(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the
convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the
interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).
Argued March 2, 1999 -- Decided June 11, 1999
PER CURIAM
This is an attorney disciplinary case.
Respondent, Patrick DiMartini, who was admitted to practice in 1958, was charged with misconduct in two
separate matters. The first matter arises out of the purchase and sale of a two-family dwelling in Jersey City. In 1972,
respondent represented Carol Perretta Pollack in the purchase of the dwelling for approximately $75,000. Although
Pollack was the title owner, she was to hold title “in trust” for her brother, John Perretta. No documents, however,
indicated that John Perretta held any ownership interest in the property.
In 1973, John Perretta married Krystine Kuty, who was then working as a temporary secretary for respondent.
In March 1988, Perretta and Pollack decided to sell the property to Grace and Zutico Dy. Pollack and her
husband transferred title to Kuty, consistent with the original arrangement with Perretta. Respondent maintained that
he structured the transfer of the property from the Pollacks to the Dys in such a manner as to transfer responsibility
for any capital gains taxes from the Pollacks to Perretta, the “true” owner of the property. Thus, the transaction was
structured so that the Pollacks would realize no profit from the sale of the property and so that Perretta and Kuty
would incur any capital gains responsibility. Because of Perretta's poor credit rating, due in part to outstanding
judgments against him, title was placed in Kuty alone, rather than in Kuty and Perretta jointly.
Kuty claimed that she was unaware of that transaction. Respondent acknowledged that Kuty was not present
at the closing. The closing documents stated that Kuty paid $73,000 for the property. No money actually changed
hands. Respondent represented all of the parties in that transaction. He neither prepared a written disclosure of the
inherent conflict of interest, nor obtained written waivers from any of the parties.
On March 31, 1988, Perretta and Kuty signed a contract to sell the property to the Dys for $170,000.
Although Kuty denied that she had signed the contract, her signature was witnessed by her father and no expert
testimony corroborated her doubts.
In June 1988, Kuty transferred title to the Dys. She claimed that she was unaware of that transaction; that she
was not present at the closing; and that respondent did not discuss the transaction with her. Respondent acknowledged
that he spoke only with Perretta, assuming that as the husband in an apparently happy marriage, Perretta had implied
authority to act for Kuty.
The first major issue at the District Ethics Committee (DEC) hearing concerned the validity of Kuty's
signature on the contract, deed, and affidavit of title in the Dy transaction. Respondent, who acknowledged the
signatures, testified that he never would have done so unless the document was signed in his presence by Kuty. Both
respondent and the DEC retained experts, who confirmed that Kuty's signatures were genuine. Although Kuty
claimed at the DEC hearing to have been in Florida at the time of this closing, her son's school records indicated that
he was in New Jersey on that day.
Kuty also maintained that she had not signed the settlement and closing agreements generated at the Dy
closing. Respondent admitted that Perretta signed Kuty's name to the settlement agreement. He testified that he
believed that Perretta, as Kuty's husband, could do so. Respondent further admitted that he signed Kuty's name to
the closing statement and added his own initials by the signature. Although neither he nor Perretta had Kuty's written
authorization to sign her name, respondent believed that as Kuty's attorney, he had implied authorization to do so. In
addition, he testified that Perretta called Kuty from the closing to obtain her social security number to place on the
federal tax form, suggesting that Kuty was aware of the transaction and approved it.
The second major issue at the DEC hearing concerned the tax consequences of the profit generated by the Dy
transaction. To disburse the proceeds of the sale, respondent drafted four checks from his trust account, payable
jointly to Kuty and Perretta, in spite of the absence of Perretta's name on any of the closing documents. Respondent
then gave those checks to Perretta, without independently informing Kuty. Perretta apparently endorsed the checks in
Kuty's name. Respondent assisted Perretta in cashing the checks by writing “OK to cash” on the back and adding his
initials. However, there was no indication that respondent knew Perretta had signed Kuty's name on the checks.
