(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the
convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in
the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).
Argued October 10, 2000 -- Decided February 15, 2001
VERNIERO, J., writing for a unanimous Court.
This appeal concerns an irrevocable charitable trust created on December 20, 1961 (the 1961 trust) by John
Seward Johnson, Sr. (Seward Sr.). The value of the trust is estimated at $350,000,000. The primary question in the
appeal is whether the parentage of Jenia Anne Josephine Johnson (Jenia) may be collaterally attacked by third
parties seeking to defeat her status as an eligible beneficiary under the trust.
Jenia was born on January 11, 1961, to Barbara E. Johnson, who had married John Seward Johnson, Jr.
(Seward Jr.) on September 16, 1956. Seward Jr. adopted Barbara's son from a previous marriage in 1958. Seward
Jr. is identified as Jenia's father on her birth certificate and on her baptismal certificate issued several months later.
In 1962, Seward Jr. sued Barbara for divorce on grounds of adultery and cruelty (including desertion).
Although Jenia's paternity was questioned by Seward Jr. in the divorce proceedings, at the close of the action he
signed a formal acknowledgment of paternity dated March 3, 1965. The trial court granted the divorce on the
ground of Barbara's desertion and made certain findings, including that Jenia “was duly born of the marriage.” The
final judgment of June 14, 1965, contained a statement that the paternity of Seward Jr. as father of Jenia was
thereby adjudicated.
Although Seward Jr. testified in proceedings involving the administration of an unrelated family trust in
1968 that he did not consider Barbara's children his children because they were “children of other men,” there was
no adjudication of his disavowal of paternity of Jenia. Also, in 1977 in an earlier stage of the administration of the
1961 trust, he represented in a document submitted to the court that he was Jenia's father.
In 1963, while his son's divorce was proceeding, Seward Sr. created another trust, the language of which
tracked generally that of the 1961 trust, except that it expressly excluded as distributees children “born to or adopted
by” Seward Jr.
Under the terms of the 1961 trust, after January 10, 1997, the trustees are to distribute the trust proceeds to
Seward Sr.'s four children, “their spouses, and their issue....” As defined in the trust, Jenia would be considered
“issue” of Seward Jr. for purposes of distribution unless her parentage was successfully challenged. During nine
intermediate accountings of the 1961 trust while the trust income was being distributed to charitable, educational or
religious organizations, there was no challenge to Jenia's status under the trust; when the date for expiration of the
trust approached (after which the income and corpus of the trust could be distributed to the beneficiaries), the
trustees sought a judicial interpretation of the term “issue” as defined in the 1961 trust and an identification of who
comprised that class. In this setting, Seward Jr., his second wife, their two children, and Jenia's cousins (the Ryans)
challenged Jenia's inclusion as a member of the class of eligible beneficiaries.
The trial court ruled in favor of Jenia, holding that her status as a child of Seward Jr. was established
conclusively as a matter of law in 1965 and declaring her an eligible beneficiary under the 1961 trust. The court
barred all other parties from seeking discovery on that issue. The legal basis for the court's decision was its view
that the twenty-three-year limitations period in the New Jersey Parentage Act, N.J.S.A. 9:17-38 to -59 (the Act)
served as a statute of repose that prohibited any challenge to the 1965 determination of Seward Jr.'s paternity. The
court saw the Act as the exclusive means for determining paternity.
On appeal, the Appellate Division agreed with the trial court that certain legal doctrines prohibited a
challenge to Jenia's parentage but disagreed with the trial court's interpretation of the Act, concluding that the time
limitations of the Act do not apply to actions seeking to construe the language of a will or trust. The court
remanded the matter to the trial court to determine whether Jenia is “issue” of Seward Jr. and whether Seward Sr.
would have intended her to benefit from the trust if she were not Seward Jr.'s child.
The Supreme Court granted the petitions for certification filed by Jenia and a guardian ad litem appointed
for Jenia's son, limited to the parentage issue. The Court denied cross-petitions filed by Seward Jr.s children by his
second wife challenging the Appellate Division's decision barring them from contesting their father's paternity of
Jenia.
Held: The adjudication of paternity in the 1965 divorce proceedings bars any third-party collateral attack on Jenia's
parentage. Jenia is an eligible beneficiary under the 1961 trust.
1. In enacting the Act in 1983, the Legislature intended to provide a set of clearly defined and uniform procedures
for establishing parentage in disputed cases. A number of significant common-law precepts are codified in the Act,
the main thrust of which is to foster the parent-child relationship. Under the Act, an adjudication of paternity “is
determinative for all purposes.” (pp.11-17)
2. Amendments to the Act and to the New Jersey Probate Code that authorize a potential heir of a decedent to
contest a will or trust in a probate proceeding unimpeded by the time limitations in the Act apply principally to
persons seeking to establish or confirm their parentage, as opposed to those seeking to defeat the established
parentage of others. The Act forecloses the third-party attack on Jenia's parentage. (pp. 17- 20)
3. The doctrine of probable intent is not implicated in this case; the 1961 trust document is clear on its face and
Jenia's parentage has been adjudicated conclusively. The definition of “issue” in the trust, which includes a child by
adoption, indicates Seward Sr.'s understanding that persons other than his blood relations could benefit under the
trust. His specific exclusion of children “born to or adopted by “ Seward Jr. as beneficiaries of a trust created two
years after this one shows his ability to limit the classes of beneficiaries when he wanted to do so. (pp. 20-22)
4. A presumption of legitimacy existed in 1961 and exists today. Those challenging Jenia's paternity are not
deprived of due process or fundamental fairness by the judicial preservation of a prior adjudication of paternity.
