(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for
the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please
note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).
(NOTE: This is a companion case to Marc Sherman v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A. also
decided today.)
Argued February 15, 1995 -- Decided November 28, 1995
HANDLER, J., writing for a majority of the Court.
In this case, New Jersey credit-card holders challenge the legality of late-payment fees assessed by
Greenwood Trust, a federally-insured state bank chartered in Delaware. James Hunter, a named party in a
class-action suit, contends that: New Jersey's Retail Installment Sales Act (RISA) (since amended in 1995)
forbids federally-insured state banks that issue credit cards to New Jersey customers from charging late-payment fees; Greenwood Trust's advertising and card-member agreements violate New Jersey's Consumer
Fraud Act; and the imposition of late-payment fees constitutes a common-law breach of contract and
conversion.
Greenwood Trust claims that it is free to charge late-payment fees in New Jersey, relying on section
521 of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDA), which expressly mirrors
section 85 of the National Bank Act (NBA) and provides that federally-insured state banks may charge
borrowers "interest at a rate allowed by the laws of the State... where the bank is located." According to
Greenwood Trust, it can charge out-of-state customers the same interest rate and other lender imposed
charges, such as late-payment fees, it is authorized to charge its own customers. Greenwood Trust points out
that section 521 of DIDA expressly preempts conflicting state constitutions or statutes. Because it is a
federally-insured bank chartered in Delaware, that includes late fees in its statutory definition of interest,
Greenwood Trust contends that RISA, and Hunter's other claims, conflict with, and are preempted by,
section 521.
The Law Division dismissed the complaint and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Supreme Court
granted Hunter's petition for certification.
HELD: For substantially the same reasons expressed in Sherman v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., New
Jersey usury law prohibiting banks from charging late fees does not conflict with the federal statute
giving national banks and federally-insured state banks preferential treatment with respect to lending
authority. Therefore, the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act does not
preempt New Jersey's Retail Installment Sales Act's prohibition on late-payment fees.
1. The language and purpose of section 521 mirrors that of section 85 of the NBA. Section 521 has been
interpreted as conferring on federally-insured state banks the same insulation from state usury laws that
national banks enjoy under the NBA. Thus, "interest," as the term is used in both the NBA and DIDA,
should be construed uniformly. Because the term "interest" in the NBA does not include late-payment fees,
"interest" in DIDA similarly does not include such fees. Like section 85, the language in section 521
expressly refers to interest rates. Thus, the Court should not impute to Congress the intent to include in the
statute a meaning it did not express. Moreover, the legislative history surrounding DIDA's enactment
indicates that Congress intended to preempt only state usury laws regarding traditional interest, namely,
periodic percentage rates, not other specific charges. (pp. 4-8)
2. To rely on agency determinations in this case would be to undermine the Court's responsibility to
interpret the law. Far less than the usual amount of deference to an agency interpretation is appropriate
when that agency has failed to adopt a consistent interpretation in administering the relevant statute in
question. Neither the Office of the Comptroller of Currency (OCC), which regulates national banks, nor the
Federal Depository Insurance Company (FDIC), the agency charged with regulation of federally-insured
banks, has issued consistent rulings concerning the interpretation of interest for the purposes of the NBA and
DIDA. (pp. 8-10)
3. New Jersey's State Bank Parity Act (Parity Act) does not authorize banks located in this State to charge
late-payment fees in the guise of interest. Although the Parity Act provides for parity between the rates of
interest charged by both banks and credit unions, the Parity Act has not explicitly authorized banks to charge
other types of fees. Moreover, there is no indication that the Legislature implicitly intended to authorize the
imposition of such other fees in the Parity Act. (pp. 10-11)
4. Greenwood Trust has failed to demonstrate a Congressional intent to preempt State usury laws that
prohibit discrete, specialized charges that do not directly affect the interest rate. Thus, there is no conflict
between RISA and DIDA. Prohibiting either national banks or federally-insured state banks from charging
late fees does not constitute discrimination because, at the time Greenwood Trust procured those charges,
New Jersey banks were likewise prohibited from assessing them. Unless Congress expressly provides so
through legislation, RISA prohibits Greenwood Trust from charging New Jersey customers late fees. The
relevant late-charges were assessed prior to the enactment of the amendment to RISA that now specifically
allows for late-payment fees on retail charge accounts. That amendment applies prospectively and is,
therefore, inapplicable to the late-payment fee in this case. (pp. 11-12)
Judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED.
