(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for
the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please
note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).
Argued September 10, l996 -- Decided February 11, 1997
POLLOCK, J., writing for a majority of the Court.
In this appeal, the Court addresses the issue of whether the New Jersey courts have jurisdiction over
a Congressionally-approved interstate (“CAI”) compact and, if so, whether the laws of New Jersey and
Delaware are substantially similar concerning the right of public employees to negotiate collectively.
The DRBA is a bi-state agency created by a compact between New Jersey and Delaware and
approved by Congress (“the Compact”). New Jersey and Delaware created the DRBA to advance their
economic development and to improve the flow of traffic between the two states. This case concerns the
duty of the DRBA to negotiate collectively with its employees.
When the DRBA hires employees, it provides them with a copy of its Personnel Manual. Although
the DRBA, in its manual, refuses to recognize any obligation to bargain collectively with its employees or
their chosen representative, it recognizes that its employees may join labor unions.
On August 25, l993, the D.R.B.A. Employee Association (“Association”), representing ninety-eight
DRBA employees, voted to affiliate with Local 68, a labor organization. Thereafter, Local 68 submitted a
written request to the DRBA, seeking recognition as the collective-negotiation representative for those
employees previously represented by the Association. The DRBA denied that request. Thereafter, a
majority of DRBA employees signed authorization cards designating Local 68 as their exclusive
representative. The DRBA did not respond to Local 68's subsequent request for recognition as the
collective-negotiation representative. Therefore, Local 68 instituted an action in the Superior Court,
Chancery Division, alleging that the DRBA's refusal to recognize Local 68 as the collective-negotiation
representative interfered with the employees' rights under the New Jersey Constitution and the labor laws of
New Jersey and Delaware. The Chancery Division dismissed the complaint, finding that it lacked jurisdiction
over the matter.
The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the Chancery Division had jurisdiction and that it
could grant the requested relief. In reaching that result, the Appellate Division concluded that the labor laws
of New Jersey and Delaware were complementary and parallel.
The Supreme Court granted certification.
HELD: Article XV of the Compact vests the courts of New Jersey and Delaware with concurrent jurisdiction
over the DRBA's labor disputes; the DRBA is subject to the law of New Jersey because both New Jersey
and Delaware have adopted complementary and parallel legislation in respect of labor disputes.
1. The “Compact Clause” of the United States Constitution empowers states to enter into interstate
compacts only with the consent of Congress. The clause applies only to those compacts that might alter the
political power of the affected states, and thus interfere with the supremacy of the United States. (pp. 5-6)
2. The construction of an interstate agreement sanctioned by Congress under the Compact Clause presents a
federal question. (pp. 6-7)
3. State courts may exercise jurisdiction over cases arising under federal law, including the construction of
CAI compacts, absent a controversy between two states or an express provision in a federal statute excluding
concurrent state and federal jurisdiction. (pp.7-9)
4. When a state signs a compact, a court of that state may not construe the compact absent the Compact's
recognition of that state's jurisdiction. (pp. 9-11)
5. Although a single state may not unilaterally impose additional duties on a bi-state agency, the creator
states together may subject the agency to complementary or parallel state legislation -- this is, legislative acts
that are substantially similar in nature. (pp. 11-15)
6. The labor laws of New Jersey and Delaware, although not identical, are complementary and parallel, each
concluding that public employees should have the right of collective negotiation. In effect, the legislatures
have modified the Compact. (pp.15-16)
7. Until such time as the legislatures of New Jersey and Delaware adopt legislation designating an agency to
resolve “the myriad of issues that will arise during the course of collective negotiations,” the absence of such
legislation will not deprive the Chancery Division of jurisdiction. (pp. 17-18)
Judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED and the matter is REMANDED to the Chancery
Division.
JUSTICE GARIBALDI filed a separate dissenting opinion in which she viewed the majority's
disposition as an amendment to the Compact without Delaware's express consent. Although noting that, in
some situations, an agency may be subject to complementary or parallel legislation when the issue is limited
to interpreting a state law or a state regulation, she believed that such legislation cannot and should not be
used to repeal the Compact and, further, viewed the majority's action as inviting uncertainty as to which
state's law and administrative procedures apply to a given situation in the labor dispute arena.
CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES HANDLER, O'HERN, STEIN and COLEMAN join in
JUSTICE POLLOCK's opinion. JUSTICE GARIBALDI filed a separate dissenting opinion.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-
9 September Term 1996
INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING
ENGINEERS, LOCAL 68, AFL-CIO,
D.R.B.A. EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION
a/w INTERNATIONAL UNION OF
OPERATING ENGINEERS, LOCAL 68,
AFL-CIO, and OLIVER TWIST,
JUDITH TWIST, KEVIN BAILEY,
MARK P. DeSORBO, DAVID R. OAT,
DAVID A. CUSICK, JOHN M. BUNTING,
A.R. SIMMONS, J. DAVID JOHNSON,
ROY S. MacCULLOCH, DANIEL A. SLATER, SR.,
GERALD H. FOSTER, SR., and DAVID E. BARNETT
on behalf of themselves and all other
persons similarly situated,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
v.
