(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for
the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please
note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).
Argued September 12, 1994 -- Decided November 18, 1994
PER CURIAM
Judge Philip A. Fenster, a judge of the Paterson Municipal Court, was charged with improperly
permitting the Mayor of Paterson to intercede in judicial proceedings. The Advisory Committee on Judicial
Conduct (ACJC) filed a presentment with the Supreme Court recommending that Judge Fenster be censured.
On review of the record, the Supreme Court concluded that the more serious sanction of suspension was
warranted.
On August 9, 1991, Judge Fenster was presiding over the case of State v. Martinez Brothers, Ricardo
Martinez and Richard Martinez. Defendant landlords were charged with multiple housing violations.
Shortly after the case began, the Mayor of Paterson interrupted the proceedings and asked for
permission to speak. Judge Fenster, who had prior knowledge that the Mayor would make his request, asked
defense counsel if he had an objection to the Mayor speaking. The Judge noted that although judicial
independence would normally prohibit the Mayor from participating in the proceedings, this case was different
because both sides had asked the Mayor to intervene.
Counsel for defendants objected. He repeatedly stated that his clients had not asked that the Mayor
interject himself in the judicial proceedings. Defense counsel noted that defendants had written a letter
complaining about the Judge to the Chief Justice. A copy of that letter was sent to the Mayor. No separate
request was sent to the Mayor.
Judge Fenster and defense counsel had an extended exchange on the Mayor's ability to speak in the
judicial proceedings. Defense counsel noted objections for the record and the Judge permitted the Mayor to
speak "as an amicus curiae, friend of the court, or intervener." The Mayor was sworn as a witness and then
made what was characterized by Judge Fenster as an "opening statement."
The case went forward and after certain witnesses testified, the Mayor requested permission from Judge
Fenster to speak again. Permission was granted and the Mayor made further comments. He left thereafter,
promising future intervention "on other issues and in other cases."
Judge Fenster found defendants guilty. In his decision, he justified permitting the Mayor to speak on
the ground that both sides had asked for the Mayor's intervention.
The ACJC found that Judge Fenster improperly interjected politics into a court proceeding by permitting
the Mayor to participate in the proceedings even though he was not a party or a lawyer. The Committee
concluded that Judge Fenster had violated Canons 1,2A, and 7A(3) of the Code of Judicial Conduct and that
he had prejudiced the administration of justice by bringing his judicial office into disrepute.
HELD: By knowingly and aggressively turning over quasi-criminal proceedings in open court to the mayor, Judge
Philip A. Fenster permitted the political independence of his court to be destroyed. A six-month suspension
from the bench is warranted.
1. There is no principle governing the judiciary in this state more firmly established or more important than the
total separation of judges from politics. Judge Fenster did nothing to correct the impression that the Mayor
could control the court; rather, by his conduct he reinforced that notion. (pp.11-12)
2. Despite Judge Fenster's fine record, reputation, and service to the public, his conduct calls for more than a
censure. But for the absence of any direct benefit to the Judge and the absence of any complicity with the
Mayor's conduct, removal would be required. (p. 13)
3. The Mayor's concerns with the municipal courts' handling of housing violations may have been justified and,
if so, he had every right to make those concerns known. He could have severely criticized the judiciary's handling
of such matters. He had no right, however, to take over a courtroom and deliver his message as a part of a
quasi-criminal proceeding. (pp. 14-15)
4. The most persistent and serious threat to the excellence of our municipal courts has been the potential of
political interference. Municipal court judges have no tenure; their careers and livelihoods are dependent on
the will of elected officials. Given those limitations, the extent of political independence of our municipal court
judges has been an enormous accomplishment. Credit goes to the judges themselves and to the those mayors
and other elected officials who have made it possible. (p. 15)
5. Clearly, Judge Fenster's misconduct does not approach the venality of a clandestine "fix" in which a mayor
decides a case through the mouth of a judge. But unless the message of condemnation is unmistakable, the
potential damage is profound. There is nothing more important to the judiciary than its independence, especially
from political influence and especially in the municipal courts. (p. 16)
It is ORDERED that Respondent be suspended from the Paterson Municipal Court, without pay, for
six months.
CHIEF JUSTICE WILENTZ and JUSTICES CLIFFORD, HANDLER, POLLOCK, O'HERN,
GARIBALDI, and STEIN join in the Court's opinion.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
D-55 September Term 1994
IN THE MATTER OF
JUDGE PHILIP A. FENSTER,
A Judge of the
Paterson Municipal Court.
