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Original WP 5.1 Version
This case can also be found at 134 N.J. 228.
SYLLABUS
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the
convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the
interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).
IN THE MATTER OF SALLY C. PURRAZZELLA, AN ATTORNEY AT LAW (D-11)
Argued September 29, 1992 -- Decided November 24, 1993
PER CURIAM
The District Ethics Committee (DEC) filed a formal complaint charging Sally Purrazzella, Esq. with violations of the
Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC's). The charges stem from Purrazzella's alleged alteration of a psychiatric report
concerning her matrimonial client, Sandra Saldino, and Purrazzella's submission of that altered report in a cross-
motion to the court. The report that was allegedly altered was a discharge summary from Carrier Clinic, where Saldino
had been treated for depression during the divorce proceedings. The report had been requested by the husband's
attorney, Silvio Silvi, Esq., in pursuit of a transfer of custody of the child of the marriage to the father.
Five days after argument on the cross-motion, Purrazzella filed a motion to be relieved as counsel because of her
belief that Saldino was both untruthful and uncooperative. The DEC concluded that Purrazzella was guilty of the
misconduct charged in the complaint in violation of the RPC's and recommended public discipline.
On its review, the Disciplinary Review Board (DRB) concluded that the record contained clear and convincing
evidence that Purrazzella alone was responsible for the alteration of the report. In support of its conclusion, the DRB
relied on the following: Purrazzella's failure to have answered Silvi's letter inquiring about the discrepancy in the
reports, Silvi's testimony that Purrazzella had told him that the passage had been deleted because it was privileged
information, Saldino's testimony that Purrazzella had told her that the deleted passage contained privileged information,
the absence of any motive for Ms. Saldino to alter the discharge summary, and the testimony of both Saldino and her
mother that Purrazzella had cautioned Saldino against working because of the adverse effect that her being gainfully
employed would have on the divorce settlement. A majority of the DRB recommended that Purrazzella be suspended
for six months; one member would have imposed a public reprimand and one member voted to dismiss the charges for
lack of clear and convincing evidence that Purrazzella had altered the discharge summary.
HELD:      The ethics charges against Sally C. Purrazzella, Esq. have not been established by clear and convincing
evidence, therefore; the ethics charges are dismissed.
1.      Saldino's mother acknowledgment that her daughter never wanted to work, in addition to the quoted excerpts from
DEC testimony and the exhibits satisfy the Court that the record does not support, by clear and convincing evidence,
the conclusion that Purrazzella told Saldino not to work. The evidence strongly suggests that Purrazzella would have
had no reason to and did not give such advice. (pp. 12-16)
2.      Purrazzella's failure to answer Silvi's letter requesting an explanation of the alteration of the discharge summary
was not an admission of guilt but was a breach of professional courtesy. Purrazzella had already received the Saldino's
ethics complaint by the time Silvi's letter arrived and decided to respond to the charges only in the appropriate forum.
In addition, knowing of that complaint, it is not likely that Ms. Purrazzella would have told Mr. Silvi that the material
had been deleted because it was privileged, thereby giving rise to an inference that she might have had something to do
with the
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alteration of the discharge summary. Her recollection of her conversation with Silvi is as believable as Silvi's version
of the incident. (pp. 16-17)
3.      Saldino had both the opportunity and the motive to alter the document. The altered version of the discharge
summary is the result of a somewhat primitive cut-and-paste process. Saldino admitted that she knew how to type and
that, during the relevant time period, she had access to a photocopy machine. Moreover, it is clear that Saldino had a
motive to excise the mention to her treating psychologist of her lawyer's advice not to work and of her own strong
desire to resume employment. Therefore, the evidence strongly preponderates in favor of the conclusion that
Purrazzella never gave that advice. Saldino had ample reason to remove the statement in light of her already
deteriorating relationship with Purrazzella. (pp. 17-19)
So Ordered.
CHIEF JUSTICE WILENTZ and JUSTICES CLIFFORD, HANDLER, POLLOCK, O'HERN,
GARIBALDI and STEIN join in this opinion.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
D- 11 September Term 1992
IN THE MATTER OF
SALLY C. PURRAZZELLA,
An Attorney at Law.
Argued September 29, 1992 -- Decided November 24, 1993
On an order to show cause why respondent should not be disbarred or otherwise disciplined.
