NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
A-4533-00T5
IN RE APPLICATION OF
GLEN GILMORE AND
MICHAEL DUPONT TO CONTEST
THE VALIDITY OF THE ENACTMENT OF
SENATE BILL 2328 (P.L. 2001, c.73)
____________________________________
Argued on an emergent application May 8, 2001 -
Decided May 8, 2001
Before Judges Baime, Wallace, Jr. and Carchman.
Angelo J. Genova argued the cause for appellants
(Genova, Burns & Vernoia, attorneys; Mr.
Genova, of counsel; Kathleen Barnett Einhorn
and Celia S. Bosco, on the brief).
Mark J. Fleming, Assistant Attorney General,
argued the cause for respondent State of New
Jersey (John J. Farmer, Jr., Attorney General,
attorney; Mr. Fleming, of counsel and on the
brief; John P. Bender, Assistant Attorney
General, on the brief).
Carmen Saginario, Jr. argued the cause for
respondent-intervenor New Jersey State Senate
(Capehart & Scatchard, attorneys; Mr. Saginario,
on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
BAIME, P.J.A.D.
Applicants Glen Gilmore and Michael Dupont brought these
proceedings to invalidate L. 2001, c. 73 (Chapter 73) because of
procedural irregularities that are alleged to have occurred in
the Senate on the date the bill was introduced. Chapter 73
changed the primary election date for 2001 from June 5 to June
26, increased public financing grants and expenditure limits for
gubernatorial candidates, and altered various deadlines for
statutorily mandated pre-primary and post-primary activities.
Applicants' petition to invalidate the enactment was filed
pursuant to N.J.S.A. 1:7-4. That statute confers original
jurisdiction upon the Appellate Division to consider challenges
to the validity of laws and joint resolutions adopted by the
Legislature. Ibid.; see also N.J.S.A. 1:7-1. The jurisdiction
granted is limited to deciding attacks upon the "machinery of
enactment." In re Application of McCabe,
81 N.J. 462, 465
(1980). We are not empowered to consider the substantive
constitutional validity of the laws themselves. Ibid.
The question raised by applicants is whether a quorum of
Senators was present prior to the introduction and first two
readings of Chapter 27. At issue is whether a full complement of
twenty-one Senators must be physically present in the Senate
chamber before a quorum can be registered. An ancillary issue is
whether a quorum of Senators must be physically present when a
bill is introduced and receives its first two readings.
These questions can best be understood within the context of
the work-a-day activities of the Senate. The informal custom is
for each Senator to press the "yea" button on his or her desk
indicating the Senator's attendance in the Senate. As a matter
of common practice, Senators are not required to remain on the
Senate floor once their attendance is marked and noted.
Applicants contend, however, that all twenty-one Senators must be
physically present in the Senate chamber before a quorum can be
registered or business conducted. They argue that a quorum was
not obtained prior to the introduction and first two readings of
Chapter 27, and that the legislation is thus invalid.
We hold that the mechanics of identifying a quorum is a
matter committed to the Legislature. In the absence of specific
constitutional or statutory standards, we have no roving
commission to determine the manner in which the Legislature is to
fulfill its constitutional mission. We abstain from deciding
what we perceive to be a nonjusticiable political question.
I.
We need not recount the facts at length. On April 18, 2001,
Senate President Donald DiFrancesco notified members of the
Senate that there would be a quorum call on April 20, 2001. At
10:00 a.m. on the scheduled date, the Senate Secretary's desk was
opened, and Senators began to filter into the Senate chamber.
Pursuant to the informal custom we have described, each Senator
marked his presence or her presence in the Senate chamber by
pressing the "yea" button on his or her desk. It is apparent
from the documentary submissions filed by applicants that not all
of the Senators remained in the Senate chamber after noting their
presence. According to affidavits accompanying applicants'
petition, at various times during the day, members of the Senate
Minority Office appeared in the Senate chamber and found no more
than ten Senators present.
According to the Senate Journal, a quorum was registered at
2:52 p.m., signifying that at least twenty-one Senators had
indicated their presence by pressing the "yea" button on their
desks. No Senator challenged the existence of a quorum. Chapter
27 was introduced and received its first two readings later in
the afternoon. In their affidavits, members of the Senate
Minority Office represent that they appeared in the Senate
chamber at various intervals during the afternoon and found no
Senators present. The proceedings were adjourned at 5:00 p.m.
