(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the
convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that,
in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).
Argued September 8, 1997 -- Decided October 23, 1997
GARIBALDI, J., writing for a unanimous Court.
Robert J. Triffin of Drexel Hill, Pennsylvania, passed the New Jersey bar examination in July 1993. A
panel of the Supreme Court's Committee on Character conducted three hearings pursuant to Regulation 303
(RG 303) of the Committee. The panel recommended that certification of Triffin's character be withheld.
Triffin requested a Review Hearing by another panel of the Committee. That panel, operating pursuant to
Regulation 304 (RG 304) of the Committee, also recommended that Triffin's certification be withheld. Triffin
sought review of the Committee's decision by the Supreme Court, which granted his requests for review and for
oral argument.
Triffin graduated from Temple University in 1973. Between 1973 and 1986, Triffin was self-employed
as a collection agent. He would purchase commercial paper and then sue for recovery in his own name. In
1974, Triffin incorporated General Funding as a purchaser of delinquent commercial accounts. In 1984, Triffin
incorporated Great States Leasing to purchase obligations and debts incurred under leases of personal property.
During the fall of 1984, Triffin made certain financial arrangements with General Funding's best
customers to pay vendors of leased equipment more quickly than Triffin's competitors. The arrangements
involved giving the customers presigned checks on General Funding's bank account. Triffin expanded the
practice by issuing presigned checks to Henry Wexler, President of Pioneer Gate Company, an assignor of post-dated checks.
In March 1985, Triffin brought suit against Continental Bank, alleging that the bank had wrongfully paid
on a check drawn to the order of Pioneer on General Funding's bank account. Continental counterclaimed,
alleging that Triffin had been a party to a check-kiting scheme and had negligently or fraudulently caused the
overdraft in General Funding's account.
Triffin failed to cooperate in pretrial discovery. Ultimately, his complaint was dismissed with prejudice
and he was barred from entering evidence in defense of Continental's counterclaim. The Pennsylvania Superior
Court affirmed those sanctions on October 27, 1988.
Neither Triffin nor his attorney, Henry Janssen, appeared at the trial on November 1, 1989, in respect
of Continental's counterclaim. Janssen told the court that Triffin had instructed him not to appear. Triffin
claimed that Janssen would not withdraw as counsel until he was paid.
The trial proceeded before the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas. The court heard Continental's
evidence and determined that Triffin had engaged with Wexler (of Pioneer) in a check-kiting scheme between
December 1984 and March 21, 1985. The court found that Triffin had engaged in actual fraud against
Continental. Triffin unsuccessfully sought to have the judgment against him stricken. His appeal of the matter
also failed.
Before the Committee on Character, Triffin asserted that he was the victim of a reverse check-kiting
scheme orchestrated by Wexler and Triffin's former bookkeeper. Triffin also presented several contradictory
excuses for his behavior relating to the Continental Bank litigation.
On April 30, 1986, during the pendency of the Continental Bank litigation, Triffin filed a Chapter 7
bankruptcy petition on behalf of General Funding. The petition was dismissed on July 1, 1986, for procedural
deficiencies. After that dismissal, Triffin apparently liquidated General Funding's remaining assets and
abandoned his offices to the landlord. Triffin paid his personal car loan with the proceeds and walked away from
his remaining obligations. Because he was unable to pay a $20,000 loan to General Funding made by his mother
in 1985, Triffin turned Great States over to her.
Triffin graduated from the Nebraska College of Law in June 1990. He sought to sit for the Pennsylvania
bar examination in July of 1990. On June 25, 1990, the Pennsylvania Board of Law Examiners refused to allow
Triffin to sit for the examination for character reasons. Triffin requested a hearing before the Board, which was
postponed for several months because Triffin sought a stay pending the outcome of federal litigation he had
brought against, among others, his former attorney (Janssen), the seven justices of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, and the members of the Pennsylvania Board.
The Board began Triffin's hearing on June 19, 1991. It continued over five sessions and, on March 13,
1992, the Board unanimously denied Triffin's application to sit for the bar. Triffin reapplied in March 1993.
The Board rejected that application and informed Triffin of his right to appeal the denial to the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court. Rather than pursue that action, Triffin brought a federal law suit challenging, among other
items, the rules, customs, and practices of the Pennsylvania Board of Law Examiners. In 1994, the complaint
was dismissed with prejudice and the Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal.
Since graduating from law school, Triffin has continued to purchase collection accounts at a discount
and to bring suit in his own name. Between September and November 1990, thirteen accounts were assigned
to Triffin by his mother, trading as Great States. On March 18, 1991, trial on one of the assignments--involving
Original Thatcher's West Chester, Inc.--was being heard. Defense counsel disputed Triffin's status as a bona
fide purchaser. Triffin called his mother to the stand who testified that there were no other agreements between
Great States and Triffin. Triffin failed to advise the court that there were at least a dozen other assignments
and that the witness was in fact Triffin's mother.