John J. Janasie, First Assistant Ethics Counsel, argued the cause on behalf of Office of Attorney Ethics.
Joseph Purrazzella argued the cause for respondent (Purrazzella and Purrazzella, attorneys).
PER CURIAM
The District Ethics Committee (DEC or local Committee) filed a formal complaint charging respondent, Sally
Purrazzella, with violations of RPC 3.3(a)(1), RPC 3.3(a)(4), RPC 4.1, and RPC 8.4(c). Those charges grew out of
respondent's alleged alteration of a psychiatric report concerning her client Sandra Saldino and respondent's
submission of the altered report to the court in a matrimonial proceeding. After a hearing the local Committee
concluded that respondent was guilty of the misconduct
charged in the complaint and that she had run afoul of the RPCs cited above. In its report recommending public
discipline, the Committee found specifically that respondent or someone at her direction had changed the psychiatric
report and had filed it with the court in connection with a cross-motion.
After its independent review of the record the Disciplinary Review Board (DRB) agreed with the findings of the
local Committee. A majority of the DRB recommended that respondent be suspended for six months; one member
would have imposed a public reprimand, and one member voted to dismiss the charges for lack of clear and
convincing evidence that respondent had altered the report. Because the Office of Attorney Ethics (OAE) considered
the recommended six-months suspension inadequate, it sought to "expand the record" by oral argument. We granted
that application and heard oral argument after issuing an Order to Show Cause why respondent should not be disbarred
or otherwise disciplined.
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Our de novo examination of the record persuades us that the ethics charges against respondent have not been
established by clear and convincing evidence. We therefore dismiss those charges.
I
The grievant, Sandra Saldino, retained respondent, an experienced matrimonial practitioner, in October 1987 to
represent her as plaintiff in divorce proceedings against her husband, whom she had married in 1981 and with whom
she had one child, born in September 1985. A major source of irritation in the marital relationship was Saldino's
employment arrangement. According to respondent, when the grievant first sought Purrazzella's assistance, she said
that she and her husband had initially agreed that she would remain home until their two-year-old son was older, but
that her husband's attitude had turned to one of resentment at her not working more than one day per week as a
physician's part-time bookkeeper for a net pay of $35.79. Saldino's certification attached to a December 1987 motion
for pendente lite support and other relief puts the matter succinctly, if somewhat crudely: "He tells me that his lawyer
says that he does not have to support me and that I should go out and get a f------ job."
Respondent viewed the divorce proceedings as relatively uncomplicated: a six-year marriage of two young people
with one child, no substantial assets other than a house, the wife working one day a week and the husband working
full time with a net annual income of $30,000. Purrazzella did not consider alimony to be a significant issue. The
sticking point in resolution of
the marital dispute, at least in the beginning, was the house. The husband took the position that Saldino was entitled to
no portion of the couple's $171,000 house, encumbered by a $70,000 mortgage, because he had purchased the house
before the marriage, using his own money supplemented by funds from his mother. Saldino, on the other hand,
contended that she and her husband had bought the house together; that she had put about $5000 of her money into the
purchase price; and that although neither of them had lived in the house until after the marriage and title was in the
name of the husband only, they had agreed that it was "their" house.
Throughout the early part of 1988 the parties were unable to settle the matrimonial case. Saldino moved out of the
marital home with her son in March 1988, and into her mother's home. At one Early Settlement Panel meeting that
same month, Saldino's husband offered her $3000 for her interest in the marital home, which of course did not advance
disposition of the case. Shortly after that conference, Saldino was admitted to the Carrier Clinic (Carrier), a
psychiatric-care facility, where she remained from June 13 to August 3, 1988, suffering from depression. Purrazzella,
whose letters to the grievant had gone unanswered and whose rapidly escalating bill remained unpaid, did not learn of
her client's confinement until Saldino telephoned her in July 1988 to report her whereabouts and the fact that her son
was in Saldino's mother's custody.
After Saldino's discharge from Carrier, negotiations toward settlement of the matrimonial case were unavailing,
despite considerable progress on issues other than the distribution of the value of the marital home. When the case did
not settle, custody of the couple's son -- previously agreed on, until settlement negotiations broke down -- became an
issue, and the grievant's ability to discharge her parental obligations assumed importance on the custody question. As
the husband's new attorney, Silvio Silvi, argued on his motion for transfer of custody (of which more below), Saldino
had returned to live with her mother in Piscataway after being discharged from Carrier on August 3, 1988; on
September 5th she had moved out of her mother's home and taken up residence with a female friend who had also
been a patient at Carrier; later in September she had moved in with her boyfriend, also a former Carrier patient; on
October 9th she had moved back in with her mother; and shortly thereafter she had resumed living with the boyfriend.
