(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the
convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in
the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).
Argued October 23, 2001 -- Decided February 26, 2002
ZAZZALI, J., writing for a unanimous Court.
The issue before the Court is whether the Brooke Amendment (
42 U.S.C.A.
§1437 (a)(1)), which limits
the amount of rent that public housing tenants can be charged, prohibits a public housing authority from assessing
tenants attorneys' fees, late charges, and court costs in an eviction proceeding where the express language of the
lease defines such fees as “additional rent.”
Vanessa Taylor rents a three-bedroom apartment in the Stanley Homes public housing development in
Atlantic City, New Jersey. Her lease provides that any reasonable fees charged by the attorney handling an eviction
would be paid by the tenant as additional rent. Unfortunately, Taylor fell behind in her monthly rent. The Housing
Authority and Urban Redevelopment Agency of the City of Atlantic City (Housing Authority), a federally-funded
public housing agency that owns and operates the Stanley Homes development, instituted a summary dispossess
action against Taylor for nonpayment of rent.
On the date of the hearing on the eviction action, Taylor paid the past due rent but contested the attorneys'
fees, late charges, and court costs that she was obligated to pay under the terms of the lease. Taylor claimed that
these charges were not additional rent and should not have to be paid to avoid eviction. Specifically, Taylor
claimed that the Housing Authority was prohibited from collecting the additional charges by a provision in the
Brooke Amendment limiting public housing tenants' total rent to thirty percent of adjusted gross income.
The trial court held that the Housing Authority was permitted to demand the additional charges as part of
the eviction action, declaring that the Brooke Amendment did not preempt State contract law. The court noted that
the express language of the lease required Taylor to pay attorneys' fees and costs in the event the Housing Authority
instituted eviction proceedings against her. Further, the lease specifically characterized these charges as “additional
rent.” The trial court entered a judgment of possession against Taylor, ruling that if she did not deposit $164.50 by
the next day, a warrant of removal would issue.
The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that requiring the payment of attorneys' fees, late fees, and court
costs in order to avoid entry of judgment of possession did not violate the Brooke Amendment.
The Supreme Court granted certification.
HELD: The Brooke Amendment, which strictly defines tenant rent to exclude other charges such as attorneys' fees,
court costs, and late charges, preempts State law; therefore, the Housing Authority may not collect these
other charges as additional rent in a summary dispossess proceeding.
1. In New Jersey, good cause to evict exists when a tenant fails to pay rent due under the lease. To establish good
cause for eviction, and to require the payment of late fees to avoid an eviction, the late fees must either constitute
“additional rent” or the “accrued costs of the proceedings.” In that event, a court could order payment of rent
including any “additional rent” to avoid the eviction. (Pp. 6-7)
2. Pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, state law that conflicts with federal law is
preempted by the federal law. The federal language preempting state law may be explicit or implied where: 1) the
scheme of federal regulation is so pervasive as to leave no room for state supplementation; or 2) where compliance
with both the state and federal law are impossible or where the state law is an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. (Pp. 7-9)
3. Courts consistently have recognized that federal law and regulations, rather than state law, may govern in the
public housing context. Since 1937, the federal government has been the primary source of affordable housing for
low-income families. Congress has developed a statutory and regulatory scheme defining and limiting rent for low-
income tenants in federally-subsidized housing programs. Central to this scheme is the Brooke Amendment, which
strictly defines rent based on a tenant's income. (Pp. 9-11)
4. Certain federal regulations implementing the Brooke Amendment draw a sharp distinction between tenant rent
and other charges. Tenant rent is defined as the amount payable monthly by the family as rent to the public housing
authority. Lease provisions that require the tenant to pay attorneys' fees and other legal costs in an eviction action
are specifically prohibited. The Department of Housing and Urban Development historically has distinguished rent
from other charges and many courts also have recognized this distinction. (Pp. 12-16)
5. Although State law authorizes the Housing Authority to designate certain charges, such as attorneys' fee, late
fees, and costs, as “additional rent,” that law conflicts with the Brooke Amendment's limit on public housing tenant
rent and, therefore, is preempted by the federal law. Permitting these charges would increase tenant rent beyond the
thirty-percent-of-income limit established by the Brooke Amendment. Thus, federal law preempts state law to the
extent that it conflicts with federal law by allowing public housing authorities to designate certain extra charges as
“additional rent.” (Pp. 16-20)
6. Because the additional charges sought by the Housing Authority are not tenant rent due under the lease, they
cannot serve as a basis for a summary dispossess action against Taylor for nonpayment of rent. Public housing
authorities retain the right to collect these additional charges in a different legal proceeding. (Pp. 20-21)
Judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED.
CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES STEIN, COLEMAN, LONG, VERNIERO and
LAVECCHIA join in JUSTICE ZAZZALI'S opinion.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-
77 September Term 2000
HOUSING AUTHORITY & URBAN
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF
THE CITY OF ATLANTIC CITY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
VANESSA TAYLOR,
Defendant-Petitioner.
Argued October 23, 2001 -- Decided February 26, 2002
On certification to the Superior Court,
Appellate Division, whose opinion is
reported at
334 N.J. Super. 573 (2000).
Kenneth M. Goldman argued the cause for
appellant (Douglas E. Gershuny, Executive
Director, Cape-Atlantic Legal Services,
Inc., attorney).
Natonya C. Phillips argued the cause for
respondent (Zeller & Bryant, attorneys).
Joseph Harris David argued the cause for
amicus curiae Legal Services of New Jersey
(Melville D. Miller, Jr., Director,
attorney; Mr. David and Mr. Miller, on the
brief).
Elio R. Mena submitted a brief on behalf of
amicus curiae Housing Authority of the City
of Newark.
Anthony L. Argo, Jr., submitted a letter
brief on behalf of amicus curiae Housing
Authority of the City of Hackensack (Zisa,
Hitscherich & Argo, attorneys).
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
ZAZZALI, J.
In this appeal, we consider
42 U.S.C.A.
§1437a(a)(1)
(Brooke Amendment), which limits the amount of rent that public
housing tenants can be charged. The question before us is
whether the Brooke Amendment prohibits a public housing authority
(PHA) from assessing tenants attorneys' fees, late charges, and
court costs in an eviction proceeding where the express language
of the lease defines such fees as “additional rent.”
The Housing Authority and Urban Redevelopment Agency of the
City of Atlantic City (Housing Authority) instituted a summary
dispossess action against a tenant, Vanessa Taylor, for
nonpayment of rent pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1a. On the date
of the hearing, Taylor remitted the past due rent but contested
the attorneys' fees, late charges, and court costs that she was
obligated to pay under the terms of the lease. The trial court
entered judgment in favor of the Housing Authority, holding that
federal law did not preempt state contract law and the Appellate
Division affirmed, Housing Authority & Urban Redevelopment Agency
of the City of Atlantic City v. Taylor,
334 N.J. Super. 573, 580-
81 (App. Div. 2000). We granted certification.
167 N.J. 633
(2001). We also granted the motions of the Housing Authorities
of the Cities of Hackensack and Newark, and the motion of Legal
Services of New Jersey for leave to appear as amicus curiae.
(c) Late Charges _ A charge of $20.00 per month for rent, or other charges paid after the 5th calendar day of the month. . . . The Authority shall provide written notice of the amount of any charge in addition to Tenant Rent, and when the charge is due. Charges in addition to rent are due no sooner than two weeks after Tenant receives the Authority's written notice of the charge. . . .
(d) Legal Fees _ In the event eviction proceedings are instituted by or on behalf of the Authority for possession of the leased premises due to the tenant's failure to pay rent, utility and maintenance fees, late fees, court costs or any other violation of this lease, the tenant agrees to pay, as additional rent, the reasonable fees charged by the attorney handling the matter, plus costs. The attorney's fees shall include, but are not limited to, the costs of filing, serving and litigating any notice to cease, notice to quit, complaint for possession, or warrant for removal. Attorney's fees shall be charged to the tenant only if the Authority prevails or if it is agreed that such fees will be paid in settlement of the case.
