(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the
convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that,
in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).
IN THE MATTER OF PATRICIA LYNNE HASBROUCK, AN ATTORNEY AT LAW (D-29-94)
Argued January 4, 1995 -- Decided May 12, 1995
PER CURIAM
Patricia Lynne Hasbrouck was admitted to the bar in 1981. She practiced in Washington, Warren
County. On April 12, 1993, she was apprehended while attempting to have a forged prescription filled in her
sister's name. Hasbrouck later disclosed that she had been forging prescriptions since 1986 for darvocet and
vicodin for migraine headaches.
Hasbrouck waived indictment. She was admitted to the Morris County Pretrial Intervention Program
(PTI) on August 2, 1993. In April and May of 1993, prior to her entry into PTI, Hasbrouck had completed a
twenty-eight day in-patient substance abuse program at Clear Brook Manor.
With the underlying facts having been conceded, the Office of Attorney Ethics (OAE) moved before
the Disciplinary Review Board (DRB) for final discipline. The OAE recommended a six-month suspension.
The DRB, however, recommended that a one-year suspended suspension should be imposed.
HELD: The conduct of an attorney who committed criminal offenses, including one based on dishonesty, to
maintain an addiction to controlled dangerous substances warrants the imposition of a one-year suspension from
the practice of law.
1. Respondent stipulated that her conduct constituted the commission of a crime. Even though that behavior
did not arise from a lawyer/client relationship, the imposition of discipline is appropriate. Respondent's conduct
warrants strict disciplinary measures because it calls into question her honesty and integrity, as well as her respect
for the law. (pp. 5-6)
2. The gravity of respondent's conduct lies not only in its evident disregard for the law but also in its fraudulent
and deceptive nature. Hasbrouck sought no help for her addiction, but rather continued illegal and unethical
measures to maintain it. (pp. 6-8)
3. Although the DRB found as mitigating factors that respondent's actions were brought about by her addiction
and that she had overcome that addiction, the Court cannot under the circumstances invest those factors with
much force. Drug addiction generally is not a mitigating factor. Further, respondent did not seek to achieve
rehabilitation until after she had been caught. (pp. 9-10)
4. The Court notes the difficulties confronting a recovering addict. This respondent was recently arrested as
a suspect in a string of doctor's offices burglaries committed to steal painkillers. As a result, respondent
consented to an immediate temporary suspension on March 16, 1995. (pp. 10-11)
5. Although the Court has approved an accelerated discipline process in In re Schaffer, also decided today, that
form of discipline will not be available or appropriate in cases such as this, cases that involve a combination of
serious drug offenses and misconduct entailing fraud, deception, and the like. The circumstances presented
require the imposition of a one-year suspension. (p. 11-12)
So Ordered.
CHIEF JUSTICE WILENTZ and JUSTICES HANDLER, POLLOCK, O'HERN, GARIBALDI, STEIN,
and COLEMAN join in the Court's opinion.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
D-
29 September Term 1994
IN THE MATTER OF
PATRICIA LYNN HASBROUCK,
An Attorney at Law.
Argued January 4, 1995 -- Decided May 12, 1995
On an Order to show cause why respondent
should not be disbarred or otherwise
disciplined.
Walton W. Kingsbery, III, Deputy Ethics
Counsel, argued the cause on behalf of Office
of Attorney Ethics.
Stephen S. Weinstein argued the cause for
respondent (Mr. Weinstein, attorney; Mr.
Weinstein and Peter N. Gilbreth, of counsel
and on the brief).
PER CURIAM.
This is an attorney-disciplinary case in which the attorney's ethics violations are based on the commission of offenses relating to controlled dangerous substances. The Office of Attorney Ethics (OAE) commenced this disciplinary proceeding by filing a motion before the Disciplinary Review Board (DRB), seeking final discipline of respondent, Patricia Lynn Hasbrouck, pursuant to Rule 1:20-2 for violating the Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC). The motion was based on respondent's arrest and
admission into a Pre-Trial Intervention program (PTI) for
obtaining a controlled dangerous substance by fraud and for
uttering a forged prescription. Although respondent did not
plead guilty and was not found guilty of either offense, she
stipulated that her conduct had violated RPC 8.4(b), commission
of a criminal act adversely reflecting on honesty,
trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer, and RPC 8.4(d), conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice. Thus, the sole
issue is the appropriate measure of discipline.
The DRB unanimously recommended that respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for one year, but that the suspension be
suspended while she continue outpatient treatment for one year
and be subject to periodic drug testing to confirm that she
remain drug free. Under this regime, the DRB recommended that
the suspension go into effect only if respondent failed to meet
those conditions.
Our independent review of the record leads us to reject the
DRB's recommendation of a suspended suspension and order
respondent's immediate suspension from the practice of law for
one year.
