(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of
the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity,
portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).
Argued January 4, 2000 -- Decided March 17, 2000
PER CURIAM
This is an attorney disciplinary case.
Respondent, William Wright, Jr. of South Orange, who was admitted to practice in 1961, was charged with
knowing misappropriation of trust funds. The charges resulted from a random audit of his books and records conducted by
the OAE in December 1998. Initially, the audit disclosed that Wright had incomplete and confusing records with multiple
trust accounts. As the investigation unfolded, it became apparent that the multiple accounts had served to control a scheme
whereby Wright's office manager-bookkeeper, Jewels Hightower (who later became his wife), moved money among the
various trust accounts, the business accounts, and several accounts of W-K Development Company (W-K).
The matter was tried before a special master. Hightower admitted that she had moved money from Wright's trust
account to his business account and to the W-K account, sometimes signing his name without his authorization. In
addition, Wright maintained that W-K was Hightower's company and denied any involvement in or knowledge of the
company's transactions. However, the evidence showed otherwise. For example, when a deficit arose in the various
accounts, Wright covered an overdraft through a loan in the amount of $58,000 from the National State Bank to W-K, for
which he signed a note as president of W-K.
Wright's participation in this scheme is further evidenced by his conduct in a matter involving his clients, the
Andersons. Specifically, the Andersons sought to consolidate their debts and took out a $64,500 mortgage, the proceeds of
which were deposited into Wright's trust account. Within a month, Wright used $27,000 of those mortgage proceeds to
open the W-K account by drawing a trust account check against those funds. He then issued another check against those
funds in the amount of $3,000 payable to Hightower for “salary.” Hightower then issued four checks to Wright from the
funds, totaling $23,000. The fourth check was endorsed by Wright with the notation, “16 Laventhal Avenue, Irvington,
NJ,” which was the address of the property he planned to purchase. Thus, none of the funds had been used for the
Andersons' benefit or purposes.
The Special Master found Wright guilty of knowing misappropriation. On de novo review, the Disciplinary
Review Board (DRB) agreed and filed its report with the Supreme Court recommending that Wright be disbarred.
The matter is before the Court pursuant to R. 1:20-16(a).
HELD: The evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates that respondent Wright knowingly misappropriated the funds of his
clients, for which he is disbarred.
1. There is overwhelming evidence that Wright knew that trust funds were being invaded and that he actively participated
in the misappropriations and in the activities taken to cover up that misconduct. (pp. 3-5)
2. A remand to consider the effect of Wright's emotional state at the time of the misappropriations is not warranted.
(pp. 5-6)
3. The record clearly establishes that Wright engaged in knowing misappropriation, the appropriate discipline for which is
disbarment. (p. 6)
CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES O'HERN, GARIBALDI, STEIN, LONG, and VERNIERO join in this
opinion. JUSTICE COLEMAN did not participate.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
D-
19 September Term 1999
IN THE MATTER OF
WILLIAM WRIGHT, JR.,
An Attorney at Law.
Argued January 4, 2000 -- Decided March 17, 2000
On an Order to show cause why respondent should
not be disbarred or otherwise disciplined.
John McGill, III, Deputy Ethics Counsel, argued
the cause on behalf of the Office of Attorney
Ethics.
Raymond A. Brown, Jr., argued the cause for
respondent (Brown and Brown and Alan Dexter
Bowman, attorneys).
PER CURIAM
This matter arises from a decision of the Disciplinary
Review Board (DRB) recommending that respondent William Wright,
Jr. be disbarred. The matter came before the DRB on presentment
of a Special Master charging respondent with knowing
misappropriation of client funds, an event that almost invariably
results in disbarment under the rule of In re Wilson,
81 N.J. 451
(1979). Our independent review of the record leads us to
conclude that disbarment is the appropriate discipline.
Respondent is a sole practitioner who was admitted to the
bar in 1961. He maintains an office in South Orange. He has no
prior disciplinary history. In December 1998, the Office of
Attorney Ethics (OAE) conducted a random audit of his books and
records. The audit disclosed that respondent has incomplete and
confusing records with multiple trust accounts. As the
investigation unfolded, it became apparent that the multiple
accounts had served to control a scheme whereby the respondent's
office manager-bookkeeper, Jewels Hightower, moved money among
the various trust accounts, respondent's business accounts, and
several accounts of W-K Development Co.(W-K). The bookkeeper
admitted that she had moved money from respondent's trust account
to his business account and to the W-K account, sometimes signing
respondent's name without his authorization.
Respondent asserted that W-K was the bookkeeper's company
and denied any involvement in the company or knowledge of any of
the company's transactions. The proofs were clearly and
convincingly otherwise. When a deficit arose in the varied
accounts, respondent covered an overdraft through a loan in the
amount of $58,000 from the National State Bank to W-K for which
he signed a note as president of W-K.
A convincing example of respondent's participation in this
scheme arises from a financing matter involving respondent's
clients, the Andersons. The Andersons sought to consolidate
their debts and took out a $64,500 mortgage, the proceeds of
which went into one of respondent's trust accounts. Within a
month, respondent signed a $27,000 check to W-K, allegedly
authorized by the Andersons to cover repairs to their home. This
check was used to open the W-K account. Respondent then issued a
$3,000 check to the bookkeeper, Hightower, for “salary.”
Hightower then issued four checks to respondent in the amount of
$23,000. The fourth check for $17,000 was endorsed by respondent
with the notation, “16 Laventhal Avenue, Irvington, NJ,” the
address of a property that respondent planned to purchase. In
short, respondent knew that the Anderson funds were being used
for other purposes. None of the $27,000 had been spent on
repairs to the home.