In 1988, Perretta and Kuty filed separate tax returns in which either one of them claimed any gain from the sale of the
property. They separated in 1991 and engaged in a bitter divorce that ended the marriage in 1993. Kuty maintained
that she learned of the sale to the Dys in 1993, when the IRS contacted her seeking payment of the capital gains taxes
on the sale. After investigation, the IRS determined that Perretta and not Kuty was responsible for the taxes. There
was no assertion by the IRS of fraud on anyone's part. Kuty filed a grievance against respondent at the suggestion
of the IRS and her attorney in the divorce proceeding.
In the second matter, respondent was charged with a violation of RPC 1.15, failure to safekeep property, for
issuing three trust account checks against uncertified funds. In that matter, respondent's client in an unrelated matter
gave respondent an uncertified check that she had received from someone as a down payment on the sale of her
property. The client asked respondent to issue her three checks from his attorney trust account against the uncertified
check. After verifying with the buyer's bank that he had sufficient funds on deposit to cover the uncertified check,
respondent agreed to issue the requested checks from his trust account. The uncertified check cleared without
incident. Respondent testified that his actions in the matter were taken solely to assist his client.
In its review of the record, in the first matter, the Disciplinary Review Board (“DRB” or “Board”) found
that the transactions were designed to defraud the IRS and Perretta's creditors. The Board further found that Kuty's
signatures on the closing documents as well as other documents relative to the transaction were forgeries. In the
second matter, the Board found that respondent's actions had put his other clients' funds at risk. The DRB
recommended that respondent be suspended for a period of two years for his misconduct in both matters.
The Supreme Court granted respondent's petition for certification.
HELD: Respondent's misconduct, consisting of engaging in a conflict of interest, of using his client as a strawman in
two transactions, of signing his client's name to closing documents, and of failing to safekeep his client's interest in
the proceeds of the sale of property, was the result of excessive negligence and poor judgment and warrants a
suspension of a period of three months.
1. Kuty's signatures on the contract, affidavit of title, and deed were genuine. (pp. 5-6)
2. A lawyer who structures a transaction to protect a client from his judgment creditors runs the risk of adversely
affecting third parties. (p. 9)
3. Respondent did not intend to defraud the IRS. (pp. 8-11)
4. Respondent's representation of both the Pollacks and Kuty in the first 1988 sale constituted a conflict of interest, in
violation of RPC 1.7. (p. 11)
5. Respondent's issuance of trust account checks against uncollected funds put client funds at risk, in violation of RPC
1.15. (p. 12)
6. Respondent's violations, although serious, involve excessive negligence and poor judgment, rather than malice, and
warrant a three-month suspension. (pp. 11-12)
CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES HANDLER, O'HERN, POLLOCK, STEIN and COLEMAN join
in this PER CURIAM opinion. JUSTICE GARIBALDI did not participate.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
D-
19 September Term 1998
IN THE MATTER OF
PATRICK DI MARTINI,
An Attorney at Law.
Argued March 2, 1999 -- Decided June 11, 1999
On an Order to show cause why respondent
should not be disbarred or otherwise
disciplined.
Nitza I. Blasini, Deputy Ethics Counsel,
argued the cause on behalf of the Office of
Attorney Ethics.
John J. Curley argued the cause for
respondent (Curley & Sciarra, attorneys).
PER CURIAM
This disciplinary action concerns two matters. The first
arises out of the purchase and sale of a two-family house in
Jersey City. In connection with those transactions, respondent,
Patrick DiMartini, is charged with violating the Rules of
Professional Conduct (RPC), sections 1.2 (scope of
representation), 1.4 (communication with client), 1.7 (conflict
of interest), 1.15 (safekeeping property), and 8.4(c) (conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation). The
second matter concerns an incident in which respondent is charged
with failing to safeguard client funds, in violation of RPC 1.15.