The facts underlying the arrest are not in dispute. Respondent was admitted to practice law in New Jersey in 1981. She has been in private practice in Washington, Warren County.
An unspecified number of years ago, respondent began
suffering from migraine headaches. Her father, a physician,
prescribed the pain-killing medication, darvocet, for her.
Gradually, she started taking the medication more frequently. In
1986, she began taking sheets from her father's prescription pads
and forging prescriptions for the drug. At first, respondent had
the prescriptions filled only at local pharmacies so the
prescription would not be questioned. As she needed to have
prescriptions filled more frequently, she traveled greater
distances. In 1989, she switched from darvocet to vicodin. When
respondent's father retired, his office supplies, including
prescription pads, were stored at respondent's home. Respondent
wrote prescriptions for herself, not only in her name, but also
in the names of her husband and her sister.
On April 12, 1993, respondent was apprehended attempting to
have a prescription filled in her sister's name. The pharmacist
had called the telephone number on the prescription for
verification and learned that respondent's father had been
retired for over one year. The pharmacist telephoned the police.
Respondent was arrested on that date for violation of N.J.S.A.
2C:21-1a(3), uttering a forged prescription, and violation of
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-13, obtaining a controlled dangerous substance by
fraud.
In a statement to the Morris County Prosecutor, respondent
admitted the facts underlying the charges. In the criminal
proceeding, respondent executed a Waiver of Indictment and was
admitted to the PTI program by order dated August 2, 1993.
Respondent entered Clear Brook Manor on April 17, 1993, completed
the prescribed twenty-eight day program for substance abuse and
was discharged on May 15, 1993.
In disciplinary proceedings, respondent admitted that she
had violated RPC 8.4(b) and (d). The OAE recommended a six-month
suspension, based on this Court's decision in In re Adubato,
106 N.J. 655 (1987). The DRB found, however, that more severe
discipline was warranted, and thus recommended a one-year
suspension. However, the DRB recommended that the suspension
itself should be suspended, finding that "no useful purpose
[would] be served by imposing an active suspension on this
attorney."
The privilege to practice law is dependant on an attorney's ability to maintain a high moral character. In re La Duca, 62 N.J. 133, 140 (1973); In re Gavel, 22 N.J. 248, 266 (1956); In re Pennica, 36 N.J. 401, 433-34 (1962). Indeed, this requirement inheres in our paramount concern in the administration of attorney discipline for the maintenance of public confidence in the integrity of the bar. In re Kaufman, 104 N.J. 509, 513 (1986). A criminal conviction is conclusive evidence of an attorney's guilt in disciplinary proceedings. R. 1:20-6(b)(1); In re Kinnear, 105 N.J. 391, 395 (1987). Yet, it is the ethics rules, and not the criminal statutes, that regulate the privilege
to practice law in this State. A deviation from those rules can
bring about disciplinary measures administered by this Court.
Respondent admitted that she violated RPC 8.4(b) and (d).
Although respondent was not convicted of a crime, she stipulated
that her conduct constituted the commission of a crime. Because
that behavior does not comport with the ethics rules governing
attorney conduct, respondent must be disciplined.
Moreover, discipline is proper and will be invoked even
though respondent's conduct did not arise from a lawyer/client
relationship, that her behavior was not related to the practice
of law or that her offense was not committed in her professional
capacity. In re Suchanoff,
93 N.J. 226, 230 (1983); In re
Kinnear, supra, 105 N.J. at 395. Any misbehavior, private or
professional, that reveals a lack of good character and integrity
essential for a person to practice as an attorney constitutes a
basis for discipline. In re La Duca, supra, 62 N.J. at 140; In
re Gavel, supra, 22 N.J. at 266; In re Franklin,
71 N.J. 425, 429
(1976). An attorney is obligated to adhere to the high standard
of conduct required by a member of the bar, even though her
activities do not involve the practice of law and do not directly
affect her clients. In re Suchanoff, supra, 93 N.J. at 230; In re
Rutledge,
101 N.J. 493, 498 (1986); In re Huber,
101 N.J. 1, 4
(1985); In re Franklin, supra, 71 N.J. at 429.
Thus, although respondent's conduct did not involve the
practice of law, she has acted in contravention of the ethical
mandates that insist upon the highest moral character from those
privileged to be members of the bar. Her acts allegedly did not
affect her clients, for she was able to maintain her legal
obligations even while she unlawfully forged prescriptions to
feed her addiction to pain killers. Nevertheless, respondent's
conduct warrants strict disciplinary measures because it calls
into question her honesty and integrity, as well as her respect
for the law.