We are thus unable to accept respondent's argument that he
was blinded by affection for and trust in his bookkeeper,
Hightower, a woman whom he later married. Before us in briefs
and oral argument, respondent's able counsel have argued that we
should allow a remand to explore the troubled state of mind that
led respondent to this faith in his bookkeeper. Specifically,
the attorneys challenge that part of the DRB's decision that
equates such trust with “willful blindness” that clients' funds
were being invaded. Respondent argues that the citation by the
DRB to In re Skevin,
104 N.J. 476 (1986), is inapposite and does
not support the result urged by the DRB. In Skevin, the
respondent systematically withdrew from his trust account sums
anticipated to be made up from proceeds of cases that had not yet
been received. The Court held that Skevin “knew that he was
withdrawing clients' funds from the commingled accounts on each
occasion when he drew his own fees or disbursements in advance of
receiving settlement checks.” Id. at 485. That, respondent
says, is a far cry from being victimized by a beloved employee.
Respondent argues that this case fits closely into the pattern of
cases in which the Court has found that, in the absence of clear
and convincing proof of a knowing misappropriation, the fact that
clients' funds have been invaded does not warrant disbarment. In
re Librizzi,
117 N.J. 481 (1990); In re Gallo,
117 N.J. 365
(1989); In re James,
112 N.J. 580 (1988). In this last case, the
attorney had also paid various personal obligations out of his
trust account and attributed that to a secretary's error.
It is true that we do not disbar lawyers who are bad
bookkeepers. This is not such a case. The DRB's report states:
However, as found by the Special Master, the
evidence goes beyond willful blindness _ it
establishes respondent's complicity in the
misappropriations. There is clear and
convincing evidence that respondent not only
knew of the misappropriations, but that he
was an active participant in the misconduct
and in the activities undertaken to cover up
the misconduct. Two clients testified that
respondent asked them to sign false
affidavits concerning the use of their funds.
One of the clients actually signed the
affidavit because respondent was her attorney
and told her that he needed the statement.
It was clear from her testimony that she did
not understand the significance of what she
was signing. The other client refused to
sign the statement because it was not true.
There is overwhelming evidence that respondent knew that
trust funds were being invaded.
We have carefully considered the request of respondent's
counsel that we permit a remand to consider the effect of the
emotional state in which respondent found himself. In a long
series of cases, we examined the effects of alcohol, In re Hein,
104 N.J. 297 (1986); drugs, In re Romano,
104 N.J. 306 (1986);
sickness, In re Skevin, supra,
104 N.J. 476; and compulsive
gambling, In re Goldberg,
109 N.J. 163 (1988), as factors that
might possibly mitigate the almost invariable disbarment
resulting from the knowing misappropriation of clients' funds.
In each instance we found it necessary to disbar attorneys with
previously good records whose compulsive conduct, whether due to
dependence on drugs, alcohol, or gambling, had contributed to or
caused the loss of judgment that led to the misappropriation of
clients' funds. We have struggled to resolve the dilemma of
recognizing these personality disorders as the diseases that they
are, while acknowledging the devastating effect that
misappropriation has on public confidence in the bar and the court.
But we have been unable to rationalize the
qualitative differences that would excuse the
violation in the case of one suffering
disease or defeat, or one suffering from
drugs or other dependency from one suffering
the anguish of collapsing home life or
marriage due to economic or other strains.
Consequently, we have chosen to resolve the
choice of professional discipline by
maintaining our primary focus on the public
interest.
[In re Skevin, supra, 104 N.J. at 489.]
Respondent has long served his clients during an unblemished
career. Nevertheless, based upon our independent review of the
record, we are clearly convinced that respondent engaged in the
proscribed conduct and that the appropriate discipline is
disbarment.
We direct, further, that respondent reimburse the
Disciplinary Oversight Committee for appropriate administrative
costs.
CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES O'HERN, GARIBALDI, STEIN,
LONG, and VERNIERO join in this opinion. JUSTICE COLEMAN did not
participate.
NO. D-19 SEPTEMBER TERM 1999
Application for
Disposition Disbarment
Decided March 17, 2000
Order returnable
Opinion by PER CURIAM
D- 19 September Term 1999
IN THE MATTER OF :
WILLIAM WRIGHT, JR., : O R D E R
AN ATTORNEY AT LAW :
It is ORDERED that WILLIAM WRIGHT, JR., of SOUTH ORANGE, who
was admitted to the bar of this State in 1961, be disbarred and
that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys of this
State, effective immediately; and it is further
ORDERED that WILLIAM WRIGHT, JR., be and hereby is
permanently restrained and enjoined from practicing law; and it
is further
ORDERED that all funds, if any, currently existing in any
New Jersey financial institution maintained by WILLIAM WRIGHT,
JR., pursuant to Rule 1:21-6, be restrained from disbursement
except on application to this Court, for good cause shown, and
shall be transferred by the financial institution to the Clerk of
the Superior Court, who is directed to deposit the funds in the
Superior Court Trust Fund, pending further Order of this Court;
and it is further
ORDERED that WILLIAM WRIGHT, JR., comply with Rule 1:20-20
dealing with disbarred attorneys; and it is further
ORDERED that WILLIAM WRIGHT, JR., reimburse the Disciplinary
Oversight Committee for appropriate administrative costs.
WITNESS, the Honorable Deborah T. Poritz, Chief Justice, at
Trenton, this 17th day of March, 2000.
CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT