(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for
the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please
note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).
Argued October 21, 1997 -- Decided January 9, 1998
PER CURIAM
This is an attorney disciplinary case. Lester T. Vincenti is an attorney who was admitted to practice
in l97l. Since then, he has been the subject of numerous ethics proceedings resulting in three separate terms
of suspension. Those suspensions stemmed from Vincenti's pattern of abuse, intimidation and contempt
toward judges, witnesses, opposing counsel and other attorneys. He continues to serve one of those terms of
suspension to date.
In the present matter, Vincenti (respondent) was charged with multiple ethics offenses, including,
but not limited to, overreaching; making false statements of material fact to a tribunal; knowingly disobeying
a court order; engaging in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal; failure to cooperate with a disciplinary
authority; engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; and conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice. These charges were the result of Vincenti's misconduct in two
separate litigation matters.
In one matter, Vincenti had agreed to represent J.D. in a federal civil rights action against the
Division of Youth and Family Services (DYFS), which had filed a petition to terminate J.D.'s parental
rights. J.D. was represented in the termination action by an appointed attorney. Vincenti's agreed role in
that action was to observe the proceedings to assist him in representing J.D. in the federal litigation.
Vincenti was to receive a fee only from the proceeds of the recovery, if any, in the federal litigation. Despite
Vincenti's agreed role in the termination action, he essentially took over the defense of J.D. After forty
days of trial, the judge who had been presiding over the termination action entered an order barring Vincenti
from participating in that action, citing Vincenti's repeated obstruction of the judicial process, his violation
of the Rules of Professional Conduct, and his unnecessary elongation of the matter by virtue of his intrusion
into the litigation. Shortly after entering that order, the judge referred the matter to the District X Ethics
Committee.
Essentially, during that trial, Vincenti had been repeatedly disrespectful to the judge and had
engaged in a pattern of harassment of various witnesses, including expert witnesses offered as part of
DYFS's case. In addition, Vincenti had embarked on personal attacks against not only DYFS's witnesses,
but also on opposing counsel. His verbal personal attacks continued through the appeal process, when
Vincenti was, several times over, ordered to discontinue his appearance in the matter in any court. In
support of his various appeals and motions, Vincenti included certifications containing false statements. In
addition, Vincenti made misrepresentations to J.D. about the appeals and the federal litigation he had
promised to file in her behalf.
Finally, after the conclusion of the termination matter, Vincenti began to repeatedly press J.D. to
send him funds, despite the fact that he was entitled to no fee in that action, as J.D. had been represented by
appointed counsel and not respondent. That notwithstanding, when J.D. finally sent Vincenti $5,000, which
she had borrowed from relatives, he applied the funds to payment of his fee in the termination action. In
addition, he continued to threaten to sue her for the unpaid balance of his fee in the termination matter. He
never filed a civil rights action in J.D.'s behalf.
From the beginning of the Office of Attorney Ethics' (OAE) investigation of this matter, Vincenti
failed to cooperate and made several misrepresentations regarding his ability to appear to assist in the
investigation and the availability of his files in the matter.
In the other matter in which he was charged with misconduct, Vincenti again displayed rude and
disrespectful behavior toward both a witness and opposing counsel. When opposing counsel later scheduled
a deposition of Vincenti's client, Vincenti again engaged in obstructive and abusive behavior toward counsel.
Furthermore, at the conclusion of the deposition, Vincenti struck opposing counsel in the torso. He then
accused opposing counsel of striking him, when, in fact, the court reporter had clearly observed that it was
Vincenti who had struck counsel.
The special master in the matters found Vincenti guilty of all of the charged ethics violations. After
describing his conduct as evidencing “his rancorous disposition and his utter contempt for the basic
sensitivities of other people,” the special master recommended that Vincenti be disbarred. The special
master considered Vincenti's “capacity for distortion, outright misrepresentation and assaultive conduct [to
be] boundless.” The Disciplinary Review Board (DRB) agreed with the special master's findings and issued
a report recommending his disbarment.
The Supreme Court issued an Order to Show Cause why Vincenti should not be disbarred or
otherwise disciplined.
HELD: The full opinion of the DRB is adopted. The only appropriate sanction for Vincenti's misconduct
is disbarment. The Court is forced to conclude that it can no longer expose judges, lawyers, litigants,
witnesses, and the public to the inexcusable conduct of a renegade attorney.
It is ORDERED that respondent be disbarred from the practice of law, effective immediately.
CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES HANDLER, POLLOCK, O'HERN, GARIBALDI,
STEIN, and COLEMAN join in the Court's opinion.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
D-
10 September Term 1997
IN THE MATTER OF
LESTER T. VINCENTI,
An Attorney At Law.
Argued October 21, 1997 -- Decided January 9, 1998
On an Order to show cause why respondent
should not be disbarred or otherwise
disciplined.
JoAnn G. Eyler, Assistant Ethics Counsel,
argued the cause on behalf of the Office of
Attorney Ethics (Lee A. Gronikowski, Deputy
Ethics Counsel, on the letter brief).
Lester T. Vincenti argued the cause pro se.
PER CURIAM
Over the past fourteen years, respondent, Lester T.
Vincenti, has been the subject of no fewer than three reported
decisions concerning violations of the Rules of Professional
Conduct. Several themes run throughout respondent's unique
disciplinary history. One is disrespect, even contempt, for
judges, lawyers, parties, witnesses, and the judicial process.
To characterize his conduct as unprofessional, irrational,
intemperate, insolent, arrogant, abusive, insulting, harassing,
scurrilous, and misleading -- as it has been characterized in his
various disciplinary proceedings -- is to minimize its impact on
the administration of justice.
Respondent is currently under suspension for violations
unrelated to the present matter. Nothing in the record inspires
confidence that if respondent were to return to practice that his
conduct would improve. Given his lengthy disciplinary history
and the absence of any hope for improvement, we expect that his
assault on the Rules of Professional Conduct would continue. Our
responsibility to the bench, bar, and the public requires that we
take final and irrevocable action.