Argued September 12, 1994 -- Decided November 18, 1994
On an Order to show cause why respondent
should not be publicly disciplined.
Patrick J. Monahan, Jr., Counsel, argued the
cause on behalf of the Advisory Committee on
Judicial Conduct.
Leonard M. Bitterman argued the cause for
respondent.
PER CURIAM
Respondent, Judge Philip A. Fenster, a municipal court
judge, was charged with judicial misconduct. After hearing
the matter, the Advisory Committee on Judicial Conduct
recommended censure, finding that his conduct required a more
severe sanction than public reprimand. We agree, but conclude
that a suspension is warranted.
Respondent was charged with improperly permitting the
Mayor of Paterson "to make a speech during a court
proceeding." On August 9, 1991, respondent presided over a
session of the Paterson Municipal Court. He had been a
municipal court judge for seven years. One of the matters
scheduled for that session was State v. Martinez Brothers,
Ricardo Martinez and Richard Martinez, in which the defendants
were charged with multiple housing violations in certain
rental properties.
Shortly after the case commenced, the Mayor of the City
of Paterson, apparently seated in the audience, interrupted
the proceedings and asked if he might approach the bench.
Respondent had previously learned that morning, before the
proceedings started, that the Mayor was in the courtroom and
wanted to speak or testify in that matter. The Committee's
opinion fairly describes and explains what then occurred:
Respondent asked defense counsel if he had an
objection to the Mayor's speaking "seeing as how
your clients sent a letter to the Mayor and, in
fact, a tenant sent a letter to the Mayor."
Respondent continued to express his own view of the
propriety of the Mayor's speaking: "Since everyone
has requested the Mayor's intervention, I think it's
appropriate that he speak. Do you have any
objections?"
Defense counsel asked to confer with his client
and as he was doing so, Respondent observed:
Well, I think normally, it would be a valid objection because the Court has to be independent from the Mayor and the City. The Court is neutral
between a defendant and the State or
the City or the complainant. The
Court has to be neutral and there is
no reason for a mayor, or any person
on City Counsel [sic] to appear. But
I think this case is different.
In this case, both sides have written
to the mayor requesting his
intervention. Both sides. Not only
one. It's not like one has said
"Politically, I know the Mayor. I
want the Mayor to influence the
case." Both sides have written to
the Mayor about this case and, in
fact, have asked the Mayor to
intervene.
Defense counsel replied that the Mayor's
intervention had not been sought "in the
judicial arena," but Respondent went on to say
that it was good for people to write to the
Mayor because the Mayor appoints the municipal
judge and it helps the Mayor to know how
someone is performing in his or her job.
Respondent continued, noting that this was a
case that was pending and concluding that the
Mayor should be able to speak on the case
because it had "been requested by both sides."
The individual defendants had not written
to the Mayor to intervene in the proceedings
but had copied him on a letter addressed to the
Chief Justice. This letter dated July 10,
1991, was admitted into evidence before the
Committee as Exhibit P-3. It was a long and
detailed letter criticizing the Respondent's
performance in the case. The Respondent's
awareness of the contents of this letter and
his initial reaction against the individual
defendants at the onset of the proceedings
strongly suggest that he was no longer
impartial. This became clearer as the matter
proceeded and defendants' counsel moved that
Respondent recuse himself.
Defense counsel asked if the Mayor would be a fact witness. Respondent noted that the issue before the court was the question of an adjournment, and he stated: "Well, he [the
Mayor] can argue as to whether the adjournment
would be correct. He can argue about anything.
Both sides have asked the Mayor to intervene."
Defense counsel persisted in trying to pin the
Respondent down to whether the Mayor would be a
fact witness or an expert witness. In
response, Respondent asked the Mayor if he
wanted to testify about whether the case should
be adjourned. The Mayor replied that he would
be sworn in, and Respondent observed that
counsel could object if the Mayor said anything
objectionable.
Defense counsel persisted and said:
"Judge, but who is calling him? Is he here as
a fact witness?" He continued: "Is he here as
an expert witness? Is this going to be a
political speech? What is this going to be?"
Respondent insisted once again that both sides
had asked the Mayor to intervene in the case
and had sent letters to him. Once again,
defense counsel observed that the Mayor's
intervention had not been sought in the
judicial proceeding. He also said that it
would be very unusual to permit the Mayor to
participate, and he told Respondent: "We may be
treading on dangerous ground here if you let
the Mayor talk at will and not being called as
an expert witness."
