(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for
the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please
note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).
Argued March 27, 1995 -- Decided June 2, 1995
PER CURIAM
This ethical proceeding against Old Bridge Municipal Court Judge Lawrence A. Carton, III arose
out of a November 5, 1992 letter from a supervising Deputy Attorney General of the Office of the Attorney
General (AG) that was filed with the Advisory Committee on Judicial Conduct (ACJC). That letter advised
the ACJC that in the course of the AG's investigation of the Old Bridge Municipal Court Clerk's Office,
certain actions were taken or statements made by Judge Carton that may have been in violation of Canons 1
and 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
The ACJC filed a three-count complaint against Judge Carton. Following three days of hearings, the
ACJC filed a presentment in which it found that Judge Carton had violated certain Court Rules and Canons
1, 2A, and 2B of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Those violations consisted of: making telephone calls to the
municipal court judge and municipal prosecutor of another municipality in an attempt to influence the
disposition of charges against a business owned by Judge Carton, the Sea Bright matter, (Count I); and
permitting a fax transmission to be sent from his law office to the judge of another municipal court about a
matter pending in that court, the Sayreville matter, (Count II). The ACJC dismissed Count III in which it
was alleged that Judge Carton had made remarks to the staff of the Old Bridge Municipal Court to
intimidate them and otherwise persuade them not to cooperate with an investigation by the State Police of
possible criminal activities by the court clerk.
The ACJC recommended that the Supreme Court publicly reprimand Judge Carton. The Court
then ordered Judge Carton to show cause why removal proceedings should not be initiated against him and
why he should not otherwise be publicly disciplined.
HELD: For his violations of Canons 1, 2, and 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, Lawrence A. Carton, III,
Judge of the Old Bridge Municipal Court, is publicly reprimanded.
1. Based on the Court's independent review of the record, it concurs with the ACJC's determination that
Judge Carton violated the standards of judicial conduct. Although the Court agrees that Judge Carton
should be publicly reprimanded, it does so on grounds different than those found by the ACJC. (pp. 3)
2. The record does not contain clear and convincing evidence that Judge Carton violated the Code of
Judicial Conduct in respect of Count I, the Sea Bright matter. There is a paucity of evidence that would lead
to the conclusion that Count I has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. Judge Carton has served
as a municipal court judge since 1982. His prior record as an attorney and as a municipal court judge has
been unblemished. That he would attempt to fix a case that would at most lead to a $50 fine does not
comport with common sense. Moreover, there was no complaint filed after the illicit conversation between
Judge Foley and Judge Carton. The information was volunteered during the AG's investigation amidst a
background and history of substantial antagonism between the judges. As such, it cannot be found that
Judge Carton is clearly and convincingly guilty of the allegations in Count I. (pp. 3-11)
3. The record does establish that during the latter part of 1989, Judge McGowan of the Sayreville Municipal Court received an unsigned fax transmission from Judge Carton's law office about a matter pending in that
court. Thus, there is clear and convincing evidence present to support the ACJC's findings with respect to
Count II, the Sayreville matter. (pp.11-15)
4. The Court agrees with the ACJC's finding that the evidence does not clearly and convincingly show that
Judge Carton impeded or sought to impede the investigation by the State Police of the actions of the Office
of the Chief Clerk of the Old Bridge Municipal Court. Therefore, Count III was properly dismissed. (pp.
15-16)
5. Because Counts I and III are dismissed, the discipline to be imposed on Judge Carton results from his
misconduct in connection with Count II, the Sayreville matter. Municipal court judges are not to participate
in criminal or quasi-criminal matters and are not to contact judges or other personnel from another
municipal court regarding any matters pending in that court. In the Sayreville matter (Count II), Judge
Carton violated Canons 1, 2, and 3 and has engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice
that brings the judicial office in disrepute. For that, a public reprimand is warranted.
So ordered.
CHIEF JUSTICE WILENTZ and JUSTICES HANDLER, POLLOCK, GARIBALDI, STEIN, and
COLEMAN join in the Court's opinion. JUSTICE O'HERN did not participate.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
D-
128 September Term 1994
IN THE MATTER OF
LAWRENCE A. CARTON, III,
Judge of the Old Bridge
Municipal Court.
Argued March 27, l995 -- Decided June 2, 1995
On an Order to show cause why removal
proceedings pursuant to R. 2:l4 and N.J.S.A.
