SYLLABUS
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has
been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the
reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please
note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not
have been summarized).
International Union of Operating Engineers Local No. 68 Welfare Fund v. Merck &
Co., Inc.
(A-22-2006)
Argued March 19, 2007 Decided September 6, 2007
PER CURIAM
In this appeal, the Court considers the propriety of an order certifying a
nationwide class of third-party payors that paid for the purchase of the prescription
drug, Vioxx.
The International Union of Operating Engineers Local No. 68 Welfare Fund (Welfare
Fund) is a joint union-employer Taft-Hartley trust fund which is organized and operates
pursuant to the laws of New Jersey. As a part of its services,
the Trust Fund acts as a sponsor of health benefit plans that provide
prescription drug coverage for its members and their beneficiaries. It is therefore a
third-party payor, meaning it makes payments to pharmaceutical companies for prescription medications for
those members.
The Trust Fund asserts that as a third-party payor it made payments and
incurred costs for Vioxx, the prescription drug manufactured and marketed by defendant, Merck.
The Trust Fund further asserts that it was induced by Mercks fraudulent marketing
scheme to pay a higher price than that charged for similar medications. In
addition, the Trust Fund claims that Merck was aware that its product was
neither more effective nor safer than other available products, and that Merck engaged
in extensive efforts to conceal or minimize information that there were significant health
and safety risks associated with the continued use of Vioxx.
The Trust Fund also asserts that Mercks marketing intentionally targeted third-party payors that
oversee and make payments for the vast majority of prescription medications. Third-party payors
rely on Prescription Benefit Managers (PBMs) that select drugs to be included on
the payors approved purchase listing, known as a formulary. The Trust Funds expert
contends that there is an agreed-upon set of principles and guidelines governing the
practices of third-party payors and PBMs in establishing the terms under which the
third-party payor agrees to be responsible for the costs of members prescriptions. As
a result, the Fund claims it can fairly represent the interests of a
variety of third-party payors, including funds like itself, as well as such diverse
entities as corporate health insurers, health maintenance organizations and self-insured employers. Mercks expert
asserts that the way in which PBMs operate in evaluating drugs for formulary
purposes varies greatly. The experts research showed that different managed care plans accorded
Vioxx widely different formulary treatment. Mercks expert asserts that there are such divergences
among class members and in how they analyzed Mercks information on Vioxx that
class certification is inappropriate.
Central to the Trust Funds assertions is its argument that if Merck
had disclosed the adverse information about which it was aware, the Trust Fund
and other class members would have taken action to discourage consumers from purchasing
Vioxx, thereby reducing the amounts paid to reimburse members for the drugs cost.
Merck contends that this argument amounts to nothing more than a fraud on
the market theory that cannot be sustained in accordance with this States law.
HELD: Certification of a nationwide class is not appropriate because common questions of
fact or law do not predominate and a class action is not superior
to other available mechanisms for redress.
1. Class action certification is governed by
Rule 4:32-1. The provision that is
at issue here is
Rule 4:32-1(b)(3), which this Court recently addressed in
Iliadis
v. Wal Mart Stores, Inc.,
191 N.J. 88 (2007). This provision requires that
questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate
over any questions affecting only individual members, and that the class action is
superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the
controversy. In
Iliadis, the Court explained the meaning of predominance, referring to the
importance of an analysis of the number and, more importantly, the significance of
common questions. At a minimum, predominance requires a common nucleus of operative facts.
The superiority requirement involves a comparison with alternative procedures and a determination of
the fairness and efficiency of each. The Court also expressed concern in
Iliadis
that, absent a class, where members lack financial resources and have only nominal
claims, individual members would not pursue their claims. The Court there found a
class action superior, in part, because it served as an equalizing mechanism between
adversaries of vastly different resources. (pp. 12-16)
2.The Law Division concluded that the Trust Funds proposed class met the prerequisites
for predominance and superiority. In a published opinion, the Appellate Division affirmed.
384 N.J. Super. 275 (App. Div. 2006). The Appellate Division based its decision, in
large part, on its conclusion that the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (CFA)
could be applied to all members of the class, and that therefore common
questions of law would predominate. The Appellate Division reasoned that the CFAs ascertainable
loss requirement need not be proven by each class member individually, but could
be proven on a class-wide basis through expert testimony. (pp. 16-20)
3. The first question the Court addresses is whether, even if it agrees
that the CFA can be given nationwide application to all class members, common
questions of fact or law predominate. The record demonstrates that each third-party payor,
relying on different PBMs, made individualized decisions concerning the benefits that would be
available to its members for whom Vioxx was prescribed. The evidence about separately
created formularies, different tier systems, and individualized requirements for approval for reimbursement imposed
on various plans members and their prescribing physicians are significant. Standing alone, that
evidence suggests that common fact questions surrounding what Merck knew and what it
did would not predominate. (pp. 20-25)
4. Nationwide application of the CFA creates a further consideration important to the
predominance analysis. In place of the traditional reliance element of fraud and misrepresentation,
the CFA requires a consumer to demonstrate it has sustained an ascertainable loss.