THE DELAWARE RIVER AND BAY AUTHORITY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Argued September 10, 1996 -- Decided February 11, 1997
On certification to the Superior Court,
Appellate Division.
Wayne J. Positan argued the cause for
appellant (Lum, Danzis, Drasco, Positan &
Kleinberg, attorneys; Domenick Carmagnola and
Christina Silva Lee, on the briefs).
Raymond G. Heineman argued the cause for
respondents (Kroll & Heineman, attorneys).
John A. Zagorski submitted a brief on behalf
of amicus curiae Delaware River Port
Authority (Mr. Zagorski, attorney; Mr.
Zagorski and Roxanne P. La Roc, on the
brief).
Hugh H. Welsh submitted a brief on behalf of
amicus curiae The Port Authority of New York
and New Jersey (Mr. Welsh, attorney; Mr.
Welsh and Donald F. Burke, on the brief).
Gerald P. Lally, General Counsel, submitted a
letter brief on behalf of amicus curiae
Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
POLLOCK, J.
This appeal raises two issues. The first is whether the New
Jersey courts have jurisdiction over a Congressionally-approved
interstate ("CAI") compact, specifically the Compact between the
states of New Jersey and Delaware creating the Delaware River and
Bay Authority (the "DRBA"). If so, the second issue is whether
the laws of New Jersey and Delaware are substantially similar
concerning the right of public employees to negotiate
collectively.
The DRBA is a bi-state agency created by a compact between New Jersey and Delaware and approved by Congress ("the Compact"). N.J.S.A. 32:11E-1; Del. Code Ann. tit. 17, § 1701; Pub. L. 87-678, 76 Stat. 560 (1962). New Jersey and Delaware created the DRBA to advance their economic development and to improve the flow of traffic between the two states. N.J.S.A. 32:11E-1. Toward that end, the DRBA operates crossings between the two states including the Delaware Memorial Bridge and the Cape May-Lewes Ferry. Delaware River and Bay Authority v. Internat'l Org., etc., 45 N.J. 138, 140 (1965) ("International Org."). Congress approved the DRBA Compact in 1962. Delaware-New Jersey Compact, Pub. L. 87-678, 76 Stat. 560 (1962). This case concerns
the duty of the DRBA to negotiate collectively with its
employees.
Among the many powers of the DRBA is the power in Article
VII, Section (e) to:
[A]ppoint, or employ, such other officers,
agents, attorneys, engineers and employees as
it may require for the performance of its
duties and to fix and determine their
qualifications, duties, compensation,
pensions, terms of office and all other
conditions and terms of employment and
retention.
When the DRBA hires employees, it provides them with a copy
of its Personnel Manual. Article XIV of the Manual states:
Upon accepting a position . . . with the
Authority, an individual becomes a public or
governmental employee . . . [i]n this
connection, Authority employees have no right
to incite, organize, conduct or participate
in any strike, slowdown, or impediment to
work against the Authority . . . and neither
does the Authority have the obligation to
engage in collective bargaining with its
employees or their chosen representative as
may be unusual [sic] and legally done in
private individual employment.
Although the DRBA refuses to recognize any obligation to
bargain collectively with International Union of Operating
Engineers, Local 68, AFL-CIO ("Local 68"), it recognizes that its
employees may join labor unions. Thus, Article XV of the Manual
provides:
The Authority fully recognizes the right
of its employees to join a labor union of
their own choosing and to organize, present
and make known to the Authority any complaint
or grievance which an employee might have in
connection with employment. . . .
On August 25, 1993, the D.R.B.A. Employee Association
("Association"), representing ninety-eight DRBA employees, voted
to affiliate with Local 68, a labor organization. On August 7,
1993, Local 68 submitted a written request to the DRBA, seeking
recognition as the collective-negotiation representative for
those employees previously represented by the Association. The
DRBA denied that request. Between July 19 and September 9, 1993,
a majority of DRBA employees signed authorization cards
designating Local 68 as their exclusive representative. On
October 7, 1993, Local 68 requested recognition as the
collective-negotiation representative. The DRBA did not respond.
Local 68 then instituted this action. The complaint alleged
that the DRBA's refusal to recognize Local 68 as the collective-negotiation representative of certain DRBA employees interfered
with the employees' rights under the New Jersey Constitution and
the labor laws of New Jersey and Delaware. Finding that it
lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter and to grant the requested
relief, the Chancery Division dismissed the complaint.