With sedulous dedication to detail, the Special Master and
the Disciplinary Review Board (DRB) have documented respondent's
transgressions. Both the Special Master and the DRB have
recommended that respondent be disbarred. Our independent review
of the record leads us to adopt the full opinion of the DRB as
our own. In adopting the DRB report, we have omitted supporting
references to exhibits and the transcripts. Those omissions have
led to the further elimination of some footnotes and the
renumbering of others. Subject to those changes, the DRB opinion
follows.
This matter was before the Board based on a recommendation
for
disbarment filed by Special Master Melvin P. Antell, P.J.A.D.
(retired and temporarily assigned on recall). The Office of
Attorney Ethics (“OAE”) filed two complaints in this matter. In
Docket No. XIV-95-134E respondent was charged with violations of
RPC 1.4(b) (failure to explain matter to permit client to make
informed decisions), RPC 1.5(a) (overreaching), RPC 3.1
(asserting a frivolous issue), RPC 3.2 (failure to expedite
litigation), RPC 3.3(a)(1) (making false statement of material
fact to a tribunal), RPC 3.4(c) (knowingly disobeying a court
order), RPC 3.4(e) (alluding at trial to irrelevant matters and
stating personal opinions as to the justness of a cause and the
credibility of a witness), RPC 3.5(c) (conduct intended to
disrupt a tribunal), RPC 4.4 (using means that have no purpose
other than to embarrass, delay or burden a third person), RPC
7.5(e) (using phrase “Legal Clinic” on letterhead without
informing clients of lack of affiliation with a public, quasi-public or charitable organization), RPC 8.1(b), in concert with
Rule 1:20-3(g)(3) (failure to cooperate with a disciplinary
authority), RPC 8.4(c) (conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit or misrepresentation), and RPC 8.4(d) (conduct prejudicial
to the administration of justice). In Docket No. XIV-95-406E
respondent was charged with a violation of RPC 3.2 (failure to
expedite litigation) and RPC 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice).
Respondent was admitted to the New Jersey bar in 1971. He
has an extensive ethics history. In 1983, he was suspended for
one year for displaying a pattern of abuse, intimidation and
contempt toward judges, witnesses, opposing counsel and other
attorneys. He engaged in intentional, reprehensible behavior,
including insults, vulgar profanities and physical intimidation,
consisting of, among other things, poking his finger in another
attorney's chest and bumping the attorney with his stomach and
then his shoulder. In re Vincenti,
92 N.J. 591 (1983).
In 1989, respondent was again suspended, this time for three
months, for challenging opposing counsel and a witness to fight;
for using loud, abusive and profane language against his
adversary and an opposing witness; and for using racial innuendo
on at least one occasion. He also called a deputy attorney
general a vulgar name, was extremely abusive toward a judge's law
clerk and told her that she was incompetent. In re Vincenti,
114 N.J. 275 (1989). In 1994, respondent received an admonition for
failing to comply with discovery requests in a disciplinary
matter, despite repeated requests from the panel chair, and for
falsely testifying at the ethics hearing that he had personally
served a subpoena, knowing that to be untrue. In the Matter of
Lester T. Vincenti, Docket No. DRB 94-303 (November 30, 1994).
Finally, effective March 12, 1997, respondent was suspended
for one year, with reinstatement conditioned on demonstration of
fitness to practice law. His misconduct in that case consisted
of violating the recordkeeping provisions of R.1:21-6,
negligently misappropriating client funds and engaging in conduct
intended to disrupt a tribunal. In re Vincenti,
147 N.J. 460
(1997). He is currently serving that suspension.
There are no ethics matters pending against respondent.
I. The A.R.S. Matter - Docket No. XIV-95-134E
The Division of Youth and Family Services (“DYFS”) filed a petition in Superior Court to terminate the parental rights of J.D.,See footnote 1 the natural mother of A.R.S. The matter, captioned In re A.R.S., was tried before Judge Gerald B. Hanifan. Barbara
Einhorn, an attorney employed by Somerset-Sussex Legal Services,
represented J.D., while a Deputy Attorney General (“DAG”)
represented DYFS. In addition, James Valenti was appointed and
served as law guardian for the child, A.R.S.
On September 30, 1991, the first day of the trial,
respondent appeared as a “volunteer” to assist Einhorn in her
defense of J.D. According to J.D., Einhorn, who was acquainted
with respondent, mentioned the termination of parental rights
litigation to respondent. He expressed interest in a potential
federal lawsuit against DYFS for violating J.D.'s civil rights.
Accordingly, respondent's agreed role at the trial was to observe
the proceedings to assist him in representing J.D. in the federal
litigation. The fee agreement between J.D. and respondent
provided that respondent would receive a fee only from the
proceeds of the recovery, if any, in the federal litigation.
Although not counsel of record, respondent took over the defense,
cross-examining the witnesses called by DYFS to testify. The
A.R.S. matter consumed more than forty trial days between
September 1991 and May 1992.
On May 7, 1992, Judge Hanifan entered an order, on his own
motion, removing respondent from participation in the case for
all matters, including trial appearances, because respondent
“ha[d] repeatedly been obstructive of the Judicial Process and
violative of the Rules of Professional Conduct, and having caused
unnecessary delay by his intrusion in this matter.” Shortly
thereafter, on May 14, 1992, Judge Hanifan referred the matter to
the District X Ethics Committee.See footnote 2
During the A.R.S. trial, respondent was repeatedly
disrespectful to Judge Hanifan. He constantly interrupted the
Judge, particularly when he was ruling on objections or motions.
For example, respondent interrupted Judge Hanifan by asserting
that respondent's purpose in the case “all along has been to get
you to correct your mistakes as far as the defense is concerned.