JUSTICE POLLOCK, dissenting, in which JUSTICE GARIBALDI joins, is of the view that interest
under DIDA includes late fees. Interpretations by the FDIC support that conclusion and the Controller of
Currency has long ruled that interest could include late fees. DIDA, unlike the NBA, includes an express
preemption clause. The word "notwithstanding" in section 521's preemption clause suggests that Congress
intended that DIDA preempt conflicting State statutes. In Sherman, Justice Pollock concluded that section
85 conflicts with State laws, such as RISA, that prohibit late fees. He likewise finds that section 521 conflicts
with State laws prohibiting such fees; therefore, under its express preemption clause, DIDA preempts
Hunter's statutory claims. Moreover, state law prohibiting out-of-state federally-insured state banks from
charging late fees impermissibly discriminates against those institutions. That conflict with Congressional
intent to prevent discrimination against federally-insured state banks further supports the conclusion that
DIDA preempts state statutes that prohibit late fees. In addition, Congress intended that section 521 of
DIDA have the same preemptive effect as section 85 of the NBA; therefore, Hunter's common law claims,
like his statutory claims, conflict with DIDA and are preempted. Lastly, Justice Pollock notes that under the
authority of DIDA, Greenwood Trust may impose late fees as authorized by its home state, Delaware.
Consequently, the RISA's new $10 limitation on late charges must yield to DIDA, as construed by the FDIC.
JUSTICE O'HERN, dissents for the reasons stated in his separate opinion in Sherman v. Citibank
also filed today.
CHIEF JUSTICE WILENTZ and JUSTICES STEIN and COLEMAN join in JUSTICE
HANDLER's opinion. JUSTICE POLLOCK filed a separate dissenting opinion in which JUSTICE
GARIBALDI joins. JUSTICE O'HERN filed a separate dissenting opinion.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-
103 September Term 1994
JAMES H. HUNTER, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly
situated,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
GREENWOOD TRUST COMPANY,
Defendant-Respondent.
Argued February 15, 1995 -- Decided November 28, 1995
On certification to the Superior Court,
Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported
at
272 N.J. Super. 526 (1994).
Michael D. Donovan, a member of the
Pennsylvania bar, argued the cause for
appellant (Spector Gadon & Rosen, attorneys;
Mr. Donovan and Ann Miller, a member of the
Pennsylvania bar, of counsel; Mr. Donovan,
Ms. Miller, Paul R. Rosen and Robert L.
Grundlock, Jr., on the briefs).
Arthur R. Miller, a member of the
Massachusetts bar, argued the cause for
respondent (Archer & Greiner, attorneys; Mr.
Miller and Sean T. O'Meara, on the briefs)
Marilyn A. Bair, Deputy Attorney General,
argued the cause for amicus curiae Attorney
General of New Jersey (James J. Ciancia,
Acting Attorney General, attorney; Andrea M.
Silkowitz, Assistant Attorney General, of
counsel).
Richard P. Jacobson submitted a brief on behalf of amici curiae The States of Arizona, Delaware, Louisiana, Nevada, Ohio, South
Dakota, and Utah (Dunn, Pashman, Sponzilli,
Swick & Finnerty, attorneys).
Charles N. Riley submitted a brief on behalf
of amicus curiae Consumer Action (Tomar,
Simonoff, Adourian & O'Brien, attorneys).
Beverly R. Porway, Counsel, submitted a brief
on behalf of amicus curiae Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation.
Charles N. Riley submitted a brief on behalf
of amici curiae the States of Hawaii, Iowa,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, Vermont, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin (Tomar, Simonoff, Adourian &
O'Brien, attorneys).
Dennis R. Casale submitted a brief on behalf
of amici curiae The New Jersey Bankers
Association, American Bankers Association,
American Financial Services Association and
Consumer Bankers Association (Jamieson,
Moore, Peskin & Spicer, attorneys).
Michael J. Dunne submitted a brief on behalf
of amici curiae Visa U.S.A., Inc., and
Mastercard International Incorporated
(Pitney, Hardin, Kipp & Szuch, attorneys).
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
HANDLER, J.
The facts and issues in this case are substantially similar
to those in the companion case, Sherman v. Citibank (South
Dakota), N.A., __ N.J. __, rev'g
272 N.J. Super. 526 (1994), also
decided today. Here, New Jersey credit-card holders challenge
the legality of late-payment fees assessed by Greenwood Trust, a
federally-insured state bank chartered in Delaware. The bank, on
the other hand, claims that it is permitted under the Depository
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act to charge out-of-state customers the same interest rate and other lender-imposed charges it is authorized to charge its own customers.
The specific issues are framed by the contentions of the
parties. Plaintiff is the named party in this class-action suit.