Their interest in increasing their own economic gain does not outweigh the adjudication of Jenia's legitimacy and
her right to family identification. (pp. 22-32)
The JUDGMENT of the Appellate Division is REVERSED.
CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and ASSOCIATE JUSTICES STEIN, COLEMAN, LONG,
LA VECCHIA, and ZAZZALI join in JUSTICE VERNIERO's opinion.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-69/
70 September Term 1999
IN THE MATTER OF THE TRUST
CREATED BY AGREEMENT DATED
DECEMBER 20, 1961 BY AND
BETWEEN JOHN SEWARD JOHNSON,
GRANTOR, AND PHILIP B.
HOFMANN, GUSTAV O. LIENHARD,
AND KENNETH PERRY, TRUSTEES,
(Known as the JOHN SEWARD
JOHNSON 1961 CHARITABLE
TRUST)
Argued October 10, 2000 -- Decided February 15, 2001
On certification to the Superior Court,
Appellate Division.
Thomas J. Bitar argued the cause for
appellant, pro se as Guardian Ad Litem for
Henry Bruce Sheeran (Dillon, Bitar & Luther,
attorneys; Mr. Bitar and Mary A. Powers, on
the briefs).
Robert J. Del Tufo argued the cause for
appellant Jenny Anne Josephine Johnson
(Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom,
attorneys).
Richard M. Altman argued the cause for
respondents John Seward Johnson, III and
Clelia C. Johnson (Pellettieri, Rabstein &
Altman, attorneys; Mr. Altman and Elsie
Elizabeth Sweetser, of counsel and on the
brief).
Joseph C. Mahon argued the cause for
respondents Eric B. Ryan and Hillary A. Ryan
(Hill Wallack, attorneys).
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
VERNIERO, J.
This appeal involves a dispute among the offspring of J.
Seward Johnson (Seward Sr.), son of the founder of the Johnson &
Johnson corporation. It is one of many such disputes involving
trusts or trust property that have arisen within the Johnson
family over the past three decades. See Hill v. Estate of
Richards,
142 N.J. 639 (1995); Wiedenmayer v. Johnson,
106 N.J.
Super. 161 (App. Div.), aff'd sub nom. Wiedenmayer v. Villanueva,
55 N.J. 81 (1969).
Seward Sr.'s son, John Seward Johnson, Jr. (Seward Jr.),
divorced his first wife in 1965. During the divorce proceeding,
Seward Jr. acknowledged in writing that he was the father of
Jenia Anne Josephine Johnson (Jenia). That acknowledgment is
consistent with Jenia's birth and baptismal certificates, each of
which identifies the child's father as Seward Jr. At the
conclusion of the proceeding, the trial court found as fact that
Seward Jr. was Jenia's father and entered judgment accordingly.
Some thirty-five years after entry of that judgment, we are
called on to determine whether Jenia's parentage may be
collaterally attacked by third parties seeking to defeat her
existing status as an eligible beneficiary under a trust
established by Seward Sr. in 1961. The trial court foreclosed
the third-party challenge, concluding that the prior adjudication
of Seward Jr.'s paternity applied to the present administration
of the trust. The Appellate Division disagreed, remanding the
matter for further proceedings. We now reverse.
On December 20, 1961, Seward Sr. created an irrevocable charitable trust (the 1961 trust), naming four of his six children and eleven grandchildren as the trust's measuring lives. In a trust instrument, a “measuring life” refers to the lives of individuals named by a grantor whose death as a group would terminate the trust. The 1961 trust expressly names Jenia for that purpose. The trust was funded with 4,600 shares of Johnson & Johnson common stock. The trust directs the trustees to pay all net trust income to “educational, religious, or charitable organizations” until the earlier of January 10, 1997, or the deaths of Seward Sr.'s four named children and eleven named grandchildren. Thereafter, the trust authorizes the trustees, in their “absolute and uncontrolled discretion,” to distribute the trust's proceeds to Seward Sr.'s four children, Mary Lea Johnson Ryan, Elaine Johnson Wold, Seward Jr., and Diana Melville Johnson Stokes, “their spouses, and their issue, or any one or more of them[.]” The trial court summarized the trust's distribution provisions as follows:
All of the net income from the 1961 Trust has been paid to charitable organizations since its creation on December [20], 1961. On January 10, 1997, the mandatory charitable phase of the Trust will conclude. Thereafter, the Trustees are authorized, in their absolute and uncontrolled discretion . . . whenever they deem it to be for his or her best interests . . . , to pay any and all of the income and corpus of the Trust “to and among the Grantor's four children . . . , their spouses, and their issue, or any one or more of them . . . .” The Trust provides for its termination “upon the death of the last to survive of the Grantor's . . . four children . . . and the Grantor's eleven [named] grandchildren . . .” and for the distribution of any remaining property to the Grantor's children and their issue based upon a formula of survivors at a generational level.