Every disciplinary case is fact sensitive. In re Kinnear, supra, 105 N.J. at 395; In re Litwin, 104 N.J. 362, 366 (1986). The gravity of respondent's conduct lies not only in its evident disregard for the law but also in its fraudulent and deceptive nature. Dishonest conduct "'impugns the integrity of the legal system' and destroys 'public trust and confidence' in the law and the legal system.'" In re Zauber, 122 N.J. 87, 93 (1991) (citation omitted). Such conduct "places in question the lawyer's integrity and respect for the law." In re Kaufman, supra, 104 N.J. at 514. Violations of the criminal laws governing controlled dangerous substances that involve fraudulent conduct constitute serious ethics transgressions that justify a stern disciplinary response, see In re Adubato, supra, 106 N.J. 655; In re McCarthy, 119 N.J. 437 (1990); In re Zauber, supra, 122 N.J. 87, and even disbarment when that conduct is particularly egregious. See, In re Zauber, supra, 122 N.J. at 93.
In Adubato, a case similar to respondent's, the attorney was
disciplined on the basis of being found guilty of a violation of
N.J.S.A. 24:21-22(a)(3), an attempt to obtain a controlled
dangerous substance by fraud. Like respondent, Adubato suffered
from migraine headaches for which two physicians prescribed
dilaudid. He became addicted to dilaudid. When he no longer had
a valid prescription, he resorted to misrepresentation and fraud
to obtain the drug. A six-month suspension was imposed.
More severe discipline was imposed in McCarthy. McCarthy
was found guilty of distribution of a controlled dangerous
substance, in violation of N.J.S.A. 24:21-19(a)(1), and obtaining
a controlled dangerous substance for himself by fraud in
violation of N.J.S.A. 24:21-22(a)(3). Between April 1982 and May
1984, McCarthy, a practicing psychiatrist, wrote 108
prescriptions for four patients for controlled dangerous
substances, without a valid Drug Enforcement Agency number. He
further stipulated that, between July 1981 and May 1984, he
deceptively wrote seventeen prescriptions, using the names of
family or friends, in order to obtain controlled dangerous
substances for his personal use. The Court deemed twenty-seven
months served, from the date of McCarthy's temporary suspension,
to be sufficient discipline, and ordered reinstatement to
practice law be conditioned on medical and psychiatric proofs of
fitness.
The DRB here found that
[i]n light of the length of time that
respondent's transgressions spanned, the
repeated incidents and the careful
calculation involved in her fraudulent
actions, the Board is of the view that her
misconduct falls between that of Adubato and
McCarthy. Although the record is not
specific, respondent's misconduct extended
over years and, although she knew right from
wrong, involved the repeated commission of
criminal acts. Most significant were
respondent's repeated acts of forgery.
The record thus indicates that respondent did not confront
her addiction but rather resorted to continuing unlawful and
fraudulent measures to maintain her addiction. Such conduct
"demonstrate[s] a callous disregard of a lawyer's obligation to
conduct himself or herself within the confines of the law, [or at
least] a casual approach to that obligation." Kaufman, supra,
104 N.J. at 513. Respondent's misconduct was more aggravated
than that exemplified in Adubato. Although Adubato was actually
convicted for his criminal misconduct, his action was less
egregious than respondent's because it was confined to one
attempt to obtain dilaudid. Respondent, on the other hand, took
part in fraudulent conduct that covered seven years. Thus, a
one-year suspension, as opposed to the six-month suspension
ordered in Adubato, is appropriate. See In re Kaufman, supra,
104 N.J. at 513 (finding aggravation in fact that illegal conduct
was not an isolated incident).
The DRB recognized several mitigating factors that weighed in favor of suspending respondent's suspension from practice: (1) that her actions were brought about by her addiction to prescription drugs; and (2) that respondent had overcome her drug addiction to pain-killing medication. However, we cannot under the circumstances invest those factors with much mitigating force.
We have deemed drug addiction to warrant immediate disciplinary measures, see In re Romano, 104 N.J. 306 (1986) (attorney disbarred for misappropriating client's funds to support drug habit); In re Kaufman, supra, 104 N.J. 509 (attorney given six-month suspension for pleading guilty to two criminal indictments for possession of controlled dangerous substances); In re Orlando, 104 N.J. 344 (1986) (attorney who pleaded guilty to one count indictment for possession of cocaine suspended until such time as could demonstrate fitness); In re Goldberg, 105 N.J. 278 (1987) (attorney disbarred for participation in criminal narcotics conspiracy), and continue to hold that drug addiction should not be considered mitigation under these circumstances.
In Zauber, supra, the Court considered whether drug addiction can serve as a mitigating factor in a disciplinary case. We held that,
[a]lthough mitigating factors are relevant to the severity of discipline, . . . drug addiction is generally not such a factor. . . Moreover, drug addiction, whether to legal or illegal drugs, may not mitigate serious ethical infractions such as misappropriation
or crimes involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit
or misrepresentation.