As in Sherman, plaintiff argues that New Jersey's Retail
Installment Sales Act, N.J.S.A. 17:16C-50, -54 (RISA) (since
amended, L. 1995, c. 43) forbids federally-insured state banks
that issue credit cards to New Jersey customers from charging
late-payment fees, that defendant's advertising and cardmember
agreements violate New Jersey's Consumer Fraud Act, N.J.S.A.
56:8-2, -19 (CFA), and that the imposition of late-payment fees
constitutes a common-law breach of contract and conversion. Like
the claims in Sherman, plaintiff's claims focus on whether the
notion of interest includes late-payment charges.
Greenwood Trust, however, argues it is free to charge late-payment fees in New Jersey. It relies on section 521 of the
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act,
12 U.S.C.A.
§1831d (DIDA), which expressly mirrors section 85 of
the National Bank Act,
12 U.S.C.A.
§85 (NBA), and provides that
federally-insured state banks may charge borrowers "interest at a
rate allowed by the laws of the State . . . where the bank is
located."
12 U.S.C.A.
§1831d(a). Section 521 expressly
preempts conflicting state "constitution[s] or statute[s]."
Ibid. Because it is a federally-insured state bank chartered in
Delaware, which includes late fees in its statutory definition of
interest, Greenwood Trust argues that RISA and plaintiff's other
claims conflict with, and are preempted by, section 521. 272
N.J. Super. at 529-30.
The Law Division dismissed the complaint. The Appellate
Division affirmed,
272 N.J. Super. 526, and we granted
plaintiff's petition for certification.
138 N.J. 270 (1994).
For substantially the same reasons expressed in Sherman, we
conclude that this State's usury law prohibiting banks from
charging late fees does not conflict with the federal statute
giving national banks and federally-insured state banks
preferential treatment with respect to lending authority. We
hold that DIDA does not preempt the New Jersey RISA's prohibition
on late-payment fees, and, therefore, reverse the judgment of the
Appellate Division.
Although it is clear that Congress intended section 521 to preempt conflicting state usury provisions, federal preemption of state law requires an actual conflict, not merely a potential, speculative or hypothetical one. Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659, 102 S. Ct. 3294, 3298-99, 73 L. Ed.2d 1042, 1049 (1982); Brown v. Hotel Employees International Union, 468 U.S. 491, 510, 104 S. Ct. 3179, 3185, 82 L. Ed.2d 373, 389 (1963). An actual conflict arises when it is impossible to comply with both state and federal law, or when state law is an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 299-300, 108 S. Ct. 1145, 1150-51, 99 L. Ed.2d 316, 325 (1988); Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 117 N.J. 125, 135 (1991). However, courts faced with potentially conflicting state and federal statutes must attempt to harmonize them whenever possible. Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 97 N.J. 526, 533 (1984) (citing Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 83 S. Ct. 1210, 10 L. Ed.2d 248 (1963); Huron Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 80 S. Ct. 813, 4 L. Ed.2d 852 (1960)). "Preemption of state law by federal statute is not favored 'in the absence of persuasive reasons--either that the nature of the regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion, or that Congress has unmistakenly so ordained.'" Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 317, 101 S. Ct. 1124, 1130, 67 L. Ed.2d 258, 264-65 (1981) (quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc., supra, 373 U.S. at 142, 83 S. Ct. at 1217, 10 L. Ed. 2d at 257).
Section 521 of DIDA provides that any federally-insured state bank may:
notwithstanding any State constitution or statute to the contrary which is hereby preempted for the purposes of this section, take, receive, reserve, and charge on any loan or discount made, or upon any note, bill or exchange, or other evidence of debt, interest at a rate of not more than 1 per centum in excess of the discount rate on ninety-day commercial paper in effect at the Federal Reserve bank in the Federal Reserve district where such State bank . . . is located or at the rate allowed by the laws of the State . . . where the bank is located, whichever may be the greater . . . .
