NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
A-1420-99T3
IN RE THE MATTER OF THE
1999-2000 ABBOTT V. BURKE
IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS,
N.J.A.C. 6:19A-1.1 et seq.
Argued October 9, 2001 - Decided February 22,
2002
Before Judges Havey, Coburn and Weissbard.
On appeal from the New Jersey Department of
Education.
David G. Sciarra, Executive Director, argued
the cause for appellants (Education Law
Center, attorneys; Mr. Sciarra, on the
brief).
Michelle Lynn Miller, Deputy Attorney
General, argued the cause for respondent
Department of Education (John J. Farmer, Jr.,
Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney;
Nancy Kaplan, Assistant Attorney General, of
counsel; Ms. Miller on the brief).
Zazzali, Zazzali, Fagella & Nowak, attorneys
for Amicus Curiae New Jersey Education
Association (Richard A. Friedman, on the
brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HAVEY, P.J.A.D.
Appellants, a group of children who attend public schools in
special needs districts designated as "Abbott districts,"
challenge the constitutionality of regulations promulgated by the
Department of Education (DOE) pursuant to the Supreme Court's
directives in Abbott v. Burke,
153 N.J. 480 (1998) (Abbott V) and
Abbott v. Burke,
163 N.J. 95 (2000) (Abbott VI). The challenged
regulations were codified at N.J.A.C. 6:19A-1.1 to -8.1 and
recodified with amendments as N.J.A.C. 6A:24-1.1 to -9.6, which
are scheduled to expire in June 2005.
32 N.J.R. 1329, 1329-41
(April 17, 2000);
32 N.J.R. 2470, 2470-83 (July 3, 2000).
Essentially, appellants claim that the regulations failed to
codify the Court's mandates in Abbott V and Abbott VI. Prior to
its decisions in Abbott V and Abbott VI, the Court had held in
Abbott v. Burke,
149 N.J. 145, 152-53 (1997) (Abbott IV), that
the Comprehensive Education Improvement and Financing Act of 1996
(CEIFA or the 1996 Act), L. 1996, c. 138, was unconstitutional as
applied to school districts that served children in poor
districts and that were classified as "special needs districts."
The Court ordered the State to provide increased funding to the
twenty-eight "Abbott" school districts, and to manage
implementation of the additional funding so as to further the
students' ability to achieve at the level prescribed by the Core
Curriculum Content Standards (CCCS) adopted by the DOE. Id. at
224-25.
The Court in Abbott IV directed the Commissioner of
Education (Commissioner) to conduct a comprehensive study of the
needs of students in the Abbott districts, specify programs that
would address those needs, determine the costs of those programs,
and devise a plan for implementation. Ibid. In addition, the
Commissioner was ordered to review the facilities needs of the
Abbott districts and provide recommendations on addressing those
concerns. Id. at 225. The Commissioner was to provide to the
Superior Court interim progress reports and a final report.
Ibid. The Court appointed Judge King of the Appellate Division,
to conduct hearings on the Commissioner's report, and he issued a
report and recommendation dated January 22, 1998. Abbott V,
supra, 153 N.J. at 493. In Abbott V, the Court relied on Judge
King's report to explain the remedial measures it deemed
necessary "to ensure that public school children from the poorest
urban communities receive the educational entitlements that the
Constitution guarantees them." Id. at 489.
The key to the Abbott reform efforts is implementation in
elementary schools of a concept known as "whole-school reform."
Id. at 494-502. Whole-school reform is a comprehensive approach
that integrates reform efforts throughout a school on an
institutional level, so as to affect the culture of the entire
school, including instruction, curriculum, and assessment. Id.
at 494. During the hearings conducted by Judge King, the
Commissioner recommended the adoption of a version of whole-
school reform known as Success for All - Roots and Wings (SFA).
Id. at 494-95. School-based management teams (SMTs), consisting
of school administrators, teachers and parents, are an essential
component of the SFA model, which relies on the assumption that
each of these different groups will "buy into" the program. Id.
at 496-97. Another key aspect of whole-school reform is "zero-
based budgeting" whereby a school combines all of its revenue
sources and uses the entirety of its funds to implement the
reform, rather than allocating certain funds to specific
programs. Id. at 498.
The Commissioner proposed a version of the SFA that expanded
"every element" of the model including, for example, a reduction
in the model's recommended class sizes, an increase in the number
of tutors per student, and the inclusion of substantial
technology components. Id. at 497. In addition to the SFA
model, the Commissioner proposed that a school could adopt one of
four other models "if it could show convincingly that the
alternative model it chose would be equally effective and
efficient as SFA or that the model was already in place and
operating effectively." Id. at 494.
Accepting evidence of the success of whole-school reform
programs that encompassed SFA, the Court stated:
[W]e adopt Judge King's recommendation "that
the State require the Abbott districts to
adopt some version of a proven, effective
whole-school design with SFA-Roots and Wings
as the presumptive elementary school model."
We direct that implementation proceed
according to the schedule proposed by the
Commissioner and that SFA contain the
essential elements identified by the
Commissioner. Finally, we direct the
Commissioner to implement as soon as feasible
a comprehensive formal evaluation program,
modeled on SFA's formal evaluation
precedents, to verify that SFA is being
implemented successfully and is resulting in
the anticipated levels of improvement in the
Abbott elementary schools.
[Id. at 501-02 (citations omitted).]
The Court rejected appellants' contention that SFA was beyond the
DOE's statutory authority and inconsistent with the Court's
decision in Abbott IV. Id. at 499. It found that the
Commissioner's "broad remedial powers" under the CEIFA provided
sufficient authority for the Commissioner's actions. Id. at 499-
501.
In addition to adopting the whole-school reform approach for
elementary schools, the Court examined the aspects of whole-
school reform relevant to early childhood education programs,
recognizing that early childhood education was "essential" for
children in Abbott districts and "an integral component of whole-
school reform." Id. at 502-08. Specifically, the Court adopted
Judge King's recommendation for the implementation of full-day
kindergarten "immediately" or, as an alternative for schools
unable to obtain promptly sufficient space or instructors, by
commencement of the September 1999 school year. Id. at 503. In
addition, it directed the Commissioner "to exercise his power"
under CEIFA "to require all Abbott districts to provide half-day
pre-school for three- and four-year-olds." Id. at 508. The
Court permitted the Commissioner to implement the pre-school
programs by "authoriz[ing] cooperation with or the use of
existing early childhood and day-care programs in the community."
