(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for
the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please
note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).
Argued October 11, 1995 -- Decided February 1, 1996
O'HERN, J., writing for a unanimous Court.
Sick-leave injury (SLI) benefits for State employees who sustain work-related injuries are benefits
that are supplementary to otherwise collectible workers' compensation benefits. The issue on appeal is the
validity of an agency interpretation of a regulation that would limit SLI benefits to a one-year period
following the first date of disability from work.
Irene Musick contracted carpal tunnel syndrome in connection with her employment as a clerk-bookkeeper in the New Jersey Department of Corrections (DOC). Carpal tunnel syndrome (CTS) is a
disease of the musculoskeletal system most often associated with the stress arising from the repetitive
movement of the hands, in this case, across a computer keyboard. The symptoms of CTS are pain,
numbness in the hands, and sometimes pain radiating to the back. The effects of this disease are painful and
can be disabling.
On August 14, 1989, Musick was referred by her employer to a DOC physician because of pain and
numbness in the fingers of her left hand and pain in her left arm and shoulder. The DOC physician
examined her and then referred her to West New Jersey Occupational Health Services (WJO). Doctors at
WJO diagnosed CTS of the left hand and told Musick to stay out of work. However, the DOC personnel
office ordered her to return to work on August 28, 1989, in disregard of the doctor's order. Because of
extreme pain, Musick was referred by her doctor to an orthopedic surgeon who operated on Musick's left
hand on September 21, 1989. She was cleared to return to work on November 27, 1989.
Musick's employer denied her claim for SLI benefits for the period between August 14 and
November 27, 1989. The employer contended that Musick had failed to establish that her condition was
work-related. Musick appealed this denial of benefits to the Merit System Board (the Board). Musick relied
on the opinion of her doctor that the left-hand CTS was work-related. Initially, the Board denied Musick
any SLI benefits for her left-hand CTS. Musick appealed to the Appellate Division. That court remanded
the matter to await the outcome of other matters pending in the Appellate Division.
Shortly after the remand, Musick began suffering from pain in her right hand, which was diagnosed
as work-related CTS. Musick underwent surgery on the right hand on September 3, 1991. On September
16, 1991, Musick was again diagnosed with CTS of her left hand and had a second surgery on October
15,1991.
On January 6, 1992, the Board issued its final decision in respect of Musick's CTS-related SLI
claims. The Board found that she was disabled from work from August 14, 1989, until November 27, 1989,
due to left-hand CTS, and was disabled from August 6, 1991, until October 9, 1991, as a result of right-hand
CTS. The Board further found that Musick was disabled from October 9, 1991, until December 2, 1991, as a
result of recurrence of CTS in her left hand. The Board granted Musick SLI benefits for the period of
August 14 through November 27, 1989, for left-hand CTS and from August 6 through October 9, 1991, for
right-hand CTS. The Board denied SLI benefits for left-hand CTS from October 9 through December 2,
1991, finding that this was just a continuation of Musick's disability from the 1989 claim. Relying on N.J.A.C.
4A:6-1.6(b)3, the Board concluded that SLI benefits are limited and are not compensable for disabilities that
continue for more than a one-year period.
On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed and remanded the case for an award of SLI benefits
reflecting the 1991 recurrence in Musick's left hand. The Appellate Division found that the disability was
related to her work and that there was no reasonable basis to penalize Musick for the hiatus in her disability
of that hand. The Appellate Division reasoned that there was nothing in the enabling statute, N.J.S.A.
11A:6-8, to indicate that the Legislature had any contrary intent. Therefore, the court invalidated N.J.A.C.
4A:6-1.6(b)3 to the extent that it would cap the benefits at one year from the date of injury.
The Supreme Court granted the Board's petition for certification.
HELD: Given the Merit System Board's balanced approach to recognition of repetitive stress injuries and its
overall need to allocate available resources among all State employees, the Board's policy
determination to limit SLI benefits to one year from the first date of the disability is within the
agency's statutory mandate, and application of that policy to Irene Musick does not constitute such a
clear abuse of discretion as to warrant judicial intervention.