The language and purpose of section 521 essentially imitate that of section 85 of the NBA. See, e.g., Copeland v. MBNA America Bank, N.A., __ Colo. __ (1995) (slip op. at 14). Courts and federal agencies have interpreted Section 521 as conferring on federally-insured state banks the same insulation from State usury laws that national banks have enjoyed for over 100 years under the NBA. Greenwood Trust Co. v. Massachusetts, 971 F.2d 818, 826-27 (1st Cir. 1992) (concluding that section 521 permits federally-insured state banks to "export" interest rates), rev'g 776 F. Supp. 21 (D. Mass. 1991); Vanderweyst v. First State Bank, 425 N.W.2d 803, 806 (Minn.) (concluding that section 521 gives federally-insured state banks "most-favored-lender" status), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 943, 109 S. Ct. 369, 102 L. Ed.2d 359 (1988); Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 44 Cal. Rptr.2d 441, 465-66 (1995) (Arabian, J., dissenting); id. at 467-68 (George, J., dissenting). Thus, "interest," as that term is used in the NBA and DIDA, should be construed uniformly. E.g., Greenwood Trust, supra, 971 F. 2d at 827 ("historical record clearly requires a court to read the parallel provisions of DIDA and the Bank Act in pari materia"); see also Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384, 112 S. Ct. 2031, 2037, 119 L. Ed.2d 157, 167 (1992) (finding that when legislature borrows exact phrase from existing statute, courts should adopt prior judicial interpretations of that phrase). As demonstrated in Sherman, the term "interest" in the NBA does not include late fees, __ N.J. at __ (slip op. at 5-26); Smiley, supra, 44 Cal.
Rptr.
2d at 469 (George, J., dissenting). We conclude that
"interest" in DIDA similarly does not include late fees.
Like section 85, the language in section 521 expressly
refers to interest rates. It says nothing about other specific
charges associated with lending money. Thus, it would be
improvident to impute to Congress the intent to include in the
statute a meaning it did not express. Moreover, as we discussed
at length in Sherman, the legislative history surrounding DIDA's
enactment indicates that Congress intended to preempt only state
usury laws regarding traditional interest, namely, periodic
percentage rates, not other specific charges. See Sherman, __
N.J. at __ (slip op. at 10-14); see also Smiley, supra,
44 Cal.
Rptr.2d 441, 465 (Arabian, J., dissenting).
The record of Congressional debate and deliberation
concerning the enactment of DIDA is generally supportive of the
notion that preemption of credit-card regulation under DIDA is
confined to numerical interest rates. Ibid. Even if the
sponsors and supporters of DIDA preemption provisions were shown
to be committed to achieving total competitive equality of all
lending terms offered by state banks and national banks, the
simultaneous and persistent concerns of the bill's sponsors to
preserve state consumer protection must likewise be acknowledged.
During Senate consideration of the conference report on March 27,
1980, Senator Proxmire emphasized the limited preemptive scope of
Title V.See footnote 1 This limitation, in DIDA's Title V, to annual
percentage rates is clear from the Senate floor discussions of
mortgage loans, from the Senate Banking Committee Report, and
from the hearings on DIDA in the House of Representatives.See footnote 2
In this case, as in Sherman, the defendant relies on an agency interpretation of the statute to support its expanded notion of interest. However, to rely upon agency determinations in this case would be to undermine our responsibility to
interpret the law by the views of an entity that has heretofore failed to provide a clear and consistent understanding of what Congress intended to include in its definition of interest. Far less than the usual amount of deference to an agency interpretation is appropriate when that agency has failed to adopt a consistent interpretation in administering the statute in question. See Sherman, supra, __ N.J. at __ (slip op. at 21-23) (citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 n.30, 107 S. Ct. 1207, 1221 n.30, 94 L. Ed.2d 434, 457 n.30 (1987); Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 273, 101 S. Ct. 1673, 1681, 68 L. Ed.2d 80 (1981); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 143, 97 S. Ct. 401, 411-12, 50 L. Ed.2d 343 (1976)); see also Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Mangivest, 826 F.2d 1318, 1319-20 (3d Cir. 1987) (finding "ambiguities and inconsistencies in the Director's interpretation . . . of regulations . . . sufficiently great to preclude deference"); Disabled in Action v. Sykes, 833 F.2d 1113, 1117-19 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 989, 108 S. Ct. 1293, 99 L. Ed.2d 503 (1988); Revak v. National Mines Corp. 808 F.2d 996, 1002 (3d Cir. 1986) (rejecting deference arguments due to inconsistent agency interpretation of statute). Neither the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), which regulates national banks, nor the Federal Depository Insurance Company (FDIC), the agency charged with the regulation of federally-insured banks, has issued consistent rulings concerning the interpretation of interest for purposes of the NBA and DIDA. See Sherman, supra,
__ N.J. at __ (slip. op. at 23-26). But cf. Copeland, supra, __
Colo. at __ (slip op. at 13) (asserting that "[t]he OCC
consistently has taken the position that late payment fees are
interest" under both section 85 of the NBA and section 521 of the
DIDA) (emphasis added). Inconsistent agency rulings should not
be guides for a judiciary, the government branch principally
responsible for the construction of statutes. See, e.g., SEC v.