Finding ethics infractions in both matters, the District
Ethics Committee (DEC) recommended disbarment. The Disciplinary
Review Board (DRB) recommended a two-year suspension.
Our responsibility in attorney disciplinary matters is to
conduct an independent review of the record, R. 1:20-16(c), and
to determine whether the charges have been proved by clear and
convincing evidence. On two critical issues, our independent
review of this record leads us to different factual conclusions
from those of the DRB. Although we find respondent guilty of
ethical infractions, we conclude that the appropriate discipline
is a three-month suspension.
Respondent was admitted to the bar in 1958. Until the filing of the complaints in these matters, respondent had not been charged with any ethics infractions.
For approximately a quarter of a century, respondent was the "family attorney" for the Perretta family. The grievant, Krystine Kuty, was married to John Perretta from 1973 until their divorce in 1993. Kuty met Perretta when she worked briefly as a temporary secretary in respondent's office. Respondent served as the best man at Perretta and Kuty's wedding. He visited them as they moved about the nation, and is the godfather to one of their children.
The matter at issue concerns respondent's representation of Kuty, Perretta, and Perretta's sister, Carol Perretta Pollack. On the factual question whether respondent acknowledged a series of forged signatures, the DEC and DRB disagreed. The DEC concluded that respondent's acknowledgment of the signatures on those documents was proper, but the DRB concluded from its review of the record that the signatures were forgeries. Like the DEC, we conclude that Kuty's signatures on the documents were not forged and that respondent did not commit an impropriety in acknowledging the signatures on those documents. Furthermore, unlike both the DEC and DRB, we find that the record falls far short of establishing clear and convincing proof that respondent attempted to deceive the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).
In 1972, respondent represented Pollack in the purchase of a two-family dwelling for approximately $75,000. Although Pollack was the title owner, she was to hold title “in trust” for Perretta. No documents, however, indicated that Perretta held any ownership interest.
Also in 1972, while Kuty was working as a temporary secretary for respondent, she met Perretta. Perretta and Kuty were married the following year on February 16, 1973.
In March 1988, Perretta and Pollack decided to sell the property to Grace and Zutico Dy. Pollack and her husband transferred title to Kuty, consistent with the original arrangement with Perretta. Respondent testified that the transfer of the property from the Pollacks to the Dys was structured to transfer responsibility for any capital gains taxes from the Pollacks to Perretta, the “true” owner of the property. Thus, respondent designed the transactions so that the Pollacks would realize no profit from the sale of the property and that Perretta and Kuty would incur any capital gain. Because of Perretta's poor credit rating, due in part to the entry of judgments against him, title was placed in Kuty alone, rather than in Kuty and Perretta jointly. Kuty claims that she was unaware of the transaction. Respondent acknowledges that Kuty was not present at the closing. The closing documents stated that Kuty paid approximately $73,000 for the property, about the same amount as Pollack had paid for the property sixteen years earlier. No money actually changed hands.
Respondent represented all parties despite the conflict of interest inherent in representing both sides in a property closing. He neither prepared a written disclosure of the conflict, nor obtained written waivers from any of the parties.
On March 31, 1988, Perretta and Kuty signed a contract to sell the property to the Dys for $170,000. Although Kuty's father apparently witnessed their signatures, Kuty questioned the signature of her father. No expert testimony corroborated her doubts. At the time of the DEC hearing, Kuty's father was dead. Consequently, the record does not contain his testimony.
In June 1988, Kuty transferred title to Mr. and Mrs. Dy. Kuty testified that she was unaware of that transaction as well, and that she was not present at the closing. She further claims that respondent did not discuss the transactions with her. Respondent acknowledged that he spoke only with Perretta. He assumed that as the husband in an apparently happy marriage, Perretta had implied authority to act for Kuty.