1. Prior to October 1991, claims for SLI benefits for CTS were routinely denied. By late 1991, the Board
recognized that that policy needed to be changed and, accordingly, began to award SLI benefits for CTS
claims. By October 1992, the Board eliminated the need to establish a one-time occurring accident or
traumatic event in order to get SLI benefits. In January 1993, the Appellate Division dealt with the
application of the one-year limitation on benefits in In re Naomi Dykas, where it was held that it was on the
date the disability began and not the date when the injury or illness became manifest that the one-year time
limitation begins to accrue. The Dykas court in dicta dealt with the hiatus issue by finding that the employee
should not be penalized by the hiatus in disability. (pp. 5-10)
2. The Board's policy is clear that provable claims of CTS will be recognized but SLI benefits will be limited
to one year from the first date of disability from work. In response to Dykas, the Board amended N.J.A.C.
4A:1.6(b)3. In that amendment, the Board rejected the hiatus exception. (pp. 10-11)
3. Courts have only a limited role in reviewing the actions of other branches of government. Courts can
intervene in the administrative actions of governmental agencies only in those rare circumstances in which an
agency action is clearly inconsistent with its statutory mission or other state policy. In setting aside an agency
decision, the Court must determine whether: 1) the agency followed the law; 2) the record contains
substantial evidence to support the findings on which the agency bases its action; and 3) in applying the
legislative policies to the facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably
have been made on a showing of relevant factors. In this case, the Court addresses the first and third prongs
of that test. (pp. 12-14)
4. The Legislature has given a very broad mandate to the Board to adopt the necessary rules and regulations
to implement the SLI benefits program. It is not an irrational choice of policies to establish a fringe benefit
for State employees that differentiates between an employee whose injury and treatment require an
immediate and protracted absence from work, and an employee whose treatment and absences from work
may fall beyond one year from the date of the initial injury. Such a classification is not suspect. Although
the issues are debatable, the debate regarding the choice of competing policies should be reserved for the
agency itself unless the Legislature's intent is clear. (pp.14-17)
Judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the decision of the Merit System Board is
REINSTATED.
CHIEF JUSTICE WILENTZ and JUSTICES HANDLER, POLLOCK, GARIBALDI, STEIN and
COLEMAN join in JUSTICE O'HERN'S opinion.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-
27 September Term 1995
IN THE MATTER OF
IRENE MUSICK,
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
Argued October 11, 1995 -- Decided February 1, 1996
On certification to the Superior Court,
Appellate Division.
Lewis A. Scheindlin, Deputy Attorney General,
argued the cause for appellant, Merit System
Board (Deborah T. Poritz, Attorney General of
New Jersey, attorney; Joseph L. Yannotti,
Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Mr.
Scheindlin and Joann Fitzpatrick, Deputy
Attorney General, on the briefs).
Steven P. Weissman argued the cause for
respondent, Irene Musick (Weissman & Mintz,
attorneys; Mr. Weissman and James M. Cooney,
on the briefs).
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
O'HERN, J.
This appeal concerns sick-leave injury (SLI) benefits for
State employees who suffer work-related injuries. These benefits
are supplementary to otherwise collectible workers' compensation
benefits. The issue in this case is the validity of an agency
interpretation of a regulation that would limit SLI benefits to a
one-year period following the first date of disability from work.
We find that to place such a cap on benefits is within the
statutory authority of the State's personnel agency and that the
agency's interpretation of the governing regulation was
reasonable.
The case arises from Irene Musick's contraction of carpal tunnel syndrome in connection with her work as a clerk-bookkeeper in the New Jersey Department of Corrections (DOC). Carpal tunnel syndrome (CTS) is a disease of the musculoskeletal system most frequently associated with the stress arising from the repetitive movement of the hands as in the case of a computer keyboard operator. The symptoms of the disease are pain, numbness in the hands, and sometimes radiating pain to the back. The pain is similar to that experienced with epicondylitis, the repetitive stress injury (RSI) suffered by carpenters or even weekend athletes in the form of tennis elbow. The effects of such an injury are painful and disabling.