The DRB also felt that respondent's rehabilitation should be
given mitigating weight. Regrettably, respondent sought to
achieve rehabilitation only after having been caught in her
criminal attempt to satisfy her habit. She has given us no
indication that she would have attempted to control her addiction
to pain-killers if one of her forged prescriptions had not been
detected. It was the heavy arm of the law, rather than her own
conscience, that convinced respondent to seek help.
We recognize the grave affliction that besets those stricken
by the disease of addiction and acknowledge that lawyers are not
insulated from the expansive reach of this illness. See In re
Kinnear, supra, 105 N.J. at 394. We appreciate also the
difficult path of treatment and self-deprivation that must be
traveled on the way to recovery. This Court looks to aid
attorneys who attempt to better their lives by seeking help and
eventual recovery. We acknowledge that there was not available
to respondent when she succumbed to her addiction a program to
assist an attorney suffering from substance abuse before the
attorney has committed serious ethics violations. See RPC 8.3
(providing limited confidentiality for any disclosures made by an
attorney under the Lawyers Assistance Program, which provides
assistance and counselling for lawyers suffering from substance
abuse). The fragility of a recovering addict, the constant peril
of temptation, and the continuing risk of relapse attend the
never-ending struggle for genuine rehabilitation. We thus
understand that a state of recovery is enormously hard for a
seriously addicted person to achieve and maintain. E.g.,
139
N.J.L.J. 836 (February 27, 1995) (reporting that respondent was
recently arrested as a suspect in a series of doctors' offices
burglaries committed in order to steal pain-killers); see Consent
Order for Temporary Suspension of Patricia Lynn Hasbrouck, (March
16, 1995),
4 NJL 643 (March 27, 1995).
Nevertheless, we acknowledge that often rehabilitation
becomes possible only after an addict has "hit rock bottom." We
thus recognize that an addicted attorney's rehabilitation, even
though initiated only after apprehension for criminal violations,
may be taken into account as a basis for accelerating discipline,
although it will not obviate discipline. See, e.g., In re
Schaffer, __ N.J. __ (1995) (also decided today). Concern for
the recovering addict impels us to accelerate the discipline for
addicted attorneys guilty of offenses involving basically their
own personal use of controlled dangerous substances, who
genuinely and immediately seek to enroll in a rehabilitation
program in order to recover. However, we do not envisage that
form of discipline to be available or appropriate for a
respondent whose ethics infractions are based on more serious CDS
offenses or involve a combination of CDS offenses and misconduct
entailing fraud, deception and the like.
The Court's central concern in the administration of
attorney discipline is not to punish the attorney, but to promote
public confidence in the integrity of the bar. In re Kinnear,
supra, 105 N.J. at 397; In re Kushner,
101 N.J. 397, 400 (1986).
In this case, however, the Board recommends the suspension of any
suspension from the practice of law to be imposed on respondent.
That discipline, in practical effect, is far short of that
imposed in similar cases and could well lead the public to
perceive that no substantial discipline was imposed upon an
attorney who committed two criminal offenses, one based on
dishonesty, to maintain her addiction to controlled dangerous
substances.
Balancing those various considerations in this case, we
conclude that the circumstances call for a one-year suspension
from the practice of law as appropriate discipline.
In addition, respondent is to reimburse the Disciplinary
Oversight Committee for costs, including but not limited to the
cost of producing transcripts.
So ordered.
Chief Justice Wilentz and Justices Handler, Pollock, O'Hern,
Garibaldi, Stein, and Coleman join in this opinion.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
D-
29 September Term 1994
IN THE MATTER OF :
PATRICIA LYNN HASBROUCK, : ORDER
AN ATTORNEY AT LAW :
It is ORDERED that PATRICIA LYNN HASBROUCK of WASHINGTON,
who was admitted to the bar of this State in 1981 and who was
thereafter temporarily suspended from the practice of law by
consent on March 16, 1995, and who remains suspended at this
time, is hereby suspended from the practice of law for a period
of one year, effective immediately, and until the further Order
of the Court; and it is further
ORDERED that respondent be restrained and enjoined from
practicing law during the period of her suspension and that she
continue to comply with Rule 1:20-20, which governs suspended
attorneys; and it is further
ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Oversight
Committee for appropriate administrative costs incurred in the
prosecution of this matter.
WITNESS, the Honorable Robert N. Wilentz, Chief Justice, at
Trenton, this 12th day of May, 1995.
/s/ Stephen W. Townsend
CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT
NO. D-29 SEPTEMBER TERM 1994
Application for
Disposition one-year suspension
Decided May 12, 1995
Order returnable
Opinion by PER CURIAM