(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for
the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please
note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).
Submitted January 18, 1995 -- Decided March 31, 1995
PER CURIAM
Salvatore Principato was admitted to the New Jersey bar in 1983. On February 14, 1992, a former
client, J.M., filed a complaint against Principato in Haddon Township Municipal Court, charging him with
simple assault, a disorderly persons offense. At the time of the assault, Principato and J.M. had been
involved in a sexual relationship. Principato was tried in municipal court and found guilty as charged. Prior
to his conviction, Principato had an unblemished professional record.
In August of 1992, a representative of Services for Victims of Domestic Violence (SOLACE)
informed the Office of Attorney Ethics (OAE) of Principato's conviction. The OAE reviewed the matter
and, thereafter, filed a Motion For Final Discipline Based Upon a Criminal Conviction before the
Disciplinary Review Board (DRB), seeking final discipline of Principato. While the OAE review was
ongoing, J.M. filed with the District IV Ethics Committee an ethics grievance against Principato, alleging, in
addition to the criminal conviction, Principato's impropriety in having represented her in a matrimonial
action and in beginning an affair with her during that representation. The OAE did not conduct an
investigation of those allegations, instead filing the motion for final discipline based on Principato's conviction
of simple assault. Thus, the Court's inquiry is limited to the facts underlying the conviction.
The DRB found that Principato had engaged in unethical conduct and recommended that he be
privately reprimanded.
HELD: Salvatore Principato is publicly reprimanded for his criminal conviction of the disorderly persons
offense of simple assault.
1. Principato's conviction of simple assault is clear and convincing evidence of his violation of RPC 8.4(b).
The sole issue to be determined is the extent of the discipline to be imposed. In making that determination,
the Court considers the interests of the public, the bar, and the attorney. (pp. 4-5)
2. Although the assault was not related to Principato's practice, he did assault his client. In dealing with a
client, an attorney is bound to the highest degree of fidelity and good faith. A sexual relationship with a
client jeopardizes the attorney-client relationship and has the potential of involving the attorney in unethical
behavior. Moreover, a bar applicant must possess certain traits that are considered fundamental norms of
the profession -- honesty and truthfulness, trustworthiness and reliability, and a professional commitment to
the judicial process and the administration of justice. Acts of domestic violence violate those fundamental
norms. (pp. 5-7)
3. The Court agrees with the mitigating factors found by both the municipal court and the DRB. J.M. was
not seriously harmed; Principato had no prior history of misconduct; Principato's conduct was aberrational
and unlikely to recur; Principato's representation of J.M. was not adversely affected by their personal
relationship; there was a significant adverse impact on Principato's career as a result of negative publicity;
and Principato had an otherwise unblemished ethics record. (pp. 7-8)
4. New Jersey has a strong public policy against domestic violence. But for the fact that the Court had not
previously addressed the appropriate discipline to be imposed on an attorney convicted of an act of domestic
violence, and that the offense was an isolated incident and did not present a pattern of abusive conduct, the
discipline imposed would have been greater than a public reprimand. However, in the future an attorney
convicted of an act of domestic violence will ordinarily be suspended. (pp. 8-9)
CHIEF JUSTICE WILENTZ and JUSTICES HANDLER, POLLOCK, O'HERN, GARIBALDI,
STEIN, and COLEMAN join in the Court's opinion.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
D-
64 September Term l994
IN THE MATTER OF
SALVATORE PRINCIPATO,
An Attorney at Law.
Submitted January l8, l995 -- Decided March 31, 1995
On consideration of why respondent should not
be disbarred or otherwise disciplined.
Robyn M. Hill, Chief Counsel, submitted a
recommendation for discipline on behalf of
Disciplinary Review Board.
Saverio R. Principato submitted a letter in
lieu of brief on behalf of respondent.
PER CURIAM
This disciplinary proceeding arose from a Motion for Final
Discipline Based Upon a Criminal Conviction filed by the Office
of Attorney Ethics (OAE) before the Disciplinary Review Board
(DRB), seeking final discipline of Salvatore Principato, pursuant
to Rule l:20-6(c)(2)(i). That motion was based on respondent's
conviction of simple assault, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:l2-la(l).
The DRB found that respondent had engaged in unethical
conduct, and recommended that respondent be privately
reprimanded. Our independent review of the record leads us to
conclude that respondent has been guilty of unethical conduct.
However, we believe that a public reprimand more appropriately
reflects the seriousness of respondent's misconduct.