In April 1993, Triffin sued Albert DiSalvo, president of A&M Check Cashing, and others on a chose
in action purchased from United Jersey Band (UJB). Defendants claimed that Triffin's case relied on
confidential information that was obtained from A&M's files when Triffin had held himself out as an attorney
and had agreed to represent A&M in the matter against UJB. The Pennsylvania courts found that Triffin had
held himself out as an attorney and that he had used A&M's confidential information to bring the action, which
was dismissed with prejudice. Triffin did not disclose this litigation to the RG 303 panel.
Twenty-five witnesses and seven affidavits of good character were presented at Triffin's RG 303 hearing
before the Character Committee. A majority of the witnesses testified that Triffin was honest, truthful,
trustworthy, reliable, and professional in his dealings with them. Some of the witnesses, however, raised
questions about Triffin's character.
The RG 303 panel recommended that certification of Triffin's character be withheld. The panel relied
on the Continental Bank and DiSalvo cases for evidence of civil fraud, unauthorized practice of law, and conduct
that demonstrated a fundamental lack of integrity and trustworthiness. The panel also noted that Triffin had
not produced even a "scintilla" of evidence of rehabilitation. The RG 304 panel concluded that the evidence in
the record substantiated the findings of the RG 303 panel. Furthermore, Triffin had presented no additional
evidence of rehabilitation.
HELD: Certification of the character of the applicant must be withheld. The record demonstrates that he lacks
the qualities of honesty and truthfulness that are necessary to become a member of the bar.
1. Admission to the practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Applicants must demonstrate that
they have good moral character. (pp. 17-18)
2. The decisions of the courts of Pennsylvania that relate to Triffin's application are entitled to full faith and
credit by the Court. Even if those decisions were discounted, the record contains clear and convincing evidence
of Triffin's long-held lack of respect for the judicial process. His actions also indicate that he is unwilling to
assume responsibility for his own support or for his debts. It is not a disqualification that Triffin cannot pay his
debts. Rather, it is that he seems not even to care that he owes these debts. A financially irresponsible person
should not be placed in a position to make decisions detrimental to the financial well-being of his or her clients.
(pp. 18-22)
3. There has been no showing of rehabilitation, no renunciation of past misconduct, no evidence of pro bono
work. Although Triffin may never be able to demonstrate rehabilitation, the Court will permit a reapplication
to the Committee on Character no earlier than three years from the filing date of this decision.
(pp. 23-25)
The report and recommendation of the Committee on Character are adopted and certification of the
character of Robert J. Triffin is withheld.
CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES HANDLER, POLLOCK, O'HERN, STEIN, and COLEMAN
join in JUSTICE GARIBALDI's opinion.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
E-
3 September Term 1997
IN THE MATTER OF
THE APPLICATION OF
ROBERT J. TRIFFIN
FOR ADMISSION TO THE
BAR OF NEW JERSEY
Argued September 8, 1997 -- Decided October 22, 1997
For Admission to the New Jersey Bar.
John J. Janasie, Assistant Ethics Counsel,
argued the cause on behalf of the Committee
on Character.
Robert J. Triffin argued the cause pro se.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
GARIBALDI, J.
Robert J. Triffin (Triffin or candidate) passed the written examination for the New Jersey Bar in 1993. He had been denied admission to the Pennsylvania Bar in 1992. His Certified Statement for admission to the New Jersey Bar disclosed various civil proceedings, including a bankruptcy filing and outstanding judgments against him. After three hearings an RG 303 Panel, convened pursuant to the Regulations Governing the Committee on
Character (RG 303), recommended that Triffin's certification for
admission to the New Jersey Bar be withheld. That recommendation
was based on the Character Committee's conclusion that the
candidate did not possess the fitness and good character
essential for the practice of law.
Triffin requested a Review Hearing by a Statewide Panel as
provided by RG 304. In its Report and Recommendation, the RG 304
Panel concurred with the RG 303 Panel's recommendation that
certification of good character be withheld. Triffin then
appealed directly to this Court to review the Character
Committee's Recommendation. We granted Triffin's request for
oral argument.See footnote 1
In determining that Triffin was unfit to practice law, the Committee relied on the Pennsylvania courts' findings of civil fraud, unauthorized practice of law, and unprofessional conduct in two contested legal matters, Triffin's lack of respect for the judicial process, his lack of financial responsibility, and the lack of even a "scintilla of evidence" of rehabilitation.
Robert J. Triffin graduated from Temple University in 1973. From 1973 to 1986 Triffin was self-employed as a collection
agent. Triffin purchased commercial paper and then would sue for
recovery in his own name in the Court of Common Pleas of various
counties in Pennsylvania. In 1974, Triffin incorporated General
Funding, which was a non-recourse purchaser of delinquent
commercial accounts. In 1984, Triffin incorporated a second
company, Great States Leasing, Inc. (Great States), to purchase
obligations and debts incurred under leases of personal property.