. . .” Shortly thereafter, Judge Hanifan attempted to rule that
neither respondent nor the DAG could contact a particular expert
until his report was completed:
The Court: It goes for both sides. The only
person really can talk --
Mr. Vincenti: Oh, oh certainly, I mean we, we
have given so many indications of attempting
to interfere with, with D.Y.F.S.'s witnesses
all along.
The Court: Counsel, I'm just trying to set
it, set it for --
Mr. Vincenti: My, my, my --
The Court: -- for Mr. Valenti so he --
Mr. Vincenti: -- we must be protected.
Mr. Vincenti: I object to your comments. It shows nothing but prejudice and bias.
The Court: Fine. Fine.
Mr. Vincenti: You make a ruling and then you decide that simply because [the DAG] doesn't like it, you're going to change your ruling. How many times do you think you --
The Court: That's that's --
Mr. Vincenti: -- have to do than --
The Court: Counsel --
Mr. Vincenti: -- in order to be shown on the
record for the Appellate Courts in this State
to be biased and prejudiced?
Respondent's defense in the termination of parental rights
case was based, in part, on his ill-founded theory that Judge
Hanifan, DYFS staff, the witnesses called by DYFS, and the DAG
were engaged in a conspiracy to deprive respondent's client,
J.D., of her civil and constitutional rights to custody of her
child. In this regard, respondent continued his sarcastic and
insulting remarks during another objection:
The Court: Counsel -- hang on.
Mr. Vincenti: She doesn't want us to develop
the line to prove it because she's involved
in the conspiracy.
The Court: Couns --
Mr. Vincenti: I have every right in the world
to prove it even to you, Judge.
The Court: Would you. Would you let me speak
counsel, please.
Mr. Vincent: In your bias and prejudice.
The Court: Would you please let me speak?
Mr. Vincenti: I'm done.
The Court: Thank you.
Mr. Vincenti: I have the right to make statements
on the record.
During his questioning of witnesses, respondent often asked
multi-part questions that the witnesses were not able to answer.
When Judge Hanifan requested respondent to repeat the question,
the following colloquy occurred:
Mr. Vincenti: I don't know. I think I'm
using the English language.
The Court: Counsel, I asked you nicely.
Don't argue with me please. Just break it
apart.
Mr. Vincenti: I'm not arguing with you.
The Court: That's what it sounds like, counsel.
Mr. Vincenti: Well I'm sorry for that. But
that's your misperception, not mine.
Subsequently, Judge Hanifan asked a question of a witness
during respondent's cross-examination and the following exchange
took place:
Mr. Vincenti: I can't help it if the people
in this Courtroom are not able to follow my
questioning. . . . Your [sic] interfering
with my conduct of this cross examination.
The Court: Yes. I am. When I, when I get
confused --
Mr. Vincenti: And I object to it.
The Court: You can object all you want, counsel.
Mr. Vincenti: I certainly will
The Court: When you, when you can -- will you
please, counsel. That's -- you're being rude
now.
Mr. Vincenti: And so are you.
Finally, the following excerpts from the A.R.S. trial
transcripts demonstrate respondent's disrespect for the court:
The Court: Counsel, your tone is difficult
for me to handle on a day to day basis.
Mr. Vincenti: I apologize for that, but your
rulings in this case --
The Court: I, well I'm, I'm telling --
Mr. Vincenti: -- are beyond belief.
The Court: Counsel, it's, it's those kind of
comments that, that make it difficult for me
to process this matter.
Mr. Vincenti: Well then you know what, what
remedies you have.
Mr. Vincenti: Oh, I've had my chance?
The Court: You've had your chance, yes, you did.
Mr. Vincenti: Oh, you permitted her to cut me off
to be discourteous --
The Court: Please sit down and be quiet, counsel.
Mr. Vincenti: Objection.
The Court: Fine. I note your objection.
Please sit down and be quiet.
Mr. Vincenti: You're biased and prejudiced and you
know it.
As stated above, Judge Hanifan was not the only target of respondent's venomous attacks. Respondent's obnoxious demeanor
was also directed at opposing counsel, the DAG, and went far
beyond aggressive advocacy. Respondent repeatedly accused the
DAG of being a liar. For example, when the DAG objected to a
statement made by respondent, the following exchange ensued:
Mr. Vincenti: You're a liar.
The Court: Hang on counsel, please.
Mr. Vincenti: She is nothing but a liar.
The Court: Counsel --
Mr. Vincenti: And if you don't stop it --
The Court: No, counsel, wait --
Mr. Vincenti: You're going to stop me, right?
The Court: No, counsel --
Mr. Vincenti: Very good.
The Court: I think, I think that that's
inappropriate behavior which you're just
exhibiting.
Mr. Vincenti: Fine, make a note of it.
The Court: I am making a note of it.
Mr. Vincenti: Good.
Respondent also told Judge Hanifan “[T]his woman [the DAG]
is out of her mind, Judge.” He also insulted her with the
remark that “her ignorance is beyond repair, it's monumental.”
Respondent accused the DAG of having destroyed families in the
Superior Court for seventeen years, apparently a reference to the
fact that she had represented DYFS for that length of time. In
describing respondent's conduct toward the DAG, the special
master found that “he was invariably abusive, insulting and
profoundly vulgar.”
Respondent's treatment of the State's witnesses was equally
obnoxious. He was abusive and tried to intimidate the witnesses,
with some success. Respondent personally attacked the witnesses
during his unreasonably long and confrontational cross-examinations. He called the witnesses insulting names and
belittled the credentials of the expert witnesses.
Dr. Douglas Haymaker, a psychologist, treated J.D.'s son,
A.R.S. During cross-examination, when Haymaker did not
immediately answer respondent's question, respondent snapped:
Do you want time to think about it, Doctor?
Because I mean there seems to be a habit in
this case of witnesses who don't know what to
say to simply sit there and think and come up
with some cockamamie response to a very
serious question. Now I'd like you to answer
the question without thinking about it ad
nauseam for the next five minutes.