The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the Chancery
Division had jurisdiction and that it could grant the requested
relief. Essential to that holding was the Appellate Division's
conclusion that the labor laws of New Jersey and Delaware were
complementary and parallel. We granted certification,
143 N.J. 311 (1995) and now affirm.
Article I, Section 10, Clause 3 of the United States
Constitution (the "Compact Clause") empowers states to enter into
interstate compacts. U.S. Const. art I, § 10, cl. 3. The
Compact Clause provides "[n]o State shall, without the consent of
Congress, . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another
state. . . ." Ibid. That language is broad enough to prohibit
interstate compacts entered without the consent of Congress. In
practice, the clause applies only to those compacts that might
alter the political power of the affected states, and thus
interfere with the supremacy of the United States. Cuyler v.
Adams,
449 U.S. 433, 440,
101 S. Ct. 703, 707,
66 L. Ed.2d 641,
649 (1981) (holding Compact Clause does not apply to agreements
not "directed to the formation of any combination tending to the
increase of political power in the States, which may encroach
upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United States");
Virginia v. Tennessee,
148 U.S. 503, 519-21,
13 S.Ct. 728, 734-35,
37 L.Ed. 537, 543 (1893) (distinguishing those compacts not
encroaching upon federal power from those that may encroach upon
that power).
Through interstate compacts states can establish bi-state
agencies. On receiving the consent of Congress, the agency
becomes a creature of the creator states and the federal
government. Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30,
,
115 S. Ct. 394, 400,
130 L. Ed.2d 245, 255 (1994).
Generally speaking, the mission of such an agency is to address
"interests or problems that do not coincide nicely either with
the national boundaries or with State lines [or] . . . interests
that may be badly served or not served at all by the ordinary
channels of National or State political action." Ibid.
Once sanctioned by Congress, a compact becomes a "law of the
Union." Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S.
(13 How.) 518, 566,
14 L. Ed. 249, 269 (1851). "Because
congressional consent transforms an interstate compact within
[the Compact Clause] into a law of the United States, . . . the
construction of an interstate agreement sanctioned by Congress
under the Compact Clause presents a federal question." Cuyler,
supra, 449 U.S. at 438, 101 S. Ct. at 707, 66 L. Ed.
2d at 648.
Accord Carchman v. Nash,
473 U.S. 716, 719,
105 S. Ct. 3401,
3403,
87 L. Ed.2d 516, 520 (1985). Thus, the consent of
Congress transforms the States' agreement into federal law under
the Compact Clause. Cuyler, supra, 449 U.S. at 440, 101 S. Ct.
at 708, 66 L. Ed.
2d at 649.
The DRBA argues that its Compact is a federal law and that
only federal courts have jurisdiction to construe the compact.
We must first determine therefore whether the DRBA Compact is a
federal law. If so, the next question is whether compacts deemed
federal laws are subject to the jurisdiction only of the federal
courts or to the concurrent jurisdiction of state courts.
One of the primary goals of the Compact is to improve the
flow of traffic between Delaware and New Jersey. N.J.S.A.
32:11E-1. Congress's interest in regulating interstate commerce
renders the subject matter of the Compact appropriate for
congressional legislation. U.S. Const. art I, § 8, cl. 3.
Thus, the DRBA qualifies as a "congressionally sanctioned
interstate compact the interpretation of which presents a
question of federal law." Cuyler, supra, 449 U.S. at 442, 101
S.Ct. at 709.
We recognize that the United States Supreme Court has
original and exclusive jurisdiction in controversies between two
or more states.
28 U.S.C.A.
§1251(a). See Kansas v. Colorado,
___ U.S. ___,
115 S. Ct. 1733,
131 L. Ed.2d 759 (1995) (invoking
original jurisdiction over suit filed by one state against
another relating to terms of CAI compact); Texas v. New Mexico,
462 U.S. 554,
103 S.Ct. 2558,
77 L.Ed.2d 1 (1983) (same);
Guarini v. New York,
215 N.J. Super. 426 (Ch. Div.) aff'd
215 N.J. Super. 293 (App. Div. 1986) cert. denied,
484 U.S. 817,
108 S.Ct. 71,
98 L.Ed.2d 34 (1987) (refusing to assume jurisdiction
over suit between two states, concluding that case was for
exercise of original and exclusive jurisdiction by United States
Supreme Court). Absent a controversy between two states or an
express provision in a federal statute excluding concurrent
jurisdiction, however, state courts may exercise jurisdiction
over cases arising under federal law. Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil
Oil Corp.,
453 U.S. 473, 477,
101 S. Ct. 2870, 2875,
69 L. Ed.2d 784, 791 (1981); Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney,
368 U.S. 502,
507-08, 82 S. Ct, 519, 523,
7 L. Ed.2d 483, 487 (1962). Nothing
in the "federal system prevents state courts from enforcing
rights created by federal law." Courtney, supra, 368 U.S. at
507, 82 S. Ct. at 522, 7 L. Ed.
2d at 487.