Respondent was admitted to the bar in l983. Prior to this present incident, he had an unblemished professional career. On February l4, l992, a former client, J.M., filed a complaint against respondent in Haddon Township Municipal Court, charging him with simple assault, a disorderly persons offense. Respondent was tried and found guilty as charged. He was fined $200, assessed $25 in court costs and directed to pay a $50 violent crimes penalty.
In August of l992 a representative of SOLACE (Services for Victims of Domestic Violence) informed the OAE of respondent's conviction. The OAE initiated a review that resulted in the filing of the Motion for Final Discipline. While the OAE review was ongoing, J.M. on February 8, l993 filed with the District IV Ethics Committee an ethics grievance against respondent, alleging in addition to the criminal conviction respondent's ethical impropriety in having represented her in a matrimonial action and commencing an affair with her during that representation. The OAE did not conduct an investigation of the allegations contained in J.M.'s grievance but filed the Motion for Final Discipline only on the basis of respondent's criminal conviction for simple
assault. Thus, our inquiry and examination is limited to the
facts underlying that criminal conviction.
On February l990, J.M. was referred to respondent by a
battered women's shelter for advice on filing a domestic violence
complaint against her then husband. J.M. decided not to file the
complaint. She had no further contact with respondent until
approximately one year later when she contacted respondent
concerning a problem she was having at work. Respondent gave
J.M. advice that he characterized as "a common sense approach and
. . . not . . . legal advice per se."
Subsequently, a social relationship, which evolved into a
sexual relationship, developed between respondent and J.M. On
April ll, l99l, J.M. telephoned respondent. In hysterics, she
related that her husband had taken her daughter and run off.
Although respondent realized the impropriety of maintaining both
a sexual and professional relationship with J.M., he indicated
"my normal protective instincts kind of kicked in and I wanted to
help her." Respondent accepted a retainer of $2,500 on April l9,
l99l and represented J.M. in custody and divorce proceedings.
Respondent acknowledged that he continued seeing J.M. on an
intimate basis through July l99l.
On August 2, l99l, respondent went to J.M.'s home. There,
respondent admitted to yelling and using profanity. The Haddon
Township Municipal Court found in addition that respondent
overturned the mattress on which J.M. was sitting and, with J.M.
pinned behind the mattress, "Mr. Principato lost control of
himself, possibly because she was ending this relationship
. . . . [H]e began to pummel her against the mattress, he never
hit her skin directly, but he did pummel the mattress forcefully
at least l0 or l5 times . . . the matter lasted at least l0
seconds." The court found that although J.M. did not sustain
serious injuries, she was in fear for her life, suffered pain,
and suffered a scratch on her arm.
Respondent remained attorney of record for J.M.'s divorce
action until the case was taken over by her new attorney in
November l99l. However, respondent apparently took no further
action on behalf of J.M. after August 2, l99l.
A criminal conviction is conclusive evidence of guilt in a disciplinary proceeding. R. l:20-6(c)(l). Therefore, respondent's conviction of the disorderly persons offense of simple assault is clear and convincing evidence that he has violated RPC 8.4(b) (by committing a criminal act that reflects adversely on his honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer). The sole issue to be determined is the extent of discipline to be imposed. R. l:20-6(c)(2)(ii); In re Lunetta, ll 8 N.J. 443, 445 (l989); In re Goldberg, l 05 N.J. 278, 280 (l987). In determining appropriate discipline, we consider the interests of the public, the bar, and the respondent. In re Litwin, l 04 N.J. 362, 365 (l986). The primary purpose of
discipline is not to punish the attorney but to preserve the
confidence of the public in the bar. The appropriate discipline
depends on many factors, including the "nature and severity of
the crime, whether the crime is related to the practice of law,
and any mitigating factors such as respondent's reputation, his
prior trustworthy conduct, and general good conduct." In re
Lunetta, supra, ll8 N.J. at 445, 446; In re Kushner, l0l N.J.
397, 400-0l (l986).
Although the assault itself was not related to respondent's legal practice, respondent assaulted his client. An attorney in his relations with a client is bound to the highest degree of fidelity and good faith. To the public he is a lawyer whether he acts in a representative capacity or otherwise. In re Gavel, 22 N.J. 248, 265 (l956). Public policy requires strict adherence to that rule. The fact that respondent was involved with his client in a sexual relationship exacerbates the problem. We have warned attorneys that sexual relationships with clients jeopardize the attorney-client relationship and have the strong potential to involve the attorney in unethical behavior. In re Liebowitz, l04 N.J. l75, l79 (l985). In that case we held that sexual misconduct with an assigned client warranted a public reprimand.