Respondent harassed Haymaker by asking him irrelevant
questions, such as whether he was an aficionado of pornography, a
militarist and whether he believed in military solutions to
political problems. When Haymaker testified that a statement
made by A.R.S. could not necessarily be attributed to his foster
mother, respondent sarcastically asked, “Oh, it could have come
from the froggies or the horsies or some other non-living thing,
is that right?” Respondent also accused Haymaker of having a
highly selective memory and of being “in cahoots” with the foster
parents.
In reply to one of respondent's questions, Haymaker used the
word “assume,” prompting respondent to interrupt him:
A. I assume, I assume it was a work similar
--
Q. No, don't make assumptions, I mean
that's all you've done so far is make
assumptions and speculations and give us your
opinions and conclusions. I'm not interested
in your opinions and conclusions,
speculations or assumptions, Doctor. I'm
interested in having you search your memory,
think if you can come up with what was
stupid, et cetera. Make your best effort,
Doctor. It's only a year ago. As a matter
of fact, it's not even a year ago. It's
eight months ago. That's not such a long
time ago. Tell us. I challenge you to tell
us.
Respondent's comments were particularly inappropriate
because he previously had demanded that Haymaker express his
opinions and conclusions.
During the trial, respondent referred to Haymaker as a
“liar,” “so-called psychologist,” “busy body do-gooder” and “so-called therapist.” He belittled Haymaker's therapy sessions with
A.R.S. as “your so-called game therapy, play therapy so-called.”
Respondent accused Haymaker of condoning violence, insults to
women, pornography and brutality.
Another witness called by DYFS was a social worker. At the
request of James Valenti, law guardian for A.R.S., the social
worker conducted a bonding evaluation to address the issue of
where A.R.S. should reside permanently. The social worker, too,
was the victim of harassment and intimidation by respondent. At
the ethics hearing, the social worker testified as follows about
respondent's courtroom behavior:
A. The thrust of his questions as I
experienced them had less to do with the
content than with an attempt to demean me, to
ridicule me. I felt the nature of his cross-examination was highly personalized and had
very little to do with the content or with
trying to uncover the truth of the issues.
For example, in the voir dire, he took a
tremendous amount of time asking me what
specific courses I had taken when I was in
graduate school. At the time that I
testified, I had - it had been fifteen years
since I completed my doctorate and over
twenty years since I completed my Masters
degree. He wanted to know the specific names
of the courses I had taken. I said I
couldn't remember the specific names, but I
could talk about the kinds of courses I took
and how they were related to the work that I
was doing. He ridiculed me for the fact that
I could not remember the course name and went
over that over and over again.
Respondent also made insinuations about the social worker's
sexual orientation. He suggested that she inappropriately
touched his client, J.D., during a bonding-evaluation session
with J.D. and A.R.S. Respondent attached significance to the
fact that the social worker used purple paper for taking notes in
her office, despite her explanation that it was the easiest color
for her eyes. Respondent even said that he would bring in an
expert to talk about the meaning of using purple paper.
Respondent also used sashaying and other body language to
question her sexuality. As the social worker testified at the
ethics hearing:
The Court: Did he imply what meaning he read
into this?
The Witness: My view?
The Court: Yeah.
The Witness: Given his body language, given
that it came on the heels of his suggesting
that I had touched his client, that there was
something about my sexual orientation that
was revealed by the colors of the paper and
the paper clip, as well. That's why I
mentioned the body language, also, that on
the heels of all of this and the context
within which it was raised, certainly the
implication was that there was something
about my sexual orientation that he was
alluding to.
The Court: Is that what came across to you?
The Witness: Yes absolutely, without question.
In addition, respondent took the social worker's notes from her during her testimony. He then toyed with her, refusing to
return the notes. When she asked Judge Hanifan to instruct
respondent to return the notes, respondent berated the judge for
talking to the witness.
Unfortunately for the social worker, the conclusion of the
A.R.S. trial did not signal the end of respondent's harassment
toward her. About six months after the trial ended, she and Dr.
Hagovsky, another witness who had testified in the A.R.S. matter,
were invited to participate at a conference sponsored by the
Association of Trial Lawyers of America. There was no connection
between the trial and the conference. However, in a letter to
Cary B. Cheifetz, the conference coordinator, respondent
contended that the social worker and Hagovsky held “Nazi views”
and suggested that it would be helpful if respondent attended the
conference to denounce them. Although the letter could not be
introduced into evidence because Cheifetz discarded it after
receiving it, both Cheifetz and the social worker testified at
the ethics hearing about the contents of the letter. While
respondent complained that the letter was not produced, he did
not deny having sent it.See footnote 3
As stated above, by order dated May 7, 1992, respondent was removed from the A.R.S. trial and prohibited from further participation in it. Respondent immediately filed an emergent motion for leave to appeal the order. On May 12, 1992, the Appellate Division denied the motion. In addition, respondent
filed a motion in aid of litigant's rights on short notice with
the Assignment Judge of Morris County, Judge Stanton, seeking a
mistrial and removal of Judge Hanifan from the litigation. By
letter dated May 13, 1992, Judge Stanton summarily denied the
motion, explaining that it was filed in the wrong forum. Judge
Stanton suggested that any review of Judge Hanifan's decisions be
sought in the Appellate Division.
The A.R.S. trial was concluded following four trial days
subsequent to respondent's removal from the case. Judge Hanifan
ruled in favor of DYFS, terminating J.D.'s parental rights.
Although respondent did not represent J.D. and was barred from
participating in the matter, he filed an emergent application
with the Appellate Division seeking review of Judge Hanifan's
decision. Judge Arnold M. Stein of the Appellate Division denied
respondent's application and ordered respondent not to appear
before “this or any other court in connection with this matter.”
Respondent's subsequent motions for reconsideration of the August
20, 1992, order and for recusal of Judge Stein were denied by the
Appellate Division on September 17, 1992.