As defined in the 1961 trust, “issue” includes “an adopted child and children[.]” Under the trust, Jenia would be considered the issue of Seward Jr. for purposes of distribution unless her parentage was successfully contested. Because several of the persons named as measuring lives are still living, the mandatory charitable phase of the trust concluded on January 10, 1997. According to the Appellate Division, the value of the trust is estimated at $350,000,000.
Seward Jr. filed a complaint for divorce in 1962, asserting as grounds his wife's alleged cruelty (which included allegations of desertion) and adultery. To prove the adultery claim, Seward Jr. sought and obtained an order from the Chancery Division directing that Jenia and the parties submit to blood tests in advance of trial. The Appellate Division reversed that directive, concluding that it was premature. In an opinion written by Judge Conford, the court stated that
an infant, as ward of the court acting as parens patriae, is entitled to its discretionary protection from the threats in respect of its legitimacy and property rights involved in the taking of blood grouping tests in these circumstances unless and until no alternative is left to such action in the performance of the court's paramount objective to ascertain the truth in order to do justice in deciding the controversy between the parties hereto.
The panel remanded the matter, directing that the trial court consider other evidence of Mrs. Johnson's alleged adultery prior to considering Seward Jr.'s blood-test application.
Thereafter, Seward Jr. admitted that he was Jenia's father and signed a document entitled “ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF PATERNITY.” That acknowledgment states in relevant part: “TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: The Undersigned, JOHN SEWARD JOHNSON, JR. . . . hereby unequivocally acknowledges paternity of Jennie Anne Josephine Johnson . . . born of Barbara E. Johnson at Princeton, New Jersey, on January 11, 1961.” The document was signed, witnessed, and notarized on March 3, 1965.
The trial court granted the divorce on the ground of Mrs. Johnson's desertion. The court also made several findings of fact, including “[t]hat Jennie Anne Josephine Johnson was duly born of the marriage.” Additionally, the judgment nisi entered at the conclusion of the proceedings provides that “the paternity of [Seward Jr.] as the father of the infant, Jennie Anne Josephine Johnson, born January 11, 1961, is hereby adjudicated.” (A judgment nisi is an interim decree that ripens into a final judgment unless challenged. Black's Law Dictionary 944 (5th ed. 1979)). Because neither Seward Jr. nor Barbara Johnson contested the judgment nisi, it became final on June 14, 1965. The marriage of the parties dissolved on that date. In 1968, in connection with a dispute involving an unrelated 1944 trust, see Weidenmayer, supra, 106 N.J. Super. 161, Seward Jr. testified, “I do not consider these [Barbara Johnson's children] my children. . . . These are children of other men. This is my position.” That apparent disavowal of Jenia's paternity, however, was not adjudicated by any court. Years later, on September 28, 1977, in an earlier phase of the administration of the 1961 trust, Seward Jr. again represented that he was Jenia's father. In that action, he petitioned the court to appoint a guardian ad litem for all of his children, including Jenia. The petition, signed by Seward Jr., unambiguously states that he “is the father of Jenny Anne Josephine Johnson[.]”
After his son began divorce proceedings, but before the court entered the divorce decree, Seward Sr. created another charitable trust on December 31, 1963 (the 1963 trust). That trust was funded with 12,730 shares of Johnson & Johnson common stock. The provisions of the 1963 trust generally track the language of the 1961 trust, except that the 1963 trust expressly excludes Jenia and her half-brother, Bruce Alexander, as distributees. Specifically, the 1963 trust provides “that no child born to or adopted by the Grantor's son, JOHN SEWARD JOHNSON, JR., during his marriage to BARBARA E. JOHNSON (including specifically but not in limitation thereof BRUCE ALEXANDER JOHNSON and JENNY ANNE JOSEPHINE JOHNSON) and no issue of any such child shall be included as a distributee[.]”
During the course of their administration of the 1961 trust, the trustees filed nine intermediate accountings. Throughout those accountings, the trustees named Jenia as a grandchild of Seward Sr., i.e., “issue” of Seward Jr., and in so doing, they presumably considered her to be an eligible beneficiary under the trust. At no time in the prior accountings did anyone challenge Jenia's status under the 1961 trust.
The trustees filed a verified complaint with the Chancery Division for settlement of the ninth intermediate accounting on March 27, 1996. Because the trust's January 10, 1997, expiration date was approaching, the trustees sought instruction from the court on several subjects, including the interpretation of the term “issue” and who comprised that class, and whether the trustees' understanding of the class of beneficiaries was correct.
At the initial case conference, Seward Jr., his second wife, and their two children, John Seward Johnson III and Clelia Constance Johnson, challenged Jenia's inclusion as a member of the class of eligible beneficiaries under the 1961 trust. Jenia's cousins, Eric Bruce Ryan and Hillary A. Ryan (the Ryans), children of Seward Jr.'s deceased sister, made a similar challenge. In a letter to the trial court, the trustees expressed the view that the paternity contest might be resolved as a matter of law, thereby avoiding lost time and expense. The trustees reiterated that position at the second case conference. The trial court agreed, directing that Jenia move for partial summary judgment on the issue of paternity. Jenia complied, seeking confirmation of her status as an eligible beneficiary under the 1961 trust and requesting that discovery regarding that subject be precluded.
