SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
A-6604-96T2
IN THE MATTER OF
WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC
CORPORATION - BLOOMFIELD
Generator No: NJ080100916
Generator No: NJR990041071
___________________________________
Argued: April 21, 1999 - Decided: August 31, 1999
(By telephone)
Before Judges Long, Kestin and Carchman.
On appeal from the Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Disposal Facility Siting Board.
Kevin J. Bruno argued the cause for appellant
Westinghouse Electric Corporation (Robertson,
Freilich, Bruno and Cohen, attorneys; Mr. Bruno,
of counsel and, with Lynne J. Urbanowicz-Mulcahy,
on the brief).
Roger S. Haase, Deputy Attorney General, argued
the cause for respondent Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Disposal Facility Siting Board (John J.
Farmer, Jr., Attorney General, attorney;
Joseph L. Yannotti, Assistant Attorney General,
of counsel; Mr. Haase, on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
KESTIN, J.A.D.
In June 1997, the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal
Facility Siting Board (the Board) in the Department of
Environmental Protection imposed reduced assessments totalling
$351,742.03 to cover Westinghouse Electric Corporation's
(Westinghouse) fiscal years 1992, 1993 and 1994 funding
responsibilities, as a generator of low-level radioactive waste,
for the development of a disposal facility. The assessments were
made pursuant to the Regional Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal
Facility Siting Act (the Act), N.J.S.A. 13:1E-177 to -198, and
administrative rules adopted thereunder, N.J.A.C. 7:60-1.1 to -1.6
(the Rules). Westinghouse appeals. We affirm.
Westinghouse has been licensed to handle low-level radioactive
materials in connection with its own manufacturing operations and
its involvement in projects of the federal government, such as the
Manhattan Project. Until 1983, Westinghouse owned and operated a
lamp manufacturing business in Bloomfield. In 1983, the
manufacturing operation was sold to Phillips Lighting Company
(Phillips). Westinghouse retained title to the property. Phillips
continued manufacturing at the site until 1986, when all operations
ceased. Once operations on the site came to an end, clean-up was
required under standards imposed by federal and State law. Among
other things, there was a need to dispose of low-level radioactive
waste (LLRW). This has become an increasingly common industrial
problem implicating environmental concerns and policies which have
been addressed legislatively and administratively on both federal
and state levels.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently provided some
background regarding the problem and how it has been approached:
Millions of cubic feet of low-level radioactive
waste are generated by power companies, industry, the
government, universities, and hospitals each year. See
New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144, 149-50,
112 S.Ct. 2408, 2414,
120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992). The main
problem with this type of waste, which comes in forms
ranging from luminous watch dials to nuclear power plant
hardware, is that it often needs to remain isolated for
hundreds of years before it no longer poses any health
risk.
In the late 1970's, as some of the dangers
associated with the disposal of the waste came to light,
half of the nation's disposal facilities closed their
doors. By late 1978 only three sites__those in
Washington, Nevada, and South Carolina__remained open.
Then, in 1979, following a series of transportation and
packaging mishaps, Washington and Nevada temporarily shut
down their facilities. Less than eager to serve as the
nation's dumping ground for radioactive waste, South
Carolina severely cut back on the amount of waste it was
willing to accept at its site. A crisis was at hand.
In 1980 Congress reacted to the crisis by enacting
the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act, Pub.L.
96-573,
94 Stat. 3347. The 1980 Act announced a federal
policy of holding each state responsible for "providing
for the availability of capacity ... for the disposal of
low-level radioactive waste generated within its
borders." Because Congress concluded that disposal could
be managed most efficiently at a regional level, the 1980
Act encouraged states to form interstate compacts.
Starting in 1986, these compacts, after being ratified by
Congress to take the dormant Commerce Clause out of the
picture, could prohibit outside waste from entering their
regions' disposal facilities.
The 1980 Act was largely a flop. By 1985, although
most states had joined compacts, only the three formed
around Washington, Nevada, and South Carolina__the
states with facilities in operation before the Act was
passed__ had disposal sites. Congress realized that if
it ratified the compacts as planned, the three sited
compacts could have started excluding outside waste in
1986, and as many as 31 states would have been left
without access to a disposal facility.
To head off a second disposal crisis, Congress
passed the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments
Act of 1985. The 1985 Act was largely the product of a
compromise worked out by the nation's governors, and part
of the legislation took a familiar tack. For example,
like its predecessor, the 1985 Act declared that "[e]ach
State shall be responsible for providing, either by
itself or in cooperation with other States, for the
disposal of ... low-level radioactive waste generated
within the State." [U.S.C.A.] §2021c(a)(1)(A).
Similarly, the 1985 Act made clear that Congress thought
regional compacts would be the safest and most efficient
way to increase disposal capacity and ensure uniform
distribution of disposal sites. See [U.S.C.A.]