For years, moreover, both federal and state courts have
construed the terms of interstate compacts. See e.g., NYSA-ILA
Vacation & Holiday Fund v. Waterfront Comm'n of New York Harbor,
732 F.2d 292, 298 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 852,
105 S.Ct. 175,
83 L.Ed.2d 109 (1984) (holding congressional approval
of Waterfront Commission Compact transformed it into federal
law); Utah Int'l Inc. v. Intake Water Co.,
484 F.Supp. 36, 42-43
(D. Mont. 1979) (rejecting argument that federal jurisdiction
over CAI compact construction cases is exclusive); Eastern
Paralyzed Veteran's Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Camden,
111 N.J. 389
(1988). At no time has the United States Supreme Court ruled
that state courts do not have jurisdiction to construe CAI
compacts. Implicitly recognizing the powers of state courts, the
Court has written that it has the final say in compact-construction cases even when the matter concerns a question on
which a state court has already spoken. Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n,
359 U.S. 275, 278-79 n. 4,
79 S. Ct. 785,
788 n.4,
3 L. Ed.2d 804, 808 n.4 (1959). On occasion, the Court
has even remanded a compact-construction case to a state court
for reconsideration. State ex. rel. Dyer et. al. v. Sims,
341 U.S. 22, 32,
71 S.Ct. 557, 562-563,
95 L.Ed. 713 (1951) (holding
West Virginia's obligation under multi-state anti-pollution
compact did not conflict with state constitution, and remanding
case to state court).
In Hess, supra, moreover, the United States Supreme Court
recognized that bi-state agencies are creatures of both the
creator states and the federal government. 115 S.Ct. at 400.
The Court held that a federal court suit is "not an affront to
the Compact Clause entity." Id. at 401. It follows that a
state-court action likewise does not affront a bi-state agency.
This case presents a controversy between the DRBA and its
employees, not one between two states. The case, therefore, does
not invite the United States Supreme Court to exercise its
original and exclusive jurisdiction. No express statutory
provision prohibits the courts of Delaware or New Jersey from
exercising jurisdiction over the DRBA. Unless a case involves a
dispute between two states or an express statutory prohibition
against the exercise of jurisdiction by the courts of either
state, those courts may construe compacts concerning bi-state
agencies.
When a state signs a compact, a court of that state may not construe the compact absent the Compact's recognition of that state's jurisdiction. Ampro Fisheries, Inc. v. Yaskin, 127 N.J.
602, 610 (1992), cert. denied,
506 U.S. 954,
113 S. Ct. 409,
121 L. Ed.2d 333 (1992). Whether a creator state unilaterally may
exercise jurisdiction over a bi-state agency depends, then, on
the terms of the compact. Oklahoma v. New Mexico,
501 U.S. 221,
235 n.5,
111 S. Ct. 2281, 2289 n.5,
115 L. Ed.2d 207, 225 n.5
(1991); Texas, supra, 482 U.S. at 128, 107 S. Ct. at 2283, 96 L.
Ed.
2d at 114 (1987).
Here, the Compact provides, in pertinent part:
Judicial proceedings to review any . . .
action of the authority . . ., may be brought
in such court of each state, and pursuant to
such law or rules thereof, as a similar
proceeding with respect to any agency of such
state might be brought. N.J.S.A. 32:11E-1,
art. XV.
Thus, the Compact's plain language makes clear that the courts of
New Jersey and Delaware have concurrent jurisdiction to review
any action taken by the DRBA.
Over the last thirty years, the New Jersey courts have
resolved many disputes, including labor disputes involving the
DRBA. See International Org., supra,
45 N.J. 138 (affirming
lower court's order enjoining DRBA employees and their union
representatives from striking or otherwise picketing); Delaware
River & Bay Authority v. New Jersey Pub. Employment Relations
Comm'n, ("PERC"),
112 N.J. Super. 160 (App. Div. 1970) (denying
PERC's authority to order DRBA to collectively negotiate with
union absent compact provision conferring such jurisdiction;
pending case in Delaware court voluntarily stayed pending outcome
of New Jersey Appeal); aff'd,
58 N.J. 388 (1971); Guantt Constr.
Co. v. Delaware River & Bay Auth.,
241 N.J. Super. 310, 314-315
(App. Div. 1990) (acknowledging that Article XV of the Compact
provides courts of Delaware and New Jersey with concurrent
jurisdiction to hear claims involving the DRBA). We see no
reason to reach a different result in the present case. Hence,
we conclude that Article XV vests the courts of New Jersey and
Delaware with concurrent jurisdiction over the DRBA's labor
disputes.
Consistent with that premise, the Public Employees Relations
Commission does not have jurisdiction to certify a union as the
exclusive negotiating representative for DRBA employees. PERC,
supra, 112 N.J. Super. at 166. Such jurisdiction "must be
expressly given to [the Public Employees Relations Commission] by
the Legislatures of New Jersey and Delaware, and not inferred by
the courts." Id. at 165.
Consequently, we have declined to subject the Delaware River
and Port Authority ("DRPA") to the requirements of New Jersey's
Tort Claims Act ("Act"). Bell, supra, 83 N.J. at 425. A
contrary result would have granted the New Jersey Legislature
power it did not possess, specifically, "the power to modify by
unilateral action the waiver of sovereign immunity set forth in
the bi-state compact." Id. at 424.