2B:2A-1 to -11 should not be instituted or
why respondent should not be publicly
disciplined.
Patrick J. Monahan, Jr., Counsel, argued the
cause on behalf of Advisory Committee on
Judicial Conduct.
Thomas F. McGuane argued the cause for
respondent (Carpenter, Bennett & Morrissey,
attorneys).
PER CURIAM
This proceeding against respondent, Lawrence A. Carton, III, a municipal court judge, arose out of a letter from Robert E. Levy, Supervising Deputy Attorney General of the Office of New Jersey Attorney General, dated November 5, l992, that he filed with the Advisory Committee on Judicial Conduct (Committee or ACJC). That letter advised that in the course of the Attorney
General's investigation of the Old Bridge Municipal Court Clerk's
Office, "certain actions were taken, and statements made, by
Judge Lawrence Carton III of the Old Bridge Municipal Court,
which may have been in violation of Canon l and Canon 2 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct. Additionally, during the course of the
investigation two other incidents have come to our attention
which may constitute judicial misconduct."
A formal complaint was filed with the ACJC containing three
counts. After three days of hearings in which eleven witnesses
had testified and forty-three exhibits had been filed, the ACJC
issued a presentment in which it found that respondent had
violated certain Court Rules and Canons l, 2A, and 2B of the Code
of Judicial Conduct. Those violations consisted of making
telephone calls to the municipal court judge and municipal
prosecutor of another municipality in an attempt to influence the
disposition of charges against a business owned by respondent
(Count I); and permitting a fax transmission to be sent from his
law office to the judge of another municipal court about a matter
pending in that court (Count II). The ACJC, however, dismissed
Count III in which it was alleged that respondent had made
remarks to the staff of the Old Bridge Municipal Court to
intimidate them and otherwise persuade them not to cooperate with
an investigation by the State Police of possible criminal
activities by the clerk of that court. The ACJC recommended that
this Court publicly reprimand respondent. We then ordered
respondent to show cause why removal proceedings should not be
initiated against him and why he should not otherwise be publicly
disciplined.
Based on our independent review of the record, we concur in
the ACJC's determination that respondent violated the standards
of judicial conduct. Although we agree that respondent should be
publicly reprimanded, we do so on different grounds than the
ACJC. While we agree with the ACJC that clear-and-convincing
evidence is present to support the ACJC's findings with respect
to Count II, and that sufficient evidence is lacking to support
Count III, our de novo examination of the record persuades us
that the ethics charges against respondent with respect to Count
I have not been established by clear-and-convincing evidence. We
therefore dismiss Count I, the Sea Bright matter. Accordingly,
the public reprimand that we impose is only for respondent's
conduct in Count II, the Sayreville matter.
In determining the nature and extent of discipline, we "carefully scrutinize the substantive offenses that constitute the core of respondent's misconduct, the underlying facts and the surrounding circumstances." In re Collester, l 26 N.J. 468, 472 (l992) (citing In re Connor, l24 N.J. l8, 22 (l99l) (other citations omitted)). Our review of the surrounding circumstances leads us to conclude that the record does not contain clear-and
convincing evidence that respondent violated the Code of Judicial
Conduct with respect to the Sea Bright matter.
As previously observed, the allegations against the
respondent in the presentment all arose out of the State's
investigation of the Old Bridge Municipal Court Clerk's Office.
Most of the testimony at the ACJC hearing focused on the
allegations made in Count III -- whether respondent's remarks to
court clerks had been intended to impede the State's
investigation.
In August l990, several deputy clerks of the Old Bridge
Municipal Court, led by First Assistant Deputy Clerk Carol
Butewicz (Clerk Butewicz), compiled what they felt to be
incriminating evidence against the Chief Clerk of that court, a
close friend of respondent. Those clerks gave that evidence to
the Old Bridge Police Department and to Judge Foley who also was
a municipal judge in Old Bridge. Judge Foley turned that
evidence over to the Attorney General's Office. Judge Foley also
advised the deputy clerks to keep from respondent his and their
involvement in the Attorney General's investigation.