On September 18, 1992, the Appellate Division
administratively dismissed the appeal as improvidently filed. On
its own motion, the Appellate Division reinstated the appeal on
October 1, 1992, in order to give J.D. the opportunity to
prosecute the appeal through other counsel. By letter dated
October 19, 1992, Emille Cox, Clerk of the Appellate Division,
notified respondent of the court's actions and the reasons
therefor. Thus, respondent was aware that he had been directed
by the Appellate Division not to appear in any court on behalf of
J.D.
Respondent should have notified J.D. of the orders entered
by the Appellate Division and should have suggested that she
pursue the appeal through Legal Services or other counsel.
Instead, respondent filed an appeal with the Supreme Court, as
well as a motion to prohibit the Appellate Division from
exercising jurisdiction over the matter. The Court dismissed the
appeal and denied the motion. Subsequently, respondent filed yet
another application with the Appellate Division, this time a
motion in aid of litigant's rights requesting, among other
things, that the prior orders of the court barring him from
appearing on behalf of J.D. be vacated, that he be named as a
party appellant to permit him to appeal Judge Hanifan's order
barring him from participating in the matter and that the A.R.S.
trial transcripts be prepared at public expense. By order of
January 14, 1993, the Appellate Division denied respondent's
motion. In light of respondent's refusal to amend the notice of
appeal to address only the May 7, 1992, order barring him from
appearing on behalf of J.D., the Appellate Division dismissed the
appeal.
Respondent filed another notice of appeal and a motion in
aid of litigant's rights with the Supreme Court. The record does
not contain an order from the Supreme Court disposing of the
appeal and motion, although it is assumed that they were
dismissed and denied, inasmuch as the Court referred the matter
to the OAE.
In support of his appeals and motions, respondent included
certifications containing the following false statements, all
without any factual basis:
1. The judge had shown an inordinate interest in the well-being of the DAG, had private conversations with her, was seen
driving in her car, was with her in his car and in general
treated her as something more than a professional.See footnote 4
2. The judge showed favoritism toward the DAG and DYFS to
the detriment of J.D. and her son and had taken it upon himself
to present certain parts of the State's case.
3. The judge had complained for weeks of an inability to
see, breathe, and comprehend what was going on and had failed to
read and understand filed materials.See footnote 5
4. The judge had broken down on the bench and had ended
respondent's participation in the case simply because he had
become red-faced, could not breathe properly and had an anxiety
attack on the bench.
5. The judge had insulted J.D. on numerous occasions and
permitted the DAG and DYFS to insult her over vigorous objections
and made light of her poverty by permitting the Sussex County
Counsel, a close friend of the judge, to belittle the defense
efforts made for her.
6. The judge engaged in religious bigotry, made religion an
issue in the case, referred disparagingly to the “Jewishness” of
respondent's co-counsel, Bonnie Einhorn, and permitted the DAG to
insult Einhorn's religion.See footnote 6
7. The judge insulted respondent and Einhorn, took joy at
being discourteous to respondent in the courtroom and belittled
the defense's efforts to prove that J.D.'s son was not doing as
well as alleged in foster care.
8. The DAG acknowledged that she kept materials relevant to
the case hidden in the trunk of her car until she was ordered to
bring them to court.
In addition to the above false statements, respondent made
misrepresentations to his client about the appeals and the
federal litigation he was to file on her behalf. He never told
her that the Appellate Division had barred him from appearing in
any court on the matter. Respondent did not notify J.D. that an
appeal of the decision to terminate her parental rights could
have been heard if she had retained other counsel. On October
14, 1992, respondent wrote the following to J.D.:
Your case on appeal is now before the New
Jersey Supreme Court without you having
cooperated with this office in any way.
Since you seem less than seriously interested
in this matter, I will simply notify you of
the results when and if the Court makes a
decision.
Moreover, on December 14, 1992, respondent advised J.D. that
the Supreme Court decided not to hear her appeal and returned the
matter to the Appellate Division. That was untrue. The matter
had not been returned to the Appellate Division, but dismissed
outright on DYFS's motion. No appeal on the merits was ever
heard.
Respondent also misrepresented to his client the status of
the promised federal civil rights litigation. Although
respondent initially became involved in J.D.'s termination of
parental rights case to observe the state court proceedings in
preparation for filing a federal civil rights action on her
behalf, no such lawsuit was ever filed. J.D. testified at the
ethics proceeding that not only did respondent state that he had
filed the lawsuit, but he requested funds from her for the
expenses of such litigation.
In at least four separate pieces of correspondence,
respondent either implied or stated directly that the federal
lawsuit was proceeding. By letter of August 4, 1992, respondent
told J.D., “I would anticipate actually beginning the federal
case within the next week or so.” Respondent represented to
J.D., in a letter dated August 19, 1992, that “I will continue on
with my work for you both in the state courts in the Appellate
Div. and in the federal district court in New Jersey. I will be
in touch with you shortly since the situation in each of these
cases is becoming critical.” Again, by letter of September 28,
1992, respondent referred to J.D.'s “cases,” implying that both
the federal and state litigation was ongoing. On October 14,
1992, respondent informed J.D. in a letter that “[t]he federal
lawsuit is in process.” Respondent did not substantiate any of
these representations, as, for example, giving J.D. a copy of the
complaint. The Clerk of the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey later confirmed, on October 17, 1995, that
respondent did not file a federal complaint on behalf of J.D.
The Special Master noted in his report that, during a
conference prior to the ethics hearing, respondent admitted that
he never filed the federal lawsuit, contending that he never
received an affidavit of indigency from J.D. which was needed to
avoid payment of the filing fee. However, there is no mention of
an affidavit of indigency in any of the correspondence from
respondent to J.D. To the contrary, by letter dated October 6,
1992, respondent told his client that “[t]he bills in your cases
have begun to run up as I had suspected they would. For example,
the filing fee alone for the federal district court complaint is
$120.”