More recently, we have construed the DRPA compact to mean
that substantially similar statutes adopted by Delaware and New
Jersey could constitute complementary legislation. Eastern,
supra, 111 N.J. at 400. For example, in Eastern, the issue was
whether New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination ("LAD") N.J.S.A.
10:5.1 to -42, as well as its construction laws concerning
handicapped access N.J.S.A. 52:32-5, applied to the DRPA.
Eastern, supra, 111 N.J. at 395-96. We concluded that the New
Jersey laws did not apply because "neither creator state [may]
unilaterally impose additional duties, powers, or
responsibilities upon the Authority," Id. at 398. To yield a
more "just resolution" of the dispute, however, we remanded the
matter to the Law Division to consider whether New Jersey and
Delaware had jurisdiction based on complementary legislation
within both states and implied consent. Id. at 400-01.
A bi-state agency, although subject to unilateral
jurisdiction of a single creator state only when the compact
recognizes the state's jurisdiction, "may be subject to
complementary or parallel state legislation that does not intrude
on the mission of the agency." Ampro, supra, 127 N.J. at 610.
Although a single state may not unilaterally impose its will on a
bi-state agency, the creator states together may subject the
agency to complementary or parallel state legislation. Eastern,
supra, 111 N.J. at 400-01. Separate legislative acts are
complementary or parallel if they are substantially similar in
nature. Id. at 401. Legislation is substantially similar if the
creator states evidence some showing of agreement in the laws
involving and regulating a bi-state agency. Id. at 402. If the
creator states do not enact complementary or parallel
legislation, a court must make additional findings before
concluding that the bi-state agency impliedly consented to
regulation by one creator state. Ibid. Thus, a bi-state agency
consents to a single creator state's exercise of jurisdiction
when the agency either voluntarily cooperates with the creator
state in the exercise of jurisdiction or agrees to meet the
requirements of the law of that state. Ibid.
In Bunk v. Port Auth. of New York & New Jersey,
144 N.J. 176, 180 (1996), the issue was whether a Port Authority of New
York and New Jersey ("PANN") worker was entitled to receive
workers' compensation benefits under the same limitations as
apply to other public employees in New Jersey. Resolving that
issue required the determination whether the provisions of New
York and New Jersey for awarding workers' compensation benefits
were parallel and complementary. Id. at 185. Rather than
"decide the exact contours of New York law," we observed that
there was "evidence in the record, . . . that the provisions
[were] somewhat similar." Ibid. Thus, we held that New Jersey
could impose its workers' compensation laws on PANN to limit
workers' compensation benefits of a public employee receiving a
disability pension under New York law for the same injury. Id.
at 180.
The Delaware courts follow a similar practice. In Delaware
River and Bay Auth. v. Carello,
222 A.2d 794 (Del. Ch. 1966), the
Delaware Chancery Court interpreted Article VII(e) of the DRBA
compact. Carello arose in 1966, two years before the New Jersey
Legislature passed public employment legislation. Consequently,
the Delaware court held that Delaware could not "unilaterally
legislate so as to place burdens on the compact." Id. at 798-99.
The court continued, however, that the Delaware statute would
"remain ineffective until concurrent legislative action of a
similar nature is taken by the state of New Jersey." Id. at 799.
The amendment of N.J.S.A. 34:13A-1 to -29, constitutes concurrent
legislative action. Finally, Article VIII of the Compact
recognizes that the DRBA may be subject to obligations other than
those that the Compact specifies. Article VIII provides that the
DRBA shall not undertake additional duties and obligations "under
the law of either State or Congress without authorization by the
law of both States." Implicit in that provision is the premise
that the two states may subject the DRBA to complementary or
parallel legislation.
From the foregoing, we conclude that a bi-state agency, such
as the DRBA, is subject to the law of New Jersey when the
agency's compact expressly provides for unilateral action, both
states have adopted complementary or parallel legislation, or the
agency has impliedly consented to the exercise of single-state
jurisdiction.
The final issue is whether the laws of New Jersey and Delaware are complementary and parallel with regard to collective negotiations for public employees. Both states have enacted laws to prevent labor disputes between public employees, thereby assuring the orderly and uninterrupted operations of public employers. N.J.S.A. 34:13A-2; Del. Code Ann. tit. 19, § 1302. Both states grant public employees the right to join labor unions and to negotiate collectively through a representative of their own choosing. N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.3; Del. Code Ann. tit. 19, §
1303. Both states prohibit public employers from interfering
with employees in the exercise of their rights and from refusing
to negotiate in good faith with the employees' majority
representative. N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.4; Del. Code Ann. tit 19, §
1307. The labor laws of New Jersey and Delaware, although not
identical, are complementary and parallel. As a matter of public
policy, the legislatures of both states have concluded that
public employees should have the right of collective negotiation
and that employers should not interfere with that right. In
effect, the legislatures have modified the Compact. That
modification should not interfere with the DRBA's mission of
advancing the economic development of the two states and
improving the flow of traffic between them.