In an unreported opinion and subsequent order, the trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Jenia. The court held that Jenia's status as a child of Seward Jr. was conclusively established as a matter of law in 1965. The court further determined that Jenia was an eligible beneficiary under the 1961 trust, and that all other parties were precluded from seeking discovery relating to that issue. In so ruling, the trial court concluded that the twenty-three-year limitations period found in the New Jersey Parentage Act, N.J.S.A. 9:17-38 to -59 (the Act), served as a statute of repose that barred any challenge to the 1965 determination of Seward Jr.'s paternity. The court considered the Act to be the exclusive method for determining paternity, thus confirming that Jenia was “a child of J. Seward Johnson, Jr.”
Before the Appellate Division, the Ryans, Seward Jr., and his immediate family argued that the trial court erred in its ruling in respect of the Parentage Act and raised other issues. In an unreported opinion, the Appellate Division agreed with the trial court that Seward Jr., his second wife, and their children were barred from contesting Jenia's legitimacy on account of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and judicial estoppel. The panel disagreed, however, with the trial court's interpretation of the Act. It concluded that the Act's time limitations do not apply to actions seeking to construe the language of a will or trust.
Further, the panel rejected Jenia's argument that the Ryans lacked standing to challenge Seward Jr.'s paternity. The panel also reasoned that laches did not bar that challenge because if made earlier, the challenge to Seward Jr.'s paternity would have been rejected as premature. The panel remanded the matter to the trial court to determine whether Jenia “is 'issue' [of Seward Jr.] and whether [Seward Sr.] might have intended her to benefit even if she were not the child of Seward, Jr.”
The Appellate Division disposed of other issues not pertinent to this appeal. We granted Jenia's petition for certification, limited to the parentage issue, and granted a nearly identical petition filed by the appointed guardian ad litem of Jenia's son, Henry Bruce Sheeran. 163 N.J. 77 (2000). We denied the cross-petition, filed by John Seward Johnson III and Clelia Constance Johnson, challenging that part of the Appellate Division's decision barring them from contesting their father's paternity of Jenia. 163 N.J. 78 (2000). Our sole focus is on whether the Ryans or similarly situated persons may challenge Jenia's parentage and beneficiary status within the context of the administration of the 1961 trust.
The common-law presumption of legitimacy sought to avoid the effects of the doctrine of nullius filius (the child of nobody), an ancient tenet that essentially treated an illegitimate child as a non-person in the eyes of the law. As explained in a prior opinion of this Court:
At common law, the putative father was under no obligation to maintain his illegitimate offspring. The duty of support came by statute: first, on the motion of the overseer of the poor or other local representative to exonerate the municipality, and then at the instance of the mother or other interested person on behalf of the child itself, the latter a measure of relief conforming with others of the same pattern to a more enlightened concept of social justice as against the harsh medieval doctrine of nullius filius that, for the moral sin of the parents, set the unfortunate and innocent victim adrift with no standing whatever before the law.
In 1983, the Legislature enacted the New Jersey Parentage Act, which is modeled after the Uniform Parentage Act promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Statement of the Assembly Judiciary, Law, Public Safety and Defense Committee on Senate Bill No. 888, L. 1983, c. 17, reprinted in comments to N.J.S.A. 9:17-38 (Legislative Statement). In enacting that statute, the Legislature “intended to establish the principle that regardless of the marital status of the parents, all children and parents have equal rights with respect to each other and to provide a procedure to establish parentage in disputed cases.” Ibid. See also Wingate v. Estate of Ryan, 149 N.J. 227, 233 (1997) (describing history of Act).
In furtherance of those aims, the Act contains numerous provisions, including those establishing the methods by which the parent-child relationship may be proved, N.J.S.A. 9:17-41, providing for the confidentiality of proceedings brought under the Act, N.J.S.A. 9:17-42, establishing the jurisdiction of the Superior Court and providing for the joinder of certain other actions, including divorce actions, N.J.S.A. 9:17-46, authorizing the court to admit evidence of blood or genetic tests, N.J.S.A. 9:17-48, and establishing certain burdens of proof, N.J.S.A. 9:17-43.
Significant to this dispute, the Act identifies certain presumptions of paternity, one of which mirrors the common-law principle that a child born in wedlock is presumed to be the legitimate offspring of the husband. In that regard, the statute provides: “A man is presumed to be the biological father of a child if . . . [h]e and the child's biological mother are or have been married to each other and the child is born during the marriage, or within 300 days after the marriage is terminated by death, annulment or divorce[.]” N.J.S.A. 9:17-43a(1). As indicated by the legislative history, “[t]hese presumptions are intended to facilitate the flow of benefits from the father to the child.” Legislative Statement.