Respondent stated again that both sides
had written to the Mayor. Defense counsel
replied: "Yes, but that still does not give him
the right to come into court and make a
political statement. I mean, this is a
political speech now." Respondent replied:
"Well, it very may well be (sic). But that's
what both sides want, interference by a
political person. Both sides wrote to the
Mayor." Defense counsel replied: "Judge, if
both sides wanted to turn this into
kindergarten, you wouldn't permit it. Just
because both sides wanted to do something
inappropriate doesn't mean the Court has to
permit it." Respondent agreed but once again
said that the Mayor had been asked to
intervene. He noted that counsel could object,
and he maintained yet again that both sides had
written to the Mayor.
Defendant Ricardo Martinez started to
speak, and the prosecutor objected. Respondent
observed that it was inappropriate for a client
to argue, and he said that once the Mayor spoke
anyone could answer. Defense counsel then
returned once more to the question of who would
be calling the Mayor as a witness. Respondent
replied: "The court is calling him because
everybody requested--" At that point, the
municipal prosecutor finally spoke up and noted
that views from the Mayor might well be
considered to be analogous to a brief by an
amicus curiae. He concluded that the Mayor
should be permitted to speak, but defense
counsel once again said: "Judge, we never
requested the Mayor's intervention. I want to
put that clearly on the record." Respondent
insisted that defense counsel's "client sent a
long detailed letter to the Mayor about this
case, which I assume you know of because you
got a copy of it." Defense counsel replied
that that was true but that "we never requested
the Mayor's judicial intervention."
Defense counsel returned to the question
of who was going to call the Mayor as a
witness. Respondent replied that both sides
had written to the Mayor, and that the Mayor
had come to court as "everyone asked him to
do." Defense counsel responded: "Nobody asked
him from our side." Respondent insisted that
both sides had written to the Mayor telling him
that there was a problem with the case.
Respondent announced that he would permit the
Mayor to speak, and he said that defense could
object to anything the mayor said that was
inappropriate. When defense counsel said that
whatever the Mayor had to say should at least
be in the form of questions and answers,
Respondent added: "The Mayor is going to
intervene. Instead of testifying for the State
or for the -" Defense counsel asked if there
could be a proffer, and Respondent repeated
that the Mayor was going to intervene and that
defense counsel could object should the Mayor
say anything objectionable. Respondent said
that he was going to permit the Mayor to
testify "as an amicus curiae, friend of the
court, or intervener."
Defense counsel asked who would pose
questions to the Mayor during his testimony,
and Respondent answered that the Mayor would
say whatever he wanted to say. Defense counsel
then protested that there should have been a
notice of motion to alert him to any
participation of an amicus curiae, and
Respondent replied: "Well, he's making a motion
now and you oppose the motion. Is there
anything else you want to say in opposition to
the motion?" Defense counsel noted that the
motion should have been made in writing so that
he would not have been surprised. When
Respondent noted that he did not think the
defense should be surprised "because you wrote
a letter to the Mayor about this case,"
defense counsel observed that his client had
not written directly to the Mayor but had
copied the Mayor on correspondence.
After additional colloquy, during which
both Respondent and defense counsel repeated
points that they had already made several
times, and during which defense counsel
expressed his view that "this highly irregular
procedure will make things very much worse for
everybody," the Mayor was sworn as a witness.
He then made a statement in which he indicated
that the defendants' tenants had had to put up
with housing problems for eight months, and he
said:
I think it is absolutely shocking,
the conditions that have been allowed
and permitted on this property with
the adjournments and the excuse that
you're out of the country. Well, I'm
not out of the country. And I'm here
to seek justice and I hope, before I
leave today, justice will be had so
that these people over here, many of
whom are nameless, know that their
Mayor thinks that what they said is
important.
The Mayor closed his statement by saying: "So
I'm here, and I'm not leaving until justice is
had today."
After the Mayor finished speaking,
Respondent noted that the Mayor had commented
not only on the question of adjournment but
also on the evidence in the case. Respondent
described the Mayor's comments in the latter
regard as "sort of like an opening statement,"
and he said that the defendants would be found
not guilty if there were no evidence they had
violated the law. Defense counsel then began
to argue that the trial was preempted by the
fact that the defense had taken an appeal of
the violation notices to the Construction Board
of Appeals. The Mayor interrupted and said:
"You question my appearance and yet we had to
arrest your client to get him here. Now, you
tell me am I smoking funny cigarettes or what?