After the conclusion of the A.R.S. trial, respondent began
repeatedly pressing J.D. to send him funds. During an
approximate seven-month period, from May 27, 1992, through
January 2, 1993, respondent sent twenty letters to his client,
many of which requested payment of fees or expenses. Respondent
took this action despite his awareness that J.D's financial
circumstances were such that she qualified for free legal
services provided by Somerset-Sussex Legal Services. As noted
above, respondent also accused Judge Hanifan of ridiculing J.D.
due to her poverty. Notwithstanding respondent's knowledge of
his client's financial situation, by letter dated March 29, 1992,
he wrote as follows:
As you know, we have advisedy [sic] you for
at least six months or so that certain things
needed to be done on your behalf in the case,
such as the subpoena of certain individuals.
That sort of things [sic] requires the
payment of money to process servers on a
timely basis. You have admatly [sic] refused
to finance this case for your own reasons....
As a client of Somerset-Sussex Legal Services, J.D. was not
financially responsible for expenses of litigation, such as
process-servers.
Respondent sent J.D. a retainer agreement dated July 2,
1992, concerning the federal litigation. After making changes to
the agreement, J.D. signed and returned it to respondent. By
letter of August 19, 1992, respondent informed J.D. that all
revisions were acceptable to him, except the following that she
had inserted into the agreement: “This agreement would only be
effective when you gain back custody of [your son].” Respondent
indicated in the letter that, with the understanding that the
above provision was removed, he would continue working on both
the state and federal court matters.
J.D. finally paid respondent $500 with funds borrowed from
relatives. When J.D. requested an accounting of the $500,
respondent sent her a letter dated July 30, 1992, requesting
payment for the following services:
46 trial days at 8 hours per daySee footnote 7 368 hours
Travel time 92 hours
Legal research 57 hours
Total 517 hours
Respondent applied an hourly rate of $250 toward a fee of
$129,250 plus expenses of $125.
After sending J.D. several letters requesting payment, by
correspondence dated January 2, 1993, respondent threatened to
sue her for his services in the termination of parental rights
trial:
Also, you may rest assured that, if our
representation of you is terminated because
of your continuing lack of cooperation with
us, I will initiate legal action against you,
personally, for payment of all outstanding
amounts, including attorneys fees and
advanced costs, which amount to more thna
[sic] $120,000 by now in the several cases in
which we have provided legal services to you.
Respondent neither filed a federal civil rights action on
behalf of J.D., nor sued her for his fees.
From the beginning of the OAE's investigation of the within grievance, respondent failed to cooperate. In reply to the OAE's
initial letter requesting a written response to the grievance, he
reported that his original files were in storage out of state and
requested an additional two weeks, until May 1, 1995, to submit
his response. By letter dated April 25, 1995, to the OAE,
respondent confirmed that he would be able “to forward the
required items to you by the end of the first week in May.”
After the OAE sent another request, he explained in a letter
dated May 22, 1995, that “we have relocated our offices recently
and, in the midst of that process, I fell ill for about three
weeks . . . . As I suggested to you before, the files in the
underlying matter are not only voluminous but also in storage out
of state.” Respondent represented that he would comply by June
5, 1995. However, the next day, May 23, 1995, in a lengthy
letter responding to the grievance respondent added that “the
materials you forwarded to my office and what I have available at
this time constitute only a very small percentage of the file
materials . . . .” Respondent also mentioned that he had not
received copies of the trial transcripts referred to in the
grievance. As a result, the OAE sent the transcripts to him on
May 26, 1995. On June 4, 1995, respondent stated that he would
need more time to reply because “[t]here is simply no way that I
could possibly review in detail the transcript materials and
review the very voluminous files we have . . . which are stored
out of state . . . .”
In answer to the OAE's suggestion that respondent attend a
meeting on July 13, 1995, at the OAE's office, he sent a letter
on June 16, 1995, asserting, “I cannot be available on the date
you proposed since I am leaving the state in a few days and will
not be returning until the second week in July.” He suggested
that the meeting occur on July 27 or August 3. The OAE
subsequently discovered that respondent did not leave the state,
as he had represented. On June 29, 1995, he had attended a
deposition in another matter in Woodbridge, New Jersey.See footnote 8 The
meeting with the OAE finally took place on August 3, 1995.
When the OAE contacted respondent to schedule a follow-up
meeting to continue the interview and requested that he bring his
file, respondent replied, “As far as any file materials to be
provided to your agency are concerned from my office, I am in the
process of considering your requests and will inform you of my
position at the forthcoming meeting.” Respondent then suggested
that the materials in his files were protected by the attorney-client privilege. When the OAE requested that he produce his
files by September 11, 1995, respondent replied on August 30,
1995, that he would be on vacation until September 13, 1995.
Again, the OAE later learned that respondent had misrepresented
his availability and was not on vacation, as he had stated.See footnote 9
Despite the representation that he would be on vacation until
September 13, 1995, respondent asserted in a letter dated
September 11, 1995, to the OAE that he would bring his files to
the OAE's office on September 20, 1995. By letter of September
19, 1995, he sent to the OAE eight documents purporting to be
“the original file materials in my current possession.” When the
OAE asked how eight documents could be considered “voluminous,”
as respondent had previously represented, he replied as follows:
Insofar as your further demands for my
“complete files” in the underlying matter are
concerned, regrettably, you have all that is
available because I have nothing else to
forward for your review along these lines. I
was incorrect if I gave you the impression of
some files containing many thousands of
pages, and if taht [sic] is how you took my
use of the word “voluminous” in my prior
letter, I sincerely apologize.
Despite the repeated demands made by the OAE, respondent
never produced his original file in the A.R.S. matter.