For purposes of this appeal, we generally accept the version of the case set forth in Musick's brief. Irene Musick first experienced her injury on August 14, 1989, when she complained of numbness in the fingers of her left hand and pain in her left arm and shoulder. Because the injury was work-related, her employer referred her to a DOC physician. She was examined by the DOC physician who in turn referred her to the West New Jersey Occupational Health Services (WJO). Physicians at WJO diagnosed CTS and told her to remain off duty. The DOC personnel office, however, ordered her to return to work on August 28, 1989 in
disregard of the doctor's orders. After she returned to work,
she remained in intense pain. She could not work. Her physician
referred her to an orthopedic surgeon, who operated on her left
hand on September 21, 1989, and cleared her to return to work on
November 27, 1989.
Her employer denied her claim for SLI benefits for the
period between August 14 and November 27, 1989, on the basis that
she had failed to establish that her condition was work-related.
Musick appealed the denial of her 1989 benefits to the Merit
System Board (the Board). That Board is the body within the
State Department of Personnel that administers the SLI program.
She relied on the opinion of her orthopedic doctor that "based
upon her work as a bookkeeper and based upon [her] history,
physical examination and findings at operation, it is clear that
her carpal tunnel was work related." At first the Board denied
Musick any SLI benefits for the CTS in her left hand. Musick's
initial appeal to the Appellate Division resulted in a remand to
await the outcome of other matters pending in the Appellate
Division.
Shortly after the remand, Musick began to experience pain in
her right hand. Her physicians agreed that these symptoms were a
manifestation of "work-related disorder." She underwent surgery
on September 3, 1991. On September 16, 1991, she was diagnosed
with CTS on her left hand and she had a second operation on that
hand on October 15, 1991.
On January 6, 1992, the Board issued a final decision with
respect to Musick's CTS-related SLI claims. The Board found that
she was disabled from work from August 14, 1989, until November
27, 1989, due to left carpal tunnel syndrome and was disabled
from August 6, 1991, until October 9, 1991, as a result of right
carpal tunnel syndrome. The Board further found that Musick was
disabled from October 9 to December 2, 1991, as a result of
recurrence of CTS in her left hand. The Board granted Musick SLI
benefits for the period of August 14 through November 27, 1989,
for left-hand CTS and from August 6 through October 9, 1991, for
right-hand CTS. However, the Board denied SLI benefits for left
CTS from October 9, 1991, through December 2, 1991. According to
the Board, "[Musick's] disability due to left carpal tunnel
syndrome in 1991 was a continuation of her disability dating from
her 1989 claim. SLI benefits are limited and are not compensable
for disabilities which continue for more than a one-year period."
The Board relied on the regulation that then defined the scope of
SLI: "Benefits are limited to a period beginning on the initial
date of the injury or illness and ending one year from that
date." See N.J.A.C. 4A:6-1.6(b)3.
In its unpublished opinion, the Appellate Division reversed
and remanded the case for an award of SLI benefits on account of
the 1991 recurrent CTS disability in Musick's left hand. The
Appellate Division found that "[t]here is no dispute but that the
condition of carpal tunnel syndrome in [Musick's] left wrist,
which caused the later periods of disability, is related to the
performance of her specific duties and satisfies the criteria of
N.J.A.C. 4A:6-1.6." Because there was a return to work between
the two periods of left-hand CTS disability, 1989 and 1991, the
court found "no reasonable basis to penalize [Musick] for the
hiatus . . . as the benefits to which she [was] entitled [did]
not exceed one year of salary continuation." In its view, there
was "nothing in the [enabling statute,] N.J.S.A. 11A:6-8[,] to
indicate that the Legislature had any contrary intent." It
therefore invalidated N.J.A.C. 4A:6-1.6(b)3 to the extent that it
would cap the benefits at one year from the date of injury. We
granted the Board's petition for certification.
140 N.J. 276
(1995).
N.J.S.A. 11A:6-8 authorizes the Department of Personnel (DOP) to promulgate rules governing leaves of absence for career senior executive and unclassified employees in the state service due to "injury or illness directly caused by and arising from State employment." Ibid. Plaintiff urges us to understand the historical context in which the dispute arises. She claims that the Board and its predecessor, the Civil Service Commission, ignored the statutory directive and refused to provide paid leave to employees suffering from progressive and degenerative occupational injuries arising from employment.