During the fall of 1984, in order to pay vendors of the
leased equipment faster than competitors, Triffin made financial
arrangements with General Funding's best customers. Those
arrangements involved giving to customers presigned checks on
General Funding's bank account. In 1984, Triffin expanded this
practice by issuing blank presigned checks to Henry Wexler,
President of Pioneer Gate Company (Pioneer), an assignor of post-dated checks. Pioneer accepted post-dated checks from its
customers and then discounted those checks to General Funding.
In March 1985, Triffin brought suit against Continental
Bank, the bank where General Funding had its bank account.
Triffin claimed that Continental had wrongfully paid on a check
drawn to the order of Pioneer on General Funding's account.
Continental Bank counterclaimed, alleging that Triffin had been a
party to a check-kiting scheme and had negligently or
fraudulently caused the overdraft in General Funding's account.
Triffin did not cooperate in the pre-trial discovery
connected with the Continental Bank litigation. He did not
appear for a deposition scheduled for August 5, 1987. As a
result, on October 30, 1987, the court directed Triffin to appear
for depositions or suffer sanctions. Despite the order, Triffin
failed to appear at a deposition scheduled for November 24, 1987.
The court then ordered Triffin to pay $150 in counsel fees to
Continental Bank. Triffin failed to pay those fees or to appear
for a deposition scheduled for March 11, 1988. Finally, on April
22, 1988, the court entered an order dismissing Triffin's
complaint with prejudice and barring Triffin from entering
evidence in defense of Continental Bank's counterclaim. On
October 27, 1988, the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed those
sanctions. Triffin v. Continental Bank,
555 A.2d 947 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1988), appeal denied,
569 A.2d 1369 (Pa. 1989).
Neither Triffin nor his counsel, Henry Janssen, appeared at
the trial held on November 1, 1989. Janssen told the court that
Triffin had instructed him not to appear in court on his behalf.
Janssen remained counsel of record, because Triffin did not sign
the motion papers required for Janssen's withdrawal. Triffin
claims that Janssen would not withdraw until he was paid. The
trial proceeded, and Continental Bank presented its evidence.
The Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas determined that Triffin
was involved in a check-kiting scheme with Wexler between
December 1984 and March 21, 1985. See Triffin v. Continental
Bank, No. 5509, slip op. at 3 (Pa. Ct. Comm'n Pleas June 18,
1990). The court then entered judgment:
AND NOW, this 1st day of November, 1989
after trial this Court finds that the
defendant Robert J. Triffin committed actual
fraud against Continental Bank and
Continental Bank suffered the loss of
$74,648.08 plus the loss of use of its funds
summing $25,283.93 for a total loss of
$99,932.00 and JUDGMENT is hereby entered in
favor of Continental Bank and against Robert
J. Triffin a/k/a Joseph E. Murri and General
Funding and General Funding Leasing Division
in the amount of $99,932.00 plus costs.
Triffin then filed a motion to strike the judgment,
contending that he did not have notice of the ex parte trial in
violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
That motion was denied because the record demonstrated that (1)
both Janssen and Triffin were given notice of the trial and (2)
Triffin instructed Janssen not to appear and failed to appear
himself. Moreover, the court explained that even if Triffin had
been present at trial, he could not have presented a defense
because he had been sanctioned by the court for failing to appear
for depositions. The trial court's judgment was affirmed on
appeal by the Pennsylvania Superior Court. See Triffin v.
Continental Bank,
594 A.2d 790 (Pa. Super. Ct.), appeal denied,
600 A.2d 955 (Pa. 1991).
Despite claiming to understand that the RG 303 Panel would
not retry Continental Bank, Triffin insisted on attempting to
prove that he did not commit civil fraud. Also, before this
Court, Triffin asserts that he was the victim of a reverse check
kiting scheme orchestrated by Wexler and Triffin's former
bookkeeper Thelma Bart. To bolster that claim, he notes that he
never received any of the money that Wexler and Bart took from
the Continental account.
Triffin presents several contradictory excuses for his
behavior relating to the Continental Bank litigation. Before
this Court, he claims that he failed to cooperate during pre-trial discovery because his mother, who has supported him since
1986, refused to loan him the money to return from Nebraska,
where he was attending law school, to attend the depositions. In
his Pennsylvania Bar application, however, he claimed that he was
unwilling to skip classes to attend the depositions. With
respect to his failure to attend the trial, he explains, in his
brief to the Court, that he realized that Continental Bank had a
valid UCC claim and "the practical course of action would be to
return to the Philadelphia area upon completion of law school,
and with money earned from the anticipated practice of law, to
pay" the judgment he assumed Continental Bank would receive. In
his Pennsylvania Bar application, however, he stated that he
failed to attend trial because he had no notice of it.