Ibid.
Although the Commissioner declined to recommend the adoption
of whole-school reform for middle and high schools, he did
recommend several supplemental programs that could be implemented
at all levels, from elementary to high school. Id. at 508-09.
The most significant supplemental programs involved the provision
of health and social services, and increased security measures.
Id. at 509-14. The Court recognized that the Abbott schools
would have varying needs for supplemental programs. Id. at 517.
Thus it "authorize[d]" the Commissioner to implement technology
programs "at the request of individual schools or districts or as
he otherwise shall direct" and "to implement alternative schools
or comparable education programs." Ibid. It "direct[ed] the
[C]ommissioner to authorize accountability programs, as may be
deemed necessary or appropriate" and to implement school-to-work
and college-transition programs in secondary schools "at the
request of individual schools or districts or as the Commissioner
otherwise shall require." Ibid. The Court concluded:
In respect of the other supplemental
programs, we decline to order their immediate
district-wide implementation, even though all
such programs are sound in principle.
Rather, because the needs for these programs
will vary from school to school, we direct
the Commissioner to provide or secure the
funding necessary to implement those programs
for which Abbott schools or districts make a
request and are able to demonstrate a need.
We reiterate that for middle and secondary
schools, which will not have the benefit of
whole-school reform, such supplemental
programs may be necessary to ensure the
educational success of their students.
[Ibid.]
The Court also recognized that disputes would arise from the
administration of the public education that would be prompted by
the reforms, including "the implementation, extension, or
modification of existing programs, the need for additional
supplemental programs, the allocation of budgeted funds, the need
for additional funding, and the implementation of the standards
and plans for the provision of capital improvements and related
educational facilities." Id. at 526. The Court determined that
disputes relating to those matters would be considered
"controversies" under the School Laws, N.J.S.A. 18A:7A-1 to 7F-
34, and established the process to be followed to resolve such
controversies. Id. at 526-27.
The Court summarized its directions to the Commissioner as
follows:
In summary, and consistent with this
opinion, we determine and direct that the
Commissioner implement whole-school reform;
implement full-day kindergarten and a
half-day pre-school program for three- and
four-year olds as expeditiously as possible;
implement the technology, alternative school,
accountability, and school-to-work and
college-transition programs; prescribe
procedures and standards to enable individual
schools to adopt additional or extended
supplemental programs and to seek and obtain
the funds necessary to implement those
programs for which they have demonstrated a
particularized need; implement the facilities
plan and timetable he proposed; secure funds
to cover the complete cost of remediating
identified life-cycle and infrastructure
deficiencies in Abbott school buildings as
well as the cost of providing the space
necessary to house Abbott students
adequately; and promptly initiate effective
managerial responsibility over school
construction, including necessary funding
measures and fiscal reforms, such as may be
achieved through amendment of the Educational
Facilities Act.
[Id. at 527.]
The Court ordered the Commissioner "to promulgate regulations and
guidelines that will codify the education reforms incorporated in
the Court's remedial measures." Id. at 526.
By statutes effective June 28, 1999, the Legislature
expedited the procedure for the adoption of Abbott regulations
for the 1999-2000 school year, and authorized amendments to be
made thereafter in accordance with the Administrative Procedure
Act, N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1. N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-35. The statute
provided that any regulations adopted pursuant to this procedure
would expire June 30, 2000. Ibid. The Legislature also
authorized the State Board of Education (Board) to adopt
regulations for the 2000-2001 school year to implement the
Supreme Court's directive in Abbott V. N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-36.
On September 9, 1999, after public hearings were held, the
DOE adopted as N.J.A.C. Chapter 6:19A, rules for "Urban Education
Reform in the Abbott Districts," to be effective on September 10,
1999, and to expire on June 30, 2000.
31 N.J.R. 2924, 2924 (Oct.
4, 1999). Generally, the regulations: (1) provided for the
establishment of SMTs; (2) mandated the adoption of a DOE-
approved program of whole-school reform, or an alternative
program design, by all schools in the Abbott districts; (3)
established school-based budgeting; (4) implemented required
programs in the secondary schools; and (5) provided a format to
guide the school districts in their requests for State aid, and a
formula for determining a district's facilities' needs. 31
N.J.R. at 2953-64.
On November 16, 1999, appellants filed a notice of appeal
challenging the regulations as arbitrary, capricious, and
contrary to law.
On March 7, 2000, the Supreme Court decided a motion in aid
of litigant's rights filed by appellants to enforce their rights
as set forth in Abbott V. Abbott VI, supra, 163 N.J. at 100.
Appellants claimed that the Commissioner had "repudiated his
promise to provide quality preschool education for the
disadvantaged school children who reside in the Abbott
districts," and that "systemic failures" required the Court's
intervention. Ibid. Although the Court rejected appellants'
broader claim of bad faith and noncompliance by the Commissioner,
it did conclude that the DOE's use of uncertified teachers in its
preschool programs "violates the Abbott V requirement to
establish quality preschool programs for three- and four-year old
children." Id. at 100-01. The Court also found that "the
programs that have been implemented do not conform to the
proposals that were accepted by the Court." Id. at 105.
In response to the Court's decision in Abbott VI, the DOE
readopted the N.J.A.C. 6:19A regulations with amendments,
recodified as N.J.A.C. 6A:24-1.1 to -9.6, scheduled to expire in
June 2005 (the "2000-2005 regulations"). 32 N.J.R. at 2470. The
amendments implemented rules to ensure the quality preschool
education directed by the Court in Abbott VI, and established a
full-day kindergarten for five-year-olds. 32 N.J.R. at 1332-36.