Grounded in statute and steadied by its ancient roots, the presumption of legitimacy “remains one of the strongest rebuttable presumptions known to the law, and the interests of society require that it be given effect unless overcome by the strongest sort of evidence, in the absence of which the presumption remains conclusive.” 41 Am. Jur. 2d Illegitimate Children § 10, at 213 (1995) (footnotes omitted). Under the Act, the presumption “may be rebutted in an appropriate action only by clear and convincing evidence.” N.J.S.A. 9:17-43b. That, too, is essentially a codification of the common law. For a party to have succeeded in proving under the common law that a child born in wedlock was illegitimate, “there [had to] be no possible escape from [that] conclusion[.]” Wallace, supra, 73 N.J. Eq. at 403. Our courts have vigilantly sustained the presumption in numerous contexts. See, e.g., In re Adoption by K., supra, 92 N.J. Super. at 207 (holding that mother's written representation to adoption agency that her former husband was not her child's father is insufficient to rebut presumption of paternity); In re Estate of Rogers, 30 N.J. Super. 479, 486 (App. Div.) (concluding that presumption was not rebutted in case in which child's putative father acknowledged paternity to four witnesses and was alleged to be “bedmate” of child's mother), certif. denied, 16 N.J. 193 (1954).
The Act's limitations provision states in part that “[n]o action shall be brought under [the Act] more than five years after the child attains the age of majority.” N.J.S.A. 9:17-45b. We have previously observed that “[t]hat section effectively imposes a twenty-three-year statute of repose for actions under the Parentage Act, running from the child's date of birth.” Wingate, supra, 149 N.J. at 233. As noted, the Act also requires that paternity actions “shall be joined with an action for divorce,” N.J.S.A. 9:17-46a, a provision that “demonstrates a specific [legislative] intent to have the issue of parentage . . . , if known to the parties at the time, resolved during the divorce proceeding.” B.P. v. G.P., 222 N.J. Super. 101, 106 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 108 N.J. 579 (1987). Perhaps most important to our analysis, the Act provides that “[t]he judgment or order of the court or a Certificate of Parentage determining the existence or nonexistence of the parent and child relationship is determinative for all purposes.” N.J.S.A. 9:17-53a. The statute also provides that the relationship between the child and biological father “may be established by proof that [the father's] paternity has been adjudicated under prior law[.]” N.J.S.A. 9:17-41b. Lastly, the statute provides that “[t]he adjudication of paternity shall only be voided upon a finding that there exists clear and convincing evidence of: fraud, duress or a material mistake of fact, with the burden of proof upon the challenger[.]” Ibid.
We discern from those provisions that the Legislature intended the Act to provide a set of clearly defined and uniform procedures for establishing parentage in disputed cases. The Act's language and history make clear that the main thrust of the statute is to foster, not thwart, the parent-child relationship. We are thus guided by that purpose, particularly when both parents have acknowledged the father's paternity in a judicial proceeding and the issue has been conclusively adjudicated. See M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J. Super. 420, 425 (App. Div. 1991) (analyzing Act “in light of the strong public policy favoring the preserving of the family unit when neither the mother nor her husband [has] in any way disavowed the husband's paternity of the child”).
B.
Against that backdrop, the Ryans assert that the Appellate Division correctly remanded this matter for trial to determine both Jenia's parentage and Seward Sr.'s probable intent in respect of Jenia's eligibility to receive a share of proceeds under the 1961 trust. In their brief, the Ryans frame the question this way: Whether Seward Sr. intended to include within the class of eligible beneficiaries “a person who is not the natural, biological, blood issue of his son[.]” They argue that recent amendments to the Parentage Act and the Probate Code, N.J.S.A. 3B:1-1 to 3B:29-1, demonstrate the Legislature's intent to afford affected parties in their position an opportunity for a judicial determination of the parent-child relationship. To deny them that opportunity, the Ryans assert, would be fundamentally unfair.
We disagree. In Wingate, the plaintiff in a contested probate action sought to establish the putative father's paternity rather than challenge, as the Ryans do here, a prior adjudication of paternity. The putative father in Wingate died intestate. Until just before that death, the plaintiff believed that she was the biological child of another man. Wingate, supra, 149 N.J. at 229. Because the plaintiff's claim was filed more than twenty-three years after her birth, the Appellate Division concluded that the limitations period in the Parentage Act applied, thereby barring her claim. Ibid.
We reversed. After reviewing the legislative histories of the Parentage Act and Probate Code, we concluded that the Act's limitations provision did not affect the timeliness of the plaintiff's action brought under the Probate Code. Id. at 232. We stated that the Probate Code “allows an out-of-wedlock child of a deceased parent to file an heirship claim with the personal representative of the decedent's estate within the time the court has deemed reasonable for the filing of claims.” Id. at 243. Because there was no dispute over whether the plaintiff had filed her probate claim within a reasonable time, we permitted that claim to proceed. Ibid.
Subsequent to our decision in Wingate, the Legislature amended the Parentage Act to clarify that the Act's limitation provision “does not . . . limit any time period for the determination of any claims arising under the laws governing probate, including the construction of wills and trust instruments.” L. 1997, c. 376, § 2 (codified at N.J.S.A. 9:17- 45f). The Probate Code was similarly amended to provide that “[t]he parent and child relationship may be established . . . regardless of the time limitations set forth in [the Parentage Act].” L. 1997, c. 376, § 1 (codified at N.J.S.A. 3B:5-10).
