(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for
the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please
note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).
Submitted January 18, 1995 -- Decided March 31, 1995
PER CURIAM
Lawrence A. Magid (Magid) was admitted to the New Jersey bar in 1969. On December 7, 1993,
Magid pleaded guilty to the disorderly persons offense of simple assault. That offense arose out of an
incident that occurred on September 25, 1993, wherein Magid punched, kicked, and knocked down his
girlfriend of several months, K.P. At the time of this incident, Magid was the First Assistant Prosecutor of
Gloucester County.
This disciplinary proceeding arose from a Motion for Final Discipline Based Upon Criminal
Conviction filed by the Office of Attorney Ethics (OAE) before the Disciplinary Review Board (DRB),
seeking final discipline of Magid based on the simple assault conviction.
The DRB found that Magid had engaged in unethical conduct. Four members recommended that
Magid be publicly reprimanded. Two members would have imposed a private reprimand.
HELD: Lawrence G. Magid is publicly reprimanded for his criminal conviction of the disorderly persons
offense of simple assault.
1. A criminal conviction is conclusive evidence of guilt in a disciplinary proceeding. Thus, the only issue to
be determined is the extent of the discipline to be imposed. In making that determination, the Court
considers the interests of the public, the bar, and the attorney. (p. 3)
2. Magid's conviction of the disorderly persons offense of simple assault is clear and convincing evidence
that he has violated RPC 8.4(b). The fact that Magid's misconduct did not directly involve the practice of
law or a client is of no moment because private misconduct of attorneys can also be the subject of discipline.
New Jersey has a strong public policy against domestic violence. (pp. 4-5)
3. There are mitigating factors in this case: the assault by Magid was an isolated incident; there was no
pattern of abusive behavior; the assault lasted for a very short period of time; the intense negative publicity
adversely affected Magid's career; at the time of the assault, Magid's son was critically ill; Magid's
relationship with K.P. was a troubled one; and Magid had an otherwise unblemished professional record.
Nonetheless, those mitigating factors do not excuse the attack nor do they obviate the need for public
discipline. Magid held a public office through which he was to combat, not commit, acts of domestic
violence. (pp. 5-7)
4. There are few reported attorney ethics cases involving domestic violence and, as such, the Court has not
previously addressed the discipline to be imposed on an attorney who is convicted of such conduct.
Moreover, Magid did not engage in a pattern of abusive behavior. Had neither of those factors existed,
Magid would have received discipline greater than what is now imposed. In the future, however, an attorney
convicted of an act of domestic violence will ordinarily be suspended from the practice of law.
CHIEF JUSTICE WILENTZ and JUSTICES HANDLER, POLLOCK, O'HERN, GARIBALDI,
STEIN and COLEMAN join in the Court's opinion.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
D-
98 September Term l994
IN THE MATTER OF
LAWRENCE G. MAGID,
An Attorney at Law.
Submitted January l8, l995 -- Decided March 31, 1995
On consideration of why respondent should not
be disbarred or otherwise disciplined.
Robyn M. Hill, Chief Counsel, submitted a
recommendation for discipline on behalf of
Disciplinary Review Board.
Maressa, Goldstein, Birsner, Patterson,
Drinkwater & Oddo, attorneys for respondent.
PER CURIAM
This disciplinary proceeding arose from a Motion for Final
Discipline Based Upon a Criminal Conviction filed by the Office
of Attorney Ethics (OAE) before the Disciplinary Review Board
(DRB), seeking final discipline of Lawrence Magid, pursuant to
Rule l:20-6(c)(2)(i). That motion was based on respondent's
conviction of simple assault, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:l2-la(l).
The DRB found that respondent had engaged in unethical
conduct. Four members recommended that respondent be publicly
reprimanded. Two members would have imposed a private reprimand.
Our independent review of the record leads us to accept the DRB's
recommendation.
Respondent was admitted to the bar in l969. At the time of the assault he had been an attorney with the Prosecutor's Office of Gloucester County for more than sixteen years. The DRB accurately sets forth the relevant facts in its Decision and Recommendation:
On September 28, l993, a complaint was filed in Woodbury Heights Municipal Court charging respondent with the disorderly persons offense of assault, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:l2-la(l). The complaint charged respondent with attempting "to cause bodily injury to [K.P.], specifically by punching her in the head and face area causing a black eye, knocking her to the ground and kicking her in the neck, head, and lower back, causing other bruising". The incident in question occurred on the evening of September 25, l993, at Badges, a private club in Woodbury Heights, frequented by law enforcement personnel. At the time of the incident, respondent was the First Assistant Prosecutor of Gloucester County. The victim, [K.P.] was also employed by the Gloucester County Prosecutor's Office and had been dating respondent for several months. As a result of this incident, respondent was discharged from his position in the prosecutor's office.
