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(NOTE: The status of this decision is Unpublished.)Original WP 5.1 Version
(NOTE: This decision was approved by the court for publication.)
This case can also be found at 313 N.J. Super. 449.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
A-3779-97T3
IN THE MATTER OF
THE COMMITMENT OF D.M.
Argued June 10, 1998 - Decided July 2, 1998.
Before Judges Baime, Brochin and Wefing.
On appeal from Superior Court of New
Jersey, Law Division, Union County.
Robert S. Seguin argued the cause for
appellant D.M.
Susan Gleason argued the cause for respondent
State of New Jersey (Thomas V. Manahan, Union
County Prosecutor, attorney; Maureen O'Brien,
Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the
brief).
Lorraine M. Gormley, Deputy Public Advocate, argued
the cause as amicus curiae for the Division of Mental                                                             Health and Guardianship Advocacy (Ivelisse Torres,
Public Defender, attorney; Ms. Gormley, of
counsel and on the brief).
Judith Nason, Deputy Attorney General, argued the
cause amicus curiae for the State of New Jersey,                                                                  Department of Law and Public Safety (Peter Verniero,
Attorney General, attorney).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
BAIME, P.J.A.D.
D.M. appeals from the Law Division's order involuntarily committing him to the Trenton Psychiatric Hospital. We
reverse the order and remand the matter for an evidentiary hearing which is to be conducted forthwith.
I.
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D.M. pled guilty to an accusation charging him with sexually assaulting his sister ( 94 N.J. 128, 137 (1983); see also
Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80, 112 S.Ct. 1780, 1786, 118 L.Ed.2d 437, 448 (1992) (holding that the states must
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the person to be committed is mentally ill and dangerous). "`The civil
commitment process must be narrowly circumscribed because of the extraordinary degree of state control it exerts over
a citizen's autonomy.'" In re D.C., 146 N.J. 31, 48 (1996) (quoting In re S.L., 94 N.J. at 139); In re N.N., 146 N.J. 112,
130 (1996). Thus, a person subject to involuntary commitment "is entitled to
a judicial hearing, a right of notice, the right to present evidence, and the right to be represented by counsel." In re
D.C., 146 N.J. at 48. Moreover, while it may be within the trial court's discretion to refuse to hear testimony from the
patient's next of kin, see 83 N.J. 563, 570 (1980). Instead, the trial court is obliged to "state clearly its factual findings
and correlate them with the relevant legal conclusions." Ibid. Our Supreme Court has said that "[f]ailure to perform that
duty `constitutes a disservice to the litigants, the attorneys and the appellate court.'" Ibid. (quoting Kenwood Assocs. v.
Board of Adj. of Englewood, 141 N.J. Super. 1, 4 (App. Div. 1976)); see also State v. Singletary, 165 N.J. Super. 421,
424-25 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 81 N.J. 50 (1979), Wertlake v. Wertlake, 137 N.J. Super. 476, 485-86 (App. Div.
1975); Brochin and Sandler, Appellate Review of Facts in New Jersey, Jury and Non-Jury Cases, 12 Rutgers L. Rev.
482 (1957). In this case, we are left with a cryptic commitment order unsupported by any factual findings or
conclusions of law. The
matter must be returned to the Law Division.
III.
Because the issue must be retried, we are constrained to comment on Dr. Ghahramani's testimony. As we noted
earlier, although Dr. Ghahramani had difficulty providing a diagnosis, he concluded D.M.'s condition did not meet the
requisite statutory commitment criteria. In their appellate briefs, the parties and the Public Defender's Division of
Mental Health and Guardianship Advocacy have devoted much attention to whether D.M.'s psychological state may be
considered a "mental disease" sufficient to warrant involuntary commitment upon a finding of dangerousness. Because
the present record is largely uninformative respecting that question, we have no occasion to resolve the issue.
As a matter of due process, the term "mental illness" is devoid of any "talismanic significance," and legal definitions
may "vary substantially from their psychiatric counterparts." Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. ___, ___, 117 S.Ct. ____,
___, 138 L.Ed.2d 501, 513 (1997). The Constitution affords the states substantial discretion in defining the phrase
"mental disease" and "mental illness," and the definitions so drafted "need not mirror those advanced by the medical
profession." Id. at ___, 227 S.Ct. ___, 138 L.Ed. 2d at 514.
Against this backdrop, our statutes define "in need of involuntary commitment" in the following terms:
[A]n adult who is mentally ill, whose mental illness causes the person to be dangerous to
self or dangerous to others or property and who is unwilling to be admitted to a facility voluntarily for care, and who
needs care at a short-term care, psychiatric facility or special psychiatric hospital because other services are not
appropriate or available to meet the person's mental health care needs.
[N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.2m.]
The phrase "mental illness" is defined as:
[A] current, substantial disturbance of thought, mood, perception or orientation which significantly impairs
judgment, capacity to control behavior or capacity to recognize reality, but does not include simple alcohol
intoxication, transitory reaction to drug ingestion, organic brain syndrome or developmental disability unless it results
in the severity of impairment described herein. The term mental illness is not limited to "psychosis" or "active
psychosis," but shall include all conditions that result in the severity of impairment described herein.
[N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.2r.]
By adopting these definitions, the Legislature clearly intended to balance the rights of the mentally ill with those of our
citizens who are not so afflicted. See also R. 4:74-7. However phrased, the statutory definition requires, as a
prerequisite to involuntary commitment, that the person to be committed harbor a "substantial disturbance of thought,
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mood, perception or orientation" significantly impairing the individual's "judgment, capacity to control behavior or
capacity to recognize reality," N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.2r, which causes him to be "dangerous to [him]self or dangerous to
others or property," N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.2m. The statutes further require consideration of whether the person's "mental
health care needs" and the danger presented by
the underlying illness can be alleviated by means short of involuntary commitment.
Unfortunately, Dr. Ghahramani did not focus upon a functional analysis of D.M.'s condition within the context of
these statutory definitions. While the doctor made oblique references to D.M.'s "impulsivity" and the patient's inability
to control his behavior, he was primarily concerned with arcane psychiatric nomenclature unanchored to the critical
inquiry demanded by our statutes. We do not suggest that medical definitions are never useful in determining whether
the statutory requisites for involuntary commitment are satisfied. See American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders xiii, xxvii (4th ed. 1994). But medical terminology cannot substitute for the
standards plainly articulated in the relevant statutes. Regarding Dr. Ghahramani's opinion that D.M.'s condition did not
meet the commitment criteria, we note that the determination of whether an individual is legally committable, "while
requiring the court to make use of the assistance which medical testimony may provide, is ultimately a legal one, not a
medical one." State v. Krol, 68 N.J. 236, 261 (1975); see also In re D.C., 146 N.J. at 59; In re Newsome, 176 N.J.
Super. 511, 516 (App. Div. 1980).
IV.
We add one further thought before leaving the subject. Apparently, the parties to this dispute consented to staying
all review proceedings pending the outcome of this appeal. We cannot
fathom the reasons for such a stay.
Accordingly, the Law Division's order of involuntary commitment is reversed. The matter is remanded for an
evidentiary hearing forthwith.
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