Because those amendments authorize a potential heir of a decedent to contest a will or a trust in the context of a probate proceeding, the Appellate Division here reasoned that third parties in a like proceeding may collaterally attack an adjudication of parentage made in an earlier divorce action. We reject that reasoning. We interpret Wingate and the amendatory enactments more narrowly to apply principally to parties seeking to establish or confirm their parentage, as opposed to those seeking to defeat the established parentage of others. See Wingate, supra, 149 N.J. at 240 (noting that legislative approach reflected in Probate Code is intended “to make it easier, not harder or impossible, for persons born out of wedlock to establish heirship”).
Moreover, we agree with the trial court that the Parentage Act essentially forecloses a third-party attack on Jenia's parentage. The Act broadly accepts proof of paternity as “adjudicated under prior law,” N.J.S.A. 9:17-41b, as well as in a host of other settings. We interpret that provision to capture within its purview the prior adjudication of Seward Jr.'s paternity. Even if the Court assumes that the statute is susceptible to different interpretations in that respect, we would reach the same conclusion in view of the Act's legislative history and “the 'fundamental purpose for which the legislation was enacted.'” Township of Pennsauken v. Schad, 160 N.J. 156, 170 (1999) (quoting N.J. Builders, Owners & Managers Ass'n v. Blair, 60 N.J. 330, 338 (1972)).
Nor are we persuaded that the doctrine of probable intent requires a contrary conclusion or further proceedings. Briefly stated, that doctrine provides that
[i]n ascertaining the intention of [the] settlor the “primary inquiry” must be directed to “the language of the instrument itself.” In so doing, we seek “to ascertain and give effect to the probable intention of the settlor.” When the instrument itself fails to indicate intent, “resort may be had to extrinsic evidence to determine the terms of the trust.” . . . If the language [is] clear, and no ambiguity [is] asserted, the court would confine itself to giving effect to the language used.
(App. Div. 1967) (internal citations omitted).]
We agree with the trial court that the doctrine of probable intent is not implicated in a case in which a trust document is clear on its face and a child's parentage has been conclusively adjudicated. As noted, the 1961 trust defines “issue” to include an “adopted” child. Thus, Seward Sr. contemplated that the proceeds of the trust might be distributed to persons other than his blood kin. Moreover, by expressly excluding Jenia and Bruce, her half-brother, from the 1963 trust, Seward Sr. exhibited an ability to express himself with precision and care insofar as distributions are concerned.
As stated earlier, the 1961 trust was created prior to the adjudication of Seward Jr.'s paternity. Arguably, Jenia's parentage was open to some question at the time Seward Jr. filed for divorce in 1962. The Ryans thus assert that Jenia's exclusion from the subsequent 1963 trust indicates that Seward Sr. did not intend Jenia to be a beneficiary under the 1961 trust. That argument is plausible but insufficient to overcome the clear language of the 1961 trust. We must consider that language in view of Jenia's presumptive legitimacy, which existed when the grantor executed the 1961 trust and which the 1965 adjudication resolved.
We note also that, although Seward Sr. excluded Jenia and Bruce from the 1963 trust, he did so by referring to them as children “born to or adopted by” Seward Jr. We agree with the trial court that such a reference is consistent with the children's status as offspring of Seward Jr. The Court is satisfied that the inference, suggested by the Ryans concerning the two trusts, forms an insufficient basis on which to question the grantor's intent, which is unambiguously reflected in the 1961 trust. In sum, the 1965 adjudication of Seward Jr.'s paternity effectively bars this current challenge. The claims or intimations of third parties, or of Seward Jr. himself, that Jenia is not his daughter or that she has developed a parent- child relationship with a man other than Seward Jr., are insufficient to pierce the prior judgment. That the Legislature intended paternity disputes to be resolved definitively is reflected in its chosen language providing for judgments or orders of the court to be “determinative for all purposes.” N.J.S.A. 9:17-53a.
Moreover, because Jenia's parentage has been established as a matter of law, the inquiry concerning the grantor's intent is no longer relevant absent clear language to the contrary within the trust document. Under those circumstances, the Court must “confine itself to giving effect to the language used [in the trust].” In re Trust of Voorhees, supra, 93 N.J. Super. at 299. In so doing, we find nothing in the language of the 1961 trust that would cause the Court to alter Jenia's beneficiary status or would otherwise warrant a third-party attack on her parentage.
The policy favoring the integrity of the family unit is especially compelling in cases in which there has been a prior adjudication or acknowledgment of paternity. In that regard, we agree with the Ohio Supreme Court:
In those cases where, by force of events, judicial intervention occurs, where the matter of parentage is determined with finality and in the absence of fraud, and where that determination is not later vacated, either on direct appeal or pursuant to a recognized legal remedy such as that set forth [in the rule granting relief from a judgment or order], the policy of this state requires, in sum, that the parent-child relationship be shielded from the unsettling effects of further judicial inquiry, and that relitigation of parentage be barred, as a general rule, in any subsequent actions, including those initiated under [the Ohio parentage provisions].