On December 7, l993, respondent pleaded
guilty to assaulting [K.P.]. The plea was
taken by Superior Court Judge Robert W. Page,
sitting as Municipal Court Judge for the
Woodbury Heights Municipal Court.
At sentencing on February 7, l993, Judge Page
placed respondent on probation for a period
of one year, fined him $250, and administered
a $50 violent crime penalty. As conditions
of probation, Judge Page required that
respondent have no contact with [K.P.] and be
responsible for any medical expenses incurred
by her. He also directed respondent to
continue treatment with his psychiatrist and
remain drug- and alcohol-free during the
course of his probation.
A criminal conviction is conclusive evidence of guilt in a disciplinary proceeding. R. l:20-6(c)(l). The sole issue to be determined is the extent of discipline to be imposed. R. l:20-6(c)(2)(ii); In re Lunetta, ll 8 N.J. 443, 445 (l989); In re Goldberg, l 05 N.J. 278, 280 (l987); In re Tuso, l 04 N.J. 59, 6l (l986). In determining appropriate discipline, we consider the interests of the public, the bar, and the respondent. In re Litwin, l 04 N.J. 362, 365 (l986); In re Mischlich, 60 N.J. 590, 593 (l977). The appropriate discipline depends on many factors, including the "nature and severity of the crime, whether the crime is related to the practice of law, and any mitigating factors such as respondent's reputation, his prior trustworthy conduct, and general good conduct." In re Lunetta, supra, ll8 N.J. at 445, 446; In re Kushner, l0l N.J. 397, 400-0l (l986). Although we do not make an independent examination of the underlying facts to ascertain guilt, we do consider them relevant to the nature and extent of discipline to be imposed. In re Goldberg, supra, l05 N.J. at 280; In re Rosen, 88 N.J. l (l98l).
Respondent's conviction of the disorderly persons offense of simple assault is clear and convincing evidence that he has violated RPC 8.4(b) (by committing a criminal act that reflects adversely on his honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer). The primary purpose of discipline is not to punish the attorney but to preserve the confidence of the public in the bar. We judge each case on its own facts. In re Kushner, supra, l0l N.J. at 400.
That respondent's misconduct did not directly involve the practice of law or a client is of little moment. It is well-established that the private conduct of attorneys may be the subject of public discipline. In re Bock, l 28 N.J. 270, 274 (l992). The reason for that rule is
not a desire to supervise the private lives of attorneys but rather that the character of a man is single and hence misconduct revealing a deficiency is not less compelling because the attorney was not wearing his professional mantle at the time. Private misconduct and professional misconduct differ only in the intensity with which they reflect upon fitness at the bar. This is not to say that a court should view in some prissy way the personal affairs of its officers, but rather that if misbehavior persuades a man of normal sensibilities that the attorney lacks capacity to discharge his professional duties with honor and integrity, the public must be protected from him.
Both this case and In re Principato, ___ N.J. ___ (l995), also decided today, involve acts of domestic violence. The
national spotlight is focused on domestic violence. Between
three and four million women each year are battered by husbands,
partners, and boyfriends. Domestic Violence: Not Just A Family
Matter: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime and Criminal Justice
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, l03rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (June
30, l994) (statement of Senator Joseph Biden, Jr.). The New
Jersey Legislature has found that
domestic violence is a serious crime against
society; that there are thousands of persons
in this State who are regularly beaten,
tortured and in some cases even killed by
their spouses or cohabitants; that a
significant number of women who are assaulted
are pregnant; that victims of domestic
violence come from all social and economic
backgrounds and ethnic groups; that there is
a positive correlation between spousal abuse
and child abuse; and that children, even when
they are not themselves physically assaulted,
suffer deep and lasting emotional effects
from exposure to domestic violence. It is
therefore, the intent of the Legislature to
assure the victims of domestic violence the
maximum protection from abuse the law can
provide.