During the course of that two-year investigation, Clerk
Butewicz and Gail Taylor, another deputy clerk (Clerk Taylor),
received a preliminary notice of charges and proposed
disciplinary action on November 8, l99l. Both women were charged
with neglect of duty, insubordination, and conduct unbecoming of
a public/judicial employee. According to the notices that were
signed by respondent, he alleged that Clerks Butewicz and Taylor
participated in the filing of two false reports concerning him.
The clerks were suspended with pay.
Five days after her suspension, during the state-police
investigation on November l3, l99l, Clerk Butewicz reported to an
Attorney General investigator that she had heard from another
source that respondent had once tried to influence the municipal
judge in Sayreville. That allegation formed the basis of Count
II, the Sayreville incident.
Clerks Butewicz and Taylor then filed suit in l99l against
respondent and Old Bridge Township in the Chancery Division,
alleging, among other things, wrongful discharge from employment
because they had assisted in the Attorney General's
investigation. The Assignment Judge appointed a special
prosecutor who conducted an investigation, prepared the matter
for trial, and took the position that the suspension of the
clerks was proper. On May l8, l992, the matter was settled. The
plaintiffs dismissed their claims, and as part of that
settlement, they were transferred to other positions within the
township, and letters of public reprimand were permanently placed
in their personnel files.
During the time they were suspended by respondent, Judge
Foley requested that Clerks Butewicz and Taylor work in the Sea
Bright Municipal Court. Judge Foley also was prepared to testify
on behalf of Clerks Butewicz and Taylor in their civil action
against respondent.
On September 23, l992, after the conclusion of the wrongful
discharge case, Judge Foley was interviewed by the State Police
with respect to allegations made by Clerk Butewicz that
respondent had interfered with the Attorney General's
investigation. When asked at the conclusion of the interview if
he had anything else to add, he volunteered that respondent,
seven months previously, during the pendency of the civil action,
had had a conversation with him concerning two garbage summonses
pending in Sea Bright. Although he could not recall the exact
circumstances of the incident, he did recall that Clerks Butewicz
and Taylor had been present at the Sea Bright Municipal Court
when the alleged incident had taken place. That comment from
Judge Foley was the genesis of Count I. Respondent first learned
that Judge Foley claimed respondent called him about the $50
garbage summonses when he received the ACJC's complaint in
December l993.
The record indicates that two summonses were issued against
a business establishment called Squash Court of Sea Bright and
its manager, Ms. Glisson, charging illegal dumping of trash in
violation of the governing sanitary code of Sea Bright.
Initially, the matter was to be heard in the Sea Bright Municipal
Court, but it was transferred to another court. Respondent owned
the Squash Court. He testified that he had had no interest in
the tickets and that Ms. Glisson had been going to take care of
them and had done so.
The record also indicates that sometime in February l992,
Judge Foley, the municipal judge in Sea Bright as well as a
municipal judge in Old Bridge, and respondent, the presiding
judge in Old Bridge, had a telephone conversation. The initial
call was made by Judge Foley to respondent, concerning the
cancellation of some of Foley's Old Bridge Court sessions.
Respondent returned Judge Foley's call, concerning the cancelled
sessions. Understandably, because the conversation had occurred
at least seven months before Judge Foley had mentioned it to the
State Police, and because no written record of the conversation
nor any report had been made, Judge Foley "couldn't recall the
exact circumstances surrounding this incident." When Judge
Foley testified before the ACJC, he still did not recall
respondent's exact words. He testified, however, that respondent
had "asked me about two tickets involving illegal dumping of
[sic] garbage problem in the township." He also testified that
respondent had told him that those tickets were a minor matter
and that the Squash Court was not a good investment. Judge Foley
believed that those comments had been an attempt to influence
him. He further testified that he had quickly ended the
conversation with respondent, telling him to speak to the local
prosecutor about that matter.
Respondent, never having been confronted with the
allegations until two years after the alleged incident, can
specifically recall having returned Foley's call, but has no
recollection of any discussion of the Sea Bright matter. He
insists that he never received the summonses and never would have
discussed their disposition with Judge Foley. Indeed, given the
hostility between the two judges, he testified he would never
have asked Foley for any help.
The Sea Bright Municipal Prosecutor, Mitchell Ansell, also
testified that he had received a telephone call from respondent.