You tell me." Defense counsel objected to the
Mayor's remarks, and the Mayor replied: "They
stand."
Respondent then defended the Mayor,
saying: "He has made these comments as a party
to the actions hearing, pro se." He went on to
pick up one of the themes of the Mayor's
statement and chastised the defendant for
failing to appear on previous occasions.
After testimony from certain witnesses,
the Mayor addressed Respondent and requested
permission to speak. Respondent gave him
permission, and the Mayor said: "Judge, justice
delayed. One does not have to be a mental
wizard to drive by this property. I'll be
sworn again." Respondent said that the matter
was now going to trial and he suggested that
the Mayor testify as a fact witness at the
trial.
Respondent then attempted to determine exactly what facts the defense had stipulated at prior proceedings in the case. After conferring with his client, defense counsel objected to what had already transpired in the courtroom: "With all due respect to the Court and to the Mayor and to all the people here, it is my opinion that this whole proceeding has degenerated into a circus-like atmosphere and the whole thing has already been staged and choreographed --" Respondent did not reply but returned to the question of stipulations. Defense counsel said that he did not think his
client would receive a fair trial because the
mayor had been called without his knowledge and
because the courtroom was packed, many of those
present being tenants of properties owned by
the defendants.
Respondent then addressed defense
counsel's objections to the presence of the
Mayor:
Now, the fact that the Mayor is here,
first of all, the Mayor appoints the
Judge. So it's part of the Mayor's
job to see how the Court is
operating. It's the Mayor's
appointment. So, in any case, the
Mayor has the perfect right and an
obligation to come and see how court
runs. The Mayor makes the
appointment.
Respondent continued in the same vein,
indicating that the Mayor was only doing his
job by going to court in view of the letter
that he had received. Respondent also said
that the Mayor had to appoint the judge and it
was appropriate for him to see the court in
operation after having gotten a letter critical
of Respondent from defendant Martinez.
Respondent concluded: "Not coming here on the
part of the Mayor would be unfair both to the
Court and to Mr. Martinez." Defendant's
attorney noted that the Mayor could be present
to observe the judge's performance without
making speeches. Respondent then proceeded to
justify the remarks that the Mayor had already
made.
The defendant then moved for recusal, and
Respondent denied that motion. Respondent also
denied defense counsel's motion to be relieved
and then denied the defendant's request to
obtain another attorney. As the Mayor had
urged earlier in the proceeding, Respondent
refused to grant any adjournment and insisted
that the trial proceed.
As defendant Richard Martinez was testifying, the Mayor spoke up and asked to
make a point. He said that the defendant owned
"a lot of properties in Paterson." Defense
counsel objected. The mayor asked to complete
his statement, and Respondent gave him
permission. The mayor said: "Justice delayed
is not justice." He continued, saying that
there are many "absentee landlords who have
attempted to speculate off the backs of the
people of this city." He continued over the
objections of defense counsel until Respondent
said that the Mayor's remarks were relevant on
the subject of sentencing should the defendant
be found guilty.
After additional testimony by the
defendant, the Mayor interrupted once again and
said that he had "a personal matter I have to
attend to." Respondent replied: "All right.
Because I would like you to speak if you want.
It's just that now really isn't the right time.
But the Prosecutor can handle it." The Mayor
replied: "I think the record is enough. He
won't need me." Respondent said: "Alright.
You're welcome to speak if he is found guilty."
The Mayor thanked Respondent and counsel and
said: "The point is just the beginning. I
intend to be back on other issues and in other
cases so that landlords understand that they're
not going to do what they've done for 30 years
in this city. Period." With that promise of
future intervention, the Mayor departed.
After additional testimony, Respondent
made his decision. He found the defendant
Martinez guilty but deferred sentencing. When
delivering his decision, Respondent justified
the remarks made by the Mayor and repeated the
pretext on which he had relied in overruling
objections of defense counsel: both parties
had written to the Mayor asking him to
intervene.
The Committee found that "[b]y insisting, over the objections of defense counsel, that the Mayor participate in the proceeding even though he was not an attorney and not
called by either side as a witness, respondent unnecessarily
and improperly injected politics into a court
proceeding. . ."; and that
By permitting the Mayor to make a speech
that was both political in nature and
prejudicial to the interests of the defendant
and by sanctioning the Mayor's taking over the
proceedings as if he were the judge, respondent
created for those present the appearance that
the municipal court was subject to the
direction and control of the Mayor of the
municipality.
