repairs
fit precisely within the scope of the phrase "improvement to real
property."
Even less-significant alterations and additions are
considered "improvements to real property." In Brown v. Jersey
Central Power & Light Co., l63 N.J. Super. l79 (l978), certif.
denied,
79 N.J. 489 (l979), the Appellate Division found that the
installation of a free-standing electrical transfer switch was an
"improvement to real property." The Appellate Division reached
its conclusion by reasoning that the electrical transfer switch
"constituted a permanent part of one of the mechanical systems
necessary to the normal function of this particular improvement
to the real estate." Id. at l96; see Rosenberg, supra, 6l N.J.
at l98 (stating that repaving road constitutes improvement to
real property); Wayne Township Bd. of Educ. v. Strand Century,
Inc., l
72 N.J. Super. 296, 300 (App. Div. l980) (holding that
installation of dimmer panel in new auditorium was improvement to
real property because it was required for structure to function
as intended); Hall v. Luby Corp.,
232 N.J. Super. 337, 339 (Law
Div. 1989) (holding that installation of elevator was improvement
to real property because removal of elevator would materially
damage property); see also Stix v. Greenway Dev. Co., l
85 N.J.
Super. 86, 89 (App. Div. 1982) (applying N.J.S.A. 2A:l4-l.l to
defendant's alleged negligent workmanship, which caused collapse
of basement foundation wall and consequent undermining of entire
building). Such an integral addition or alteration must be
contrasted with "equipment[] or chattels brought into a structure
after it is architecturally and mechanically suitable for
occupancy for the purpose intended." Brown, supra, 163 N.J.
Super. at 197.
Only construction and designs of improvements to real
property "that result in unsafe and defective conditions
implicate the statute." Newark Beth Israel Hosp., supra, l24
N.J. at 364. In Newark Beth Israel Hosp., we concluded that the
design of the hospital in question implicated the statute because
the owner had to incur substantial costs in redesigning the
building, because absent the alterations the hospital could not
be used for its intended purpose, and because the alterations
went beyond "expensive and inconvenient changes based on
efficiency to measures necessary and proper to ensure safety."
Id. at 365.
Similar to the original design and construction of the
Horoszes' home, the April l983 alterations resulted in an unsafe
and defective condition, thereby implicating the statute. The
"underpinning" was integral to the house as a structure. Without
it, the house could not function as intended, that is, the
Horoszes could not live in it. Moreover, the underpinning went
beyond "expensive and inconvenient changes based on efficiency to
measures necessary and proper to ensure safety." Ibid. Unlike
the surveyor's error in E.A. Williams, supra, 82 N.J. at l72, the
l983 defective underpinning caused both the house's functional
impairment, with consequential economic losses, and a hazardous
condition. Thus, we conclude that the l983 underpinning also
constituted an "improvement to real property" within the meaning
of N.J.S.A. 2A:l4-l.l.
Whether N.J.S.A. 2A:l4-l.l bars the Horoszes' claim against Alps, however, depends on when the statute began to run, which in turn depends on whether the Horoszes' claim relates to defects Alps made in its original construction or to defects Alps made in its subsequent repair work. With respect to any deficiency in
the original design, planning, supervision, or construction of
the house, the statute began to run on the "final date the person
claiming repose and immunity from suit furnishe[d] any and all
services or construction [that] it ha[d] undertaken at the job
site." Welch v. Engineers, Inc.,
202 N.J. Super. 387, 397 (App.
Div. l985).
Accordingly, N.J.S.A. 2A:l4-l.l began to run on completion
of the original construction of the house in l977. To the extent
the Horoszes' cause of action alleged any deficiency in the
initial design and construction of the house, the statute of
repose would bar it because their claim was filed on September
28, l989, more than ten years after the completion of
construction. For example, had the Horoszes alleged that their
roof had been defectively designed or constructed, that claim
would be barred despite Alps' repairs to the house in l983. See
Richards v. Union Bldg. & Constr. Corp., l30 N.J. Super. l27, l30
(App. Div. l974) (holding that contractor that performed work on
portion of highway more than ten years before occurrence of
accident thereon was not liable for injury resulting from its
negligence simply because sometime within ten years of accident
it had performed work on different portion of same highway).
Alps asserts that the defect at issue -- namely, the fill
underlying the foundation -- was a defect exclusively related to
its original construction of the house and totally unrelated to
its subsequent repairs. We disagree. Fairly read, Horoszes'
complaint alleges that Alps negligently performed the
underpinning in l983. According to the Horoszes, Alps should
have underpinned the entire foundation in l983. The sinkage that
the Horoszes discovered in l983 was only a few feet from the
sinkage that they had discovered in 1989. Because the l983
repairs independently implicate N.J.S.A. 2A:l4-l.l, and in view
of the Horoszes' allegation that Alps negligently performed those
repairs, the statute of repose with respect to those repairs
began to run on April 23, l983, the date that Alps completed all
work related to the underpinning. Thus, the ten-year period had
not run by the time the Horoszes initiated this lawsuit.
We find without merit Alps's assertion that permitting this
lawsuit to go forward would unfairly transform its voluntary
repair work in l983 into a tolling of N.J.S.A. 2A:l4-l.l. This
holding does not toll the statute of repose. Any deficiency
regarding the initial design or construction of the house may not
now form the basis of a lawsuit. Yet, any deficiency related to
a subsequent improvement of the property may form the basis of a
lawsuit, provided that the property owner commences such an
action within ten years of the completion of that improvement.
Because the Horoszes filed their complaint within the
requisite time, their suit must be permitted to go forward. As
is any other builder, Alps is liable for a defect that appears
within ten years of the completion of its improvement to real
property. As the Appellate Division noted, had someone other
than Alps, the original contractor-developer, performed the l983
underpinning, the statute would clearly have run from the date of
such repair. 266 N.J. Super. at 386. "The mere fact that the
builder performed the l983 repairs, rather than a new contractor,
makes no difference in the legal principles applicable here."
Ibid.
When a builder-developer performs repairs that constitute an improvement to real property after the initial construction has been completed, the owner has ten years from completion of the repair work to file an action against the builder-developer for defects relating solely to that repair work. With respect to defects unrelated to such repairs (defects resulting from the original construction), however, N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.1 runs from the date of the completion of the initial construction of the home. Because the Horoszes' complaint alleges that Alps negligently performed the 1983 underpinning, their claim is not barred by N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.1.
We affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division.
Justices Clifford, Handler, Pollock, and O'Hern join in this opinion. Chief Justice Wilentz and Justice Stein did not participate.