Given the foregoing, Silvi asked for a copy of Saldino's medical records from Carrier. Respondent testified at the
disciplinary hearing that she had attempted to have Saldino sign a release for the records, but the grievant had declined
to do so. When Silvi issued a subpoena for the records, Carrier refused to comply, relying on the patient-physician
privilege. Respondent also asked Saldino to execute an authorization so that she, Purrazzella, could examine the
records. Again, according to
respondent, Saldino declined, explaining that she might be embarrassed by her statements in those records concerning
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her husband's family. Saldino agreed, however, to obtain the records herself from Carrier. After she did so, she gave a
copy of the discharge summary to respondent and to Dr. Raftery, the court-appointed psychologist, and kept a copy for
herself.
As indicated above, the grievant's husband's lawyer, Silvi, then applied to the court for temporary transfer of the
custody of the child, pendente lite, to his client, and for production of Saldino's medical records from Carrier. On
Saldino's behalf respondent filed a cross-motion to hold defendant in contempt of court and for an order compelling
payment of uncovered medical costs, including a $5,000 charge by Carrier. Appended to the cross-motion was
Saldino's certification, with a copy of her discharge summary from Carrier -- a document that even the husband's
lawyer acknowledged at the DEC hearing was entirely irrelevant to the motion and cross-motion. The version of the
discharge summary attached to the motion papers read as follows:
When the patient came to see the writer as an out patient, she stated that because of the symptoms of depression,
she is unable to function as a medical secretary and stated that she was always assertive and knew what she wanted to
do.
The original discharge summary, however, contained the following:
When the patient came to see the writer as an out patient, she stated that she had been informed by her attorney
that if she were to
seek gainful employment, this may prejudice her in her ability to obtain a significant divorce settlement. The patient
felt torn between that advice and her wish to work, but stated that because of the symptoms of depression, she is
unable to function. She had worked for many years as a medical secretary and stated that she was always assertive and
knew what she wanted to do. (Emphasis added).
At the DEC hearing Saldino testified that she had signed the original certification while seated at counsel table
during argument on the motion, and that at that time respondent had told her that she, Purrazzella, had removed the
emphasized portion of the discharge summary quoted above because "[the doctor] should never have put the statement
in there * * * because it was privileged information." Respondent adamantly denied that conversation and insisted that
the document had been altered while it was still in Saldino's possession. Although Purrazzella could not pinpoint the
time at which or the circumstances under which the certification had been signed, she insisted that having a client sign
documents while in court for purposes of argument on a motion would have marked a clear departure from her regular
practice, which was to have papers signed in her office. She pointed out that Saldino had frequently driven to her office
for just that purpose. Purrazzella said that she had not learned of the alteration until receipt of the grievance, around
February 2, 1989.
At the hearing on the motion and cross-motion on December 23, 1988, the trial court, after commenting on the case's
"long, stormy history" (respondent's cross-motion was her third enforcement application), ruled that absent evidence of
irreparable harm to the child, it could not entertain an application for emergency change of custody. After learning that
Dr. Raftery had interviewed the husband and wife, the court, consistent with respondent's request (she had already
submitted a copy of the discharge summary to Raftery), directed that the medical records from Carrier be released to
the psychologist. Dr. Raftery was to review those records then send them to the court. Any material irrelevant to the
custody of the child would then be excised. On respondent's cross-motion the court also provided for a counsel fee of
$350 and costs, at a time when respondent's unpaid bill amounted to $6000 for services including eleven court
appearances.
Five days after argument of the December 23rd motion respondent filed a motion to be relieved as counsel. At the
DEC hearing she explained:
I just at this point, I was so aggravated about the whole situation, that she hadn't told me she was seeing a
psychiatrist, never told me she was in Carrier, never showed up at depositions, just a long list of things. Wouldn't sign
the releases. I just felt I was getting caught in this and that there was something more to this whole situation that I was
going to find out at trial or something * * * , and this lady was going to end up losing custody of
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this child. It just, the whole thing for about eight months since June had, since July, when I guess, when I first found
out she was in Carrier, I began to think maybe this lady isn't the lady -- I think maybe there is something wrong here. I
don't know, I just, I don't know. I just -- then as the legal fees mounted and I was trying to press her for a little bit of
payment, why would I tell her not to get a job if she owed me [money] and she wants to work? That makes no sense.