The Committee found that this appearance was strengthened by
the fact that Respondent's decisions in the case were exactly
what the Mayor had argued for. It concluded that each of
these aspects of Respondent's conduct violated Canons 1, 2A,
and 7A(3) of the Code of Judicial Conduct and prejudiced the
administration of justice by bringing the judicial office into
disrepute. See Rule 2:15-8(a)(6).
The Committee's opinion continues as follows:
Four years ago, the Supreme Court publicly
reprimanded two Judges of the Superior Court
for attending the Inaugural Ball held in honor
of the new Governor. In the accompanying
statement on behalf of the Court, the Chief
Justice observed:
There is no principle governing the
judiciary in this state more firmly
established or more important than
the total separation of judges from
politics. See Clark v. De Fino,
80 N.J. 539, 547 (1979); In re Gaulkin,
69 N.J. 185, 191 (1976); In re
Hayden,
41 N.J. 443 (1964); In re
Pagliughi,
39 N.J. 517 (1963). The
principle is an essential ingredient
of judicial independence; it is
probably the most important
requirement for maintaining public
confidence in the judiciary. The
rule is so clear, the tradition in
this state so strong, that it is
rarely violated. In New Jersey,
judges and politics do not mix -- not
at all, either in fact or in
appearance.
125 N.J.L.J. 243
(February 1, 1990).
In the present matter, Judge Fenster not only
permitted the Mayor to speak in court about a
case in which the Mayor was not properly a
witness, but he overrode the objections of the
attorney for the defendants in championing the
appropriateness of the Mayor's doing so. The
Mayor was not a witness in the case, and
neither party sought to have him testify as a
witness. When he spoke, what he had to say was
political in nature, and he even suggested that
he controlled the court by saying in his
parting remark that he intended to return to
court on other issues so that landlords would
understand they could no longer get away with
what they had gotten away with for years.
Judge Fenster did nothing to correct the
impression that the Mayor could control the
court; rather, by urging the appropriateness of
the Mayor's speaking, Judge Fenster reinforced
this notion.
The Mayor had no business before the
court. He was not a witness. He had no direct
knowledge concerning the case in question.
Indeed, had he been a witness in the case,
venue would have been transferred to another
municipality in order to avoid any appearance
of impropriety. Under these circumstances, it
is all the more improper for Respondent to have
acted as he did in promoting the Mayor's
appearance.
As the Chief Justice also observed in the
above mentioned statement on behalf of the
Supreme Court:
The question is whether the public
might believe the judge is somehow
involved in politics or might have
some doubt about whether the judge is
totally and completely independent of
politics, politicians, and political
influence. In practice our
application of the prohibition is
almost harsh. The issue is not
whether a reasonable person would
probably conclude the judge had
become vulnerable to political
influence, but whether there is a
fair possibility that some portion of
the public might become concerned on
that score. And, as in many other
instances concerning the conduct of
judges, the appearances count as much
as the facts. Id.
Judge Fenster's conduct in this matter
went far beyond what is necessary for "a fair
possibility that some portion of the public
might become concerned" that he would be
vulnerable to political influence. Indeed,
the only reasonable inference that can be drawn
from his conduct and remarks regarding the
Mayor's speaking, is that the Judge wanted to
please the Mayor, who was his appointing
authority as he mentioned more than once during
the proceeding; at the formal hearing, Judge
Fenster denied that this was his motive (T85-7
to 88-5), but the Committee does not believe
him. This inference is unacceptable, as is the
conduct that gave rise to it. What is worse is
that what the Mayor eventually said was
political in nature and implied that he was in
a position not only to influence but to control
the court. This undermines the principles of
judicial independence and separation of powers.
As noted above, the Committee concluded that
Judge Fenster's conduct, in the face of
the long standing prohibition against the
intrusion of politics into the courtroom,
requires a more severe sanction than public
reprimand. The Committee respectfully submits
that he should be censured.
We agree in all respects with the conclusions of the
Committee except for the extent of discipline. Despite the
Judge's fine record, reputation, and service to the public,
his conduct calls for more than censure, severe as that
punishment is to any judge. It requires suspension. But for
the absence of any direct benefit to the Judge and the absence
of any evidence on this record of any complicity with the
Mayor's conduct, removal would be required.
This Judge permitted the political independence of the
judiciary to be destroyed in his courtroom, in open court.