During the exchange of correspondence between respondent and the OAE in this matter, the OAE noted that his letterhead contained the following designation: “The Law Office and Legal Clinic of L.T. Vincenti, Esq.” Accordingly, the OAE requested that respondent provide a copy of the disclosure required by RPC 7.5(e), which states:
A law firm name may include additional identifying language such as “& Associates” only when such language is accurate and descriptive of the firm. Any firm name including additional identifying language such as “Legal Services” or other similar phrases shall inform all prospective clients in the retainer agreement or other writing that the law firm is not affiliated or
associated with a public, quasi-public or
charitable organization. However, no firm
shall use the phrase “legal aid” in its name
or in any additional identifying language.
Respondent replied to the OAE's request as follows:
In that regard, your request as to any 7.5
material is rejected since our “letterhead”
terminology does not fall within the clear
mandate of that rule's requirements. I would
suggest that you re-read the pertinent rule
section and then re-read my letterhead. None
of the covered terms, words or phrases are
contained within my letterhead. Therefore,
there is no need for my office to conform to
the provisions of 7.5 that you cite.
II. The Pathmark Matter - Docket No. XIV-95-406E
Respondent represented Louis Lombardo in two matters against
Lombardo's former employer, Pathmark Stores (“Pathmark”). One
was a claim for unemployment benefits with the Department of
Labor, Division of Unemployment Insurance, and the other was a
wrongful termination lawsuit. Hal Crane, the grievant herein,
represented Pathmark in both matters. According to Joseph F.
Wobbekind, a hearing examiner with the Division of Unemployment
Insurance, unemployment claim hearings are conducted before a
hearing examiner and typically last about twenty-five minutes.
Lombardo's hearing lasted one and one-half hours on the first day
and the better part of a day during a second session. At the
unemployment claim hearing, respondent's behavior was similar to
that displayed during the A.R.S. trial. When James DiPadian, a
Pathmark employee, was testifying, he handed respondent a
document. Respondent literally threw it back at DiPadian. When
DiPadian tried to state what had happened for the record,
respondent denied the incident and called DiPadian a liar. He
also called Crane a liar several times. At the ethics hearing,
Wobbekind testified that, in his twenty years as a hearing
examiner, during which approximately 1,000 attorneys had appeared
before him, he had never seen an attorney as unruly as
respondent.
On June 29, 1995, Crane took Lombardo's deposition in a
conference room at Crane's office. Respondent appeared on behalf
of Lombardo. Respondent obstructed the deposition many times,
constantly instructed his client not to answer Crane's questions
and repeatedly threatened to have a judge resolve minor issues
that arose during the deposition. Respondent called Crane “a
shill for a five billion dollar corporation -- you got that
right, shill for a five billion dollar corporation.” When the
deposition had ended, respondent and Lombardo left the conference
room. Respondent suddenly reappeared, walked over to Crane, and
struck him in the torso, while calling out that it was Crane who
had hit him. Both Crane and Jennifer Realmuto, the court
reporter and the only other witness to the incident, testified at
the ethics hearing that it was respondent who struck Crane.
Although Crane ordered respondent to leave, he had to be escorted
from the building by a security guard. Realmuto also testified
that, during the deposition, respondent called Crane insulting
names, made highly personalized objections and acted in a way she
had never before seen an attorney act.
Shortly after the deposition, respondent and Crane appeared
in court for a motion. Crane was seated across the aisle from
Andrew Kessler, an attorney neither respondent nor Crane had
previously met. Kessler testified at the ethics hearing as
follows:
Mr. Vincenti came in and Mr. Crane asked him
a question. His question was something to
the effect of did you get a copy of the
deposition transcript. And Mr. Vincenti
replied, Are you talking to me? Are you
talking to me? I thought you needed a
bodyguard to talk to me. And then he looked
over to me and said, you know, is he your
bodyguard?
Kessler added that at first he thought respondent was loud and
aggressive, then he had the impression that respondent was being
sarcastic.
Crane explained at the ethics hearing that he had a growth
on his chest that was being monitored by his physician during the
time that respondent struck him. Although the growth was not
cancerous, respondent had torn away a part of the scab when he
struck Crane, causing Crane additional anxiety. Crane testified
about the effect respondent's misconduct had on him, as follows:
[T]he whole incident was just so shocking to
me that I couldn't do any work for the
balance of that day. I just was astounded at
what had happened . . . . And quite frankly,
I thought at that point, if this is what the
practice of law has come to, I don't want to
be any part of it. If lawyers can't treat
each other with minimum respect and start
assaulting each other, then there's no reason
for people to be attorneys, and I gave some
serious thought as to whether I wanted to
continue practicing law. I certainly didn't
want to have much of anything to do with Mr.
Vincenti ever again . . . . The 4th of July,
I spent the entire time in the bedroom that I
use as an office in my home and just didn't
come out. My family is upset I didn't want
to talk to anybody. I was in a very
depressed mood from this.
Crane related that to avoid further encounters with respondent he
subsequently engaged the services of another attorney to
represent Pathmark in the wrongful termination litigation.
At the conclusion of the ethics hearing, the Special Master found that respondent had violated all of the Rules of Professional Conduct cited in the complaint. In addition, the Special Master determined that, by misrepresenting to the OAE on two separate occasions that he would be unavailable for a meeting during the investigation of the grievances, respondent violated RPC 8.1(a) (making a false statement of a material fact in connection with a disciplinary matter).
The Special Master also found that respondent violated RPC 3.2 and RPC 8.4(d) by his courtroom behavior in both the A.R.S. and Lombardo matters. He concluded that respondent was “discourteous, disrespectful, and insulting toward the tribunals, opposing counsel and witnesses.” The Special Master also found that respondent's verbal attacks, as well as his physical attack on Crane, went well beyond the bounds of trial advocacy and constituted intimidation of opposing counsel and witnesses.
Moreover, the Special Master determined that respondent's behavior during the A.R.S. trial violated RPC 3.5(c) and RPC 4.4. The Special Master noted respondent's allusion to irrelevant
matters when he asked Haymaker whether he was an aficionado of
pornography or a militarist and when he made an issue about the
color of the social worker's notepaper and paper clips.