§2021d(a).
However, part of the legislation took an aggressive
approach absent in the 1980 Act. Under the new act, the
three sited states were required to accept low-level
radioactive waste generated outside of their borders
until 1992. [U.S.C.A.] §2021e(a)(2). In exchange, the
sited states were allowed to assess graduated surcharges
on outside waste. [U.S.C.A.] §2021e(d)(1). Then, when
the 7 years were up, the sited states would be allowed to
exclude out-of-state waste. In order to encourage
unsited states to meet their responsibility for disposing
of their own waste by 1992, the 1985 Act set forth three
different types of incentives__monetary, access, and a
take-title requirement. See New York, supra, 505 U.S. at
144,
112 S.Ct. 2408 (describing the incentives and
striking down a provision requiring noncomplying states
to take title to all waste generated within their
borders).
[Central Midwest Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Commission v. Pena,
113 F.3d 1468, 1470-71 (7th Cir.
1997).]
Following on the federal legislative efforts, New Jersey, in
1987, adopted its Act, designed, inter alia, to generate funds for
the construction of a waste disposal facility within New Jersey.
N.J.S.A. 13:1E-177 to -198. The legislative statement appended to
the bill during the enactment process stated in part:
This bill requires the board to develop criteria and
guidelines for the siting of a low-level radioactive
waste disposal facility that are designed to prevent
adverse public health, environmental, or economic impacts
resulting from the location of the facility, including
impacts from the transportation of waste to the facility.
The bill requires the board to . . . develop and
adopt a Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Plan, which
shall include: an inventory of current and anticipated
wastes and waste generators in the region, a technical
analysis of waste disposal methods, and an analysis of
transportation routes and the "waste stream" to a
facility.
[Assembly Energy and Environmental Committee Statement,
Senate No. 1275, L. 1987, c. 333.]
The Legislature formally stated its findings and declarations in
the body of the Act:
The Legislature finds that Congress, pursuant to the
"Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act," Pub.L. 96-573
(
42 U.S.C.A.
§2021b et seq.) and the "Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Act Amendments of 1985," Pub.L.
99-240 (
42 U.S.C.A.
§2021d et seq.), has declared that,
after January 1, 1986, each state shall be responsible
for providing capacity for the proper disposal of low
level radioactive waste generated within its borders,
except for waste generated as a result of atomic energy
defense activities; that because the management and
disposal of radioactive waste would be handled most
safely and efficiently on a regional basis, New Jersey,
pursuant to P.L. 1983, c. 329, (C. 32:31-1 et al.), has
entered as a party state into the Northeast Interstate
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Compact; and that
among the obligations of each party state to that compact
is the duty to establish a mechanism for the timely
siting of a disposal facility within its jurisdiction in
the event that it is designated as host state for the
regional facility.
[N.J.S.A. 13:1E-178.]
The Board's authority, initially established by L. 1987, c.
333, was expanded by L. 1991, c. 166. As codified in N.J.S.A.
13:1E-181, the Board is authorized, in addition to its other
powers:
n. To maintain oversight and supervision of the
construction, maintenance, operation, closure, and post
closure observation and maintenance of a facility sited
pursuant to the provisions of this act; and
o. To assess and collect fees from generators
sufficient to meet all expenses incurred . . . in
implementing . . . this act.
On November 18, 1991, the Board published proposed rules and
invited public comment, as required by the Administrative Procedure
Act, N.J.S.A. 52:14B-4. The Board's statement accompanying this
rule proposal further elucidated the design of the funding
mechanism that had been generally authorized by the Act and which
was specifically advanced in the proposed rules:
The Siting Act created an 11-member Board and a 13
member Advisory Committee to site, develop and oversee
operation of a low-level radioactive waste disposal
facility in New Jersey. In general, the board is
responsible for establishing siting criteria, developing
a disposal plan, establishing a siting process, siting
and ensuring the construction, operation and closure of
the low-level radioactive waste disposal facility, and
developing a public information program.
In October 1990, amendments to the Siting Act were
introduced which authorized the Board to require New
Jersey generators to report low-level radioactive waste
information; to oversee construction, operation and
closure of a disposal facility; and to assess the
generators for the cost of developing a low-level
radioactive waste disposal facility, and implementing
State and Federal laws concerning low-level radioactive
waste. This legislation (P.L.1991, c.166) was signed
into law on June 19, 1991. The proposed new rules are
intended to implement the amendments to the Siting Act.
The proposed new rules provide a mechanism to obtain
funds which are essential for the siting, development,
licensing and construction of a low level radioactive
waste disposal facility in accordance with Federal and
State law. The rules provide a mechanism to fund the
costs of the siting process including the cost of
consultant services to perform the technical siting,
development, licensing and construction work, and staff
to oversee the process.