Respondent said that over the succeeding weeks Saldino called respondent's office on several occasions in an attempt
to persuade respondent to withdraw her motion and to continue her representation. Purrazzella's refusal was followed
by an incident in January 1989 when Saldino and her boyfriend appeared at the window of Purrazzella's car, which
was stopped at a traffic light in the rain in Toms River. They were holding a check for $860, which they begged
respondent to accept, and asked her to continue to represent Saldino. Respondent refused, pointing out that more than
the grievant's delinquency in payment was involved, that "a lot of other things" had caused the lawyer-client
relationship to deteriorate. The trial court ultimately granted Purrazzella's motion to be relieved as counsel. Catherine
Tambasco, Esq., then took over the representation of the grievant. The matrimonial case proceeded to settlement in
March 1989, with alimony being waived.
Saldino confirmed the "car" incident. Moreover, she acknowledged that had respondent not withdrawn as her
lawyer, she would not have filed the ethics complaint.
We return to the altered discharge summary. At a settlement conference in March 1989, Saldino's new lawyer, Ms.
Tambasco, whom Saldino had told about the alteration, related that information to Silvi, and the two lawyers in turn
disclosed the discrepancy to the trial court. (At the DEC hearing the judge who had heard the December 23rd motion
and cross-motion, and who had been unaware of any difference in the versions of the discharge summary until
Tambasco and Silvi called it to his attention, said that "it's impossible for me to conclude * * * whether I would have
been influenced on the enforcement issue * * * had I known" of the language in the original discharge record.) Silvi,
having "covered [him]self" by notifying the trial court -- unquestionably the required course of action - wrote
Purrazzella (who had already received the ethics complaint) requesting an explanation of the discrepancy. A couple of
weeks later, during which he had received no response, Silvi happened to meet Purrazzella in the court house. He
testified at the DEC hearing that in response to his question about the deletion from the original record, Purrazzella
said, "Well, the information was deleted [] because it was privileged information[,] attorney-client work product," but
she did not say anything about who had altered the document.
Purrazzella's version of the same incident was as follows:
Q      Now, do you recall running into or bumping into Mr. Silvi?
A      Yes.
Q      Relate to the Board what happened that day.
A      Well by this time I had gotten the ethics complaint from her that came, like in February. So I remember being
very upset, as I think Mr. Silvi was, that this whole thing that had happened and I was being accused of it * * * . He's
right, that we met crossing the hall, but it was like in front of [the] lounge area there. I don't remember him
approaching me as much as I remember going up to him, because he had sent me that letter and I had not replied. I felt
bad that, I thought that, he believed that I had done this, and I remember, the gist of the conversation being that I
would not have attached voluntarily an altered record, then tell my client about it in an open courtroom, then filed a
motion to be removed, thus pissing her off even more.
What I would have done had I found something objectionable in the report, I would * * * say to him, I don't
remember, now, exact words, that there were methods of dealing with that. You can file a motion, ask the judge to
review them and ask for any allegedly privileged or allegedly; what might embarrass her to be redacted from the
records before it went to anyone. I mean it wasn't anything that couldn't have been dealt with very easily. We have
done that with tax returns. We have done that with other things in the past.
That's my recollection of the conversation with him. At no time did I say this [to] him, I redacted it or I know
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someone else redacted it or changed it. And I don't fault him. I just don't think he remembers, to tell you the truth.
Q      Did you alter the records which have been talked about here all day?
A      No, I did not.
Finally, when asked whether she would have been embarrassed if the trial court had seen the original, unaltered
discharge summary containing the grievant's recitation of respondent's "don't work" advice, Purrazzella answered in the
negative; she added, however, that she thought Saldino might have been upset because Saldino would know that
Purrazzella had never given that advice and that the disclosure of her self-serving fabrication would further damage the
already-shaky attorney-client relationship.
