P.A.F. was the president of Kit Enterprises, a waste disposal site. As President,
P.A.F. committed crimes directly related to the operation of the business, including the
filing of false reports and illegal dumping. In addition, P.A.F. would solicit and
receive information from a Union County sheriffs officer on license plates belonging to
vehicles parked in the vicinity of Kit Enterprises, to determine whether competitors or
law enforcement agencies were monitoring the business. Consequently, P.A.F. was also charged with
aiding and abetting official misconduct in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2, a second degree
crime. Following a guilty plea on January 4, 1984, P.A.F. was convicted and
sentenced.
On June 10, 2000, more than ten years after P.A.F. completed his sentence,
including parole, P.A.F. filed a verified petition seeking expungement of his record of
conviction. Initially, the motion judge granted the expungement. Upon reconsideration, the judge reversed
himself, holding that an accomplice is subject to the same punishment as a
principal and therefore is also barred from the benefits of the expungement process
under the third paragraph of N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2b. The Appellate Division affirmed in an
unpublished per curiam decision.
The Supreme Court granted P.A.F.s petition for certification.
HELD: The expungement bar under the third paragraph of N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2b does not
extend to private citizens who aid and abet public office holders in the
commission of crimes involving or touching their offices.
1. New Jerseys Code of Criminal Justice provides for the expungement of arrest
and criminal records subject to a number of notable exceptions. The general rule
favors expungement of a first-time criminal conviction. In keeping with standard canons of
statutory construction, however, it is not the general rule, but rather the exceptions
that are to be construed narrowly. The third paragraph of N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2b provides
that a public official who commits a crime involving or touching his office
is not eligible for expungement of the record of his conviction. The third
paragraph is far from a model of clarity, however, and lends itself to
varying interpretations. Absent a clear statutory expression, we are not inclined to expand
the class of persons who are ineligible for an expungement. The more reasonable
interpretation of the third paragraph of N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2b is that the expungement bar
does not extend to private citizens who aid and abet public office holders
in the commission of crimes involving or touching their offices. (Pp. 4-9)
2. P.A.F. should not have been denied an expungement of his criminal record
because he held no public office when he was convicted of aiding and
abetting misconduct in office. (Pp. 9-10)
The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED
to the Law Division for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES COLEMAN, LONG, VERNIERO, LaVECCHIA, and ZAZZALI join in
Justice ALBINs opinion.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-
18 September Term 2002
IN THE MATTER OF EXPUNGEMENT APPLICATION OF P.A.F.,
P.A.F.
Petitioner-Appellant.
Argued March 4, 2003 Decided May 8, 2003
On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division.
Howard G. Golden argued the cause for appellant (Frank P. Beninato, Jr., attorney;
Mr. Beninato, on the brief).
Steven J. Kaflowitz, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent, State of New
Jersey (Thomas V. Manahan, Union County Prosecutor, attorney).
ALBIN, J.
A public official who commits a crime involving or touching his office is
not eligible for expungement of the record of his conviction by the express
language of the third paragraph of N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2b. We are called on to
determine whether that same provision bars a private citizen, who aids and abets
the public official in the commission of the crime, from the benefits of
the expungement process. We hold that this provision barring expungement to the public
office holder does not extend to the private citizen who serves as his
accomplice.
II.
[N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2a.]
Three paragraphs in N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2b enumerate the exceptions to the general rule providing
for expungement of a first-time criminal conviction. The first paragraph excludes from expungement
convictions of certain pre-Code offenses, such as murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, rape, robbery, arson,
and perjury. This paragraph includes within its sweep any conspiracy, attempt, or aid
and assistance to commit such crimes. Ibid. The second paragraph excludes from expungement
convictions of a number of crimes under the Code, including murder, manslaughter, kidnapping,
aggravated sexual assault, and any attempt or conspiracy to commit such crimes. Ibid.
It is the third paragraph of N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2b that applies to this case.
That paragraph provides:
Records of conviction for any crime committed by a person holding any public
office, position or employment, elective or appointive, under the government of this State
or any agency or political subdivision thereof and any conspiracy or attempt to
commit such a crime shall not be subject to expungement if the crime
involved or touched such office, position or employment.
[N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2b (emphasis added).]