The Board proposes to base the establishment of fees
on the concept of recent use of the three existing
disposal sites by each generator, and the potential
disposal capacity needs with respect to the
decontamination and decommissioning of nuclear power
plant units.
The proposed fee will be calculated principally on
the volume and radioactivity of the low-level radioactive
wastes produced. A generator who produced greater volume
and/or greater radioactivity of waste requiring disposal
will be assessed a larger fee than a generator who
produced less. The information base for determining
volume and radioactivity of waste disposed in a low-level
radioactive waste disposal facility will be obtained from
the disposal manifests accompanying waste shipments to
the three existing disposal sites as maintained on the
National Information Management System operated by the
U.S. Department of Energy's Low-Level Waste Management
Program. * * *
For the first assessment, which will generate fees
to cover fiscal years 1992 and 1993 costs, the Board will
utilize the disposal volume and radioactivity data
compiled by the National Information Management System
for the years 1988, 1989 and 1990. For the second
assessment, which covers the fees for fiscal year 1994,
the Board will utilize 1989, 1990 and 1991 data. For the
third assessment, which covers fiscal year 1995, the
Board will utilize 1990, 1991 and 1992 data.
Many facilities which utilize radioactive material
will r[e]quire some decontamination and decommissioning
which will lead to the production of waste requiring
disposal as low-level radioactive waste. With the
exception of the nuclear power plant units, it is not
known at this time which other facilities will undergo
decontamination and decommissioning. * * *
Because the Board has determined to take into
account the impact of potential decontamination and
decommissioning, as set forth in the Disposal Plan, on
the development of the disposal facility, the Board will
assess the nuclear power plant units an additional fee
for the potential decontamination and decommissioning
wastes.
The Board recognizes there is the issue of
generators who will use the new disposal facility, but
have not participated in paying for the development of
the facility. The Board intends to evaluate this issue
in the future and will consider the feasibility of
imposing surcharges on such generators as well as
providing credits for those generators who have
participated in paying for the development of the
disposal facility.
The proposed new rules will also have a positive
social impact because they place the financial burden of
supporting the siting and development of a low-level
radioactive waste disposal facility on those who generate
the wastes rather than on the general public via General
State Funds.
In developing these rules, the Board has balanced
the need to protect the environment against the economic
impact of the proposed rules and has determined that to
minimize the impact of the rules on small businesses
would endanger the environment, public health and public
safety, and therefore, no exemption from coverage is
provided. The Board has determin[ed] that the amount of
low-level radioactive waste produced by each generator,
rather than the size of the business, will provide a
sound basis for the fee determination.
[
23 N.J.R. 3410, 3411-15 (November 18, 1991).]
After adopting the Rules in 1992, the Board applied them to
assess Westinghouse $531,584.80 for fiscal years 1992 and 1993,
based on LLRW generation in 1988, 1989 and 1990. Westinghouse was
one of ninety-six generators of LLRW assessed in those fiscal years
for calculated shares of the budgeted costs of siting and
developing an LLRW disposal facility. A second assessment of
$177,167.74 followed for fiscal year 1994, which used 1989, 1990
and 1991 data as its basis. 108 generators were assessed in that
fiscal year. No assessments were made subsequently because,
according to the Board in its brief on appeal:
When preparing and adopting a budget each year,
the . . . Board reviews debts and surpluses to determine
the amount of fees to be collected from the generators
for the next fiscal year. When unspent funds are carried
forward or other sources of funds are available, the
amount of fees is reduced accordingly.
Westinghouse objected to both of the assessments on the ground
that it was not a "generator" under the Act. Westinghouse also
requested a recalculation, see N.J.A.C. 7:60-1.5(f), because a
portion of the LLRW on which the assessment was based had been
generated by Westinghouse's involvement in uranium production
activities of the Manhattan Project, exempt under the definition of
LLRW in N.J.S.A. 13:1E-179i and N.J.A.C. 7:60-1.2.
In 1997, the Board informed Westinghouse that the assessments
had been recalculated based on information which Westinghouse had
supplied regarding its participation in the Manhattan Project. The
total assessment was reduced on this basis from $708,752.54 to
$351,742.03. Westinghouse's appeal is from the reassessment.
Westinghouse raises two related issues on appeal: that the
fee assessments are contrary to legislative intent, and that the
Board's fee assessment rule was arbitrary and capricious in
imposing a cost for future development against entities which will
not be generating LLRW in the future. We reject both arguments.
For the sake of factual completeness, we note that
Westinghouse has acknowledged that, in connection with clean-up of
its site, 7,100 cubic feet of LLRW was disposed of in 1989 and 1990
at the Barnwall, South Carolina disposal facility referred to in
Central Midwest, supra, 113 F.
3d at 1470. Westinghouse alleges,
however, that its clean-up activities are virtually completed and
that it has had and will have no need to dispose of LLRW in years
beyond those for which the assessments were made.