[Emphasis added.]
Beginning in February 1999, Taylor fell behind in her
monthly rent payments. Consequently, on March 10, 1999, the
Housing Authority initiated a summary dispossess action for
nonpayment of rent pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1a. In its
complaint, the Housing Authority sought $972 in rent arrearages
for the months of February, March, and April. Pursuant to the
lease agreement, the Housing Authority also sought $144.50 in
attorneys' fees and court costs and $20 in late fees.
On the date of the hearing, Taylor remitted $972 in back
rent, but contested the additional charges sought by the Housing
Authority. Taylor argued that the charges were not “additional
rent” and therefore did not have to be paid to avoid eviction.
Specifically, she asserted that the Housing Authority was
prohibited from collecting the additional charges by a provision
in the Brooke Amendment limiting public housing tenants' total
rent to thirty percent of her adjusted gross income.
The trial court held that the Housing Authority was
permitted to demand the additional charges as part of the
eviction action, declaring that the Brooke Amendment did not
preempt state contract law. The court noted that the express
language of the lease required Taylor to pay attorneys' fees and
costs in the event that the Housing Authority instituted eviction
proceedings. Further, the lease specifically characterized such
charges as “additional rent.” Consequently, the trial court
entered a judgment of possession against Taylor, ruling that if
she did not deposit $164.50 by the next day, a warrant of removal
would issue.See footnote 11 The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that
requiring Taylor to pay attorneys' fees, late fees, and court
costs in order to avoid entry of a judgment of possession did not
violate the Brooke Amendment. Taylor, supra, 334 N.J. Super. at
580-81. We now conclude that federal law preempts state law and
thus compels reversal.
Good cause to evict exists where “[t]he person fails to pay rent due and owing under the lease whether the same be oral or written.” N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(a). To establish good cause for eviction, and to require the payment of outstanding late fees to avoid an eviction under N.J.S.A. 2A:18-55, the late fees must either constitute “additional rent” or the “accrued costs of the proceedings.” In that event, a court may order payment of rent, including any authorized “additional rent,” to obtain dismissal of a summary dispossess complaint and avoid eviction. N.J.S.A. 2A:18-55; see also Harris, supra, 155 N.J. at 234 (stating that landlord could recover such charges as “additional rent” in summary dispossess proceeding if “[t]he written lease . . . expressly permit[s] a landlord to recover reasonable attorneys' fees and damages”). On the other hand, the force of this type of provision may be limited by rent control ordinances or federal law. Harris, supra, 155 N.J. at 242.
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution deems federal law “the supreme Law of the Land.” U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2. To the extent that state law conflicts with federal law, state law is preempted, “'whether Congress' command is explicitly stated in the statute's language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose.'” R.F. v. Abbott Labs., 162 N.J. 596, 618 (2000) (quoting Gade v. National Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 98, 112 S. Ct. 2374, 2383, 120 L. Ed.2d 73, 84 (1992) (citations omitted)).
Absent explicit pre-emptive language we have recognized at least two types of implied pre- emption: field pre-emption, where the scheme of the federal regulation is 'so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it,' and conflict preemption, where 'compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility,' or where state law 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress[.]'
[Id. at 618 (quoting Gade, supra, 505 U.S.
at 98, 112 S. Ct. at 2383,
120 L. Ed 2d at
84) (citations omitted).]
Thus, in respect of conflict preemption, the relevant inquiry is
whether state law “'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
of a federal objective.'” Ibid. (quoting Jones v. Rath Packing
Co.,
430 U.S. 519, 526,
97 S. Ct. 1305, 1310,
51 L. Ed.2d 604,
614 (1977) (citations omitted)).
In making this determination, we “first must consider the
purposes of the federal law, and then evaluate the effect of the
state law on those purposes.” Franklin Tower One, L.L.C. v.