The Senate next met on Monday, April 23, 2001. No Senator
requested that the minutes of the April 20 meeting be read or
amended to reflect a challenge to the quorum. The reading of the
minutes for the April 20 meeting was waived. Ultimately, the
minutes were adopted without amendment. Chapter 27 was given its
third reading at the April 23 meeting. Following vigorous
debate, the Senate passed the bill by a vote of twenty-one to
eleven. The Assembly passed the bill by a vote of forty-three to
thirty. The bill was signed into law by the Acting Governor
later that afternoon.
Applicants' petition was filed in the late evening hours of
Friday, May 4, 2001. Because the statutory deadline for
certification of candidates by the Secretary of State was
looming, we accelerated the proceedings. We now grant the
Attorney General's motion to dismiss.
II.
The issue presented must be considered against the backdrop
of the New Jersey Constitution. Three provisions are implicated.
They provide: (1) "a majority of all [the Senate's] members
shall constitute a quorum to do business,"
N.J. Const., art. IV,
§ 4, ¶ 2 (1948), (2) "[a]ll bills and joint resolutions shall be
read three times in each house before final passage," and "[n]o
bill or joint resolution shall pass, unless there shall be a
majority of all the members . . . personally present and agreeing
thereto,"
N.J. Const., art. IV, § 4, ¶ 6, and (3) "[e]ach house
shall . . . determine the rules of its proceedings,"
N.J. Const.,
art. IV, §4, ¶ 3.
None of these provisions deals directly with the precise
issue presented. However, the juxtaposition of several of these
provisions suggests that the physical presence of twenty-one
Senators is not required when a bill is introduced or when it is
given its first two readings. Our inquiry thus starts with that
question. We then proceed to the issue of whether the physical
presence of twenty-one Senators in the Senate chamber at the same
time is necessary for registering or obtaining an initial quorum.
We note that the "personally present" requirement is
enjoined only with reference to the "final passage" of a bill.
While the Constitution clearly mandates physical presence for the
vote to adopt a bill, this requirement is notably absent from the
earlier sentence in the same paragraph requiring that "[a]ll
bills and joint resolutions shall be read three times."
N.J.
Const., art. IV, §4, ¶6. Considering these provisions in
context, we do not read the Constitution as requiring the
physical presence of a quorum in the Senate chamber at the time
of introduction or the first two readings of a bill. The
Constitution requires no more than that a majority be physically
present at the time of the vote and agree to the passage of a
bill in order for the bill to become a law.
We perceive no warrant for importing the requirements of one
portion of paragraph 6 into another and combining the two with
the quorum provision in paragraph 2 to manufacture a new
procedural requirement for enactment of a law. The framers
clearly did not intend to so encumber the lawmaking process. We
discern no jurisprudential basis for such constitutional
tinkering. If the validity of every action of the Senate were
subject to such an ironclad rule requiring the presence of
twenty-one Senators at all stages of the legislative process, the
minutes of that body would be littered with observations
pertaining to the second-by-second movements of members as they
enter and exit the chamber. Otherwise, virtually every action of
the legislative body could be challenged at any of the many
stages of the legislative process.
The framers imposed the physical presence requirement only
with respect to the final stage in passing a bill. They left it
to the good sense and sound judgment of each body to determine
the need for further requirements in its own duly promulgated
rules.
Our examination of the Senate's formal rules discloses no
provision directly on point. Senate Rule 2.2 states that
"[t]wenty-one or more Senators shall constitute a quorum."
Senate Rule 28:1 defines "quorum" as the "presence of at least
[twenty-one] Senators at a meeting of the Senate. Senate Rule
27:1 provides that
Mason's Manual of Legislative Procedure shall
in all cases, when not in conflict with these Rules, be
considered and held as standard authority." Although
Mason's
Manual states that "[w]hen a body has convened with a quorum
present, it can continue to transact business as long as a quorum
is present,"
Mason's Manual, § 504, it does not specifically
provide that the physical presence of twenty-one Senators is
necessary to conduct routine business such as the first and
second reading of a bill.
Mason's Manual states that "[w]henever
it is observed that a quorum is not present, any member may call
for the house to be counted and if found deficient, business will
be suspended.
Ibid. But where, as here, no such action is
taken, "it is presumed that the quorum continues to be present
. . . ."
Ibid. Moreover,
Mason's Manual provides that "[w]hen
an action has been completed, it is too late to raise a point
of order that no quorum was present when the action was taken
. . . ."