II
The DRB concluded that the record contained clear and convincing evidence that respondent alone was responsible
for the alteration of the report. In support of that conclusion the DRB relied on the following factors: respondent's
failure to have answered Silvi's letter inquiring about the discrepancy in the reports, Silvi's testimony that Purrazzella
had told him that the passage had been deleted because it was privileged information, Saldino's testimony that
respondent had told her that the deleted passage contained privileged information, the absence of any motive for
Saldino to alter the discharge summary, and the testimony of both the grievant and her mother that respondent had
cautioned Saldino against working because of the adverse effect
that her being gainfully employed would have on the divorce settlement.
In connection with the allegation that Purrazzella had told her not to work, Saldino testified before the DEC that
when she retained Purrazzella, the respondent told her that she "should not * * * seek employment" because if the
grievant worked, respondent "wouldn't be able to get [her] as much money." The grievant's mother, who had
accompanied her daughter to respondent's office, testified that Purrazzella had "told [Saldino] that she should not work,
because * * * it would be hard for her to get alimony." On cross-examination, however, when asked whether her
daughter had refrained from working only because respondent had told her not to work, the grievant's mother
responded that "Sandy never wanted to work."
Beyond her adamant denial that she ever told Saldino not to work, respondent's version of her initial discussion with
the grievant reflects an understandable absence of specific detail, but it does reveal her approach to the "work"
problem in general and to Saldino's circumstances in particular.
I wish I could tell you exactly what our discussions were on the first consultation, which is usually when I
discuss [work and alimony]. I can tell you that she, when I first see a client I write out completely a Schedule A of the
complaint so if the client retains me they don't have to come back again. My secretary looks at my note and can do the
complaint or I can dictate. My whole
notes are full of her statements to me saying they had been fighting since the baby was born. The big dispute was that
she didn't want to work. They had made this deal she would stay home until the child was older. The child was still in
diapers. He was only two. She was very resentful of the fact he constantly said, "you are lazy, no good. You should be
working like you were before."
This was volunteered by her as to what the marriage was -- I mean in a matrimonial case when somebody says to
you you should work, there are so many different ways that they can say that, so you can say that, well, my husband
and I agree that I wouldn't work. I got this two-year old child. I don't want to put him in child care. I have nobody to
watch him. I am working one day a week. Do you think that's enough? I probably would say yes. I probably would say
no Judge would expect you with a two-year old in this county [where] wages are so low and child care is so high, you
know, thus reinforcing what probably the client wants me to say.
But if the client comes to me and says, I can't sit another minute. I am going out to work. My mother will take
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care of the kids. I want to go back to work, is that all right, it wouldn't make a damn bit of sense to me, the way child
support guidelines are set up.
Q      Let me just rephrase the question. Would it have made any difference in this case or significant impact on her
award if she worked?
A      If she worked more than she was?
Q       Yes.
A      I don't feel so, no, and I didn't feel
so then.
Q      Why not?
A      Because if she had worked and made a hundred fifty dollars a week, maybe taken home like hundred forty,
the guidelines would
have reduced her support $2. I mean if you look at the guidelines[, they] are set up for the purpose of not penalizing
someone for going out and working.
Q      Was she, at least based upon your understanding of the conversations with her, able to work in nineteen, early
1988?
A      You mean psychologically?
Q      No, no, as far as child's care ability, that type of thing?
A      It was clear to me that she didn't want to work. She was happy with the one day a week that she was doing.
The husband would take care of the child free. It was clear to me that this was a very anxiety-causing thing and many
clients come in saying am I going to go to work, many. I am going to have to leave my new baby or my new child. To
be honest, in that situation I would tell them, no, you don't have to go out, get a full time job, if that is the deal that you
and your husband made, if that's the status quo, which is what it was.
Saldino's own handwritten answers to interrogatories propounded by her husband in the matrimonial action support
Purrazzella's understanding of her client's circumstance. Particularly revealing is the following interrogatory and
answer in Saldino's own handwriting furnished as part of the DEC record (respondent had sent the interrogatories to
the grievant so that Saldino could supply the answers at her convenience):
80.      Do you contend you are unable to seek full or part time employment because you are or would like to be the
custodial parent of unemancipated children? If so, state every fact upon which you may rely upon at trial to prove why
you should not have the obligation to seek full or part time employment.
Yes, because Joseph Peter Saldino, being a young child, requires my full attention and guidance as his mother for
his proper development.