The amended regulations, effective June 8, 2000, 32 N.J.R. at
2470, are divided into nine subchapters. Subchapter 1, "General
Provisions," states the purpose and applicability of the rules,
provides definitions, and establishes the assignment of School
Review and Improvement Teams (SRI). N.J.A.C. 6A:24-1.1 to -1.6.
Subchapter 2, "School Management Teams" (SMT), establishes SMT
guidelines. N.J.A.C. 6A:24-2.1 to -2.3. Subchapter 3, "Early
Childhood Education," implements a full-day kindergarten program,
sets teacher-to-child ratios and class sizes, and establishes
teacher credentials. N.J.A.C. 6A:24-3.1 to -3.4. Subchapter 4,
"Whole School Reform" (WSR), establishes a time frame for
submission by secondary schools of applications for
implementation in the 2001-02 school year of WSR or alternative
program and procedure for implementation of annual school-based
budgets. N.J.A.C. 6A:24-4.1 to -4.5. Subchapter 5,
"Supplemental Programs and Services," provides standards to
determine whether a school demonstrates a particularized need for
supplemental educational programs. N.J.A.C. 6A:24-5.1 and -5.2.
Subchapter 6, "Required Programs in Secondary Schools,"
requires that SMTs submit annually a revised plan for the
implementation of required programs and identifies components of
the plan. N.J.A.C. 6A:24-6.1. Subchapter 7, "District Budget
and Request for Additional State Aid," sets forth considerations
for submission and approval of balanced school-based budgets.
N.J.A.C. 6A:24-7.1. Subchapter 8, "Facilities," requires that
each district submit a long-range facilities plan, establishes
several applicable definitions and standards to be used, and sets
forth the Commissioner's treatment of a plan. N.J.A.C. 6A:24-
8.1.See footnote 11 Subchapter 9, "Appeals," establishes an appeal procedure
for an applicant aggrieved by the DOE's decision regarding an
application to improve or amend an existing program, or to adopt
a supplemental program, implement a required secondary program,
build or renovate school facilities, or seek additional aid.
N.J.A.C. 6A:24-9.1 to -9.6.
I
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Appellants first contend that we must apply a
de novo
standard of review to their challenge to the DOE's Abbott
regulations because the appeal raises constitutional issues
related to the DOE's noncompliance with its constitutionally
prescribed duties and statutory requirements, and because the
issues involve implementation of the Supreme Court's remedial
orders entered in previous
Abbott cases to effectuate a
constitutional decree.
The Education Clause of the New Jersey Constitution mandates
that "[t]he Legislature shall provide for the maintenance and
support of a thorough and efficient system of free public schools
for the instruction of all the children in the State between the
ages of five and eighteen years."
N.J. Const. art. VIII, § 4,
¶ 1. This clause provided the constitutional authority for the
Court's mandate that remedial measures be implemented to ensure
that the educational entitlements guaranteed by the Constitution
were afforded to public school children in the poorest urban
districts.
Abbott V,
supra, 153
N.J. at 489.
Appellants reason that the constitutional issues addressed
by the Court compel us to review these regulations
de novo, "with
the State bearing the burden of demonstrating compliance upon a
prima facie showing of unconstitutionality." However, appellants
have provided no legal support for that contention. Under well-
established judicial principles, administrative regulations are
presumed to be valid.
New Jersey State League of Muns. v. Dep't
of Comm. Affairs,
158 N.J. 211, 222 (1999). In general, the
judiciary recognizes that agencies' specialized expertise renders
them particularly well-equipped to understand the issues and
enact the appropriate regulations pertaining to the technical
matters within their area.
Ibid. Thus, in general, the judicial
role in reviewing regulations is limited to three inquiries:
(1) whether the agency's action violates the
enabling act's express or implied legislative
policies; (2) whether there is substantial
evidence in the record to support the
findings on which the agency based its
action; and (3) whether in applying the
legislative policies to the facts the agency
clearly erred by reaching a conclusion that
could not reasonably have been made upon a
showing of the relevant factors.
[In re Petitions For Rulemaking N.J.A.C.
10:82-1.2 and 10:85-4.1,
117 N.J. 311, 325
(1989).]
The party challenging the validity of a regulation bears the
burden of establishing that it is arbitrary, capricious, or
unreasonable. New Jersey State League of Mun. v. Dep't of Comm.
Affairs, supra, 158 N.J. at 222.
Appellants claim that de novo review is required because
"the regulatory issues on appeal implicate fundamental
constitutional dictates and not matters of regulatory action
under a grant of statutory delegation . . . ." However, these
regulations were in fact promulgated pursuant to the statutory
authority granted by the Legislature. See N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-35 and
-36. Although the Legislature acted pursuant to the Court's
direction and based on the Court's determination that the
existing statute was unconstitutional, the Legislature was the
sole authority capable of granting the DOE the power to act.
General Assembly of N.J. v. Bryne,
90 N.J. 376, 393 (1982).
Thus, essentially we are called upon to decide whether the
challenged regulations, adopted pursuant to a legislative grant,
conform to the mandates of the Court in Abbott V and Abbott VI.
The technical challenges by appellants to specific regulations
simply do not raise issues which reach a constitutional level.
Appellants further claim that de novo review is appropriate
here because in Abbott VI "the Court did not hesitate to review
de novo Appellants' claims of State non-compliance with the
mandate" set forth in Abbott V. We do not agree. In Abbott VI,
supra, 163 N.J. at 101-04, the Court examined the regulations for
specific conflicts with the Commissioner's proposals that the
Court had adopted in Abbott V. This comparison was appropriate
because the enabling act for the regulations specifically
directed the Commissioner to "adopt regulations to implement the
order of the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Abbott v. Burke
. . . ." N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-36. Only in instances where the Court
found direct conflicts between the Commissioner's proposals and
the regulations did it order that the regulations be amended to
codify the proposals. See Abbott VI, supra, 163 N.J. at 107-17.
The Court neither engaged in wholesale de novo review nor acceded
to appellants' request that the Court designate a Superior Court
judge as a standing master to supervise implementation of the
Abbott reforms. Id. at 100, 120.