N.M.,
157 N.J. 602, 725 (1999). This requires an evaluation of
“'the relationship between state and federal laws as they are
interpreted and applied, not merely as they are written.'” R.F.,
supra, 162 N.J. at 618 (quoting Jones, supra, 430 U.S. at 526, 97
S. Ct. at 1310, 51 L. Ed.
2d at 614 (citations omitted)). Once a
clear conflict between state and federal law is established, “the
importance to the State of its own law is immaterial . . . [and]
'the federal law must prevail.'” Feldman v. Lederle Labs.,
125 N.J. 117, 135 (1991) (quoting Free v. Bland,
369 U.S. 663, 666,
82 S. Ct. 1089, 1092,
8 L. Ed.2d 180, 183 (1962)). “When a
federal regulation conflicts with state law, the same preemption
rules apply.” R.F., supra, 162 N.J. at 619 (citing Fidelity Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta,
458 U.S. 141, 153-54,
102 S.
Ct. 3014, 3022-23,
73 L. Ed.2d 664, 675 (1982)).
Courts consistently have recognized that federal law and
regulations, rather than state law, may govern in the public
housing context. See, e.g., Harris, supra, 155 N.J. at 242
(“[T]he amount due as rent may be limited by a rent control
ordinance, or in the case of public or federally-assisted
housing, by federal law.”); Housing Auth. and Urban Redevelopment
Agency of City of Atlantic City v. Spratley,
327 N.J. Super. 246,
256 (App. Div. 1999) (“Interference by the state judiciary with
respect to a responsibility conferred upon a federal agency with
presumed expertise in its assigned field would be inherently
abrasive.”); Housing Auth. of the City of Jersey City v. Thomas,
318 N.J. Super. 191, 195 (App. Div. 1999) (acknowledging out-of-
state authority that standard for eviction in federally-funded
public housing project is matter of federal law); see also In re
Parker,
269 B.R. 522, 533 (D. Vt. 2001) (stating that federal law
governs amount of rent charged by public housing authorities);
Binghamton Hous. Auth. v. Douglas,
630 N.Y.S.2d 144, 145 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1995) (holding that late fees, utility fees, and
maintenance fees do not constitute rent under federal regulations
and thus are not recoverable in summary proceeding); City of S.
San Francisco Hous. Auth. v. Guillory,
49 Cal. Rptr.2d 367, 371
(Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1995) (“The standard for eviction in
a public housing project which receives federal funding is a
matter of federal, not state, law.”). Since the enactment of the
National Housing Act in 1937, the federal government has been the
primary source of affordable housing for low-income families.
See Cesar E. Torres, The Housing Crisis Facing Low Income
Families,
29 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1498, 1501-02 (1999). To that
end, Congress developed a statutory and regulatory scheme
defining and limiting rent for low-income tenants in federally-
subsidized housing programs. Central to this scheme is the
Brooke Amendment, which strictly defines rent based on a tenant's
income.
42 U.S.C.A.
§1437a(a)(1). According to the Brooke
Amendment,
a family shall pay as rent . . . the highest
of the following amounts, rounded to the
nearest dollar:
(A) 30 per centum of the family's monthly
adjusted income;
(B) 10 per centum of the family's monthly
income; or
(C) if the family is receiving payments for
welfare assistance from a public agency
and a part of such payments, adjusted in
accordance with the family's actual
housing costs, is specifically
designated by such agency to meet the
family's housing costs, the portion of
such payments which is so designated.
[Ibid.]
In enacting the Brooke Amendment, Congress intended to
“enable families of very low incomes to afford rentals with no
more than [thirty] percent of their incomes.”See footnote 22 S. Rep. No. 91-
392 (1969), reprinted in 1
969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1524, 1541; see also
Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment and Hous. Auth.,
479 U.S. 418, 430,
107 S. Ct. 766, 773,
93 L. Ed.2d 781, 792 (1987)
(recognizing Brooke Amendment's intent that “tenants [] be
charged as rent no more and no less than thirty percent of their
income”); McGhee v. Housing Auth. of City of Lanett,
543 F. Supp. 607, 608 (M.D. Ala. 1982) (stating that public housing tenants
have right to low-cost housing at rental rate set forth by
Congress); cf. Housing Auth. of Town of Morristown v. Little,
135 N.J. 274, 292 (1994) (noting purpose of public housing to provide
affordable housing to low-income families).