Moreover, in an April 1988 certification attached to one of the many motion papers filed in the matrimonial dispute,
Saldino responded to her husband's affidavit, which claimed that her mother could care for the child of the marriage, as
follows:
As far as my ability to work, since I was forced out of the marital home, I note in the defendant's affidavit that
he says my mother can watch our son, while I go out to work full time. The defendant knows full well that my mother
is employed full time and is not available for child care. I have no skills, and the only way that I could work the one
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day a week for Dr. Stella when I was still in the marital home, was because that was the defendant's day off and he
would watch our child.
Coupled with Saldino's mother's gratuitous acknowledgement that "Sandy never wanted to work," the quoted
excerpts from the DEC testimony and exhibits satisfy us that the record does not support, by clear and convincing
evidence, the conclusion that respondent told the grievant not to work on pain of jeopardizing a satisfactory settlement
of the matrimonial action. Indeed, the evidence strongly suggests quite the opposite -- that Purrazzella would have had
no reason to give such advice and that she did not do so.
The DRB found significant respondent's failure to answer Silvi's letter seeking an explanation for the alteration in
the
discharge summary and Silvi's testimony that respondent had told him that the material had been deleted because it
was privileged. We view Purrazzella's not answering the letter as not so much an admission of any guilt as a breach of
professional courtesy - understandable, perhaps, in light of the fact that respondent had already received the grievant's
ethics complaint by the time Silvi's letter arrived, and wished to respond to the charges only in the appropriate forum.
In addition, knowing of that complaint, respondent would not likely have told Silvi that the material had been deleted
because it was privileged -- thereby giving rise to an inference that the respondent might have played some role in the
deletion. Rather, we think that her explanation of how she would have handled the privileged material -- a motion for
redaction -- and of what she recalls of her conversation with Silvi is at least as plausible as Silvi's version. On balance,
we conclude that Silvi's testimony of the conversation, two-and-one-half years after the encounter in the court house,
and respondent's failure to answer Silvi's letter are not helpful to respondent's position, but neither are they fatally
incriminating.
We turn to the DRB's heavy reliance on what it perceived as the absence of any motive for Saldino to alter the
discharge summary. We are satisfied that Saldino had both the opportunity and the motive. In that connection we have
examined the two versions of the discharge summary reproduced in the record of the
disciplinary hearing. The altered version gives every indication that it is the result of a somewhat primitive cut-and-
paste process, from which parts of the original text have been removed and in which selected portions of the original
text have been repositioned. Once attention is called to the pertinent passage, its alteration does not easily escape
detection. The grievant, who herself obtained the discharge summary from Carrier, admitted that she knew how to type
and that during the time period in question she had access to a photocopy machine.
That the grievant had motive to excise the recital to her treating psychologist of her lawyer's advice not to work and
of her own strong wish to resume employment is abundantly clear. As we have sought to demonstrate above, the
evidence strongly preponderates in favor of our conclusion that Purrazzella never gave that advice. Saldino had to
know that the statement in the record of advice never given would destroy what remained of a gradually deteriorating
relationship with her lawyer -- a relationship that apparently no matter how rocky, the client was bent on preserving --
and would run directly counter to the information that the grievant had supplied, in her own words, in answers to
interrogatories and in her certification responding to her husband's affidavit. She therefore had ample reason to remove
the statement.
Finally, we are left with the question why, if Purrazzella had altered the record, she would have provided
(unnecessarily) the false record to the court, then requested that that same document be given to the court's expert Dr.
Raftery, to whom the original records were to be made available, thereby increasing the chances to almost a certainty
that the alteration would be discovered. And why, increasing those chances even further, she would have given a copy
of the altered document to Saldino and confessed to her that she had changed it at a time when their relationship had
become so intolerable that within a week respondent asked to be relieved. And why, with an ethics complaint hanging
over her head, respondent would have confessed her misdeed to the husband's lawyer. None of those stated
propositions accords with common sense. We recognize that those events could have taken place, but their occurrence
has not been demonstrated by the requisite clear and convincing evidence - evidence that "should produce in the mind
of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established." Aiello v. Knoll
Golf Club, 64 N.J. Super. 156, 162 (App. Div. 1960).
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The alleged ethical violations not having been established by the foregoing standard, we dismiss the ethics charges
against Sally Purrazzella.
So ordered.
Chief Justice Wilentz and Justices Clifford, Handler, Pollock, O'Hern, Garibaldi, and Stein join in this opinion.
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