On April 30, 1986, during the pendency of the litigation with Continental Bank, Triffin filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition on behalf of General Funding. Triffin explained that as a result of the Continental Bank litigation, other banks ceased
working with him and he was unable to finance General Funding or
Great States. On July 1, 1986, the bankruptcy court dismissed
the petition for failure to file the required financial
schedules.
After the dismissal of the bankruptcy petition, Triffin
apparently liquidated General Funding's remaining assets and
abandoned his "offices to their landlord." He paid his personal
car loan with the proceeds and walked away from his remaining
obligations. Because he was unable to repay a $20,000 loan to
General Funding made in 1985 by his mother, he turned Great
States over to her. According to Triffin, between the time he
filed for bankruptcy and the first RG 303 hearing on November 22,
1994, he made no arrangements with his creditors to repay his
debts because he had no income and no business. He also
explained that after the business failed, he went to law school
and focused exclusively on his studies. Since finishing law
school, he has spent most of his time in litigation, attempting
to be admitted to the Pennsylvania Bar. When confronted with the
fact that his behavior suggested that he lacked a sense of
responsibility or obligation toward people who had loaned him
money, Triffin replied that he would be able to repay his
creditors faster as a member of the bar making a decent salary,
than by “working at a WaWa.” He claims that he intended to repay
everyone in full once he had the money. He further claims that
Continental Bank refused to allow him to pay the judgment from
the anticipated proceeds of a pending legal malpractice claim he
initiated against Janssen.
During the pendency of the Continental Bank litigation, Triffin began law school. He graduated from Nebraska College of Law in June 1990 and applied to sit for the July 1990 bar examinations in New Jersey and Pennsylvania. He then elected not to sit for the July 1990 New Jersey Bar Examination.
On June 25, 1990, the Pennsylvania Board of Bar Examiners (Pennsylvania Board) refused to allow Triffin to sit for the examination because his application failed to establish the "[a]bsence of prior conduct by the applicant which in the opinion of the Board indicates character and general disqualifications . . . incompatible with the standards expected to be observed by members of the bar . . . ." Specifically, the Pennsylvania Board was concerned with incidents relating to Triffin's bankruptcy. Triffin then requested a hearing before the Pennsylvania Board, which was scheduled for December 14, 1990. That hearing was postponed for several months because Triffin requested a stay pending the results of a federal lawsuit he filed against a number of people, including his former attorney Janssen, all seven justices of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and the members of the Pennsylvania Board. Among other things, Triffin sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the justices of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court and the members of the Pennsylvania
Board arising from the denial of his bar application.
Specifically, he claimed that Pennsylvania Bar Association Rules
203(3) and 213(b) violate substantive and procedural due process.
In May 1991, the district court denied Triffin's motion for a
preliminary injunction. Triffin v. Pettit, No. 90-7882, 1
991 WL 78288 (E.D. Pa. May 7, 1991).
On June 19, 1991, the Pennsylvania Board held a hearing to
determine Triffin's fitness to practice law. The hearing was
continued over five subsequent sessions. On March 13, 1992, the
Pennsylvania Board unanimously voted to deny Triffin's bar
application. The Pennsylvania Board found the following
misconduct by Triffin: "(1) making false statements, including
omissions; (2) acts involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation; (3) abuse of legal process; (4) violation of
orders of court; and (5) neglect of financial responsibility."
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Triffin's Petition for
Allocatur and Review of the Pennsylvania Board's decision.
Triffin reapplied for admission on March 17, 1993. In a
letter dated March 23, 1993, the Pennsylvania Board rejected his
second application and informed him of his right to appeal the
Board's decision to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Rather than
pursue that option, Triffin brought an action in federal district
court challenging, among other things, the rules, customs, and
practices of the Pennsylvania Board of Law Examiners and
Disciplinary Board relating to consideration of persons
reapplying for admission to the bar. On April 25, 1994,
Triffin's complaint was dismissed with prejudice as to all
defendants. Triffin v. Nix., No. 93-5519, 1
994 WL 156695 (E.D.
Pa. Apr. 26, 1994), aff'd
43 F.3d 1463 (3d Cir. 1994).
Since Triffin's law school graduation, he has continued to purchase collection accounts at a discount and bring suit in his own name to recover the amount of the debt. Between September and November 1990, thirteen accounts were assigned to Triffin by his mother, trading as Great States. His mother has operated Great States from 1986 to the present. One of the assignments was Great States's claim against Original Thatcher's West Chester, Inc. (Original Thatcher's). On March 18, 1991, a hearing was held in the lawsuit Triffin brought on that claim. Defense counsel contested Triffin's status as a bona fide purchaser. Triffin called his mother to the stand to validate the assignment. In response to one of his questions, she testified that there were no other agreements between Great States and Triffin. Triffin failed to advise the court that in fact there were at least a dozen other assignments and that she was his mother.