Sloan,
436 U.S. 103, 118,
98 S. Ct. 1702, 1711,
56 L. Ed.2d 148
(1978); Federal Maritime Comm. v. Seatrain Lines, Inc.,
411 U.S. 726, 745-46,
93 S. Ct. 1773, 1784-85,
36 L. Ed.2d 620, 633-34
(1973).
In addition, New Jersey's State Bank Parity Act, N.J.S.A. 17:13B-1 to -2, does not authorize banks located in this State to charge late-payment fees in the guise of interest. Sherman, __ N.J. at __ (slip. op. at 28-31). Defendant contends, as did the defendant in Sherman, that because New Jersey credit unions are authorized to charge late fees to credit-card customers, N.J.S.A. 17:13-104b, New Jersey banks are so authorized pursuant to the State Bank Parity Act. That is simply not the case.
The State Bank Parity Act authorizes New Jersey banks to charge the same "rate of interest" charged by credit unions. N.J.S.A. 17:13B-2 provides, in pertinent part, that,
any bank, savings bank, savings and loan association or credit union may charge a rate of interest on any class or type of loan at the rate of interest permitted to any other
lender by the laws of this State on that
class or type of loan.
Although the Act provides for parity between the rates of
interest charged by both banks and credit unions, the act does
not explicitly authorize banks to charge other types of fees.
Furthermore, there is no indication that the Legislature
implicitly intended to authorize the imposition of such other
fees in the State Bank Parity Act. See Sherman, supra, __ N.J.
at __ (slip op. at 28-32). There are sound reasons grounded in
public policy why the Legislature would choose not to equate
interest charges with other imposed fees like late charges. For
example, because small, individualized lenders, such as credit
unions, serve their own members and do not cater to a large
market, they cannot spread costs like banks. Thus, they must be
permitted to take certain actions to insure their solvency, such
as charging late-payment fees. Ibid.
We hold that Greenwood Trust has failed to demonstrate a
Congressional intention to preempt state usury laws that prohibit
discrete, specialized charges that do not directly affect the
interest rate. Thus, there is no conflict between New Jersey's
RISA statute and DIDA. Prohibiting either national banks or
federally-insured state banks from charging late fees does not
constitute discrimination because, at the time defendant procured
those charges, New Jersey banks were likewise prohibited from
assessing them. Unless Congress itself expressly provides
otherwise through legislation, we find that New Jersey's RISA
statute prohibits Greenwood Trust from charging New Jersey
customers late fees.
We note, however, as we did in Sherman, supra, __ N.J. at __
(slip op. at 39), that the late-charges at issue in this case
were assessed prior to the enactment of L. 1995, c. 43, which
amended the RISA to specifically allow for late-payment charges
on retail charge accounts. The new statute, which took effect on
May 29, 1995, applies prospectively only, and therefore is
inapplicable to the late-payment charges at issue here.
Nevertheless, we recognize that the newly amended RISA statute
authorizes holders of retail charge accounts to charge late fees
to customers. Thus, it would appear that N.J.S.A. 17:16C-42, as
amended, permits national banks and federally-insured state banks
issuing credit cards to charge late-payment fees. Sherman,
supra, __ N.J. at __ (slip op. at 39-42). The charges at issue
in this case, however, are not permissible because they were
assessed prior to May 29, 1995, the date the amendment became
effective.
The judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed.
Chief Justice Wilentz and Justices Stein, and Coleman join
in Justices Handler's opinion. Justice Pollock has filed a
separate dissenting opinion in which Justice Garibaldi joins.
Justice O'Hern has also filed a separate dissenting opinion.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-
103 September Term 1994
JAMES H. HUNTER, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly
situated,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
GREENWOOD TRUST COMPANY,
Defendant-Respondent.
POLLOCK, J., dissenting.
This appeal focuses on the question whether late-payment
fees are included in the definition of "interest" in the
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of
1980,
12 U.S.C.A.
§1831d ("DIDA"). A related issue is whether
the DIDA preempts state laws prohibiting late fees. As in the
companion case, Sherman v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., ___
N.J. ___ (1995), also decided today, the Law Division dismissed
the complaint. The Appellate Division affirmed,
272 N.J. Super. 526 (1994). The majority reverses. I dissent.
The facts in this case are substantially similar to those in Sherman. James H. Hunter is the plaintiff in a class action challenging the legality of late fees charged to New Jersey holders of credit cards issued by Greenwood Trust, a federally-insured Delaware bank. Hunter argues that New Jersey's Retail
Installment Sales Act of 1960, N.J.S.A. 17:16C-50, to -54
("RISA"), forbids federally-insured state banks from charging
late fees to New Jersey consumers. He also argues that Greenwood
Trust's cardmember agreement violates N.J.S.A. 56:8-2 and -19
(which prohibit consumer fraud), and that the imposition of late
fees constitutes a common-law breach of contract and conversion.