It is true that in both Abbott V and Abbott VI, the Court
became involved in evaluating many details of the reforms
proposed by the Commissioner. The Court's analysis was based,
however, on a factual record developed by Judge King, and the
Court's decision to retain temporary jurisdiction over a complex,
far-reaching matter whose solution it had mandated. The Court in
fact stated its intention to step away from its role as overseer
of the process and allow the legislative and administrative
systems to carry out their respective functions. Abbott VI,
supra, 163 N.J. at 100, 119-20; Abbott V, supra, 153 N.J. at 490.
We therefore reject appellants' argument that the standard
of review should be de novo.
II
THE DOE'S FAILURE TO CODIFY STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES
Appellants and
amicus advance the general assertion that the
regulations fail to codify the remedial measures mandated by
Abbott V for WSR implementation. They raise the following
specific challenges.
A
Standard-Based Education
Appellants claim that the regulations do not codify the
Abbott mandate for standard-based education because they
improperly delegate to the developers of the WSR models, the
districts and the SMTs, the obligation to conform the WSR models
and curriculum to content-and-performance standards set forth in
the CCCS, and also fail to codify the standards, procedures and
guidelines involved in this task. We reject the argument.
The CCCS "define what all students should know and be able
to do by the end of their public school education."
N.J.A.C.
6A:8-1.1. The standards are the centerpiece of CEIFA.
Abbott
IV,
supra, 149
N.J. at 161.
The [CCCS] specify expectations in seven
academic content areas: the visual and
performing arts, comprehensive health and
physical education, language arts literacy,
mathematics, science, social studies, and
world languages. The [CCCS] also include the
following five Cross-Content Workplace
Readiness Standards: career planning; use of
technology, information, and other tools;
critical thinking, decision making, and
problem solving; self-management; and
application of safety principles.
[N.J.A.C. 6A:8-1.1.]
In Abbott IV, supra, 149 N.J. at 161-62, the Court recognized
that "[t]he standards are not a curriculum; rather, they define
the results expected without prescribing specific strategies or
educational methodologies to ensure that students actually meet
those expectations. The development of a curriculum to deliver
the educational achievement levels required by the standards is
left to the local districts."
In Abbott V, supra, 153 N.J. at 498, the Court considered
appellants' complaint that the SFA would not provide the
constitutionally guaranteed thorough and efficient education to
which they were entitled because the plan was not tied to the
CCCS. The Court accepted evidence that the SFA could be adapted
to fit standards of success established by various states and
thus could incorporate the CCCS. Ibid. Appellants now claim
that the regulations ignore "the State's constitutional duty" to
conform the SFA and the four alternative WSR models to the New
Jersey CCCS because they improperly, arbitrarily, and
capriciously delegate to the districts and the SMTs the task of
ensuring that the WSR model adopted by a particular school
conforms to the CCCS.
In fact, both the regulations and the statutory scheme
provide that the Commissioner retains ultimate responsibility for
ensuring that the selected programs conform to the standards.
First, to gain approval for a particular WSR model, the developer
"must align all instructional materials and all instructional
processes in the model with the [CCCS]." N.J.A.C. 6A:24-4.1(a).
Second, the WSR implementation plan submitted by the SMTs must
"[e]nsure that the curriculum is aligned with the [CCCS] . . . ."
N.J.A.C. 6A:24-4.3(a)5. In addition, the Chief School
Administrator for each district must ensure that each model
adopted in the district is aligned with the standards. N.J.A.C.
6A:24-1.4(o). Rather than the improperly delegating authority,
the regulations provide that each level of administration
involved in the process, from designer to parents to
superintendent, is responsible for properly performing the
critical function necessary at that level that will ensure that
the programs conform with the standards. Appellants offer no
basis for rejecting the Commissioner's conclusion that the
professionals who developed the particular WSR model are also the
group best suited to adapt it to incorporate the CCCS.
Similarly, appellants complain that the regulations fail to
explain the meaning of "key terms" such as "alignment,
articulation, continuity, collaboration, instructional materials,
instructional processes, and instructional delivery systems."
However, we have no reason to believe that those in the
educational field require definitions for such terms.
Regulations are subject to the same rules of construction as a
statute and should be construed according to the plain meaning of
the language. Medford Convalescent and Nurs. Ctr. v. Div. of
Med. Assist. and Health Servs.,
218 N.J. Super. 1, 5 (App. Div.
1985). Appellants offer no examples of confusion, double-
meaning, or misunderstandings likely to occur if the terms remain
undefined and subject to their common meaning.
Appellants also argue that the regulations fail to provide
standards and procedures for CCCS-related tasks and time frames
for completing the tasks. They claim further that the
regulations fail to provide models from schools that have
successfully conformed their curriculum; and fail to codify the
requirements for the professional programs that the DOE directs
staff to utilize in implementing WSR. Appellants provide no
basis, however, for their assertion that explicit codification of
these models and standards is either specifically mandated by
Abbott or necessary for the accomplishment of Abbott objectives.
Similarly, they offer no reasons to assume that the model
developers, SMTs, and others involved in the process are
incapable of accomplishing their assigned obligations without the
specific direction demanded by appellants. Moreover, despite
their criticisms, appellants offer no specific standards,
definitions, or procedures to supplement or remedy the gaps that
they claim exist.
B
Whole-School Reform Programs
Appellants allege that the 1999-2000 regulations failed to
codify the standards, procedures, and guidelines for the minimum
elements of the
Abbott WSR program for elementary schools
including the requirements for: an integrated pre-school
education; the SFA early literacy program; a full-time
instructional facilitator in every school; a professional
development program; a family support team to address student
social and health needs; an enhanced technology program; a needs-
based security program; and a class-size reduction program. In
their supplemental brief, appellants acknowledge that the DOE
"made a few amendments to the regulations" pertaining to WSR in
elementary schools, but they allege that "none of [the
amendments] correct the failure to codify that remedial measure."
In addition to their claims alleging insufficiency in the
codification of programs for elementary schools, in their primary
brief appellants claim that the regulations fail to codify
minimum requirements for supplemental programs in middle and high
schools including coordination and referral for social and health
services, an enhanced technology program, a needs-based security
program, an alternative education program, a drop-out prevention
program, and school-to-work and college transition programs. In
their supplemental brief, appellants make no claims regarding the
2000-2005 regulations. The regulations pertaining to elementary
and secondary schools are discussed separately.