Codifying the formula for the calculation of Brooke
Amendment rent,
42 U.S.C.A.
§1437a(b)(5) and its implementing
regulations, 24 C.F.R. § 5.609 and 5.611, define “adjusted
income,” “annual income,” “mandatory exclusions” from income, and
“permissive exclusions for public housing.” The regulations also
set forth procedures for regular and interim reexaminations of a
tenant's rent and family composition to determine whether rent
should be adjusted. 24 C.F.R. §§ 960.257 and 960.259. Numerous
other statutory and regulatory provisions limit rent to protect
those who suffer hardship. For example, the Quality Housing and
Work Responsibility Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-276,
112 Stat. 2461 (1998) (QHWRA), affords public housing tenants the option of
paying either a “flat rent,” or the Brooke Amendment income-based
rent, whichever is lower. See 24 C.F.R. § 960.253. Tenants may
choose to switch from a flat rent to an income-based rent at any
time due to financial hardship.
42 U.S.C.A.
§1437a(a)(2)(B) and
(C); 24 C.F.R. § 960.253(a) and (f). QHWRA also permits a public
housing authority to “establish a minimum rent of up to $50.”
42 U.S.C.A. 1437a(a)(3); 24 C.F.R. § 5.630(a)(2). In the event of
financial hardship, such as loss of employment or public
assistance, tenants are exempted from paying even the minimum
rent and are not subject to eviction. 24 C.F.R. § 5.630(b)(1)(i)
and (iii). There are also provisions that delay rent increases
that would otherwise occur when a tenant obtains employment and
receives an increase in income. 24 C.F.R. § 960.255(b). Still
other provisions provide a “ceiling rent,” a protective measure
that caps rent at a specified amount regardless of a tenant's
income. 24 C.F.R. § 960.253(d).
The foregoing regulations not only limit public housing
tenant rent, but also draw a sharp distinction between “tenant
rent” and other charges. According to 24 C.F.R. § 5.603(b),
“tenant rent” is defined as “[t]he amount payable monthly by the
family as rent to the [public housing authority].” 24 C.F.R.
§ 966.4(b), entitled “Payments due under the lease,” refers only
to “tenant rent,” 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(b)(1), and a limited number
of other permissible additional charges, including “PHA charges,”
such as fees for maintenance and consumption of excess utilities,
24 C.F.R. § 966.4(b)(2), and “Late payment penalties,” 24 C.F.R.
§ 966.4(b)(3). Conversely, 24 C.F.R. § 966.6 enumerates
prohibited lease provisions. Among those prohibited are
provisions stating that
the tenant agrees to pay attorney's fees or
other legal costs whenever the landlord
decides to take action against the tenant
even though the court determines that the
tenant prevails in the action. Prohibition
of this type of provision does not mean that
the tenant as a party to a lawsuit may not be
obligated to pay attorney's fees or other
costs if he [or she] loses the suit.
[24 C.F.R. § 966.6(h).]
Likewise, the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) historically has distinguished rent from other charges.
See, e.g., Lease and Grievance Procedures, 24 C.F.R. § 966
(recognizing distinction between rent and other charges); PHA-
Owned or Leased Projects; Maintenance and Operation; Tenant
Allowances for Utilities, 24 C.F.R. § 965 (stating that “HUD's
practice . . . is to distinguish between rent and other
charges.”).
Many courts also have recognized the distinction between
tenant rent and other charges, refusing to permit additional
charges to be treated as rent. For example, in Miles v.
Metropolitan Dade County,
916 F.2d 1528 (11th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied,
502 U.S. 898,
112 S. Ct. 273,
116 L. Ed.2d 225 (1991),
the Eleventh Circuit held that a landlord's attempt to evict a
tenant for non-payment of attorneys' fees and costs
does not transform a miscellaneous charge
into rent. The [federal] regulations
explicitly separate tenant charges into two
categories _ miscellaneous charges not
subject to the 30% limitation and rent
charges included in the 30% income limits.