He believes that the call referred to two summonses pending in
Sea Bright. Respondent claims that the conversation concerned a
letter dated February 25, l992, from the Sea Bright Borough
Clerk, advising respondent of a meeting scheduled for March 3,
l992, with the Mayor and Council and the Borough Prosecutor to
discuss a general garbage problem. Respondent was unable to
attend that meeting. Respondent testified that because Mr.
Ansell had had no knowledge of the fact that respondent had
received a letter from that borough clerk indicating that the
borough prosecutor, among others, had requested respondent's
presence at a meeting to discuss a general garbage problem, Mr.
Ansell must have assumed that any conversation that he had had
with respondent concerned garbage related to the garbage
summonses, rather than to garbage generally.
Alluding to the difficulty in recalling an incident that
happened three years before, Mr. Ansell testified that he had not
taken respondent's comments to mean anything improper.
Respondent was a party; it was his company that was being
charged. As the prosecutor noted, parties before the Municipal
Court routinely call the prosecutor. He did not perceive
respondent's telephone call as an attempt to influence him. We
believe that Ansell's attempt to restate its contents falls far
short of corroboration of any attempt on the part of respondent
to fix the case.
The Sea Bright matter is characterized by a paucity of
evidence. Our review of the record before us leads us to
disagree with the conclusion of the ACJC, but only on the
question whether the ACJC clearly and convincingly demonstrated
that respondent was guilty of such conduct. We have concluded
that the proof does not rise to that level.
Any attempt by a judge to influence the disposition of a
case for that judge's own benefit or for another's benefit, no
matter how insignificant the case, no matter when it occurs,
demands removal. The ACJC finding here, that respondent
attempted to influence Judge Foley to dismiss the charges against
the company owned by respondent, if it were proven, would clearly
demand a removal. The charge that respondent attempted to fix
the case was an afterthought that followed an extensive
investigation of other matters. That charge was not at all part
of the original investigation. It resulted from an open-ended
question near the conclusion of the investigation, a question put
to Judge Foley about whether there was "anything else he wanted
to tell" the investigators. One would assume that an attempt to
fix a case would have been reported immediately by Judge Foley.
However, Judge Foley did not report those comments then or
anytime thereafter, but only volunteered the comments during the
course of another investigation. The lateness of the charge and
the circumstances under which it was made -- following a long
period of hostility between the two judges -- is one factor in
our determination today. Besides Judge Foley's version of the
conversation -- with which respondent's version totally differs -- the only other proof is ambiguous. That corroboration is a
conversation respondent had with the prosecutor at Judge Foley's
request. Ultimately, however, the conversation's innocence, or
at least its ambiguous quality, both in its origin and in its
content, makes this proffered evidence weak in its alleged
corroboration of the charge.
Another critical fact that leads to our conclusion is the
circumstantial incredibility of the charge. Respondent was
admitted to the Bar in l963. He first served as a municipal
court judge in l966. In l982, he became a municipal court judge
in Old Bridge Township, serving since l987, as the Presiding
Judge of the Old Bridge Municipal Court. Respondent's prior
record as an attorney and as a municipal court judge is
unblemished. He served with distinction, and had an absolutely
clear record insofar as judicial conduct is concerned. In this
matter, respondent is portrayed as attempting to fix a case that
at most would lead to a $50 fine, which involves a minimal
offense. Such a proposition does not comport with common sense.
After the alleged illicit conversation, no complaint was
filed and no report made until the information was volunteered
amidst a background and history of substantial antagonism between
the judges. With that background and on this record, we are
unable to find that respondent is clearly and convincingly
guilty.
Our conclusion is no reflection on the ACJC, or on Judge
Foley. We recognize that the conversation could have taken place
as Judge Foley stated, but its occurrence in the form he suggests
has not been demonstrated by the requisite clear-and-convincing
evidence that "`should produce in the mind of the trier of fact a
firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations
sought to be established.'" In re Purrazzella, l
34 N.J. 228, 240
(l993) (quoting Aiello v. Knoll Golf Club, 64 N.J. Super. l56,
l62 (App. Div. l960)).
Count II also arose from a remark made by Clerk Butewicz five days after respondent had filed the complaint against her and Clerk Taylor. Nonetheless, the record does establish that
during the latter part of l989, Robert J. McGowan, Jr., Judge of
the Sayreville Municipal Court, received an unsigned fax
transmission from respondent's law office. On this point, all
parties agreed at the hearing before the ACJC, although they
sharply disagreed about the subject matter of the fax. Neither
Judge McGowan nor respondent was able to produce a copy of the
fax in question.