Based on those findings, the Legislature enacted one of the
toughest domestic violence laws in the nation. N.J.S.A. 2C:25-l7
to -33. During the last decade the number of complaints filed in
New Jersey courts has increased from l3,842 in fiscal year l984
to 55,639 in l994, an increase of 302 percent. Dana Coleman,
Domestic violence charges explode by 302" in decade, New Jersey
Lawyer, Feb. l3, l995, at l (citing the Administrative Office of
the Courts).
We have not yet addressed the appropriate discipline to be imposed on an attorney convicted of an act of domestic violence. There are few reported attorney ethics cases that involve acts of domestic violence. In re Nevill, 704 P.2d l332 (Cal. l985) (disbarring attorney who was convicted of voluntary manslaughter of his wife whom he shot ten times); In re Knight, 883 P.2d l055 (Colo. l994) (holding that attorney's conviction of third-degree assault of his wife that arose from three days of severe beatings warranted six-month suspension); In re Wallace, 837 P.2d l223 (Colo. l992) (imposing three-month suspension from practice of law on attorney who assaulted his girlfriend more than once and who on one occasion entered plea of guilty to assault); In re Walker, 597 N.E 2d l27l (Ind. l992) (imposing six-month suspension on part-time prosecutor for physically assaulting his female companion and her daughter); In re Runyon, 49l N.E.2d l89 (Ind. l986) (disbarring attorney who forced entry into former wife's apartment, struck former wife with club, held her at gunpoint and who additionally was convicted of three felony counts of possession of unregistered firearms); Committee on Professional Ethics and Conduct of the Iowa State Bar Association v. Patterson, 369 N.W.2d 798 (Iowa l985) (imposing three-month suspension from practice of law on attorney convicted of assault for severely beating his girlfriend for two hours while her four-year-old son was at home and aware of the assault).
Respondent's assault was an isolated incident on an
otherwise unblemished professional record. Unlike Nevill, Knight
and Wallace, there is no pattern of abusive behavior. And unlike
Wallace, Runyon and Patterson, the actual assault lasted for a
very short period of time. Moreover, the intense negative
publicity has drastically affected respondent's career. As a
result of this incident, respondent lost his long-term position
in the Prosecutor's Office. Other mitigating factors also
existed at the time of the assault, such as respondent's son's
critical illness and his troubled relationship with Ms. Perry.
However, those mitigating factors neither excuse the attack nor
obviate the necessity for public discipline.
Acts of violence are condemned in our society. As we stated
in In re Principato, supra, ___ N.J. ___ (slip op. at ___),
"Unlike many other `victimless' disorderly persons offenses,
domestic violence offenses always involve victims, often-times
vulnerable and defenseless." The Legislature was particularly
concerned that police and judicial personnel be trained "in the
procedures and enforcement of this act, and about the social and
psychological context in which domestic violence occurs."
N.J.S.A. 2C:25-l8. It is therefore important that victims of
domestic violence understand that prosecutors, as members of law
enforcement, are sensitive to their problems. As a prosecutor
respondent must combat acts of domestic violence, not commit
them. This "incident calls into question his ability to
zealously prosecute or effectively work with the victims of such
crimes." In re Walker, supra,
597 N.E 2d at l27l (Ind. l992).
Attorneys who hold public office are invested with a public
trust and are thereby more visible to the public. Such attorneys
are held to the highest of standards. "Respondent's conduct must
be viewed from the perspective of an informed and concerned
private citizen and be judged in the context of whether the image
of the bar would be diminished if such conduct were not publicly
disapproved." In re McLaughlin, l
05 N.J. 457, 46l (l987)
(citation omitted).
Respondent's conduct was a serious violation of RPC 8.4(b).
But for the fact that we have not previously addressed the
appropriate discipline to be imposed on an attorney who is
convicted of an act of domestic violence, and that respondent did
not engage in a pattern of abusive behavior, respondent's
discipline would be greater than the public reprimand we hereby
impose. We caution members of the bar, however, that the Court
in the future will ordinarily suspend an attorney who is
convicted of an act of domestic violence.
Respondent shall reimburse the Disciplinary Oversight
Committee for appropriate administrative costs.
Chief Justice Wilentz and Justices Handler, Pollock, O'Hern, Garibaldi, Stein, and Coleman join in this opinion.
NO. D-98 SEPTEMBER TERM 1994
Application for
Disposition Public Reprimand
Decided March 31, 1995 Order returnable Opinion by Per Curiam