Like the claims in Sherman, Hunter's claims depend on whether
interest includes late fees.
The DIDA, like the National Bank Act (NBA), which was the
subject of Sherman, authorizes federally-insured state banks to
charge borrowers "interest . . . allowed by the laws of the State
. . . where the bank is located." Delaware's statutory
definition of interest includes late fees: "If the agreement
governing a revolving credit plan so provides, a bank may impose,
as interest, a late or delinquency charge." Del. Code Ann. tit.
5, § 950 (1994). Thus, Greenwood Trust maintains both that the
DIDA expressly authorizes charging late fees as interest and that
the DIDA preempts conflicting state laws.
Hunter, however, contends that late fees are not interest under the DIDA. Specifically, he asserts that "interest" refers only to the periodic percentage rate charged on outstanding balances. He argues that his state-law claims do not conflict with the DIDA, and therefore that the DIDA does not preempt them. Alternatively, Hunter argues that the DIDA's express preemption
clause preempts only his statutory, but not his common-law,
claims.
This case requires us to determine the meaning of "interest . . . allowed by the laws of the State . . . where the bank is located," as that phrase is used in the DIDA. Ultimately, matters of statutory construction involve a determination of congressional intent. E.g., Norfolk and Western Ry. Co. v. American Train Dispatchers Ass'n, 499 U.S. 117, 128, 111 S. Ct. 1156, 1163, 113 L. Ed.2d 95, 106-07 (1991); Roig v. Kelsey, 135 N.J. 500, 515 (1994). In the DIDA, Congress did not expressly define "interest." Nor does a fair reading of the legislative history disclose the intended meaning of that term.
As discussed more fully in my dissent in Sherman, supra, ___
N.J. at ___ (slip op. at 6), the Civil War Congress enacted
section 85 of the NBA to protect the newly-created national
banking system from unfriendly state usury laws. Section 85
provides that any national bank
may take, receive, reserve, and charge on any
loan or discount made, or upon any notes,
bills of exchange, or other evidence of debt,
interest at a rate allowed by the laws of the
State . . . where the bank is located, or at
a rate of 1 per centum in excess of the
discount rate on ninety-day commercial paper
in effect at the Federal reserve bank in the
Federal reserve district where the bank is
located, whichever may be the greater . . . .
In Tiffany v. National Bank of Missouri, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.)
409, 411-13, 21 L. Ed. 862, 863-64 (1873), the United States
Supreme Court held, pursuant to section 85, that the defendant
national bank could charge its borrowers the highest interest
rate authorized to any lender in that state. The Court
acknowledged that the "most favored lender" doctrine might
disadvantage state-chartered banks, but relied on Congress's
intent to create a strong national banking system immune from
hostile state legislation. Id. at 412-13, 21 L. Ed. at 863-64.
A century later, the Court determined that a national bank
located in one state could charge its borrowers in other states
the highest interest rate allowed to any lender in its home
state. Marquette Nat'l Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp.,
439 U.S. 299,
99 S. Ct. 540,
58 L. Ed.2d 534 (1978).
In the years following Marquette, interest rates soared. Although national banks could charge interest at a rate tied to the federal discount rate, local usury laws constrained state banks. See Greenwood Trust Co. v. Massachusetts, 971 F.2d 818, 826 (1st Cir. 1992), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S. Ct. 974,
122 L. Ed.2d 129 (1993). Congress rectified the imbalance by
enacting the DIDA. Ibid.
Section 521 of the DIDA ("section 521") provides that
[i]n order to prevent discrimination against
any [federally-insured state bank], such
State bank may . . . notwithstanding any
State constitution or statute which is hereby
preempted for the purposes of this section,
take, receive, reserve, and charge on any
loan or discount made, or upon any note, bill
of exchange, or other evidence of debt,
interest at a rate of not more than 1 per
centum in excess of the discount rate on
ninety-day commercial paper in effect at the
Federal Reserve bank in the Federal Reserve
district where such State bank . . . is
located or at the rate allowed by the laws of
the State . . . where the bank is located,
whichever may be the greater . . . .