The dissent would deny DRBA employees the right of
collective negotiation that the New Jersey and Delaware
legislatures have conferred on all public employees. In denying
that right, the dissent misperceives judicial recognition of the
legislative enactments in both New Jersey and Delaware as an
attempt by the judiciary to amend the compact contrary to the
will of the legislature. (Post at , slip. op. at 1).
Contrary to the dissent, we merely recognize that the New Jersey
and Delaware legislatures have adopted a substantially similar
policy concerning collective negotiations by public employees.
Anomalous indeed would be the failure to apply so important a
policy to an entity created by both states for their mutual
benefit. Unlike the dissent, moreover, we do not believe that
recognizing the right of DRBA employees to negotiate collectively
will "`lead to discord and a destruction of the purposes for
which such bi-state agencies are formed.'" (Post at , slip
op. at 9) (quoting PERC, supra, 112 N.J. Super. at 166.)
Nor do we share the dissent's lack of confidence in the
ability of the Chancery Division to interpret labor law. (Post
at , slip op. at 10). Historically, courts have exercised
equitable power to resolve labor disputes. See e.g., Local No.
11 of Internat'l Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental
Ironworkers v. McKee,
114 N.J.Eq. 555 (Ch. Ct. 1933) (appointing
receiver to manage union's business until members could elect new
officers); Fryns v. Fair Lawn Fur Dressing Co.,
114 N.J.Eq. 462
(Ch. Ct. 1933) (holding Chancery Court had jurisdiction and that
employer could not force employees to join a particular union).
Even today, courts interpret labor law. See Douglas L. Leslie,
ed., The Railway Labor Act 7 (BNA Books 1995) (describing courts
as "gatekeepers" that define a labor dispute to determine whether
to exercise jurisdiction, compel arbitration, or direct the union
to the National Mediation Board). At some time, the New Jersey
and Delaware legislatures may adopt legislation designating an
agency to resolve "the myriad of issues that will arise during
the course of collective negotiations." Ibid. Until such time
as the legislatures make such a designation, however, the absence
of such legislation does not deprive the Chancery Division of
jurisdiction.
The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed, and the
matter is remanded to the Chancery Division.
CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES HANDLER, O'HERN, STEIN and
COLEMAN join in JUSTICE POLLOCK's opinion. JUSTICE GARIBALDI
filed a separate dissenting opinion.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-
9 September Term 1996
INTERNATIONAL UNION OF
OPERATING ENGINEERS, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
v.
DELAWARE RIVER & BAY AUTHORITY,
Defendant-Appellant.
GARIBALDI, J., dissenting.
The Court has done what the Legislatures of New Jersey and
Delaware have not -- amend the congressionally-approved
Interstate Compact (the Compact) between Delaware and New Jersey
to require the Delaware River and Bay Authority (the DRBA) to
negotiate collectively with its employees. I believe that the
Court does not have the power to amend the Compact unilaterally
or to impose additional duties and obligations, arising under New
Jersey law, on the DRBA without Delaware's consent.
The majority finds that New Jersey has the power to amend
Articles VII(e) and VIII of the Compact because the labor laws of
New Jersey and Delaware, although not identical, are
complementary or parallel with regard to collective negotiations
for public employees. Although in some situations an agency may
be subject to complementary or parallel legislation when the issue is limited to interpreting a state law or a state regulation, such legislation cannot and should not be used to repeal the Compact. Such a result comes from an unwarranted expansion of the dicta in Eastern Paralyzed Veterans Association, Inc. v. City of Camden, lll N.J. 389 (l988), and will lead to confusion, uncertainty, and conflicts when the Superior Court, Chancery Division of New Jersey, attempts to decide how the differing labor laws of New Jersey and Delaware, as expressed in their parallel labor legislation, are to be effectuated.
The Court's ruling directly contravenes Article VII(e) of the Compact, giving the DRBA the power to
[a]ppoint, or employ, such other officers, agents, attorneys, engineers and employees as it may require for the performance of its duties and to fix and determine their qualifications, duties, compensation, pensions, terms of office and all other conditions and terms of employment and retention.
That provision is intended to keep matters concerning labor
relations and collective negotiations in the hands of the DRBA.
The Court's opinion also directly contravenes Article VIII
of the Compact that establishes additional powers that may be
granted to the DRBA but limits the duties that may be imposed on
it. That Article provides:
For the purpose of effectuating the
authorized purposes of the authority,
additional powers may be granted to the
authority by legislation of either State
without concurrence of the other, and may be
exercised within such State; or may be
granted to the authority by Congress and
exercised by it; but no additional duties or
obligations shall be undertaken by the
authority under the law of either State or of
Congress without authorization by the law of
both States.
Requiring the DRBA to negotiate collectively with its employees
most certainly will impose "additional duties or obligations" on
it.