The issue before the Court is one of statutory interpretation. Clearly, if P.A.F.
were a public official, he would not be entitled to an expungement of
his record. There is no dispute, however, that P.A.F. was a private citizen
when he committed the offense of aiding and abetting misconduct in office. In
affirming the trial courts order denying expungement, the Appellate Division, relying on D.A.C.,
supra, 337 N.J. Super. at 498, began its analysis by determining that the
expungement statute is to be narrowly construed. In adopting that approach, the Appellate
Division began with the premise that N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2b precluded expungement of a criminal
record of a private citizen who engaged with a public official in any
conspiracy or attempt to commit . . . a crime touching or involving
the officials office. Given that point of departure, the Appellate Division was left
to determine whether an accomplice must be treated differently from one who attempts
or conspires to commit a crime with a public official. Reasoning that an
accomplice is legally responsible for the conduct of a principal and the relationship
between a conspirator and an accomplice is similar, the Appellate Division doubt[ed] that
the Legislature would have prohibited the expungement of a crime committed by a
conspirator but not an accomplice.
If we were to accept the premise of the Appellate Division that any
conspiracy or attempt to commit such a crime applies to private citizens under
N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2b, we would not disagree with the conclusion that accomplice liability falls
within its fold. Legislation must be construed so as to avoid absurd results.
State v. Haliski,
140 N.J. 1, 9 (1995); Robson v. Rodriguez,
26 N.J. 517, 528 (1958). We presume that the Legislature intended a logical and consistent
application of this statute. We would find it difficult to conclude that the
Legislature intended to deny expungement to a private citizen who conspired or attempted
to commit a crime with a public official but not to an accomplice
of the public official.
However, we cannot agree with the initial premise accepted by the Appellate Division.
In interpreting N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2, we observe that the general principle of that statute
favors expungement of the criminal records of a first-time offender. N.J.S.A. 2C:52-32. The
statute begins with the language: In all cases, except as herein provided .
. . . N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2a (emphasis added). In keeping with standard canons of
statutory construction, it is not the general rule, but rather the exceptions that
are to be construed narrowly. Young v. Schering Corp.,
141 N.J. 16, 25
(1995); State v. N.W.,
329 N.J. Super. 326, 331 (App. Div. 2000).
The third paragraph of N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2b is far from a model of clarity
and lends itself to varying interpretations. The legislative history of the third paragraph
does not provide any conclusive insight into divining the interpretive riddle in this
case. It is worth noting, however, that both the Sponsors Statement and the
Senate Judiciary Committees report concerning this provision contained similar language indicating that the
focus of the Legislature was on the public office holder:
This bill would implement one of the recommendations contained in the recent State
Commission on Investigation report on local government corruption. This bill would provide that
if a public official or employee is convicted of a crime and that
crime involves or touches the persons office or employment, the record of that
conviction is not subject to expungement.
[Sponsors Statement, No. 1337.]
Ultimately, we must decide whether the Legislature intended the phrase, and any conspiracy
or attempt to commit such a crime, N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2b, to apply only to
public office holders who commit crimes involving or touching their office or to
private citizens as well. P.A.F. argues that the language of paragraph three only
bars expungement to those who have committed crimes while in public office or
employment, not private citizens who were accomplices to those crimes. He observes that,
unlike the first and second paragraphs of N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2b, the third paragraph prohibits
expungement for certain classes of persons as opposed to certain types of crimes.
In that regard, he sees the focus as being on the person who
held and breached a position of public trust, not on any specific crime
committed by that person. The State, in oral argument before this Court, graciously
acknowledged that P.A.F.s interpretation of the statute is not unreasonable. The State expressed
that it would be satisfied with guidance from this Court that will settle
this issue.
The third paragraph of N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2b is an exception to the general rule
permitting expungement of criminal records of first-time offenders. That exception should be construed
narrowly in accordance with the overall objective of N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2a to provide expungement
to first-time criminal offenders and, therefore, we are not inclined to expand the
class of persons who are ineligible for an expungement absent a clear statutory
expression. Although there may be more than one permissible interpretation of the paragraph
at issue, we conclude that the more reasonable interpretation is that the expungement
bar does not extend to private citizens who aid and abet public office
holders in the commission of crimes involving or touching their offices.
NO. A-18 SEPTEMBER TERM 2002
ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court
IN THE MATTER OF EXPUNGEMENT
APPLICATION OF P.A.F.,
P.A.F.
Petitioner-Appellant.
DECIDED May 8, 2003
Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING
OPINION BY Justice Albin
CONCURRING OPINION BY
DISSENTING OPINION BY
CHECKLIST