Id. at § 505. We thus find no specific Senate rule
mandating the physical presence of twenty-one Senators in the
Senate chamber when a bill is introduced or when it is given its
first and second reading. In any event, even assuming the
existence of such a rule, the point was not raised during the
meeting of the Senate on April 20, 2001, or for that matter
during the meeting of April 23, 2001, and, under
Mason's Manual,
the point is no longer cognizable.
Having said this, no one disputes the necessity of obtaining
a quorum before the Senate's business can take place. Applicants
argue that a quorum requires the physical presence of twenty-one
Senators in the Senate chamber at the same time. As we have
observed, the Constitution is silent on the issue. Although
Senate Rule 3.1 provides in pertinent part that "[w]hen a quorum
is present, the President [of the Senate] may proceed with the
business" of that body, the rule does not indicate the method for
tallying the number of Senators present for the purpose of
registering a quorum.
In the absence of constitutional or statutory standards, or
even a formal Senate rule dealing with the precise question
presented, we decline applicants' invitation to establish a
requirement mandating the physical presence of twenty-one
Senators in order to register a quorum or conduct routine
legislative business. We regard the question presented as
essentially political in nature and, hence, nonjusticiable.
"The nonjusticiability of a political question is primarily
a function of the separation of powers."
Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186, 210,
82 S. Ct. 691, 706,
7 L.Ed.2d 663, 682 (1962). While
the doctrines of separation of powers and checks and balances do
not require hermetically sealed, watertight compartments in the
conduct of the State's business, their purpose is to "safeguard
the 'essential integrity' of each branch of government.
Gilbert
v. Gladden,
87 N.J. 275, 281 (1981) (quoting
Massett Building Co.
v. Bennett,
4 N.J. 53, 57 (1950)). The distribution of powers
among the three branches of government is fundamental to our
organic law.
State v. Gregorio,
186 N.J. Super. 138, 145 (Law
Div. 1982). It has been hailed as the great "contribution of
Anglo-American lawyers to the prevention of absolutism . . . ."
Mulhearn v. Federal Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co.,
2 N.J. 356,
364 (1949). The doctrine "expresses a profound belief that the
concentration of governmental power increases the potential for
oppression, and that fragmentation . . . helps insure its
temperate use."
General Assembly v. Byrne,
90 N.J. 376, 381
(1982).
In the context of the question raised, we conclude that the
procedural rules applicable to the conduct of the Senate's
business have been textually committed to the legislative branch
of government.
See Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. at 211, 82
S. Ct. at
706, 7
L.Ed.
2d at 682;
De Vesa v. Dorsey,
134 N.J. 420, 431
(1993) (Pollock, J., concurring);
Gilbert v. Gladden, 87
N.J. at
282. As we noted earlier, our Constitution expressly provides
that "[e]ach house shall . . . determine the rules of its
proceedings."
N.J. Const., art. IV, § 4, ¶ 3. We have thus
refrained from delving into whether the procedural rules of a
legislative body were adhered to in the enactment of a law when
the Constitution has been followed.
In re Application of Lamb,
67 N.J. Super. 39, 59 (App. Div.),
aff'd,
34 N.J. 448 (1961);
see
also De Vesa v. Dorsey, 134
N.J. at 433;
Gilbert v. Gladden, 87
N.J. at 282. We apply that principle here. It is not our
function to substitute our judgment for that of the Senate with
respect to the rules it has adopted or the procedure followed in
giving effect to the rules. Unless there is "an obvious
violation of fundamental rights,"
In re Application of Lamb, 67
N.J. Super. at 59, we owe no duty or obligation to intervene.
That the Senate has acted in accordance with an informal,
unwritten custom in determining whether a quorum was obtained and
in not requiring the physical presence of twenty-one Senators
during the bill's introduction and first two readings should not
alter the principle applied. The overarching consideration is
that the custom itself represents a determination by the
legislative branch on how best to fulfill its constitutional
mission. That determination deserves our respect.
Nor is it our business whether a different rule might better
advance the public interest, as applicants contend. The
Constitution commits such judgments to the legislative branch.
The more the Constitution is found to be intolerant of
disagreement on arguable issues, the deadlier becomes the grip
upon human genius. The price of such intolerance may be
sterility. We are not empowered to act as a superlegislature,
and second guess that branch's rules of procedure.
We thus dismiss applicants' petition with prejudice.