Unless both states agree, it is well-established that a single-creator state may not unilaterally impose additional duties upon a bi-state agency when to do so would contravene the terms of the Compact. Eastern, supra, lll N.J. at 398; Bell v. Bell, 83 N.J. 4l7, 424 (l980); Delaware River & Bay Auth. v. New Jersey PERC, ll2 N.J. Super. l60, l65-66 (App. Div. l970) (PERC), aff'd o.b., 58 N.J. 388 (l97l). That principle was addressed by the Appellate Division in PERC, supra, a case also concerning labor relations of the DRBA. ll2 N.J. Super. at l65. There, the court was asked to determine whether New Jersey's Public Employment Relations Commission (PERC) had jurisdiction to certify a union as the exclusive bargaining representative for certain DRBA employees. Id. at l63. Holding that PERC did not have jurisdiction, the panel stated that such jurisdiction "must be expressly given to [PERC] by the Legislatures of New Jersey and Delaware, and not inferred by the courts." Ibid. (emphasis added). To hold otherwise, the panel explained, would authorize one creator-state to impose its will and policies over the other
state contrary to the terms of the Compact. Ibid. The court
noted that under Article VIII of the Compact, the DRBA's powers
were to be jointly controlled by both creator-states. Id. at
l64.
The court further explained that because a bi-state agency
is a single agency of the governments of both creator-states,
neither creator-state may enact laws involving and regulating the
agency unless both states agree. Id. at l65-66; see also Bell,
supra, 83 N.J. at 424 ("[T]he New Jersey Legislature does not
have the power to modify by unilateral action the waiver of
sovereign immunity set forth in the bi-state compact; yet that
would be the result were the Tort Claims Act held to apply to the
DRPA."); Gauntt Constr. Co. v. Delaware River & Bay Auth., 24l
N.J. Super. 3l0 (App. Div. l990) (rejecting contention that
public policy of both compacting states imposed duties on bi-state agency).
A careful reading of Eastern, supra, lll N.J. at 389,
discloses that the majority has expanded the scope of that
decision. In Eastern we only decided whether the New Jersey Law
Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. l0:5-l to -42, the New Jersey
Uniform Construction Code Act, N.J.S.A. 52:27D-ll9 to -l4l, and
the New Jersey Handicapped Access Law, N.J.S.A. 52:32-42 to -l6
applied to the Delaware River Port Authority (DRPA). We
concluded that New Jersey laws could not be applied because the
DRPA was a public corporate-instrumentality of both New Jersey
and Pennsylvania. Hence, "neither creator state [may]
unilaterally impose additional duties, powers, or
responsibilities upon the Authority." Id. at 398. Additionally,
the Court, citing Bell, concluded that New Jersey may not
unilaterally exercise jurisdiction over the DRPA because to do so
would violate the Compact, which made no provision for such
jurisdiction. Ibid.
In Eastern, we also found that the DRPA's Compact did "not
contemplate single-state jurisdiction in general." Id. at 400.
The Court observed that "when Pennsylvania and New Jersey
intended that local law would govern an area relevant to their
compact, such as acquisition by eminent domain, N.J.S.A. 32:3-l3.5l, or consent for highway connection to the bi-state toll
bridge, N.J.S.A. 32:3-l3.55, they so specified." Id. at 40l-02.
In addressing the Eastern Paralyzed Veterans Association's
contention that the public policy of New Jersey mandated that the
DRPA install elevators at its transit facility in Camden, the
Court stated:
This State lacks the sovereign authority to
direct the DRPA to cede jurisdiction to New
Jersey. . . . [S]o too a single state cannot
dictate the policy of a bi-state agency.
Accordingly, the Court held that the State of New Jersey could
not exercise unilateral jurisdiction over the DRPA, stating that
compacting states may only be subjected to single-state
jurisdiction when the compact itself recognizes such
jurisdiction. Id. at 399. The DRPA's Compact, the Court made
clear, did not contemplate that form of unilateral state
jurisdiction. Id. at 400.
Remanding the matter to the trial court, the Court, in
dicta, suggested, however, that "the theories of complementary
regulations and implied consent, given a fuller exposition, may
yield a just resolution of the dispute." Id. at 400-0l. To
succeed under that fact-sensitive, complementary-legislative
theory, the Court stated, there must be "some showing of
agreement" by the creator states to the enforcement of laws
involving and regulating a bi-state agency. Id. at 402 (emphasis
added). The best illustration of parallelism, the Court pointed
out, is that DRPA employees are required to observe stop lights
in New Jersey just as they are required to do so in Pennsylvania,
even though neither state adopted such regulations within the
framework of the compact creating the bi-state agency. Id. at
400 (citing Nardi v. Delaware River Port Auth.,
490 A.2d 949, 952
n.l0 (Pa. Commw. Ct. l985)). That example indicates the type of
uncomplicated situation that complementary laws were capable of
addressing.