The argument based on legislative intent focuses on a portion
of the definition of "generator" identically contained in both the
Act, N.J.S.A. 13:1E-179n, and the Rules, N.J.A.C. 7:60-1.2:
"Generator" means any person, association, public
utility, hospital, clinic, research laboratory,
corporation, society, radiopharmaceutical facility,
academic facility, or nuclear medical research facility
that produces low-level radioactive waste, . . .
Westinghouse omits, however, to set out the rest of that
definition:
. . . or any other entity identified by the board that
produces low-level radioactive waste, or that is licensed
by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission to
use, possess, handle or dispose of radioactive materials.
[N.J.S.A. 13:1E-179n; N.J.A.C. 7:60_1.2 (emphasis supplied).]
Westinghouse's argument is that it did not "produce" LLRW in
1988-1991, and had not done so since 1986, at the latest, when the
property it owned ceased being used as a manufacturing facility.
We reject that argument as inapposite, for it fails to take
adequately into account clear State legislative purposes and
designs associated with the provisions before us viewed through the
lens of the history recounted in Central Midwest and other sources.
That history strongly suggests that the term "produce" as used in
the Act and Rules means "produce for disposal," rather than
"create" as essentially contended by Westinghouse. The problems
which the Act and its federal counterparts were designed to deal
with arise from the difficulties of disposing of LLRW, not just
from creating it. Only one construction makes sense: that a
"generator" of LLRW is one who produces it for disposal
irrespective of when it was created.
In reaching this conclusion, we adopt the Supreme Court's
general approach in In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 7:1I,
149 N.J. 119
(1997), although we view the result reached there not to affect the
outcome in this matter (as Westinghouse contends it should) because
of many distinguishing factors:
In construing a statute, the primary task is to
"'effectuate the legislative intent in light of the
language used and the objectives sought to be achieved.'"
Merin v. Maglacki,
126 N.J. 430, 435,
599 A.2d 1256
(1992) (quoting State v. Maguire,
84 N.J. 508, 514,
423 A.2d 294 (1980)). "[S]tatutes are to be read sensibly
rather than literally and the controlling legislative
intent is to be presumed as 'consonant to reason and good
discretion.'" Schierstead v. Brigantine,
29 N.J. 220,
230,
148 A.2d 591 (1959) (quoting Morris Canal & Banking
Co. v. Central R.R. Co.,
16 N.J.Eq. 419, 428 (Ch. 1863);
see also Guiseppi v. Walling,
144 F.2d 608, 624 (2d
Cir.1944) (Hand, J.) ("There is no surer way to misread
any document than to read it literally.")
[Id. at 127-28.]
There is an additional, more encompassing, basis for holding
Westinghouse to be covered, however. It comes from the highlighted
portion of the definition of "generator" which Westinghouse has
omitted to present. A straightforward reading in the face of the
background which has been provided in the record on appeal leads to
only one conclusion: Westinghouse is covered as an "entity [in
this State] . . . licensed by the United States Nuclear Regulatory
Commission to use, possess, handle or dispose of radioactive
materials." N.J.S.A. 13:1E-179.
We also reject the second argument advanced, that it is
unreasonable to assess fees against Westinghouse for the
development of a disposal facility it will never use, because
Westinghouse is no longer creating LLRW and will have no new LLRW
to dispose of in the future. We see nothing necessarily arbitrary,
capricious or unreasonable about generating the costs of developing
a future disposal facility from entities whose past activities are
in a class of those which have resulted in the current or
anticipated unavailability of previously accessible disposal sites,
or have rendered future use inadvisable. We furthermore discern
nothing arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable in the use of the
benchmark years for these assessments.
In its reply brief, Westinghouse advances an additional
argument for relief from the assessments: "because the . . . Board
has suspended the process of siting and constructing [an LLRW]
disposal facility" and has, in fact, adopted a resolution to return
funds to the generators. We note, however, that Governor Whitman
has vetoed this resolution as premature in advance of the
"prepar[ation of] a comprehensive plan and explor[ation of] all
options for the short and long term needs for the funds with
sufficient input from affected parties before returning the funds."
We see no reason why Westinghouse should be governed by different
standards than other generators of LLRW. Westinghouse has, for
more than a half-dozen years enjoyed the benefits of delay by
reason of its objections and this litigation. Now that we have
determined the assessments against Westinghouse to have been valid,
that company should comply, forthwith, to discharge its payment
responsibilities, as other generators doubtless have, and await
further developments as all generators must.
Because we have rejected, on the merits, Westinghouse's
arguments to invalidate the assessments against it, we need not
address the Board's argument that "Westinghouse should be precluded
from challenging the fee assessment rule at this late date when it
failed to participate in the rulemaking process at the appropriate
time."
Affirmed.