The text of section 521 virtually mirrors that of section
85. Section 521 articulates Congress's intent that the purpose
of the DIDA, like that of the NBA, is to prevent discrimination
against federally-insured state banks. Unsurprisingly, courts
and banking regulators have interpreted section 521 as protecting
federally-insured state banks from hostile state laws, just as
section 85 protects national banks from those laws. Greenwood
Trust, supra, 971 F.
2d at 826-27 (concluding that section 521
permits federally-insured state banks to "export" interest
rates); Copeland v. MBNA America Bank, N.A., ___ Colo. ___ (slip
op. at 14) (1995) (concluding that "language and legislative
history of section 521 of the DIDA grants federally insured,
state chartered banks the same interest authority as national banks");
VanderWeyst v. First State Bank,
425 N.W.2d 803, 806 (Minn.)
(concluding that section 521 gives federally-insured state banks
"most favored lender" status), cert. denied,
488 U.S. 943,
109 S.
Ct. 369,
102 L. Ed.2d 359 (1988); Letter by Douglas H. Jones,
Deputy General Counsel, FDIC No. 92-47, Fed. Banking L. Rep.
(CCH) ¶ 81,534 at 55,730 (July 8, 1992) (most favored lender and
exportation principle); Letter by Frank L. Skillern, Jr., General
Counsel, FDIC No. 81-3 (February 8, 1981) (most favored lender
status); Letter by Kathy A. Johnson, Attorney, FDIC No. 81-7
(March 17, 1981) (exportation principle).
I agree with the majority, ante at ___ (slip op. at 6), that
"interest," as that term is used in the NBA and the DIDA, should
be construed uniformly. E.g., Greenwood Trust, supra, 971 F.
2d
at 827; see also Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
504 U.S. 374, 383-84,
112 S. Ct. 2031, 2037,
119 L. Ed.2d 157, 167 (1992)
(finding that when legislature borrows exact phrase from existing
statute, courts should adopt prior judicial interpretations of
that phrase). Substantially for the reasons set forth in my
Sherman opinion, ___ N.J. ___, I conclude that "interest" in the
DIDA includes late fees.
Interpretations of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC), the agency charged with the regulation of federally-insured banks,
12 U.S.C.A.
§1811, support that conclusion. In
my dissent in Sherman, supra, ___ N.J. at ___ (slip op. at 13-14), I noted that when Congress does not define a statutory term,
courts should accept a reasonable interpretation of the term of
the appropriate administrative agency. Nationsbank of North
Carolina, N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. ___,
___,
115 S. Ct. 810, 813,
130 L. Ed.2d 740, 747 (1995); Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC,
467 U.S. 837, 843-44,
104 S. Ct. 2778,
2782-83,
81 L. Ed.2d 694, 703-04 (1984); Lammers v. Board of
Educ.,
134 N.J. 264, 274 (1993); Metromedia, Inc. v. Director,
Div. of Taxation,
97 N.J. 313, 327 (1984); Kenneth C. Davis &
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise, § 3.3 (3d
ed. 1994) (discussing Chevron); Antonin Scalia, Judicial
Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1
989 Duke
L.J. 511, 516-18 (1989) (same). As described in my dissent in
Sherman, supra, ___ N.J. at ___ (slip op. at 16-18), the
Comptroller of the Currency, which regulates national banks, has
long ruled that interest could include late fees. Like the
Comptroller, the FDIC has concluded that interest, for purposes
of section 521, includes late fees that are authorized by a
bank's home state. Letter from Douglas H. Jones, Deputy General
Counsel, FDIC No. 92-47, Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 81,534 at
55,730 (July 8, 1992). As in Sherman, I find that interpretation
reasonable.
Whether a federal law, such as the DIDA, preempts a state law is a matter of congressional intent. E.g., Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, Inc.,
505 U.S. 504, ___,
112 S. Ct. 2608, 2617-18,
120 L. Ed.2d 407, 422-23 (1992). The inclusion of an express
preemption clause unmistakably declares the intent of Congress to
preempt conflicting state statutes. Ibid.
The DIDA, unlike the NBA, includes such an express
preemption clause. Section 521 permits a national bank to charge
interest at a rate allowed by its home state "notwithstanding any
State constitution or statute which is hereby preempted for the
purposes of this section . . . ." The word "notwithstanding"
suggests that Congress intended the DIDA to preempt conflicting
state statutes. Thus, under the language of the DIDA's express
preemption clause, the question is whether RISA's prohibition
against late fees conflicts with section 521.