We have found no case precisely analogous to this one. As a
general rule, however, courts in other jurisdictions appear to
agree that third-party challenges to paternity and legitimacy
should be barred once those questions have been resolved by
acknowledgment or agreement of the putative parents or by
judicial decree. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
158 So. 217, 220 (La. Ct. App. 1935) (stating that “'[i]f the
husband and his heirs cannot dispute . . . legitimacy . . . , for
a stronger reason the door should be closed on third parties in
actions for money or property'”) (citation omitted); Deatherage
v. Phipps,
441 P.2d 1020, 1023 (Okla. 1967) (concluding that, in
case in which neither husband nor wife disputed legitimacy of
child born in wedlock, third party was barred from doing so);
Byrd v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
275 S.W.2d 861, 863-64 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1955) (observing that “[i]f the father renounces the right
to bastardize his alleged son, either expressly or tacitly, it is
extinguished and can never thereafter be exercised by anyone”).
The decision in Knauer v. Barnett,
360 So.2d 399 (Fla.
1978), is particularly instructive. In that case, the trustee of
an inter vivos trust sought a declaratory judgment to determine
to whom he should distribute the trust's income and corpus. The
trust document provided that the trustee distribute such property
to the “blood issue” of the settlor or, if there were no such
issue, to the settlor's “collateral kindred.” Id. at 401.
Charles Barnett claimed to be the son and blood issue of the
settlor, William Barnett. Ibid. Other relatives disputed that
claim, asserting that the settlor had no blood issue and,
consequently, that they were entitled to the entire trust
distribution. Ibid.
Charles was born in Paris, France, to Marcelle Perron and
was identified in both the official civil and church records as
“Charles Perron.” Ibid. Five years later, William Barnett and
Marcelle appeared before the deputy mayor of Paris and declared
in the presence of witnesses that they recognized Charles “as
their son[.]” Ibid. William and Marcelle then married. Ibid.
Charles's birth record was thereafter corrected by an official
striking through the name “Perron” and writing above it the name
“Barnett.” Id. at 402. Later, William and Marcelle swore before
a notary public that a petition prepared for filing with the
French government was true in stating that Charles has been
“acknowledged by the said William L'Engle Barnett as his son.”
Ibid. Several years later, after Charles and his parents became
estranged, William began referring to Charles as his “adopted
son” or “step-son” and purportedly stated that “[t]here's not a
drop of my blood in that boy.” Id. at 402-03.
Based on that record, the circuit court concluded that
Charles was not the blood issue of William and thus, Charles was
not entitled to receive any of the trust's income or corpus. The
district court reversed. In affirming that reversal, the Florida
Supreme Court stated:
To permit the collateral kindred of William
to challenge the parentage of Charles . . .
is not supported by . . . policy
considerations and would seriously undermine
the status of every child born out of wedlock
who is subsequently legitimatized by
acknowledgment and intermarriage pursuant to
[Florida's probate statutes].
This Court is cognizant of the well-
established principle that the intent of the
settlor of a trust is controlling. However,
unless the trust instrument is ambiguous the
intent of the settlor must be ascertained
from that which lies within the four corners
of the instrument itself, and no extrinsic
evidence of the settlor's intent is
admissible. . . . No ambiguity is created by
an application of the legal definition to the
term “blood issue,” as used in the trust
instrument in question. By virtue of
William's compliance with the [Florida
statutes], Charles was rendered, by operation
of law, the “blood issue” of William. The
trust contains no expressed intent to exclude
Charles from the definition of this term.
Consequently, the district court properly
concluded that Charles Barnett, as the blood
issue of William Barnett, was entitled to
distribution of the trust assets and that the
extrinsic evidence relied upon by the circuit
court below in ruling that Charles is not the
blood issue of William was irrelevant to this
determination.
(We note for completeness that a portion of the Florida statute
relied on by the court in Knauer has been revised by the
Legislature of that state. See Thurston v. Thurston, No. 1D97-
692, 2
000 WL 1838640 (Fla. Dist. App. Ct. Dec. 15, 2000). The
court's rationale in support of its holding, however, remains
instructive.)
Although not an exact analogue, Knauer resembles this case.
Here, as in Knauer, third parties raise the specter of probable
intent as the principal vehicle by which to reopen a prior
proceeding concerning a child born in wedlock or otherwise
legitimized. The Court should not invoke the doctrine of
probable intent for that purpose. Our reasons are similar to
those expressed by the court in Knauer. We have considered the
1961 trust against the backdrop of the presumption of legitimacy
that existed when Seward Sr. executed the trust document and that
exists today. In so doing, the Court finds no ambiguity within
the four corners of the instrument to warrant the belated
questioning of the grantor's intent almost four decades later.
Finally, because they were not parties to Seward Jr.'s 1965
divorce action, the Ryans further argue that it would be
fundamentally unfair for the Court to rely on that prior
adjudication in resolving this dispute. They consider Seward
Jr.'s 1965 acknowledgment of paternity to be false, executed
solely to conclude the then-pending divorce litigation. The
Ryans thus state in their brief that “[n]o public purpose will be
served by allowing the false acknowledgment of Jennyanne's
paternity to preclude the court's determination of Mr. Johnson's
intent.” They also assert that their right to due process would
be violated if they were denied the opportunity to contest
Jenia's parentage within the context of the distribution of the
1961 trust.