We need not dispute or debate Musick's version of the history. Suffice it to observe that the State's experience with
CTS has been similar to that of the private sector. See
generally, Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Workers' Compensation:
Recovery For Carpal Tunnel Syndrome,
14 A.L.R.5th 1, 12 (1993)
(observing that carpal tunnel syndrome "cannot easily be
classified within the broad parameters of the various [state]
workers' compensation schemes" and noting that most state courts
at first failed to recognize CTS as a compensable injury).
The Musick case bridges a five-year span beginning in 1989,
during which the Board revised its SLI policy concerning
progressive and degenerative occupational injuries. In that
period of time, the Appellate Division rendered two decisions
relevant to such cases and the SLI regulations were twice
amended.
Petitioner claims that prior to 1991, the Board
"routinely denied" SLI claims for CTS. The issues were recurring. In today's modern workplace, computer monitors and keyboards are as common as the copy or fax machine. It is therefore not surprising to learn that the fastest growing category of workplace personal injury claims is coming from an epidemic of repetitive stress injuries ("RSIs"). Repeated, long-term trauma to the hands and wrists through the use of a computer keyboard, for example, allegedly cause RSI. Office workers and journalists who seek to tie the frequent and regular use of their computer keyboards to a variety of debilitating hand and wrist disorders, such as tendinitis and carpal
tunnel syndrome, are the primary plaintiffs
bringing such claims.
[Craig T. Liljestrand, Repetitive Stress
Injuries And The Computer Keyboard: If There
Still Is No Causal Relationship Between Use
And Injury, Is It Wise To Warn?, 13 J.
Marshall J. of Computer and Info. L. 391,
391 (Spring 1995) (footnotes omitted).]
Even in the more employee-oriented context of workers'
compensation benefits, jurisdictions at first resisted
compensation for repetitive injuries like CTS. See Village v.
General Motors,
472 N.E.2d 1079, 1081 (Ohio 1984) (finding that
prior decisions denying compensability for disabilities
developing over period of time because they lacked suddenness,
unexpectedness and unforeseeability, frustrated clear purpose of
workers' compensation law to compensate workers injured as result
of employment). By October 1991, the Board, prompted by
unreported decisions of the Appellate Division and its own
investigation of CTS claims among State employees, recognized
that it needed to adjust its policy regarding the distribution of
SLI benefits to include injuries like CTS. Accordingly, the
Board began to award SLI benefits for CTS claims.
In considering its rules on SLI, the Board declared that the
then "current rulesSee footnote 1 on SLI benefits d[id] not adequately
address claims arising from disorders such as carpal tunnel
syndrome."
24 N.J.R. 2108 (June 15, 1992). The Board considered
two options. Option 1 would have rejected injuries such as CTS
unless certain standards of proof were met; Option 2 stated that
SLI benefits would be available for "repetitive motion disorders"
such as CTS "when the claim is supported by medical documentation
clearly establishing that the disorder would not have occurred
but for the performance of specific work duties." Id. at 2109.
to Employees Who Suffer CTS
In October 1992, after reviewing public comments regarding
the two options, the Board rejected Option 1 on the grounds that
"restricting SLI to injuries caused by a specific event, as set
forth in Option 1, would unfairly deny benefits to employees who
suffer disabling injuries due to work activities occurring over a
period of time," while Option 2 would permit such claims, subject
to medical documentation.
24 N.J.R. 3721 (October 19, 1992).
The effect of adopting Option 2 was to eliminate clearly the
necessity of establishing a one-time occurring accident or
traumatic event as the cause of an injury or illness for which
SLI benefits are available.
In January 1993, the Appellate Division dealt with the application of the one-year limitation on benefits. In re Naomi Dykas, 261 N.J. Super. 626 (App. Div. 1993). At that time, N.J.A.C. 4A:6-1.6(b)(3) stated, "Benefits are limited to a one year period from the initial date of the injury or illness."