(a)
Elementary Schools
Appellants first contend that the DOE "completely ignores
the explicit directive in
Abbott V that WSR incorporate the
requirements for preschool education." This assertion ignores
the framework for early childhood education set forth in the
amended regulations, Subchapter 3,
N.J.A.C. 6A:24-3.1 to -3.4.
The only reference to
Abbott V cited by appellants in support of
this argument is the Court's discussion of the precise elements
later incorporated into Subchapter 3, including full-day
kindergarten and preschool for three- and four-year olds.
See
Abbott V,
supra, 153
N.J. at 502-08.See footnote 22
Appellants also argue that the regulations fail to codify
specific program requirements for the literacy component of SFA.
In evaluating the Commissioner's proposal for implementation of
WSR and his recommended version, SFA, the Court described the
functional elements of the SFA reading program as involving daily
ninety-minute reading sessions, with the students placed in
groups of fifteen organized according to reading level.
Id. at
495. In addition, under the SFA program daily individual
tutoring should be available for the younger children in grades
one through three, and daily group tutoring sessions for the
students in the higher elementary grades.
Ibid. Nowhere,
however, in its opinion did the Court mandate the adoption by
every school of the SFA model or the codification of the SFA
components. To the contrary, the Court "adopt[ed] Judge King's
recommendation 'that the State require the Abbott districts to
adopt some version of a proven, effective whole-school design
with SFA-Roots and Wings as the presumptive elementary school
model.'"
Id. at 501. It directed only that the SFA "contain the
essential elements identified by the Commissioner."
Ibid. This
mandate was consistent with the Court's recognition that a key
element of the success of WSR is the involvement of school
personnel and parents, and its recognition that individual
schools had different needs that were best understood by those
involved in the daily life of the school.
In accordance with the Court's instruction, the regulations
do not require that a school adopt a particular WSR model. The
selected model must be, however, a research-based model or an
alternative design, which must comport with certain requirements
set forth in the regulations.
N.J.A.C. 6A:24-4.1 to -4.2.
Moreover, the regulations specifically define SFA-Roots and Wings
as the "nationally-proven [sic] research-based whole school
reform model developed by Dr. Robert Slavin . . . [that] shall
include the enhancements made by Dr. Slavin to the model so as to
meet New Jersey requirements."
N.J.A.C. 6A:24-1.2. Appellants
offer no evidence that the lack of codification of specific
elements of the SFA literacy program conflicts with the
Commissioner's proposals or undermines existing standards.
Appellants further argue that "[t]here is no codification of
the minimum elements of the minimum professional development
program adopted in
Abbott V . . . . " In
Abbott V,
supra, 153
N.J. at 496, the Court described details of the Commissioner's
recommended program of professional development for members of
the SFA instructional teams, which included at least three full
days of training prior to the school year, a week-long training
session for the principal and school facilitator, weekly in-
school training sessions, and three two-day evaluations by SFA
staff. The regulations provide only that: "All staff of the
school shall be engaged in an organized, continuous program of
staff training, focused on the acquisition of knowledge and
skills directly related to the achievement of the Core Curriculum
Content Standards and the implementation of the selected WSR
model."
N.J.A.C. 6A:24-4.1(i)6. Although this regulation does
not codify the specific program elements described by the Court,
neither does it conflict with or prevent the DOE from
implementing the form of professional development program
described in the recommendations.
Appellants further claim that despite the Court's
"unequivocal instruction on the maximum number of students per
class," the DOE failed to direct the implementation of reduced
class sizes, to provide guidance on methods to reduce class size,
or to set forth "how to secure any additional funds" necessary to
achieve this requirement. In
Abbott V,
supra, 153
N.J. at 498-
99, the Court observed that the Commissioner proposed a reduction
of class sizes to twenty-one students for kindergarten through
third grade, and twenty-three students for fourth and fifth
grade, with reading classes of fifteen students for grades K-5.
It rejected appellants' argument that class sizes for all
subjects should be reduced to fifteen students, and concurred in
"Judge King's recommendation that it will not be essential to
reduce class size in the elementary schools to an extent greater
than that proposed by the Commissioner."
Ibid.
The regulations provide that, for schools implementing a WSR
model: "A plan shall be in place to continue to reduce class size
by September 2002 to 1:21 for grades K through 3 and 1:23 for
grades four through eight and 1:24 for grades nine through 12.
The plan shall also include an aide in kindergarten."
N.J.A.C.
6A:24-4.1(j)9. For schools implementing an alternative design
model: "The design shall reduce class size in grades K through 3
to 21 children and in grades four through eight to 23 children
and in grades nine through 12 to 24 children or demonstrate a
program of smaller class sizes geared to more effective learning,
including reading class size reduction[.]"
N.J.A.C. 6A:24-
4.2(c)5. Thus, the regulations clearly implement the Court's
directive regarding class size in the elementary schools.
Appellants attack the regulations for failing to provide
guidance on "methods" to achieve the reduction, for delaying the
requirement until 2002, and for ignoring the requirement to
reduce reading class sizes to fifteen students. Appellants offer
no examples of any "methods" that exist, beyond the obvious
method of lowering the ratio of students to teachers, that would
have the effect of reducing class size, or which were cited by
the Court in
Abbott V. They do not explain why implementing this
goal would require separate procedures for obtaining funds
distinct from those procedures established in the overall Abbott
statutory and regulatory scheme. As to the class size for
reading groups, the fifteen-student class size pertains to
schools who have adopted the SFA program for reading. Other
programs may approach the issue of reading in an entirely
different manner, for example, by utilizing computers or
audiotapes in which class size is less relevant. Neither the
Court nor the regulations mandate the imposition of SFA as the
exclusive reading program, and there is no basis for imposing a
class-size requirement that may be antithetical to the methods of
a particular, accepted alternative reading program.