Judge McGowan testified that he had no independent
recollection of the incident, but was testifying from the report
he had made in l99l to the state-police investigator. In that
report, Judge McGowan stated that the fax had contained a request
by respondent for an adjournment of a scheduled case involving
Mark Fallon, who had been charged with multiple disorderly
persons offenses returnable in the Sayreville Municipal Court.
Fallon is the son of Joan Fallon, who was respondent's court
clerk at the time. The charges against him were filed on July
24, l989. The first scheduled trial date, August l7, l989, was
adjourned, and the matters were resolved by a plea agreement on
October 3, l989.
The ACJC presentment presents both views of the incident:
According to Judge McGowan, he telephoned
Respondent after receiving the fax, which
bore markings indicating it had come from
Respondent's law office. During the ensuing
telephone conversation, Respondent told Judge
McGowan that he was "just trying to help the
kid out, the kid needed to contact your court
to request an adjournment quickly."
Respondent told Judge McGowan that he had not
personally sent the fax transmission but had
permitted Mark Fallon to send it from
Respondent's law office. Judge McGowan
replied that Respondent could not represent
Mark Fallon and that it was improper for him
to intercede on Fallon's behalf. McGowan
said that Respondent should not be involved
in the matter at all, and Respondent replied
that McGowan was blowing the incident out of
proportion because Respondent was not asking
him to do anything.
* * * *
For his part, Respondent maintained before
this Committee that Judge McGowan was
mistaken in testifying that the contact
concerned any case involving Mark Fallon.
According to Respondent, Joyce Wetstein, one
of the employees of the Old Bridge Municipal
Court, called him at his law office on
Friday, October l3, l989, because her son,
Brian Wetstein, had been found guilty of an
offense in the Sayreville Municipal Court and
the appeal period was going to expire the
following Monday. Respondent told Ms.
Wetstein to have Brian call him and Brian did
so shortly thereafter. When Brian Wetstein
called Respondent, Respondent was in a hurry
to go somewhere, and he told Brian to write
out a summary about the case and, if all else
failed, Respondent would help Brian draft a
letter applying for a new trial to deliver to
the judge in Sayreville that Monday.
When Respondent found out that Robert McGowan
was the Judge of the Sayreville Municipal
Court, he called McGowan's law office,
identifying himself only as "Larry Carton,"
and asked to speak to McGowan. Respondent's
intention was "simply to ask him whether he
would accept a letter from a lawyer -- from a
fellow who was no longer represented as an
indication of a new trial." Respondent spoke
to McGowan's secretary, and she said that she
would have him return the call. He did not
return the call.
The following Monday, October l6, Respondent had to be out of the office once again. He called his office and asked one of his
secretaries to call Judge McGowan's law
office and ask if McGowan would be able to
speak to him that morning. Later on, he
called back and spoke to the secretary once
again. She told him that she had called
McGowan's law office and that McGowan's
secretary had suggested she fax a request for
adjournment to the office. Respondent said
that without checking with him, the secretary
went ahead and drafted and faxed such a
request. Respondent told the Committee that
he was upset at what his secretary had done,
and he apologized profusely to Judge McGowan
when they both attended a conference some
months later. Respondent denied, however,
that he had any telephone conversation about
the matter with Judge McGowan at any time.
Respondent presented testimony from both
Joyce Wetstein and Brian Wetstein in support
of his contention that the fax transmission
sent to Judge McGowan concerned Brian
Wetstein and was sent by a secretary who
acted without authorization. Respondent did
not present testimony from that secretary;
instead, he represented to the Committee that
she had no memory of the event.
The ACJC properly concluded that irrespective of whether the fax was on behalf of Mark Fallon or Brian Wetstein, respondent's office undoubtedly sent a fax to Judge McGowan concerning a matter pending before him in court. Although determining that Brian Wetstein's account lacked credibility, the ACJC found that the evidence indicated that respondent had given him legal advice in a pending criminal matter. Giving respondent the benefit of any doubt, the ACJC found "that respondent is charged with the running of his office and his failure to do so properly in this instance gives rise to conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute." Our
independent review of the record leads us to agree with the
findings of the ACJC.