The Trust Fund asserts that the common facts surrounding Mercks marketing scheme created
an effect on the price of Vioxx such that the ascertainable loss element
of the CFA may be proven on a class-wide basis by use of
expert analysis alone. Merck urges that such an approach cannot demonstrate ascertainable loss
because it amounts to a fraud on the market theory. That theory is
a creature of federal securities litigation, and it allows plaintiffs that purchase securities
to demonstrate they were damaged simply because a defendant engaged in prohibited behavior
and there was a change in price. This Court has rejected the fraud
on the market theory as inappropriate in any context other than federal securities
fraud litigation. The Trust Funds proof theory that it can demonstrate class-wide damages
through use of a single expert who could opine about the effect on
pricing due to Mercks marketing campaign - would indeed be the equivalent of
fraud on the market. To the extent that the Trust Fund proposed, and
the Appellate Division authorized, the use of a single expert to establish this
critical CFA proof element so as to create a common question of fact
or law that would bear on the predominance analysis, the Courts rejection of
the theoretical basis for that proof mechanism removes it as a potential common
question entirely. (pp. 25-27)
5. The Court addresses a further, fundamental question relating to the proposed class.
Merck focuses on the relatively large sum of damages that the Trust Fund
contends it individually sustained, and argues a class action is not appropriate. The
argument has merit. The Court reaches this conclusion based on its recent analysis
of class actions as expressed in
Iliadis. It is the differences between the
proposed class members here and those in
Iliadis that requires the Court to
reach a different result in this matter than the one reached there.
Iliadis
involved claims raised by a proposed class of thousands of individual hourly wage
earners, and the amount any worker might individually recover was small. The class
members would have been greatly disadvantaged pursuing their claims individually against a large
corporate defendant. Unlike those hourly wage earners, members of this proposed class allege
they have been damaged in large sums, and are well-organized, institutional entities with
considerable resources. Unlike in
Iliadis, here there is no disparity in bargaining power
and no likelihood that the claims are individually so small that they will
not be pursued. In short, the Court finds no ground on which to
conclude that the proposed nationwide class meets the test for superiority that the
Court has traditionally required. (pp. 27-30)
The judgment of the Appellate Division is
REVERSED, and the matter is
REMANDE D
to the Law Division for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
JUSTICES LONG, LaVECCHIA, WALLACE, RIVERA-SOTO, and HOENS join in this opinion. JUSTICE ALBIN
did not participate.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-
22 September Term 2006
INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING ENGINEERS LOCAL NO. 68 WELFARE FUND, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
MERCK & CO., INC.,
Defendant-Appellant.
Argued March 19, 2007 Decided September 6, 2007
On appeal from the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at
384 N.J. Super. 275 (2006).
John H. Beisner, a member of the District of Columbia bar, argued the
cause for appellant (Dechert, attorneys; Mr. Beisner, Diane P. Sullivan and Richard Jasaitis,
III, on the briefs).
Christopher A. Seeger argued the cause for respondent (Seeger Weiss and Lynch Keefe
Bartels, attorneys; Mr. Seeger, John E. Keefe, Jr., David R. Buchanan, Frederick S.
Longer and Donald E. Haviland, Jr., on the briefs).
Michael Dore argued the cause for amicus curiae Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of
America (Lowenstein Sandler, attorneys; Mr. Dore and Rosemary E. Ramsay, of counsel and
on the brief).
Theodore M. Lieverman argued the cause for amici curiae AARP; American Federation of
State, County and Municipal Employees; Center for Medical Consumers; Central New York Citizens
in Action; Citizen Action of New York; Commonwealth Care Alliance, Inc.; Florida Chain;
Gray Panthers of Sacramento; Health Care for All; Lynn Health Task Force; Medicare
Rights Center; New Jersey Citizen Action; New Jersey PIRG Law & Policy Center;
Pennsylvania Employees Benefit Trust Fund; Prescription Access Litigation Project; United Senior Action of
Indiana; Elaine Kleinman and Ronald Martin (Spector Roseman & Kodroff, attorneys; Mr. Lieverman
and David J. Cohen, on the brief).