In their initial brief, appellants allege that the
regulations pertaining to enhanced technology programs: (1) fail
to provide definitions for terms that it deems "critical," such
as "educational technology, equipment and infrastructure, and
appropriate staff"; (2) fail to specify computer ratios or
minimum staff levels; fail to direct schools to provide a full-
time technology coordinator; and (3) "do[] not codify at all the
requirement for an additional full-time media specialist in every
school."
In
Abbott V,
supra, 153
N.J. at 514-15, the Court discussed
the Commissioner's proposal for a technology program that would
provide one computer for every five students in grades K-12, a
full-time media/technology specialist, and a full-time technology
coordinator. The Court discussed the program, however, within
the context of the "supplemental programs" for which it
recognized that the Abbott schools would have varying needs.
Id.
at 514-517. Consequently, rather than ordering the as-is
adoption of the proposals, the Court "authorize[d] [the
Commissioner] to implement technology programs at the request of
individual schools or districts or as he otherwise shall direct."
Id. at 517.
N.J.A.C. 6A:24-1.4(f) requires that the local board "shall
provide for a full-time media specialist responsible for ensuring
that school libraries have appropriate materials to supplement
the curriculum and to address the [CCCS]," although it does not
state whether the specialist would be district-wide or at each
school.
N.J.A.C. 6A:24:1.4(g) provides for a "full-time
technology coordinator" at each secondary and elementary school.
We reject appellants' arguments that a single media
specialist for the district is insufficient and that the
regulations include the standards for the qualification and
duties of the position. The Commissioner is given discretion in
implementing a technology program and appellants have provided no
evidence of critical criteria omitted from these regulations.
We further reject appellants' claim that the regulations are
deficient because they do not enumerate the specific duties and
qualifications of particular members of a school's Family Support
Team and do not specify the school's right to provide health
services based on demonstrated need. School personnel will have
sufficient hands-on knowledge of the qualifications of members of
the community to staff the team. As to school-based health
services, Subsection 5 of the regulations sets forth procedures
for demonstrating particularized need for all non-required
programs. Therefore, no specific regulation is needed here.
Moreover, contrary to appellants' argument, the regulations
pertaining to family support teams,
N.J.A.C. 6A:24-4.1, generally
track the Court's described purpose and goals of such teams.
Abbott V,
supra, 153
N.J. at 496.
Appellants also attack the regulations pertaining to
security programs for the elementary schools which they claim
"plainly violate
Abbott V." The Court recognized that security
was a "critically important factor in the provision of a thorough
and efficient education."
Id. at 514. It rejected the
Commissioner's proposal to provide one security guard for every
535 elementary school students and one guard for every 225 middle
and high school students, because those numbers were based on
submissions from only two school districts.
Id. at 513. It
observed that "[w]ithout a link to actual needs, the
Commissioner's proposal lacks an evidentiary basis."
Id. at 514.
Instead, the Court held "that individual Abbott schools or
districts have a right to request supplemental programs for
security and that the Commissioner must authorize the requested
programs that are based on demonstrated need and secure or
provide necessary funding."
Ibid.
The regulations provide that the local board
shall implement a Department approved
district wide security plan that includes a
Code of Student Conduct, and one security
guard for each elementary school building and
one for each 225 students at the secondary
level as part of the board's plan. As part of
the board's plan, it may apply for a waiver
of the required number of security guards
pursuant to (e) above.
[
N.J.A.C. 6A:24-1.4(i).]
Thus, contrary to the Court's direction, this regulation codifies
the proposal it rejected and fails to establish a mechanism to
implement security programs adapted to a school's specific needs.
In addition, in the subchapter pertaining to WSR implementation,
the regulations provide that the WSR model must address security
in the following manner:
Safe School Environment Conducive to
Learning: The school climate must be safe and
conducive to learning. There shall be a code
of conduct that clearly defines acceptable
and unacceptable student behaviors and the
consequences for them. The district shall
provide required security staff and other
necessary protective devices as set forth in
N.J.A.C. 6A:24-1.5(h).
[
N.J.A.C. 6A:24-4.1(i)7.]
The problem with this provision is that
N.J.A.C. 6A:24-1.5(h)
does not exist. Section 6A:24-1.5 is a paragraph that sets forth
district accountability requirements; section 6A:24-1.4(h)
pertains to dropout prevention measures and the health and social
services coordinator. No regulation discusses what protective
devices are deemed necessary.
Thus the security provisions in the regulations are
inconsistent with each other and with
Abbott. The Court's
recognition of the critical role that security programs play in
the education of children in all Abbott schools suggests that the
Court intended that specific regulations pertaining to security
needs should be developed, rather than be included in the general
regulations and procedures for obtaining supplemental educational
programs and services. The regulations pertaining to security
programs,
N.J.A.C. 6A:24-1.4(i), and
N.J.A.C. 6A:24-4.1(i)7, must
therefore be remanded for development of a regulation that allows
each school to provide evidence of its security needs.
Appellants' final argument regarding implementation of WSR
programs is that the regulations fail to codify the requirement
for a full-time instructional facilitator in each school. A
conflict does arise in this area because, although the
Commissioner clearly proposed to the Court a full-time, school-
wide instructional facilitator,
Abbott V,
supra, 153
N.J. at 497,
the regulations merely provide that "[a] teaching staff member
shall be designated to ensure that all the elements of the design
are properly implemented and coordinated[.]"
N.J.A.C. 6A:24-
4.2(c)8. Thus the regulation is unclear as to whether the staff
member would have teaching duties in addition to a role as
facilitator, a component that would be contrary to the
Commissioner's proposal. Regulation
N.J.A.C. 6A:24-4.2(c)(8)
must therefore be remanded for amendment to specify that the
facilitator's position is devoted exclusively to implementation
of the WSR program.
(b)
Middle and High Schools
Appellants argue that the Court "issued detailed directives
on the minimum supplemental programs for middle and high schools"
and the regulations "fail[] to codify the required elements
. . . ." Appellants claim, first, that these regulations
"eviscerate[]" the Court's requirements that the secondary
schools provide social and health services through coordination
and referral to community-based agencies and that the schools can
provide on-site services based on demonstrated need.