Based on our de novo review of the record, we also agree with the ACJC's finding that the evidence does not clearly and convincingly show that respondent impeded or sought to impede the investigation by the State Police of the actions of the Office of the Chief Clerk of the Old Bridge Municipal Court. The ACJC's presentment fairly describes and explains the incident that led to Count III:
On August 20, l990, the New Jersey State Police began an investigation into the Old Bridge Municipal Court by executing a warrant for the search of the files of that court. The investigation was begun after employees of the court compiled information to the effect that Joan Fallon, the clerk of that court, may have used her position to favor her sons and others by failing to schedule cases for trial, collect fines, enforce court orders or report traffic violations to the Division of Motor Vehicles.
In the Third Count of the Complaint before this Committee, it was alleged that Respondent had made a number of remarks to the members of his court staff to intimidate them and otherwise persuade them not to cooperate with the investigation being conducted by the State Police. Respondent acknowledged having made, if not the alleged remarks, remarks that were essentially the same; but he testified that he was referring not to the State Police but to the Old Bridge Police Department. Certain employees of the Old Bridge Municipal Court were close to officers of the Old Bridge Police Department and filed reports with that department
concerning matters within the Old Bridge
Municipal Court. It was, according to
Respondent, with reference to such reports
and contacts that he made the remarks in
question.
Finding that the evidence presented was not "clear and
convincing," the ACJC properly dismissed the Third Count of the
complaint.
Accordingly, with the dismissal of Counts I and III, the discipline to be imposed on respondent results from his misconduct in connection with Count II, the Sayreville matter. It has long been the rule that municipal court judges "shall not practice in any criminal, quasi-criminal or penal
matter." R. l:l5-l(b). It is well-established that municipal court judges should not be contacting the judges or personnel of another municipal court on behalf of parties to matters pending before the other court. In re Santini, l 26 N.J. 29l, 298 (l99l) (citing In re Murray, 92 N.J. 567 (l983)).
In both Santini, supra, and Murray, supra, we disciplined two part-time municipal court judges for contacting officials in other municipal courts with respect to pending matters. In both cases, the judges recognized, as did respondent here, that they could not represent clients before another municipal court. Unfortunately, in both cases through a series of mishaps, they were unable to secure the immediate services of another attorney. In Santini, supra, the judge called a zoning officer, a municipal
court clerk, and another municipal court judge to discuss the
pending matter. l26 N.J. at 293-94. Despite the fact that
Santini's client was facing an arrest warrant from the municipal
court, we emphasized that "[u]nder no condition may a municipal
court judge communicate with the judge or clerk of the court in
which the proceeding is pending." Id. at 296. The municipal
court judge in Murray, supra, wrote a letter to a municipal court
judge to advise him that his former clients were out of state.
92 N.J. at 570. Because of his position, we found that the
municipal judge in Murray, supra, had used "his power, prestige,
and influence" to persuade other judges and that such action was
insensitive to public perceptions of his judicial role. Id. at
57l. In both Santini and Murray, although unique time pressures
and circumstances were involved and both judges had unblemished
records, we found that they both violated judicial Canons l, 2
and 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. As a result, both were
publicly reprimanded.
Canons l, 2, and 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct set forth
the law regarding this issue: Canon l requires a judge to uphold
the integrity and independence of the judiciary; Canon 2 requires
a judge to avoid any impropriety or even an appearance of
impropriety; Canon 2B prohibits a judge from allowing social or
other relationships to influence his or her judicial conduct or
judgment, requires that a judge not lend the prestige of office
to advance the private interests of others, and requires that a
judge not convey or permit others to convey the impression that
they are in a special position of influence; Canon 3A(6)
prohibits a judge from either initiating or considering ex parte
or other communications concerning a pending or impending
proceeding.
We find that respondent has violated Canons l, 2, and 3, and
has engaged in "conduct prejudicial to the administration of
justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute." R.
2:l5-8(a)(6). Certainly by now, all municipal court judges
should be well aware that they may not do what respondent did
when he contacted McGowan.
Because of respondent's improper conduct in the Sayreville
matter, we find that a public reprimand is warranted.
Accordingly, we need not and do not refer this matter to a
removal panel.
So ordered.
Chief Justice Wilentz and Justices Handler, Pollock,
Garibaldi, Stein, and Coleman join in this opinion. Justice
O'Hern did not participate.