In April 1993, Triffin sued Albert DiSalvo, the president of
A&M Check Cashing (A&M), and others on a chose in action
purchased from United Jersey Bank (UJB). See Triffin v. DiSalvo,
643 A.2d 118, 119 & n.1 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994), appeal denied,
661 A.2d 874 (Pa. 1995). Defendants filed a motion requesting that
Triffin be disqualified from participating in the action in any
capacity. They claimed Triffin's case relied on confidential
information that was obtained from A&M's files when he held
himself out as an attorney and agreed to represent A&M in the
matter against UJB. The trial court dismissed the action with
prejudice. On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed,
stating that "[h]ere, Triffin held himself out as an attorney
when he met with A & M . . ." Id. at 120. Further, the court
found that "[t]here is simply no manner in which Triffin can
proceed in this action without using the confidential information
he obtained by establishing an attorney-client relationship with
A&M." Id. at 121. Triffin did not initially disclose the
DiSalvo case to the RG 303 Panel.
For the most part, the small amount of work Triffin has done in the liquidation business since graduating law school has resulted in no income. Since filing his bankruptcy petition, Triffin has been supported by his mother and more recently by his fiancee. At the RG 303 Hearing, Triffin's mother testified that
since 1986 she had lent him approximately $300,000 for his living
expenses, education, litigations, and for the purchase of
collection accounts. Triffin has entered into a secured lending
agreement with his mother, requiring that her ongoing loans to
him be paid prior to payments to his other creditors. He admits
that he has considered obtaining some other type of employment,
but prefers to stay in the liquidating business because he enjoys
the contact with professionals; also, he would otherwise not have
time to pursue his federal litigation. Between November 1991 and
March 1992, Triffin was an independent contractor working on a
per diem basis for a number of attorneys who shared office space
in Philadelphia. At the March 9, 1995, RG 303 Hearing, he stated
that since October 1994 he has been responding to ads for
paralegals in the Sunday Philadelphia Inquirer. At that hearing,
Triffin further stated that he had not filed a tax return since
1984.
Between 1990 and 1993, Triffin sat several times for the New Jersey Bar Examination. He passed in July 1993. At the request of a reviewing attorney, RG 303 hearings were held on three separate dates. Triffin appeared pro se at each hearing. Twenty-five witnesses and seven affidavits of good character were presented.
The businessmen testifying on Triffin's behalf were
associated with companies from which Triffin had purchased
collection cases or were bankers. Most became acquainted with
him in the early 1980s. In some cases their relationship with
Triffin was ongoing; in others, it had terminated in the ten
years prior to the RG 303 Hearing. They all testified that he
was honest, truthful, and reliable. Some mentioned that if
Triffin were admitted to the bar they would hire him.
Thirteen attorneys testified before the RG 303 Panel. The
majority testified that Triffin was honest, truthful,
trustworthy, reliable, and professional in his dealings with
them. They also stated that Triffin was always clear that he
represented himself pro se and was not a member of the bar.
Some of the attorneys, however, raised questions about
Triffin's character. Although agreeing on further questioning
that Triffin never claimed to be an attorney and represented
himself pro se, Robert R. Kasmar, a member of the New Jersey Bar,
initially stated that Triffin was an attorney at law, licensed in
the State of New Jersey. Kasmar was under the impression that
the hearing concerned an ethical complaint. He testified that
Triffin was trustworthy, reliable, and committed to the judicial
process.
Hal B. Eisenstein, a member of both the New Jersey and
Pennsylvania bars, had met Triffin just once and had spoken to
him by phone a couple of times. When asked his opinion of
Triffin's truthfulness, Eisenstein stated: "That's a little bit
touchy, because in the transmittal I got with the subpoenas I
received to come here today, it was indicated that I had agreed
to be here, and I never even discussed it." Eisenstein further
testified that based on the bankruptcy matter in which they were
both involved "[his] opinion of his [Triffin's] procedural manner
there is relatively high, because he was doing the best in his
interest at the time, he didn't break any rules or do had [sic]
anything unethical at that time."
Geoffrey B. Gompers, an attorney licensed in Ohio,
Pennsylvania, and New Jersey, claimed that he personally
witnessed Triffin represent himself as an attorney at a meeting
of the Check Cashing Association of Pennsylvania during the
summer of 1992. He also provided hearsay testimony that his
clients, the DiSalvos, had been told by Triffin that he was an
attorney. Gompers testified that in dealing with Triffin on the
DiSalvo matter Triffin failed to provide timely notice of
depositions, and had stated that because he was not an attorney
he did not need to play by rules that attorneys follow. During
the course of Gompers's testimony, Triffin stated: "I have no
further questions for this creature." (emphasis added).