In
Abbott V,
supra, 153
N.J. at 511, the Court rejected
Judge King's proposal that schools be required to provide on-site
health and social services. The Court reasoned, first, that the
type of services necessary and the appropriate model for delivery
were especially dependent on the needs of an individual school.
Id. at 511-12. Second, the Court "acknowledged that the
provision of such health and social services, although intimately
affecting public education in the special needs districts, is not
the exclusive responsibility of the DOE."
Id. at 512. The
Commissioner was directed to provide a community services
coordinator in every middle and secondary school in order to
identify student need and arrange for community-based providers
to furnish essential health and social services.
Ibid. The
Court also reiterated that schools and districts had the right,
based on demonstrated need, to "obtain the resources necessary to
enable them to provide on-site social services that either are
not available within the surrounding community or that cannot
effectively and efficiently be provided off-site."
Id. at 512-
13. Furthermore, the Commissioner had "a corresponding duty to
authorize requested school-based social service programs for
which there is a demonstrated need and to provide or secure
necessary funding."
Id. at 513.
In our view, the pertinent regulation satisfies the Court's
directives. It provides that the SMT must submit a plan that
includes "[a] mechanism for access to the health and social
services identified by the SMT as being essential for the
educational achievement of students, through utilization of
existing district staff, programs and services, and through
coordination of and referral to community-based providers[.]"
N.J.A.C. 6A:24-6.1(a)1. Although appellants challenge the
regulation because it "mandates the use of 'existing district
staff' rather than requiring a coordinator in every school," they
acknowledge that, elsewhere, the regulations require each board
to "provide for . . . a full-time staff member responsible for
the coordination of health and social services and the referral
of students to such services for each secondary school within the
district."
N.J.A.C. 6A:24-1.4(h). The problem, according to
appellants, is that the regulations are unclear as to whether a
full-time coordinator is required in each school, or only in each
district and, furthermore, the regulation "fails to provide
standards, procedures and guidelines" on the duties and
qualifications for the coordinator position. Appellants provide
no evidence that the local school districts have found the
direction in these regulations to be confusing. Moreover,
appellants offer no suggestion of what the regulations should
include, nor do they establish that the regulations are
contradictory to the Court's direction in
Abbott V.
In addition, appellants challenge the regulations pertaining
to various supplemental programs, including an enhanced
technology program, an alternative education and dropout
prevention program, and school-to-work and college transition
programs. They claim that
Abbott V "requires" the adoption of
each of these programs, and that the pertinent regulations fail
to codify the programs as described in the Court's opinion or
Judge King's report.
In
Abbott V,
supra, 153
N.J. at 513-17, the Court discussed
the Commissioner's recommendations on technology enhancements,
alternative schools, individualized instruction to assist
disruptive students and prevent drop-outs, and school-to-work and
college transition programs. The Court's response to the
supplemental programs issue was as follows:
As with social services and security,
there will be varying needs in the Abbott
schools for supplemental programs. Consis-
tent with the Commissioner's recommendations,
we authorize him to implement technology
programs at the request of individual schools
or districts or as he otherwise shall direct.
We further authorize the Commissioner to
implement alternative schools or comparable
education programs. Similarly, we direct the
[C]ommissioner to authorize accountability
programs, as may be deemed necessary or
appropriate, and to coordinate them with
whole-school reform. We also direct the
Commissioner to implement school-to-work and
college-transition programs in secondary
schools in the Abbott districts at the
request of individual schools or districts or
as the Commissioner otherwise shall require.
In respect of the other supplemental
programs, we decline to order their immediate
district-wide implementation, even though all
such programs are sound in principle.
Rather, because the needs for these programs
will vary from school to school, we direct
the Commissioner to provide or secure the
funding necessary to implement those programs
for which Abbott schools or districts make a
request and are able to demonstrate a need.
We reiterate that for middle and secondary
schools, which will not have the benefit of
whole-school reform, such supplemental
programs may be necessary to ensure the
educational success of their students.
[
Id. at 517.]
The regulations adhere to this directive as well. They require
that the secondary school SMTs: (1) identify students for
placement in the district's alternative school program,
N.J.A.C.
6A:24-6.1(a)3; (2) submit plans for school-to-work or college
transition programs that "address the Cross-Content Workplace
Readiness Standards of the [CCCS]," integrate academic and
occupational concepts and link secondary years to post-secondary
educational opportunities,
N.J.A.C. 6A:24-6.1(a)4; and (3) infuse
technology into all aspects of the curriculum and provide for the
acquisition and maintenance of necessary equipment and
infrastructure, appropriate developmental activities, and
designation of staff,
N.J.A.C. 6A:24-6.1(a)5. Furthermore, as
with the elementary schools, the SMT in a secondary school may
submit applications for additional supplemental programs based on
demonstrated particularized need.
N.J.A.C. 6A:24-5.1(a).
Appellants' contention that the programs they describe were
"required" by the Court is simply incorrect. Although the Court
recognized that a specific program might be necessary for the
educational success of the students at an individual school, it
clearly decided that the statewide imposition in the Abbott
districts of particular programs actually might hinder the goal
of identifying and responding to the actual needs of the
students. The Court's approach was consistent with testimony
that research on appropriate WSR programs for secondary schools
was being conducted, and programs would be available shortly.
Under those circumstances, requiring immediate statewide
implementation of specific programs that were merely supplemental
presented the real possibility of hindering anticipated efforts
to implement WSR programs in secondary schools.
In addition to the above claims, appellants in this section
also challenge the regulations pertaining to security programs.
The security regulations are not specific to secondary schools
and were discussed
supra.
C
Selection of WSR and Alternative Reform Models
Appellants challenge the regulations pertaining to selection
of WSR models for elementary schools. In addition, they contend
that the regulations improperly require middle and high schools
to adopt WSR models prior to "the Court-mandated study by the
Commissioner" to determine that models for secondary schools are
"available and effective."