The doctrine of fundamental fairness “'serves to protect
citizens generally against unjust and arbitrary governmental
action, and specifically against governmental procedures that
tend to operate arbitrarily.'” Doe v. Poritz,
142 N.J. 1, 108
(1995) (citation omitted). We are satisfied that that doctrine
does not alter our conclusion that the Ryans should be precluded
from reopening the issue of Seward Jr.'s paternity. There is
nothing unjust or arbitrary about preserving a prior adjudication
of paternity. To the contrary, with its clear command that an
adjudication of parentage “is determinative for all purposes[,]”
N.J.S.A. 9:17-53a, the Parentage Act strongly favors the finality
of such judgments.
Moreover, unverified allegations of fraud are insufficient
to overcome the presumption of paternity imbedded in our law. By
design, the presumption is intended to prevent rumor, innuendo,
and whispers of illegitimacy from creeping into the serious
process of determining paternity. See In re Estate of Rogers,
supra, 30 N.J. Super. at 486 (observing that presumption of
legitimacy is comparable in substance to presumption of innocence
and as such, “cannot as a matter of law be demolished by proof of
circumstances which create only doubt and suspicion”). As the
Appellate Division aptly noted some time ago: “Both good men and
[bad] men may be less so than suspected. To surmise or
conjecture the illegitimacy of birth would offend the principles
of our public policy and established law.” Id. at 485.
In a similar vein, we see no violation of due process in
foreclosing a third-party collateral attack on a longstanding
paternity judgment. Generally, the right to due process is
triggered when the complained-of action implicates certain
protectible interests of the aggrieved party. Doe, supra, 142
N.J. at 106. “Due process is not a fixed concept, however, but a
flexible one that depends on the particular circumstances.”
Ibid. We surmise from the Ryans' argument that their protectible
interest is an asserted right to share in the distribution of the
1961 trust and that Jenia's status as an eligible beneficiary
under the same trust infringes on that interest.
In essence, the Ryans' claim requires us to balance the
adjudication of Jenia's legitimacy against their purported right
to defeat that legitimacy and thereby increase their economic
gain. In Michael H. v. Gerald D.,
491 U.S. 110, 113,
109 S. Ct. 2333, 2337,
105 L. Ed.2d 91, 99 (1989), the United States
Supreme Court set aside the due process claim of a putative
father who sought to establish his paternity of a child born to
the wife of another man. More specifically, the putative father
asserted that the presumption of the child's legitimacy infringed
on his right to due process, along with the child's right to
maintain a relationship with her biological father. Ibid. The
California statute at issue provided that the presumption of
legitimacy in favor a child born in wedlock could be rebutted
only by the husband or wife, and then only in certain
circumstances. Id. at 115, 109 S. Ct. at 2338, 105 L. Ed.
2d at
101.
In a plurality opinion, the Court rejected the putative
father's claim. Relying in part on the same policy undergirding
the presumption of legitimacy that we have noted here, four
members of the Court stated that “our traditions have protected
the marital family . . . against the sort of claim [the putative
father] asserts.” Id. at 124, 109 S. Ct. at 2342,
105 L. Ed 2d
at 106 (footnote omitted). A fifth member of the Court concurred
in its judgment, observing that the marriage between the child's
mother and her husband provided the child “with a loving and
harmonious family home.” Id. at 135-36, 109 S. Ct. at 2348, 105
L. Ed.
2d at 114 (Stevens, J., concurring).
We note that the purported economic right to become eligible
for an unspecified share of trust proceeds occupies a lower place
in the hierarchy of rights as compared to a putative father's
right to the parent-child relationship. See Santosky v. Kramer,
455 U.S. 745, 758-59,
102 S. Ct. 1388, 1397,
71 L. Ed.2d 599,
610 (1982) (declaring that right of parents to raise and care for
their children “is an interest far more precious than any
property right”). Thus, the circumstances that justify setting
aside the due process claim in this case appear more compelling
than those that existed in the Michael H. case.
The Court is convinced that Seward Jr.'s paternity of Jenia
should not be disturbed in the present setting. We note again
that the asserted right to share in the proceeds of the 1961
trust is within the discretion of the trustees. When measured
against Jenia's equal or greater right to family identification,
the Ryans' claim for an uncertain larger share of the trust's
distribution is insufficient to justify the remedies sought in
this appeal. Jenia cannot be Seward Jr.'s daughter for only some
purposes. By operation of law, the adjudication of Seward Jr.'s
paternity cements Jenia's status as an eligible beneficiary under
the 1961 trust absent clear language to the contrary within the
trust itself.
IV.
CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES STEIN, COLEMAN, LONG, LaVECCHIA and ZAZZALI join in JUSTICE VERNIERO's opinion.
NO. A-69/70 SEPTEMBER TERM 1999
ON APPEAL FROM
ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court
IN THE MATTER OF THE TRUST
CREATED BY AGREEMENT DATED
DECEMBER 20, 1961 BY AND
BETWEEN JOHN SEWARD JOHNSON,
GRANTOR, AND PHILIP B.
HOFMANN, GUSTAV O. LIENHARD,
AND KENNETH PERRY, TRUSTEES,
(Known as the JOHN SEWARD
JOHNSON 1961 CHARITABLE
TRUST)
DECIDED February 15, 2001
Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING
OPINION BY Justice Verniero
CONCURRING OPINION BY
DISSENTING OPINION BY