These explicit regulations imply that the
drafters did not intend to give the PHAs
discretion to decide whether a particular
charge is 'rent.'
[Id. at 1532 n.4.]
Similarly, in Parker, the public housing authority sought
attorneys' fees and utility and repair charges as a condition of
assumption of a lease by a Chapter 13 debtor-tenant. Parker,
supra, 269 B.R. at 527. In rejecting the public housing
authority's argument, the court held that utility and repair
charges could not be considered past due rent. Id. at 533. The
court stated that a public housing authority “may not use the
terms of its lease to broaden the definition of rent to include
utility or repair charges, or . . . attorney's fees.” Ibid. The
court also concluded that, under Vermont law, a public housing
authority may not “use this broader definition of rent as a basis
for eviction” and that “payment of the utility and repair charges
was not a condition necessary to [the tenant's] cure of the rent
default prior to assumption of the lease.” Ibid.
In Beckham v. New York City Housing Authority,
592 F. Supp. 785 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), rev'd on o.g.,
755 F.2d 1074 (2d Cir. 1985),
the district court discussed the Brooke Amendment's implementing
regulations:
[T]he regulations implementing this statutory
scheme prohibit the inclusion of
miscellaneous charges and penalties as rent .
. . . For example, charges 'for maintenance
and repair beyond normal wear and tear and
for consumption of excess utilities,' as well
as penalties for late payments under the
lease are distinguished by the regulation
from charges for rent, itself.
[Id. at 792-93 (citations omitted).]
See also Crochet v. Housing Auth. of City of Tampa,
37 F.3d 607,
612-13 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that utility deposit and
arrearages are not rent under Brooke Amendment); Aujero v. CDA
Todco, Inc.,
756 F.2d 1374, 1376 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that
meal charge does not constitute rent under federal law); Hanrahan
v. Housing and Redevelopment Auth. of Duluth,
912 F. Supp. 428,
437-38 (D. Minn. 1995), aff'd,
86 F.3d 1159 (8th Cir. 1996)
(same); Douglas, supra, 630 N.Y.S.
2d at 145 (holding that public
housing tenant rent does not include “charges for excess utility
consumption or other miscellaneous charges”); Gonzalez v. St.
Margaret's House Hous. Dev. Fund Corp.,
668 F. Supp. 187, 193-94
(S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd,
848 F.2d 391 (2d Cir. 1988) (stating that
mandatory meal charges are not rent under Brooke Amendment).
Federal law defines tenant rent as “[t]he amount payable monthly by the family as rent to [the public housing authority].” 24 C.F.R. § 5.603(b). Although the implementing regulations authorize a public housing authority to assess tenants other charges, 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(b)(2) and (3), that does not mean that those additional charges are “rent,” and therefore collectible in a summary dispossess proceeding. To the contrary, federal law explicitly distinguishes tenant rent from other charges. By definition, the treatment of tenant rent in federal law precludes any other assessments from being defined as “additional rent.”
We note also that 24 C.F.R. § 966.6(h) prohibits lease provisions in which the tenant agrees to pay attorneys' fees or other legal costs “whenever the landlord decides to take action against the tenant even though the court determines that the tenant prevails in the action.” The regulation also states that “[p]rohibition of this type of provision does not mean that the tenant as a party to a lawsuit may not be obligated to pay attorney's fees or other costs if he [or she] loses the suit.” 24 C.F.R. § 966.6(h). Notably, however, the regulation does not permit the treatment of attorneys' fees as “additional rent,” or allow for lease provisions that require the payment of attorneys' fees as a condition for dismissal of a summary dispossess action. Courts consistently have upheld this limitation. In Wright, the United States Supreme Court concluded:
The Brooke Amendment could not be clearer: as further amended in 1981, tenants could be charged as rent no more and no less than 30 percent of their income. This was a mandatory limitation focusing on the individual family and its income. The intent to benefit tenants is undeniable.