Over the strong objections of counsel, he knowingly and
aggressively turned over the quasi-criminal proceedings before
him to the Mayor, allowing him to speak under oath in favor of
swift and severe punishment of the defendant and of all others
in the future. The Judge did not even object to the Mayor's
parting assurance that he would see to it that all future
proceedings of this kind were handled by the court in
accordance with the Mayor's notion of justice.
These proceedings involved a mayor, not a building
inspector or other administrative official aiding in the
prosecution of some code violation; a mayor, not just aiding
the prosecution, but attempting to dictate the outcome; a
mayor, the official who appoints the judge.
The Mayor's concerns with the municipal courts'
handling of housing violations may have been justified, and if
so, he had every right to make those concerns known. He had
every right to deliver his message, including, if he saw fit,
severe criticism of the court; he could announce it at a press
conference, at a public gathering, at a meeting of the
governing body, or at any other place and in any way designed
to reach the public with the full impact that he may have
sought to achieve. We seek no muting of public officials'
criticism of the judiciary. But, although he apparently did
not realize it, he had no right to take over a courtroom and
to deliver that message as part of a pending quasi-criminal
proceeding as a self-appointed "witness" and to imply that he
was somehow going to control that court in the future. In
this country, judges control the court; judges decide the
case; not mayors or other public officials. Clearly, having
taken his action in open court in full view of everyone, the
Mayor did not believe that he was doing anything wrong; but
for our purposes, that is beside the point. Our concern is
not with the Mayor but with the Judge. He permitted the
conduct, he encouraged it, despite his clear duty to prohibit
it, and he did so continuously over the strong objections of
counsel, time and time again, during these relatively
protracted proceedings.
The most persistent and serious threat to the
excellence of our municipal courts has been the potential of
political influence, a threat apparent from the experience of
history, and arising from the institutional provisions of the
court. Its judges have no tenure; their careers and
livelihoods are dependent on the will of elected officials.
Given those limitations, the extent of political independence
of our municipal court judges has been an enormous
accomplishment. The credit goes to the judiciary, and
especially to the judges themselves, along with those mayors
and other elected officials who have made it possible.
Political independence was perhaps the most serious problem
facing the judiciary in 1948 and one on which remarkable
progress has been made. Its achievement has been a precious
accomplishment for our citizens, and we will not allow it to
be jeopardized in the least.
Clearly this judge's misconduct and culpability does
not approach the venality of a clandestine "fix" in which a
mayor decides the case through the mouth of the judge. But
unless the message of condemnation is unmistakable, the
potential damage is profound. We will not allow the political
independence of the municipal courts to be affected even
slightly by speculation about how much a judge may do to
accommodate the political, social, or legislative agenda of
the mayor, whether that agenda be evil or benign. In his or
her judicial role, the judge may do so not at all, not in the
least, never. There is nothing more important to the
judiciary than its independence, especially its independence
from political influence. That truth resonates throughout the
judiciary, but nowhere more than in the municipal courts.
Judge Fenster is suspended without pay for a period of
six months, effective immediately.
So ordered.
Chief Justice Wilentz and Justices Clifford, Handler,
Pollock, O'Hern, Garibaldi, and Stein join in this opinion.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
D-
55 September Term 1994
IN THE MATTER OF
JUDGE PHILIP A. FENSTER,
O R D E R
A Judge of the
Paterson Municipal Court.
JUDGE PHILIP A. FENSTER of the Paterson Municipal Court
having been Ordered to Show Cause why he should not be publicly
disciplined for violations of Canons 1, 2A, and 7A(3) of the Code
of Judicial Conduct and Rule 2:15-8(a)(6);
And the Court having reviewed the record and having
considered the arguments of counsel;
And good cause appearing;
IT IS ORDERED that JUDGE PHILIP A. FENSTER is suspended
without pay for six months, effective immediately; and it is
further
ORDERED that pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2B:12-6 and Rule 1:12-3,
the Assignment Judge of Passaic County shall appoint an acting
judge to serve in the Paterson Municipal Court during
respondent's suspension or until such time as the municipality
appoints a judge pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2B:12-5(a)(2) or N.J.S.A.
2B:12-4.
WITNESS, the Honorable Robert N. Wilentz, Chief Justice, at
Trenton, this 18th day of November, 1994.
Clerk of the Supreme Court
NO. D-55 SEPTEMBER TERM 1994
Application for
Disposition Six-month suspension
Decided November 18, 1994
Order returnable
Opinion by PER CURIAM