Appellants argue in their initial brief that the 1999-2000
regulations failed to require the adoption of SFA/R&W by every
elementary school, and improperly designated it only as the
"presumptive" model, and in their supplemental brief, that the
2000-2005 regulations are deficient even further because they
remove the presumption entirely. They also contended that the
1999-2000 regulations failed to codify "the express and limited
standards" under which the Commissioner could permit a school to
select another model and, instead, improperly permitted him to
authorize selection of an alternative model "if justified." They
argue that the 2000-2005 regulations remove that standard and
elementary schools "now have no guidance whatsoever on the core
Abbott V mandate -- adoption and implementation of SFA/R&W."
Appellants are correct that the Court viewed SFA/R&W as "the
presumptive elementary school model" for whole-school reform.
Abbott V,
supra, 153
N.J. at 501. Appellants' contentions,
however, are difficult to understand in light of the public
comment by their representative, the Education Law Center (ELC),
at the hearing on the 2000-2005 amendments. Contrary to the
position expressed in appellants' brief, at the hearing the ELC
"shared a concern that the requirement in the proposed rules that
Success For All (SFA) be imposed on schools that fail to adopt a
model . . . violates SFA policy." 31
N.J.R. at 2940.
Presumably, the ELC was referring to the concept that WSR works
only if the entire school team "buys into" the selected program.
The DOE's response reminded the commentator that the "SFA was
identified as the presumptive model" by the Court, but that the
rules had been amended to require an intermediate step of
employing an intervention team to work with schools that have not
chosen a model.
Ibid. Thus the deficiency that appellants
allege, in part, was implemented to answer the ELC's concern that
imposition of a particular model violated the premise of SFA/R&W.
Appellants also contend that the provision that permits a
school to adopt a school-developed WSR program "alters" the
Court's directive because "[t]here is nothing in
Abbott V to even
suggest that the Commissioner can permit schools to develop their
own models . . . ." In
Abbott V,
supra, 153
N.J. at 501, the
Commissioner adopted Judge King's recommendation that the State
require the Abbott districts to adopt some version of a proven,
effective, whole-school design with the SFA/R&W as the
presumptive model. At the public hearing, appellants' counsel
took the position that the Commissioner had no authority to allow
adoption of alternative designs without presenting evidence to
support such changes and without the approval of appellants and
the Court.
See
31 N.J.R. 2942. The DOE disagreed, pointing to
the fact that the Court had approved the Commissioner's proposal
allowing districts to devise their own research-based designs and
standards necessary to do so.
Ibid. The DOE's position was
entirely consistent with Judge King's report to the court.
See
Abbott V,
supra, 153
N.J. at 645.
Consistent with the Commissioner's position and Judge King's
recommendation, the regulations provide extensive and detailed
guidelines necessary for adoption of an alternative design and
specifically require that "[t]here shall be reliable research
supporting the key components of a design and evidence of
effective practices, including evidence that the program has
worked successfully in the applicant school and/or in other
schools with similar characteristics. The design shall identify
the research that supports each of its key components[.]"
N.J.A.C. 6A:24-4.2(c)2. The regulations explicitly answer Judge
King's requirement that each individual component of the program
be based on proven, research-based models. Although the Court
designated SFA/R&W as the presumptive model, it did not
disapprove of the State's proposal that schools be permitted to
develop their own designs. The option for schools to develop
their own models is consistent with the philosophy behind
Abbott V that schools strive as much as possible to meet the
needs of the students in the individual school and do so with the
whole-hearted support of the entire school team.
Appellants also argue that the regulations fail to codify
the mandate for a comprehensive formal evaluation program of the
WSR implementation because the provision in the 2000-2005
regulations fails to provide a time frame to commence the
evaluation and no deadlines by which the DOE must provide the
school with "critical evaluation data" so they can measure their
efforts. They charge that the DOE "has already delayed the
mandated evaluation for well over two years."
However, the Court's directive was for the Commissioner "to
implement as soon as feasible a comprehensive formal evaluation
program, modeled on SFA's formal evaluation precedents, to verify
that SFA is being implemented successfully and is resulting in
the anticipated levels of improvement in the Abbott elementary
schools."
Abbott V,
supra, 153
N.J. at 501-02. The Court also
recognized, however, that "[i]t takes three years to implement
SFA fully in any given school."
Id. at 497. Implementation of
the
Abbott directives is a massive undertaking. Appellants'
insistence that the DOE's actions are improper because they
should have conducted an evaluation of the results two years ago,
prior to actual implementation of the programs, and prior to the
passage of time to allow for improvement, is simply unrealistic.
Moreover, in response to a similar comment from the ELC at the
public hearing, the Commissioner explained:
Within each WSR school, a continuous
evaluation mechanism is part of the model or
alternative program design. This mechanism
is designed to ensure that the school itself
generates and utilizes timely feedback to
improve implementation locally. In addition,
the State has solicited proposals from
qualified bidders for a three-year evaluation
of the Whole School Reform Initiative in the
Abbott schools; these proposals are currently
under review.
[32
N.J.R. at 2474.]
Thus the DOE, in fact, conducts ongoing evaluations and has made
appropriate provisions for a more formal evaluation.
Finally, appellants allege that the 1999-2000 regulations
improperly required secondary schools to submit a plan for
adoption of a WSR model, and the 2001-2005 amendments "continue[]
to violate
Abbott V by compelling the adoption of WSR models in
middle and high schools without the Court-mandated study by the
Commissioner." In
Abbott V,
supra, 153
N.J. at
508 n.5, the
Court observed that testimony showed that WSR programs were being
developed for middle and secondary schools and "might be
introduced" in Abbott schools by September 1999. It stated: "We
infer that the Commissioner will at that time determine whether
the introduction of whole-school reform in Abbott middle and
secondary schools is appropriate."
Ibid. The Court did not
"mandate" that the Commissioner conduct a formal study prior to
implementation of the programs; nor did it preclude the
Commissioner from taking steps in preparation of that goal. In
response to the ELC's comment at the public hearings on July 3,
2000, the DOE explained:
This year, the Department intensified
its focus on assisting middle schools and
high schools with the WSR matching process
through a variety of activities. The outcome
of the three symposiums and secondary school
work group sessions conducted this year was
featured in the first edition of the
Department's newsletter, the WSReport