[Wright, supra, 479 U.S. at 430, 107 S. Ct.
at 773-74, 93 L. Ed. 2d at 792.]
Likewise, in Douglas, a case factually similar to this appeal,
the public housing authority sought to evict a tenant for non-
payment of rent and “added rent,” which consisted of late fees,
utility fees, and maintenance fees. Douglas, supra, 630 N.Y.S.
2d
at 145. The court held that the public housing authority could
not “recover these charges through [a summary] proceeding by
defining them as 'added rent' in its lease with [the tenant].”
Ibid. The court reasoned that
[d]espite the clear lease provisions, the
property at issue is governed by standards
different from those applicable to private
landlord/tenant relations. Pursuant to the
Brooke Amendment, as implemented by the
public housing regulations, the total tenant
payment allowable as rent is only that amount
designated by the guidelines therein . . .
and does not include charges for excess
utility consumption or other miscellaneous
charges[.]
[Ibid. (quotation omitted).]
See also Housing Auth. of City of Passaic v. Torres,
143 N.J.
Super. 231, 236 (App. Div. 1976) (finding no jurisdiction where
rent sought not in compliance with HUD regulations). Cf. Ivy
Hill Park Apartments v. Sidisin,
258 N.J. Super. 19, 23 (App.
Div. 1992) (finding court lacked jurisdiction in action to evict
for nonpayment of rent and other charges as “additional rent”
where other charges violated rent control ordinance).
State law, which permits the recovery of “additional rent”
in a summary dispossess proceeding, thus conflicts with the
Brooke Amendment, which strictly defines tenant rent to exclude
such other charges. Allowing summary eviction for nonpayment of
“additional rent,” such as attorneys' fees, court costs, and late
charges, undermines the Amendment's express limitation on tenant
rent. Put simply, federal law defines rent as a percentage of a
tenant's adjusted monthly income, and expressly distinguishes
tenant rent from other charges. The concept of “additional rent”
permits other charges unconnected with a tenant's monthly income
to be considered part of “tenant rent.” Those disparate results
cannot be reconciled.
We therefore hold that state law is preempted by federal
law. Thus, the additional charges sought by the Housing
Authority are not tenant rent due under the lease. Charges that
exceed the thirty percent cap may be permissible, if allowed
under other provisions, but cannot be considered or treated as
rent, and therefore cannot serve as the basis for a summary
dispossess action for nonpayment of rent.
The Housing Authority acknowledged at oral argument that it
has other avenues of relief available to it, such as initiating
an action in the Special Civil Part to collect the other charges.
R. 6:1-2(a)(2). We recognize that the above may not be the best
or even the most efficient of alternatives for the Housing
Authority to obtain the fees it is owed. Nevertheless, the
Housing Authority retains the option of pursuing an action for
attorneys' fees and late charges in a separate proceeding.
Reversed.
CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES STEIN, COLEMAN, LONG, VERNIERO and LaVECCHIA join in JUSTICE ZAZZALI's opinion.
NO. A-77 SEPTEMBER TERM 2000
ON APPEAL FROM
ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court
HOUSING AUTHORITY & URBAN
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF
THE CITY OF ATLANTIC CITY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
VANESSA TAYLOR,
Defendant-Petitioner.
DECIDED February 26, 2002
Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING
OPINION BY Justice Zazzali
CONCURRING OPINION BY
DISSENTING OPINION BY
Footnote: 1 1As noted by the Appellate Division, nothing in the record
shows whether Taylor paid the additional fees and costs totaling
$164.50 to prevent the entry of a judgment of possession and
issuance of a warrant of removal. Taylor, supra, 334 N.J. Super.
at 575. However, the panel was informed by counsel at oral
argument that the money was deposited with the clerk of the
court. Ibid.
Footnote: 2 2In 1981, Congress changed the maximum percentage of income
that could be paid as “rent” from twenty-five percent to thirty
percent. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No.
97-35, § 322,
95 Stat. 357, 400 (1981).