In Dykas, the worker suffered from CTS in both wrists. She
first reported the affliction to her employer on approximately
June 1, 1989. Dykas, supra, 261 N.J. Super. at 629. The first
surgery took place November 14, 1989, and the second on August
31, 1990. The worker received SLI benefits only for the recovery
period following the first surgery. The Board upheld the denial
of benefits on the grounds that the "date of the second surgery,
August 31, 1990, exceeded [the] one-year limitation established
in N.J.A.C. 4A:6-1.6(b)3." Ibid. The issue was whether "the
initial date of the injury or illness" was the first date her
discomfort was brought to the employer's attention (notice), or
the date when she was actually out of work due to the illness
(disability). The Board applied the "notice" theory and limited
SLI benefits to one year from June 1, 1989.
The Appellate Division reversed and remanded the case,
holding that the "date the disability began," not the date when
the "injury or illness was suffered or became manifest," is "the
initial date" from which the one-year period begins to accrue.
Id. at 631. As applied to the Dykas case, the one-year period
began on November 14, 1989, which was the date of the disabling
surgery. The second sick leave, resulting from the surgery on
August 31, 1990, occurred within the one-year time limit and,
therefore, qualified for SLI benefits.
The Dykas court discussed the effect a hiatus in treatment
should have on the one-year time limitation. The court found:
If the Board chooses to establish a one-year
maximum for the receipt of benefits, an
employee whose injury or illness is reported
in a timely fashion should not suffer a loss
of benefits because there is a medical or
practical necessity for a sufficiently long
hiatus between stages of treatment so as to
extend its entire course beyond one year; as
long as the total of benefits received does
not exceed a year's worth of salary
continuation.
In response to the January 1993 Dykas decision the Board
changed the language of N.J.A.C. 4A:6-1.6(b)3 and adopted
sections (b)3(i) and (ii). The Board noted:
Recent appeals concerning Sick Leave
Injury (SLI) benefits have raised questions
on the application of the one-year limit on
benefits, particularly with regard to claims
arising from carpal tunnel syndrome and
similar disorders. N.J.A.C. 4A:6-1.6(b)3
currently provides that SLI benefits are
limited to a one year period from the initial
date of the injury or illness. The
longstanding interpretation of this rule, as
expressed in decisions by the Merit System
Board, has been that the one year period is
continuous, and does not consist of aggregate
periods of disability which total one year.
To clarify the rule in conformance with this
interpretation, N.J.A.C. 4A:6-1.6(b)3 would
be amended to provide that SLI benefits are
limited to a period beginning on the initial
date of the injury or illness and ending one
year from that date. Further, a provision
would be added that SLI benefits shall not be
paid for any absence occurring more than one
year from the initial date of the injury or
illness, even if the aggregate period of
disability does not exceed one year. With
regard to progressive, degenerative or
repetitive motion disorders, such as
asbestosis or carpal tunnel syndrome, it is
nearly impossible to specify "the initial
date of the injury or illness" because of the
nature of those disorders. Therefore, the
Board proposes to add a new N.J.A.C. 4A:6-1.6(b)3ii providing that the one year period
begins with the first date of disability from
work.
In other words, the Board agreed with the Dykas court that
CTS injuries begin on the "first date of disability from work"
but rejected the Dykas "hiatus" exception. The new regulation,
effective February 7, 1994, provides:
Sick Leave Injury (SLI) requirements: State
service
. . . .
(b) An employee who is disabled due to a
work-related injury or illness shall be
granted a leave of absence with pay.
. . . .
3. Benefits are limited to a period
beginning on the initial date of the injury
or illness and ending one year from that
date.
i. Benefits shall not be paid for any
absence from work occurring more than one
year from the initial date of the injury or
illness, even if the aggregate period of
disability does not exceed one year.
ii. In cases of disorders as set forth in
(c)4 below [including the CTS type injuries] ,
the one year period shall begin with the
first date of disability from work.
[N.J.A.C. 4A:6-1.6(b)3.]