The first major issue at the DEC hearing concerned the validity of Kuty's signature on the contract, deed, and affidavit of title in the Dy transaction. Respondent, who acknowledged the signatures, testified that he never would have done so unless the document was signed in his presence. He further testified that, consistent with his “absolute practice,” Kuty signed all documents in his presence. Both respondent and the DEC retained experts, who confirmed that Kuty's signatures were genuine.
At the disciplinary hearing, Kuty claimed that she was in Florida with her children on the day of the closing. Her son's school records indicate, however, that he was in New Jersey on that day.
The DEC was "not persuaded that respondent's acknowledgment of these documents was improper." In contrast, the DRB concluded, after reviewing the record, that the signatures were forgeries. Our independent analysis of the record leads us to conclude that Kuty's signatures on the contract, affidavit of title, and deed were genuine. That finding affects our assessment of both that issue and of the credibility of respondent's testimony.
A related issue concerned the signing of Kuty's name to the settlement and closing agreements at the Dy closing. In respondent's presence, Perretta signed Kuty's name to the settlement agreement. Respondent frankly acknowledges that he likewise signed Kuty's name to the closing statement, adding his own initials by the signature. Although neither Perretta nor respondent had written authorization from Kuty, respondent assumed that he had "implied authorization" as Kuty's attorney. He also explained that "[b]ecause of the husband/wife relationship, I felt that [Perretta] could sign [Kuty's] name." Additionally, respondent testified that Perretta called Kuty from the closing to obtain her social security number to place it on the federal tax form 1099B, suggesting that she was aware of the transaction and approved it.
The second major issue concerned the tax consequences of the profit generated by the Dy transaction. A portion of the sale proceeds were properly used to pay the mortgages on the property that had been held by Pollack, and to satisfy two judgments affecting the property. To disburse the amount due to the seller, respondent drafted four checks from his trust account, payable jointly to Kuty and Perretta. Perretta's name, however, does not appear on the closing documents. Respondent gave those checks to Perretta without independently informing Kuty. As respondent explained, "Well, sir, I felt it was a happily married couple, husband and wife. The wife had signed the contract. She signed the deed."
Perretta apparently signed Kuty's endorsement on the back of the checks. Respondent assisted Perretta in cashing the checks by writing “OK to cash” on the back and adding his initials. Nothing indicates, however, that respondent knew that Perretta had signed Kuty's signature on the checks.
Until 1988, Perretta and Kuty filed joint federal tax returns. In that year, for the first time in the course of their marriage, Perretta and Kuty filed separate tax returns. Neither declared any gain from the sale of the property. Respondent did not represent Perretta and Kuty in the preparation of their annual tax returns.
According to Kuty's testimony, Perretta was a dreadful failure as a father and a husband. Perretta and Kuty separated in 1991 and engaged in a bitter divorce that terminated their marriage in 1993.
Kuty maintains that she learned of the sale to the Dys in 1993, when the IRS contacted her seeking payment of the capital gains taxes on the sale. After investigation, the IRS determined that Perretta, not Kuty, was responsible for the taxes. The IRS never asserted that anyone had committed tax fraud.
Kuty explained that she instituted the grievance proceeding against respondent at the suggestion of both the IRS and her attorney in the divorce proceeding. In its review of the record, the DRB found that the transactions were designed to defraud the IRS. We disagree.
The DRB found that “[r]espondent concocted the bogus first transaction in an attempt to defraud the IRS through the avoidance of the payment of capital gains taxes due by the Pollacks.” Although he structured the transaction to avoid the gain to the Pollacks, the entire profit was transferred to Perretta. No profit was hidden; the only change was in the identity of the responsible party.
Admittedly, Perretta's name did not appear in either set of closing documents. As respondent explained, Perretta's name was omitted not to avoid tax liability, but to protect Perretta from his creditors. The extent to which a lawyer may aid a client to achieve that purpose has not been an issue in these proceedings. Given the age of the proceedings, we believe the better practice is to dispose of this matter without remanding for further consideration of that issue.