John R. Poeta, a member of the New Jersey Bar, testified
that he had contact with Triffin while representing banks on two
separate occasions on matters involving bad checks. He gave a
qualified "yes" in response to a question concerning Triffin's
honesty, because he felt that Triffin had reneged on a settlement
after being given access to Poeta's client. Finally, Laura
Proske O'Hara, a member of the New Jersey and Pennsylvania bars,
who works for Chemical Bank, testified that Triffin had
threatened that "he would buy up every piece of Chemical Bank
paper on the street, and he would sue us forever" if she did not
induce the bank to sell him bad paper. On one particular matter,
he suggested that "because [she] had been nice to him, he would
waive the interest if [she] would agree to appear . . . [at the
RG 303 Hearing] on his behalf."
The RG 303 Panel unanimously recommended that certification of Triffin for admission to the bar be withheld. The Panel explained that the findings by the Pennsylvania courts in the Continental Bank and DiSalvo cases of civil fraud, unauthorized practice, and behavior violating the professional conduct expected of an attorney "demonstrate a fundamental lack of the integrity and trustworthiness expected of a prospective attorney." The Panel rejected Triffin's contention that it should not credit the findings in those cases because he had been denied due process. Moreover, the Panel noted that regardless of the findings of the Continental Bank court, Triffin's refusal to participate in pre-trial discovery and failure to be represented at trial demonstrate "a disturbing lack of character."
The Panel was particularly troubled by the testimony of the
four attorneys who felt that Triffin had acted dishonestly and
unprofessionally in his dealings with them. Specifically, the
Panel focused on the statement by Poeta that Triffin had reneged
on a settlement after gaining access to Poeta's client, and the
testimony by O'Hara that Triffin "attempted to use threats or
bribes in order to obtain business and favorable testimony." The
Panel concluded that such conduct was a violation of professional
ethics.
Although recognizing that prior conduct that demonstrates a
lack of fitness to be admitted may be overcome by a showing of
rehabilitation, the Panel found that Triffin had failed to
present even a "scintilla of evidence of rehabilitation."
Following the report of the RG 303 Panel, Triffin requested and
received a RG 304 review hearing. The RG 304 Panel reviewed the
Report and Recommendation of the RG 303 Panel, the transcripts of
the hearings before the RG 303 Panel, exhibits that included
Triffin's original Certified Statement with attachments and a
later six volume submission, and his brief. After reviewing
Triffin's assignments of errors to the RG 303 Report and
Recommendation, as well as his argument that he had not been
afforded due process, the RG 304 Panel unanimously determined
that the evidence substantiated the findings of the RG
303 Panel.
The RG 304 Panel noted that at its hearing Triffin had "presented
no additional evidence as to rehabilitation and remorse except
for the presentation of his participation in Sons of Italy and
his assertion that if he were admitted to practice he would
participate in pro bono work."
The New Jersey Constitution provides that the Court has jurisdiction over admission to the practice of law. N.J. Const. art. VI, § 2, ¶ 3. "[T]he Court has inherent jurisdiction to review any determination concerning an applicant's fitness to practice law . . . [and] retains the authority in all cases to make the final determination of an applicant's fitness to practice law." Application of Matthews, 94 N.J. 59, 74 (1983).
Bar membership in New Jersey is a privilege burdened with conditions. See id. at 75. "Among the most basic conditions precedent to bar admission are `good moral character, a capacity for fidelity to the interests of clients, and for fairness and candor in dealing with the courts.'" Ibid. (quoting In re Pennica, 36 N.J. 401, 433 (1962)). In Matthews, supra, the Court first articulated the "substantive standards governing individual fitness to practice law" in New Jersey. Ibid. Those standards continue to be followed. See Application of McLaughlin, 114 N.J. 133 (1996). The Matthews Court explained that the fitness requirement must be considered "in relation to the state's interests in the regulation of the legal profession. These interests are generally recognized to be two-fold: first, the protection of prospective clients, and second, the assurance of
the proper, orderly and efficient administration of justice."
Matthews, supra, 94 N.J. at 76-77.
The Matthews Court concluded that "a bar applicant must
possess a certain set of traits -- honesty and truthfulness,
trustworthiness and reliability, and a professional commitment to
the judicial process and the administration of justice." Id. at
77. The Court further concluded that "applicants must
demonstrate through the possession of such qualities of character
the ability to adhere to the Disciplinary Rules governing the
conduct of attorneys." Ibid.
We now examine whether and to what extent Triffin's conduct demonstrates a present unfitness to practice law. We are satisfied that unless evidence of unfitness is clear and convincing "any lingering doubts as to the ability of the candidate to undertake the professional responsibility of a lawyer can be resolved in his or her favor and admission to the bar should be allowed." Matthews, supra, 94 N.J. at 78.
