SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
A-5639-95T3
HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE
CITY OF HOBOKEN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CARMEN ALICEA,
Defendant-Respondent.
____________________________________
Argued January 6, 1997 - Decided January 31,
1997
Before Judges Havey and Kestin.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division - Special Civil Part, Hudson
County.
Douglas H. Hurd argued the cause for
appellant (Mason, Griffin & Pierson, P.C.,
attorneys; Rudy Garcia, of counsel; Mr. Hurd,
on the brief).
John Ukegbu argued the cause for respondent
(Hudson County Legal Services Corp.,
attorneys; Mr. Ukegbu, of counsel and on the
brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HAVEY, P.J.A.D.
Plaintiff Housing Authority of the City of Hoboken filed an
eviction complaint against defendant, Carmen Alicea, asserting
that she violated N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1p by permitting her son Luis
to occupy the leased premises after Luis had been charged with an
offense under the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act (CDRA), N.J.S.A.
2C:35-1 to -23. At the close of plaintiff's case, the Special
Civil Part judge dismissed the complaint, concluding that
plaintiff failed to make a prima facie showing that Luis
"occupied" defendant's premises. We affirm.
Defendant and her grandchildren are the only "occupants"
named in her written lease with plaintiff. On December 14, 1995,
defendant's twenty-six year-old son, Luis, was charged with
possession of heroin, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10a, and remaining in an
area for the purpose of illegally obtaining heroin, N.J.S.A.
2C:33-2.1b. The arrest occurred approximately one block away
from defendant's apartment, but apparently in the same apartment
complex.
On March 12, 1996, plaintiff served defendant with a "Notice
Terminating Lease" which provided:
You have permitted Luis Alicea, while an
occupant of your premises, to engage in DRUG
RELATED ACTIVITY upon the leased premises.
Such activity occurred on December 14, 1995,
wherein Luis Alicea was arrested and charged
with Possession of Heroin.
During trial, plaintiff called the police officer who arrested Luis. He testified that upon Luis' arrest he stated he lived in defendant's apartment.See footnote 1 Plaintiff also presented its realty manager who resided in an apartment near defendant's. She testified that, during the time of Luis' arrest she observed Luis enter and leave defendant's apartment "every day." She was asked: "So he was visiting there every day until last week?"
(emphasis added), and she responded, "Yes."
Under N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1p, a tenant may be evicted if the
landlord establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that:
(1) the tenant has committed a drug offense under the CDRA
"within or upon the leased premises or the building or complex of
buildings and land appurtenant thereto"; or (2) the tenant
permits or permitted "such a person" to occupy the premises
"continuously or intermittently."See footnote 2
This provision is part of the Anti-Eviction Act, N.J.S.A.
2A:18-61.1 to -61.12, which is remedial legislation deserving of
liberal construction. 447 Assocs. v. Miranda,
115 N.J. 522, 529
(1989). The Act establishes that "tenants may not be removed
from their residential premises except on one of various
enumerated grounds constituting `good cause.'" Id. at 528
(quoting N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1). The Act was intended to address
the critical shortage of residential housing and to prevent "the
dispossession of tenants who are paying their rent and generally
complying with their obligations as tenants." Riverview Realty,
Inc. v. Williamson, 284 N.J. Super. 566, 568 (App. Div. 1995).
Thus, it should be construed "so as to allow a tenant to
understand what the consequences may be as a result of his or her
actions while residing in the leased premises." Housing Auth. v.
Reid, 263 N.J. Super. 554, 565 (Law Div. 1993) (tenant's
conviction for conspiracy to distribute drugs was not a basis to
evict under N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1n).
With these statutory principles in mind, we are satisfied
that, to justify the ultimate sanction of eviction under N.J.S.A.
2A:18-61.1p, a tenant must not only "permit" a drug offender to
occupy the leased premises, but must also tolerate the offender's
occupancy of the premises knowing that such person has violated
the CDRA. Otherwise, a tenant who has not committed a drug
crime, and who does not know that the person who occupies the
leased premises has committed such an offense, would be subject
to eviction. In essence, the innocent and unknowing tenant would
be subject to removal based solely on the criminal act of
another. This result obviously runs contrary to the remedial
purposes of the Act.
Applying the standard under R. 4:37-2(b); see also Brill v.
Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.,
142 N.J. 520, 535-36 (1995), we
are convinced that the Special Civil Part judge properly granted
defendant's motion for an involuntary dismissal. Accepting
plaintiff's argument that Luis' statement to the police about his
residence raised a legitimate inference that he "occupied"
defendant's apartment on December 14, 1995, the day of his
arrest, it does not logically follow that she knew of Luis' drug
arrest and nevertheless countenanced his occupancy in the
premises after that date. The record is entirely silent with
respect to defendant's knowledge of Luis' encounter with the law.
Moreover, all the realty manager was able to say was that
defendant "visited" defendant's apartment "every day." But this
evidence did not support a reasonable inference of Luis'
"occupancy," which is a "[t]aking possession of property and use
of the same; [as in] a tenant's use of leased premises." Black's
Law Dictionary 743 (6th Ed. 1991). Nor did this testimony
establish defendant's knowledge of Luis' arrest.
Affirmed.
Footnote: 1Defendant did not object to the testimony on hearsay grounds. See N.J.R.E. 801(c). Footnote: 2Apparently, defendant concedes that Luis committed the drug offense within the "complex of buildings" in which her apartment building is situate.