In Ampro Fisheries, Inc. v. Yaskin, l
27 N.J. 602 (l992),
cert. denied,
506 U.S. 954, ll
3 S. Ct. 409, l2l L. Ed.2d 333
(l992), and Bunk v. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey, l44
N.J. l76 (l996), the facts were much different from those in this
case. In those cases, the Court did not amend the language of
the Compact. In this case, however, Article VII(e), giving the
Authority exclusive control over conditions and terms of
employment, and Article VIII, providing that no state shall
impose additional duties on another state without its consent,
are, in effect, being directly overruled.
The Compact does not expressly give the compacting states
the power to impose their labor laws on the DRBA, and the DRBA
did not consent to the exercise of single-state jurisdiction in
the area of collective negotiations with its employees. In fact,
the evidence is to the contrary. That policy is confirmed by
Article XIV of the DRBA's Personnel Manual (the Manual), which
provides:
Upon accepting a position . . . with the
Authority, an individual becomes a public or
governmental employee . . . . In this connection,
Authority employees have no right to incite,
organize, conduct or participate in any strike,
slowdown, or impediment to work against the
Authority . . . and neither does the Authority
have the obligation to engage in collective
bargaining with its employees or their chosen
representative as may be unusual [sic] and legally
done in private individual employment.
In view of the language of Article VII(e) and VIII of the
Compact, something more than mere complementary or parallel
statutes is needed to repeal specific language in the Compact, or
stated differently, to act as an implied repeal of the Compact's
language. Similar public policy in two states is not sufficient
to render one state's legislation applicable to a bi-state
agency's employment practice. Malverty v. Waterfront Comm'n of
N.Y. Harbor, 7l N.Y.2d 977 (l988).
Permitting similar legislative acts of compacting states to
amend a compact completely disregards the long-standing
precedents requiring legislatures to agree expressly before a
state can impose duties and obligations on a bi-state agency.
The majority's reasoning ignores the fact that when the
Legislatures of New Jersey and Delaware sought to impose
unilaterally-enacted state legislation on their bi-state agency,
they expressly provided for it in the Compact. Eastern, supra,
lll N.J. at 40l-02; see also N.J.S.A. 32:llE-l, Article XXII
(imposing obligation on DRBA to comply with unilaterally-enacted
environmental protection laws when planning, developing,
constructing, or operating certain projects). The lack of a
similar provision imposing unilaterally-enacted employment or
labor laws on the DRBA must be viewed as an intent that such laws
not apply.
Moreover, as explained in PERC, supra, ll2 N.J. Super. at l66, "[t]o sanction such practice would lead to discord and a destruction of the purposes for which such bi-state agencies are formed." The panel made it clear that to impose New Jersey's labor policies on Delaware and its citizens, who are employed by the DRBA, would require that
[t]he States of New Jersey and Delaware . . . amend the compact and agree upon the issue of whether [the DRBA's] employees may organize and engage in collective negotiations, what procedure should be utilized to implement this result, and where and how it should be accomplished. Unless, such is done, Delaware and New Jersey could each claim jurisdiction since both states have legislation permitting public employees to organize and negotiate. The confusion and conflicts which would follow if one state assumed jurisdiction, makes it clear that such was never intended by the compact.
The same problem will result from the majority's remand to the Chancery Division to effectuate the implementation of the two
laws. Although the labor laws of New Jersey and Delaware are
based on similar public policies, they differ in the following
manner: (l) each States' statute describes a different procedure
for determining the employee-bargaining unit (N.J.S.A. 34:l3A-5.3; Del. Code Ann. tit. l9, § 1310); (2) the provisions for
determining unfair labor practices and enforcing the statutes are
different (N.J.S.A. 34:l3A-5.4; Del. Code Ann. tit. l9, § l308);
(3) the New Jersey statute provides for arbitration of disputes
whereas the Delaware statute does not (N.J.S.A. 34:l3A-7); and
(4) neither statute indicates in its declaration or purpose that
it intended for the statute to apply to the DRBA.
Inevitably, the Court's decision will create uncertainty as
to which state's law and administrative procedures apply to a
given situation. Rather than acting as a court, the Chancery
Division will be acting as an administrative agency interpreting
labor law; a role for which the Chancery Court was not intended
and for which it is not well suited.
In conclusion, I find that complementary or parallel state laws cannot repeal the language of the Compact. The Legislatures of both States could readily enact concurrent legislation requiring the DRBA to enter into collective negotiations with its employees thereby designating an entity more appropriate than the Chancery Division to decide the myriad of issues that will arise during the course of collective negotiations. They did not, however, choose to follow such a course. As such, the courts of New Jersey lack the authority to unilaterally grant such power.
I would reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division.
NO. A-9 SEPTEMBER TERM 1996
ON APPEAL FROM
ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court
INTERNATIONAL UNION OF
OPERATING ENGINEERS, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
v.
DELAWARE RIVER & BAY AUTHORITY,
Defendant-Appellant.
DECIDED February 11, 1997
Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING
OPINION BY Justice Pollock
CONCURRING OPINION BY
DISSENTING OPINION BY Justice Garibaldi