In Sherman, supra, ___ N.J. at ___ (slip op. at 28), I
concluded that section 85 conflicts with state laws, such as
RISA, that prohibit late fees. I likewise submit that section
521 conflicts with state laws prohibiting such fees. Under its
express preemption clause, the DIDA perempts Hunter's statutory
claims.
I further determined in Sherman that New Jersey's State Bank Parity Act authorizes banks located in this State to charge interest in the form of late-payment fees. ___ N.J. at ___ (slip op. at 27-28); see Letter by Francis P. Carr, Assistant
Commissioner, Department of Banking (Oct. 14, 1994). Because I
conclude that New Jersey banks may charge late fees to their New
Jersey customers, I also conclude that a state law prohibiting
out-of-state federally-insured state banks from charging such
fees impermissibly discriminates against those institutions. See
Sherman, supra, ___ N.J. at ___ (slip op. at 28). That conflict
with the congressional intent to prevent discrimination against
federally-insured state banks further supports my conclusion that
the DIDA preempts state statutes that prohibit late fees.
The Court recently addressed a comparable issue in Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. ___, 115 S. Ct. 1483, 131 L. Ed.2d 385 (1995). In Freightliner, the Court clarified that Cipollone does not preclude implied preemption whenever Congress includes an express preemption clause in a federal statute. 514 U.S. at ___, 115 S. Ct. at 1487-88, 131 L. Ed. 2d at 393. "At best, Cipollone supports an inference that an express pre-emption
clause forecloses implied pre-emption; it does not establish a
rule." Id. at ___, 115 S. Ct. at 1488, 131 L. Ed.
2d at 393.
The Court emphasized that a statute's preemptive scope is a
function of congressional intent. Id. at ___, 115 S. Ct. at
1487, 131 L. Ed.
2d at 393.
I believe that Congress intended that section 521 of the
DIDA should have the same preemptive effect as section 85 of the
NBA. A recent interpretive letter by the FDIC further supports
that conclusion. Letter by Douglas H. Jones, Deputy General
Counsel, FDIC No. 93-27, Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 81,635 at
55,838 (July 12, 1993) (concluding that Congress intended to
confer upon federally-insured banks the same protections that
section 85 of the NBA confers on national banks). I conclude
that Hunter's common-law claims, like his statutory claims,
conflict with the DIDA and are preempted.
In Sherman, supra, ___ N.J. at ___ (slip op. at 28-29), I disagreed with the majority's conclusion that in the future, out-of-state federally-insured state banks may charge late fees on delinquent customers, but only up to $10. Although I agree that those banks may charge such fees, I disagree that state law may limit the amount so charged. As a national banking law, the DIDA takes precedence over conflicting state law. Under the authority of the DIDA, Greenwood Trust may impose late fees as authorized
by its home state, Delaware, without reference to another state's
limitation on those fees. Consequently, the RISA's limitation on
late charges must yield to the DIDA, as construed by the FDIC.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
Justice Garibaldi joins in this dissent.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-
103 September Term 1994
JAMES H. HUNTER, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly
situated,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
GREENWOOD TRUST COMPANY,
Defendant-Respondent.
O'HERN, J., dissenting.
I dissent for the reasons stated in my separate opinion in Sherman v. Citibank, ___ N.J. ___, also filed today.
NO. A-103 SEPTEMBER TERM 1994
ON APPEAL FROM
ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court
JAMES H. HUNTER, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly
situated,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
GREENWOOD TRUST COMPANY,
Defendant-Respondent.
DECIDED November 28, 1995
Chief Justice Wilentz PRESIDING
OPINION BY Justice Handler
CONCURRING OPINION BY
DISSENTING OPINIONS BY Justices Pollock and O'Hern
Footnote: 1
126 Cong. Rec. S. 6900 (March 27, 1980):
I wish to reemphasize the point made initially in
the Senate Banking Committee report that in exempting
mortgage loans from State usury limitations, we intend
to exempt only those limitations that are included in
the annual percentage rate. We do not intend to exempt
limitations on prepayment charges, attorneys' fees,
late charges or similar limitations designed to protect
borrowers.
Footnote: 2 An official of the Federal National Mortgage
Association, in response to an inquiry by Rep. St. Germaine,
Chair of a House subcommittee considering DIDA, referred to the
Senate Banking Committee Report cited above and stated:
This expression of legislative intent not to displace
state laws designed for consumer protection with regard
to charges other than charges treated as interest would
leave in place those protective enactments in the
various states that relate to prepayment penalties,
late charges, regulations on disclosure of interest
charges and restrictions on other costs in connection
with loan transactions other than interest.
[Regulation Q. and Related Measures: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions of the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 125-26 (1980) (emphasis added).]