For the first time in this case and in In re Magid, ___ N.J. ___ (l995), also decided today, we address the appropriate discipline to be imposed on an attorney who is convicted of
domestic violence. In enacting the Prevention of Domestic
Violence Act of l99l, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-l7 to -33, the Legislature
recognized that "domestic violence is a serious crime against
society" that affects people "from all social and economic
backgrounds and ethnic groups." N.J.S.A. 2C:25-l8. The policy
of New Jersey is "that violent behavior will not be excused or
tolerated." N.J.S.A. 2C:25-l8. Unlike many other "victimless"
disorderly persons offenses, domestic violence offenses always
involve victims, often-times vulnerable and defenseless. The
public must be assured that the legal profession is concerned
about domestic violence.
To be admitted to the bar, an applicant "must possess a certain set of traits -- honesty and truthfulness, trustworthiness and reliability, and a professional commitment to the judicial process and the administration of justice." In re Matthews, 94 N.J. 59, 77 (l983). We described those traits as the fundamental norms that control the professional and personal behavior of attorneys. Ibid. Acts of domestic violence violate those fundamental norms.
There are few reported attorney ethics cases that involve acts of domestic violence. In re Nevill, 704 P.2d l332 (Cal. l985) (disbarring attorney who was convicted of voluntary manslaughter of his wife whom he shot ten times); In re Knight, 883 P.2d l055 (Colo. l994) (holding that attorney's conviction of
third-degree assault of his wife that arose from three days of
severe beatings warranted six-month suspension); In re Wallace,
837 P.2d l223 (Colo. l992) (imposing three-month suspension from
practice of law on attorney who assaulted his girlfriend more
than once and who on occasion entered plea of guilty to assault);
In re Walker,
597 N.E 2d l27l (Ind. l992) (imposing six-month
suspension on part-time prosecutor for physically assaulting his
former client/girlfriend and her daughter); In re Runyon, 49l
N.E.2d l89 (Ind. l986) (disbarring attorney who forced entry into
former wife's apartment, struck former wife with club, held her
at gunpoint and who additionally was convicted of three felony
counts of possession of unregistered firearms); Committee on
Professional Ethics and Conduct of the Iowa State Bar Association
v. Patterson,
369 N.W.2d 798 (Iowa l985) (imposing three-month
suspension from practice of law on attorney convicted of assault
for severely beating his girlfriend for two hours while her four-year-old son was at home and aware of assault).
Respondents in the those cases all committed acts of
domestic violence that resulted in serious bodily injury to the
victim. Additionally, in Nevill, Knight and Wallace, there was a
pattern of abusive behavior. Respondent's actions did not result
in any physical injury to J.M., other than a scratch on her
finger. Moreover, both the municipal court and the DRB found
several mitigating factors. We agree. The municipal court
observed that no serious harm was done; that respondent had no
prior history of misconduct; that "the character and attitude of
the defendant indicate he is unlikely to commit another offense";
and that there was no indication that respondent's representation
of J.M. was adversely affected by their personal relationship.
In fact, according to J.M.'s own testimony, respondent's legal
representation of her was excellent.
The DRB in its Decision and Recommendation also acknowledged
that there were mitigating factors:
First, respondent recognized that he used
poor judgment in becoming personally involved
with [J.M.]. He acknowledged his wrongdoing
in assaulting [J.M.] and was contrite for
what he had done. Second, his conduct was
aberrational and is highly unlikely to recur.
The Board is also mindful of the impact that
the negative publicity generated by
respondent's case has had on his career (See,
e.g., exhibit C to OAE's brief). Moreover,
the incident occurred nearly three years ago.
The Board has taken these factors into
account and has further considered
respondent's previous unblemished ethics
record.
New Jersey has a strong public policy against domestic violence. Respondent's assault on J.M., a particularly vulnerable client, referred to him by a battered women's shelter, was a serious violation of RPC 8.4(b). But for the fact that we have not previously addressed the appropriate discipline to be imposed on a lawyer who is convicted of an act of domestic violence, and that respondent's offense was an isolated incident and did not present a pattern of abusive conduct, respondent's discipline would be greater than the public reprimand we hereby
impose. We caution members of the bar, however, that the Court
in the future will ordinarily suspend an attorney who is
convicted of an act of domestic violence.
We direct that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary
Oversight Committee for administrative costs.
Chief Justice Wilentz and Justices Handler, Pollock, O'Hern,
Garibaldi, Stein, and Coleman join in this opinion.
NO. D-64 SEPTEMBER TERM 1994
Application for
Disposition Public Reprimand
Decided March 31, 1995 Order returnable Opinion by Per Curiam