In sum, the Board policy is now clear that provable claims
of CTS will be recognized but SLI benefits will be limited to one
year from the first date of disability from work.See footnote 2
It is against this background that we must decide Irene Musick's claim for SLI benefits. Musick's injuries arose during Stage I, when the Board was questioning CTS claims. The Board made its January 1992 decision to grant partial CTS benefits after it had begun its process of review of its regulations but prior to the Dykas decision. Subsequent to Dykas, Musick petitioned the Board to reconsider its partial denial of SLI benefits to Musick. The Board denied Musick's request on May 18, 1993.
Musick appealed the Board's denial, and the Appellate Division issued its decision on November 3, 1994, nine months after the Board had amended N.J.A.C. 4A:6-1.6(b)3 (Stage IV).
In her appeal to the Appellate Division, Musick argued that the Appellate Division decision in Dykas was controlling and that the Board had chosen to ignore the decision in that case. According to the Board, however, "[A]ny language in . . . Dykas which may have dealt with an aggregate one-year maximum for the receipt of benefits was clearly dicta[,] since that was not the issue before the court." The Board said that Dykas dealt only with the question of causation. Actually, Dykas dealt with both causation and the date when the one-year period of SLI benefits began. But because Dykas held, in the alternative, that it is
the onset of disability, not notice of injury, that begins the
one-year period, there was technically no need to decide the
"hiatus" issue. Whether we view the Dykas language as dictum or
holding, still we must decide if the Board's interpretation is
legally correct, giving due consideration to the Dykas court's
interpretation of the rule.
The standards for judicial review are familiar. Courts have
only a limited role to play in reviewing the actions of other
branches of government. In light of the executive function of
administrative agencies, judicial capacity to review
administrative actions is severely limited. Gloucester County
Welfare Bd. v. New Jersey Civil Serv. Comm'n,
93 N.J. 384, 390
(1993). Courts can intervene only in those rare circumstances in
which an agency action is clearly inconsistent with its statutory
mission or other state policy. Although sometimes phrased in
terms of a search for arbitrary or unreasonable action, the
judicial role is generally restricted to three inquiries: (1)
whether the agency's action violates express or implied
legislative policies, that is, did the agency follow the law; (2)
whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the
findings on which the agency bases its action; and (3) whether,
in applying the legislative policies to the facts, the agency
clearly erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably
have been made on a showing of the relevant factors. Campbell v.
Department of Civil Serv.,
39 N.J. 556, 562 (1963).
In this case, we deal essentially with the first and third
prongs of the measure, namely, whether the agency followed the
law, and whether, in applying the law to the facts, the agency
clearly erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably
have been made. The prongs are somewhat intertwined, the legal
question being whether the Legislature would intend that its SLI
benefits be capped at a period of one year from the onset of the
disease, especially in the case of degenerative and progressive
occupational diseases. On the question of interpretation, courts
normally defer to agency determinations and their enabling act so
long as the interpretation is reasonably debatable. Richard's
Auto City v. Director, Div. of Taxation,
140 N.J. 523, 530
(1995); G.E. Solid State v. Director, Div. of Taxation,
132 N.J. 298, 306 (1993).
The worker argues that the Board's policy is counter-productive in that it encourages state employees to remain out of
work rather than to attempt to return to work and work through
the pain as long as possible. We agree that policy choices can
be made on both sides of the argument. We believe, however, that
the Legislature has not clearly limited the agency's choice of
policy. It has given a very broad mandate to the agency to adopt
the necessary rules and regulations to implement an SLI benefits
program. In its administration of the SLI program, the Board has
determined that the most feasible way to administer the program
is to cap the benefits at one year from the onset of the
disability.
The worker counters that the proffered reasons of the Board,
that it enables departments to formulate budgetary and staffing
plans, to determine with certainty whether an injury is
compensable, and to conserve the State's limited fiscal
resources, are not achieved by the regulation. She argues that
the arbitrary cutoff of benefits after one year from the initial
date of absence does not assist in managing and determining
staffing needs, nor is there a significant impediment to the
ability to develop budgets. Moreover, time frames are always
difficult to predict because of the progressive onset of the
disease. Finally, she urges that the State's resources will not
only not be conserved, but rather will be depleted because
employees who might be inclined to pursue a conservative regime
of medical treatment may be induced to submit to more invasive
procedures requiring their absence of work and thus necessitating
the payment of extra benefits. Common sense, the worker urges,
suggests that the one-year cap will increase, not decrease,
expenditure of the State's limited fiscal resources.