According to the Special Master, respondent offered his personal
opinions about the case by suggesting that DYFS had done
everything it could to destroy the relationship between the child
and his natural mother. The Special Master found that respondent
gave his personal opinions about witnesses' testimony and the
manner in which the DAG presented her case. The Special Master
concluded that the above misconduct was contrary to RPC 3.4(e).
The Special Master also found that respondent violated RPC
3.5(c), in that his conduct, questions and motions had no purpose
other than to prolong the trial and harass the court, witnesses
and opposing counsel. According to the Special Master,
respondent's harassment of witnesses, repetitive questioning, and
“harangues” against the witnesses were “wantonly cruel and
uncalled for,” while the letter he sent to the Association of
Trial Lawyers of America declaring that the social worker and
Hagovsky maintained Nazi views was malicious and vindictive. The
special master found that respondent violated RPC 4.4 by such
conduct.
Also, respondent's filing of motions and appeals contrary
to two court orders removing him from the case violated RPC 3.1,
RPC 3.4(c) and RPC 8.4(d), according to the Special Master's
report. The Special Master commented that respondent could not
credibly assert that he was not obligated to abide by the court
orders entered by Judge Hanifan and the Appellate Division, which
prohibited him from participating in the A.R.S. matter. Further,
the Special Master found [that] respondent committed an
additional violation of RPC 3.1 by requesting to have transcripts
prepared at public expense after the Appellate Division had
denied such relief. The Special Master determined that
respondent's misrepresentations in his certifications in support
of the motions submitted to Judge Stanton, the Appellate Division
and the Supreme Court violated RPC 3.3(a)(1) and RPC 8.4(c).
The Special Master also ruled that respondent's failure to
inform his client that the Appellate Division would not entertain
an appeal filed by respondent on her behalf violated RPC 1.4(b);
that his misrepresentations to her regarding the status of the
appeal and the federal court action violated RPC 8.4(c); and that
his demand and acceptance of funds from J.D., without entitlement
to such funds because of J.D.'s indigency, constituted
overreaching in violation of RPC 1.5(a).
With regard to respondent's conduct toward the OAE, the
Special Master found that he violated RPC 8.1(a) and (b), RPC
8.4(c) and R. 1:20-3(g)(3). The Special Master remarked that
respondent used delaying and deceptive tactics to impede the
investigation, misrepresented his availability for interviews on
two occasions by contending that he would be out of state when he
was not, and refused to produce his file in the A.R.S. matter.
The Special Master found that respondent's excuse that he could
not produce the file based on attorney-client privilege was not
valid, particularly in light of the comment to Rule 1:20-3(g)(3),
which makes clear that confidentiality or privilege may not be
asserted in these matters.
Finally, the Special Master ruled that respondent's use of
the phrase “Legal Clinic” on his letterhead violated RPC 7.5(e).
Although that particular phrase does not appear in the rule, the
Special Master found that its use was misleading and that “a
client would be even more likely to believe that a firm using the
designation 'Legal Clinic' is associated with some type of public
or charitable organization than a firm with the name 'legal
services.'”
In summarizing respondent's misconduct, the Special Master
made the following remarks:
Respondent's brief seems blind to the fact
that there is a line between aggressive
advocacy and the behavior of an arrogant
bully. The feral character of his groundless
personal attacks upon the witnesses and
opposing counsel in A.R.S. and the Pathmark
case and upon the judge in A.R.S. evidence
only his rancorous disposition and his utter
contempt for the basic sensitivities of other
people. His conduct went far beyond the
limits of aggressive lawyering.
What clearly emerges from respondent's brief
is his inability to conceive that he has done
anything morally reproachable. We have no
doubt that respondent is contumaciously
intent on marching to the beat of his own
drummer with complete indifference to
established rules of professional behavior
and with absolute disregard for the authority
of the OAE.
In a supplementary report issued on August 26, 1996, the
Special Master recommended that respondent be disbarred
expressing the following view of respondent:
From his prior history, from the record of
these proceedings and from respondent's
performance in defense of the OAE's
complaints herein it is clear that respondent
is incorrigible. While the seriousness of
his misconduct does not reach the level of
that shown by his previous ethical
violations, respondent still does not
appreciate that there are boundaries for
acceptable behavior that are entitled to a
healthy respect. In our view, his capacity
for distortion, outright misrepresentation
and assaultive conduct is boundless. It
would constitute a gross betrayal of the
clients who retain his representation and the
members of the Bench and Bar who must deal
with him to allow respondent to go on testing
the system in search for that minimal ethical
standard at which he will be permitted to
function.
Following a de novo review of the record, the Board [was] satisfied that the Special Master's conclusion that respondent was guilty of unethical conduct is fully supported by clear and convincing evidence.
Respondent's courtroom behavior in both matters, particularly at the A.R.S. trial, was abominable. There, respondent engaged in a prolonged course of misconduct by mistreating virtually every person associated with the proceedings. He was disrespectful and discourteous to Judge Hanifan; antagonistic and hostile to the DAG; intimidating and overbearing to DYFS's witnesses, particularly expert witnesses; and, in general, combative and sarcastic. All in all, respondent
failed to observe common courtesy, let alone proper courtroom decorum. Respondent repeatedly used vile tactics in an attempt to verbally and physically bully all involved in the litigation: the judge, opposing counsel and witnesses. Respondent had no basis for attacking these individuals, although he seemed to be operating under the premise that there was some kind of conspiracy in which the judge, the DAG, DYFS staff and DYFS's witnesses were all colluding to deprive his client of custody of her son. Respondent asked repetitive questions, pursued irrelevant lines of inquiry and launched into lengthy diatribes when making objections and motions. And when Judge Hanifan ruled against him on motions or objections, he accused the court of bias and prejudice.