Applying the Matthews standard to Triffin, we find that he is currently unfit to practice law. We find no merit in Triffin's assertion that the Continental Bank judgment is unconstitutional. Under New Jersey law, a judgment properly entered in another jurisdiction is entitled to full faith and credit provided the judgment does not violate the Due Process Clause. Triffin was not denied due process. Triffin was given
an opportunity to be heard and he declined the opportunity by
failing to appear and by directing his attorney not to appear.
Moreover, Triffin's due process argument was pursued by him to
the highest levels of the Pennsylvania court system, and was
rejected.
The court's finding of actual fraud in Continental Bank
demonstrates that he lacks the qualities of honesty and
truthfulness that are necessary to become a bar member. See
Matthews, supra, 94 N.J. at 81 (relying on proposition that
involvement in fraud can be considered in determining that
applicant lacks "the character traits of honesty and
truthfulness, trustworthiness and reliability, and of an ability
to fully conform to the Disciplinary Rules governing the
professional and ethical conduct of attorneys").
We also find little merit in Triffin's argument that the
DiSalvo decision should not be given full faith and credit.
Pennsylvania has proper jurisdiction over its own procedural
requirements. The Pennsylvania Superior Court rejected Triffin's
procedural argument, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied
Triffin's appeal. The DiSalvo court's finding that Triffin
obtained privileged information while holding himself out as the
DiSalvos' attorney, and then used that information to the
DiSalvos' detriment, demonstrates a violation of RPC 1.6
(confidentiality of information), RPC 1.7 (conflict of interest:
general rule), RPC 1.9 (conflict of interest: former client), and
RPC 8.4(c) (misconduct: conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit, or misrepresentation). In sum, Triffin has failed to
demonstrate his ability to adhere to the rules governing the
conduct of attorneys in New Jersey.
Even discounting the findings in Continental Bank and
DiSalvo, clear and convincing evidence exists that Triffin is
presently unfit to practice law in New Jersey. There is much
evidence indicating that Triffin has long lacked respect for the
judicial process. During the course of the Continental Bank
litigation, he was sanctioned by the court for repeatedly failing
to comply with the pre-trial discovery orders. By disregarding
that order, Triffin violated RPC 3.5(c) (engaging in conduct
intended to disrupt a tribunal) and RPC 8.4(d) (engaging in
conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice).
Although Triffin has expressed remorse for his failure to comply
with the court's orders, his failure to comply with the orders
evinces a lack of respect toward the tribunal and the judicial
process. Also, he refused to sign the necessary documents to
allow his attorney to withdraw from the case, even after he had
fired him. In addition, he failed to provide the court with his
new address and purposefully failed to attend trial.
Moreover, some of Triffin's witnesses at the RG 303 Hearing
raised important questions about his character, particularly,
John R. Poeta, who felt that Triffin had reneged on a settlement
agreement after being given access to Poeta's client, and Laura
Proske O'Hara, who testified that Triffin threatened to sue
Chemical Bank to force it to give him business. Despite the
positive testimony of other attorneys and business associates,
his more recent actions with regard to Poeta and O'Hara suggest
that he still lacks respect for the judicial process and the
administration of justice.
His rude comment to Gompers during the RG 303 Hearing, "I
have no further questions for this creature," does not reach the
level of disgraceful behavior toward the Committee on Character
and other court personnel displayed by McLaughlin. See
McLaughlin, supra,
114 N.J. 133. Nonetheless, when viewed in the
context of his other behavior, Triffin's comment evidences a lack
of respect toward the courts.
Because Triffin provided the Committee with extensive
records of the many lawsuits in which he has been involved, his
failure initially to reveal the DiSalvo findings to the Committee
on Character does not reach the level of Jenkins's lack of candor
with the Committee. See Application of Jenkins,
94 N.J. 458
(1983). Given the extensive documentation Triffin provided with
his application, however, his initial failure to reveal the
DiSalvo findings indicates a lack of respect for the hearing
process and for the judicial process in general. Finally,
Triffin's failure to tell the Original Thatcher's court that his
witness was his mother and to correct any misimpression by the
court, as a result of a misstatement by her, also indicate his
lack of respect for the administration of justice.
Triffin's failure to demonstrate any financial
responsibility also supports a finding of present unfitness to
practice law. Triffin appears to have learned from the
Continental Bank litigation that he should never give anyone
presigned checks on his account, and he has not done so since
1985. He has, however, made no effort to repay his creditors,
including his mother to whom he owes over $300,000, from the time
he unsuccessfully filed for bankruptcy in 1986. Despite
Triffin's assurances that he plans to repay his mother and other
creditors once he is admitted to the bar, his actions indicate
that he is unwilling to assume responsibility for his own support
or for his debts. It is not a disqualification that Triffin
cannot pay his debts. It is that he seems not even to care that
he owes these debts. Rather than support himself, Triffin has
chosen to spend years filing fruitless lawsuits in order to gain
admittance to the Pennsylvania Bar.