The agency counters that its restricted approach to SLI
benefits is more consistent with legislative policy. The
Legislature, it argues, reasonably concluded that the Executive
Branch, "which must deal on a day to day basis with the demands
on the public fisc," was in the best position to determine the
restrictions on SLI benefits. The Board emphasizes that SLI
benefits do not come from the same mold of remedial social
legislation as do Workers' Compensation benefits. In Morreale v.
New Jersey Civil Serv. Comm'n,
166 N.J. Super. 536 (App. Div.),
certif. denied,
81 N.J. 275 (1979), the court explained:
In particular reference to the cost of
disability sick-leave benefits of public
employees, we must consider that the burden
falls on the State Government, to be defrayed
by the taxpayers, and that in that area the
imposition of costs and expenses upon the
public should not be inferred from a statute
not expressly or by fair implication
mandating the asserted charge against the
State.
This is not a case in which an agency is cutting off a
social "safety net" that the Legislature has mandated. See
Franklin v. New Jersey Dep't of Human Services,
111 N.J. 1, 20
(1988) (upholding agency regulation that would cap emergency
assistance benefits at five months so long as "other programs
. . . are in place to make reasonably certain that . . .
families . . . will find . . . housing elsewhere"). Workers
whose leaves occur more than one year after the disability arises
do have recourse to any accumulated sick leave (15 days per year
with no limit on accumulation) or to regular workers'
compensation benefits. And finally, CTS injuries would be
treated no differently than other injuries.
We thus do not consider it to be an irrational choice of
policies to establish a fringe benefit for State employees that
differentiates between an employee whose injury and treatment
necessitate an immediate and protracted absence from work, and an
employee whose treatment and absences from work may fall beyond
one year from the date of the initial injury. Such a
classification is not suspect. See Texter v. Department of Human
Services,
88 N.J. 376, 383-84 (1982) (recognizing validity of
agency discretion in choosing medical eligibility standards but
remanding for agency review of its regulation). The Board
retains the necessary flexibility to extend SLI benefits beyond
the one-year period and acknowledges that it has done so on prior
occasions. It contends, however, that waiver should occur only
in rare instances and the record does not suggest that the Board
abused its discretion in Irene Musick's case. In the one waiver
case involving CTS the worker had taken three non-consecutive
days off for CTS approximately two years prior to her surgery.
In Musick's case, the SLI benefits followed her first surgery and
the attendant disability.
The issues are debatable, but the debate regarding the
choice of competing policies should be reserved for the agency
itself unless the Legislature's intent is evident. Given the
Board's balanced approach to recognition of RSI injuries and its
overall need to allocate available resources among all State
employees, the Board's policy determination to limit SLI benefits
to one year from the date of disability is within the agency's
statutory mandate and application of the policy to the employee
does not constitute such a clear abuse of discretion as to
warrant judicial intervention.
The judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed and the
decision of the Board is reinstated.
Chief Justice Wilentz and Justices Handler, Pollock, Garibaldi, Stein, and Coleman join in Justice O'Hern's opinion.
NO. A-27 SEPTEMBER TERM 1995
ON APPEAL FROM
ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court
IN THE MATTER OF
IRENE MUSICK,
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
DECIDED February 1, 1996
Chief Justice Wilentz PRESIDING
OPINION BY Justice O'Hern
CONCURRING OPINION BY
DISSENTING OPINION BY
Footnote: 1At that time N.J.A.C. 4A:6-1.6(c) limited SLI benefits to
"[i]njuries or illnesses which would not have occurred but for a
specific work-related accident or condition of employment."
24 N.J.R. 2108, 2109 (June 15, 1992).
Footnote: 2We do not address the question of whether the 1994
clarification of this regulation constitutes a unilateral
alteration in the terms and conditions of employment under the
Employer-Employee Relations Act, N.J.S.A. 34:13A-1 to -21, or
the question of whether negotiations over the issue are preempted, because we rely upon the Board's administrative interpretation of its pre-existing regulation.