Suffice it to say that a lawyer who structures a transaction, as respondent structured this one, runs the risk of adversely affecting third parties. The lawyer also runs the risk that the transaction will unravel because of disagreement among the parties.
In recommending a two-year suspension, the DRB relied on two cases in which the attorneys received two-year suspensions for forging signatures on real estate documents. Both cases, however, involved misconduct that was substantially more flagrant and malicious than that of respondent. In the first case, In re Silverberg, 144 N.J. 215 (1996), the attorney witnessed and notarized the signature of a man the attorney knew to be deceased. The attorney also attempted to perpetuate the fraud by providing two false statements to the ethics authorities.
In the second case, In re Weston, 118 N.J. 477 (1990), the attorney not only signed the client's name without authorization, but also falsely assured the purchaser's attorney that the documents were genuine. In other cases where multi-year suspensions have been imposed, the signatures forged were those of judicial officers. See, e.g., In re Yacavino, 100 N.J. 50 (1985) (forging judge's name resulted in three-year suspension); In re McNally, 81 N.J. 304 (1979) (forging sheriff's name resulted in two-year suspension). The major distinction between those cases and the present one is that this case does not involve forgery.
Respondent mistakenly believed that he and Perretta had authority to sign for Kuty. That respondent signed his own initials to Kuty's name confirms that belief. In addition, respondent has cooperated with the ethics authorities and has been straightforward in his explanations.
In addition, our assessment of the effect of respondent's conduct on the IRS differs from that of the DRB. Fraud perpetrated on a public agency is a particularly serious offense, which justifies a multi-year suspension. See, e.g., In re Gillespie, 124 N.J. 81 (1991) (imposing three-year suspension for willful assistance in filing false corporate returns); In re Giordano, 123 N.J. 362 (1991) (imposing three-year suspension for attempted tampering with public records). In the absence of such fraud, the sentence justifiably may be reduced. Our reading of the record leads us to conclude that respondent did not intend to defraud the IRS.
Nonetheless, respondent's ethics violations remain serious. The facts show, by clear and convincing evidence, that respondent ignored a conflict of interest in his representation of both the Pollacks and Kuty in the first 1988 sale, in violation of RPC 1.7. Further, respondent used Kuty as a “strawman” in the two closings, in violation of RPC 1.2; failed to communicate with Kuty, in violation of RPC 1.4; signed Kuty's name to the closing documents, in violation of RPC 8.4(c); and failed to safekeep Kuty's interest in the proceeds of the second 1988 sale, in violation of RPC 1.15.
Respondent's violations, although serious, involve excessive negligence and poor judgment, rather than malice. Respondent's motive in both matters was to accommodate, albeit improperly, his clients. The violations nonetheless merit suspension. On balance, we conclude that the appropriate period of suspension is three months.
CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES HANDLER, POLLOCK, O'HERN,
STEIN, and COLEMAN in this PER CURIAM opinion. JUSTICE
GARIBALDI's did not participate.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
D-
19 September Term 1998
IN THE MATTER OF :
O R D E R
PATRICK DI MARTINI, :
AN ATTORNEY AT LAW :
It is ORDERED that PATRICK DI MARTINI of JERSEY CITY, who
was admitted to the bar of this State in 1958, is hereby
suspended from the practice of law for a period of three months,
effective July 5, 1999, and until the further Order of the Court;
and it is further
ORDERED that respondent be restrained and enjoined from
practicing law during the period of his suspension and that he
comply with Rule 1:20-20 governing suspended attorneys; and it is
further
ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Oversight
Committee for appropriate administrative costs incurred in the
prosecution of this matter.
WITNESS, the Honorable Deborah T. Poritz, Chief Justice, at
Trenton, this 11th day of June, 1999.
/s/ Gail G. Haney
ACTING CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT
NO. D-19 SEPTEMBER TERM 1998
Application for
Disposition Three-Month Suspension
Decided June 11, 1999
Order returnable
Opinion by PER CURIAM