As the Matthews Court explained, the fitness requirement
must be considered "in relation to the state's interest in . . .
the protection of prospective clients." 94 N.J. at 76-77. A
financially irresponsible person should not be placed in a
position where he might make decisions detrimental to the
financial well-being of his clients.
Because the Court is interested in an applicant's present
fitness to practice law, evidence of reform and rehabilitation is
relevant to an assessment of the applicant's moral character.
Matthews, supra, 94 N.J. at 81. "Where evidence convincingly
demonstrates reform and rehabilitation, it can overcome the
adverse inference of unfitness arising from past misconduct and,
if persuasive, present fitness may be found." Ibid. However,
"in the case of extremely damning past misconduct, a showing of
rehabilitation may be virtually impossible to make." Id. at 81-82 (emphasis added). "In certain instances, evidence of a
positive kind including affirmative acts demonstrating personal
reform and improvement will be required in order to establish the
requisite degree of rehabilitation." Id. at 81 (citation
omitted). The following types of evidence are probative of
reform and rehabilitation: (1) an applicant's complete candor in
filings and proceedings conducted by the Committee on Character;
(2) an applicant's renunciation of his or her past misconduct;
(3) the absence of misconduct over a period of intervening years;
(4) "a particularly productive use of [the applicant's] time
subsequent to the misconduct"; and (5) "[a]ffirmative
recommendations from people aware of the applicant's misconduct
who specifically consider the individual's fitness in light of
that behavior." Id. at 82.
Applying the Matthews standard, we find that the evidence
clearly and convincingly demonstrates that Triffin is presently
unfit to practice law. There has been no showing of
rehabilitation. There is nothing in the record to suggest that
Triffin will be more financially responsible in the future than
in the past. He has made no attempt to pay his creditors. Mere
assurances by Triffin that he intends to participate in pro bono
work and to repay his debts once admitted to the bar cannot
overcome the adverse inference of unfitness that must be drawn
from his misconduct. There is no renunciation of his past
misconduct, except for his acknowledgment that he should have
obeyed the court's order in the Continental Bank case. He has
presented no evidence of pro bono work; his membership in the
Sons of Italy does not suffice.
Based on our independent review of the record, we find, as
did the RG 303 Panel, that Triffin has failed to produce even a
"scintilla of evidence" of rehabilitation. Specifically, Triffin
failed to produce evidence of "candor before the committee,
absence of any intervening misconduct, renunciation of past
misdeeds, and productive use of [his] time including commitment
to the community at large."
We do not know whether Triffin will ever be rehabilitated.
Even if Triffin can present evidence of affirmative acts in the
future, he may not be able to overcome the adverse inferences of
unfitness that must be drawn from his past acts. In Matthews,
the Court found Matthews presently unfit to practice law, even
after he made restitution to the victims of his "Ponzi" scheme
and received positive reviews from attorneys in the law office
where he was working. Matthews, supra, 94 N.J. at 83-84.
Nonetheless, we are hesitant to foreclose the possibility that at
some future time Triffin may be able to produce sufficient
evidence of the character traits necessary to establish his
fitness to practice law. Jenkins, supra, 94 N.J. at 470. Such
evidence, we suggest, should demonstrate at least that he has
become self-supporting, has implemented a plan for repayment of
his creditors, and has become involved in community
service/volunteer activities. Moreover, he must demonstrate that
"when placed in a position of responsibility, he can act honestly
and truthfully and with trustworthiness and reliability in his
dealing with others." Matthews, supra, 94 N.J. at 83.
Accordingly, we adopt the Committee's recommendation and
direct that certification of the candidate's character and
fitness be withheld without prejudice to the candidate's right to
present to the Committee, no earlier than three years from the
filing date of this opinion, evidence of rehabilitation in
accordance with Matthews, supra,
94 N.J. 59, and this decision.
So ordered.
CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES HANDLER, POLLOCK, O'HERN, STEIN, and COLEMAN join in JUSTICE GARIBALDI's opinion.
NO. E-3 SEPTEMBER TERM 1997
ON APPEAL FROM
ON CERTIFICATION TO
For Admission to the New Jersey Bar.
IN THE MATTER OF
THE APPLICATION OF
ROBERT J. TRIFFIN
FOR ADMISSION TO THE
BAR OF NEW JERSEY
DECIDED October 23, 1997
Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING
OPINION BY Justice Garibaldi
CONCURRING OPINION BY
DISSENTING OPINION BY
Footnote: 1On November 28, 1995, the Court entered an Order