Anita R. Hotchkiss submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae Product Liability
Advisory Council, Inc. (Porzio, Bromberg & Newman, attorneys; Ms. Hotchkiss and Michael E.
Rowan, on the brief).
John F. Brenner submitted a joint brief on behalf of amici curiae The
Commerce and Industry Association of New Jersey; The Somerset County Business Partnership and
The Chemistry Council of New Jersey (McCarter & English, attorneys for The Commerce
and Industry Association of New Jersey; Norris McLaughlin & Marcus, attorneys for The
Somerset County Business Partnership and Reed Smith, attorneys for The Chemistry Council of
New Jersey; Mr. Brenner, Steven A. Karg and Steven J. Picco, of counsel).
Edward J. Fanning, Jr. and David R. Kott submitted a brief on behalf
of amicus curiae Healthcare Institute of New Jersey (McCarter & English, attorneys; Mr.
Fanning, Mr. Kott and Marielena Piriz, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
In July 2005, a Law Division judge granted the motion of plaintiff International
Union of Operating Engineers Local #68 Welfare Fund to certify a nationwide class
of third-party[,] non-government payors who . . . paid any person or entity
for the purchase of a prescription anti-inflammatory arthritis and acute pain medication marketed
by defendant Merck & Company, Inc. . . . under the brand name
Vioxx. The Appellate Division affirmed that decision and defendant moved for leave to
appeal to this Court.
We granted that motion for leave to appeal, agreeing to consider the propriety
of the order certifying a nationwide class. Because we conclude that the court
erred in finding that common questions of fact or law predominate and that
a class action would be superior to other mechanisms for adjudicating the claims,
we reverse.
I.
We accept as true all of the allegations in the complaint in light
of the fact that we are considering the issues in the context of
a challenge to class certification.
See Riley v. New Rapids Carpet Ctr.,
61 N.J. 218, 223 (1972);
see also Delgozzo v. Kenny,
266 N.J. Super 169,
180-81 (App. Div. 1993) (citing
Blackie v. Barrack, 524
F.2d 891, 901 n.17
(9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied,
429 U.S. 816,
97 S. Ct. 57, 50
L. Ed.2d 75 (1976)). For purposes of our analysis, we derive the
essential facts from plaintiffs complaint and the record developed in connection with the
motion for class certification.
A.
According to the complaint, plaintiff is a joint union-employer Taft-Hartley trust fund,
See footnote 1
which
is organized and operates pursuant to the laws of New Jersey. As a
part of its services, plaintiff acts as a party to benefit contracts, a
policy issuer, and a sponsor of health benefit plans that provide prescription drug
coverage for its members and beneficiaries. It is therefore a third-party payor, meaning
that it makes payments to pharmaceutical companies for prescription medications for those for
whom its benefit plans afford coverage.
Plaintiff asserts that as a third-party payor it made payments, and therefore incurred
costs, for Vioxx, a prescription drug manufactured and marketed by defendant. More specifically,
plaintiff asserts that it was induced to make those payments and incur those
costs in response to defendants wide-ranging fraudulent marketing scheme. In essence, the complaint
alleges that defendant marketed its product as a safer and more effective alternative
to other traditional pain medications, thus driving the price of its product substantially
higher than the price charged for similar medications.
More to the point, however, plaintiff asserts that defendant did so through an
aggressive marketing campaign undertaken at a time when defendant was aware that its
product was neither more effective nor safer than other available products. Pointing in
particular to three separate warning letters issued to defendant by the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA), plaintiff asserts that defendant engaged in extensive efforts to conceal
or otherwise minimize information coming to its attention to the effect that its
product was not as safe as available alternatives.
At the same time, plaintiff contends that defendant was aware, through its ongoing
clinical studies, that there were significant health and safety risks associated with continued
use of its product and that defendant also either minimized or actively concealed
those studies from the FDA, the public, and third-party payors. In particular, plaintiff
asserts that beginning in 1998, defendants clinical studies and internal analyses of the
use of Vioxx demonstrated a link between the medication and adverse cardiovascular side
effects. In spite of that discovery, however, defendant continued its marketing and promotional
campaign and concealed those adverse findings until the product was withdrawn from the
market in September 2004.
B.
Plaintiff also asserts that the defendant intentionally targeted third-party payors that oversee, and
make payments for, the vast majority of purchases of prescription medications. Although the
specific allegations about defendants marketing campaign are not important to our analysis, plaintiff
asserts, as part of its class action allegations, that defendant engaged in a
uniform series of fraudulent activities in its dealings with all members of the
proposed nationwide class. As such, plaintiff asserts that it can fairly represent the
interests of a variety of third-party payors, including other Taft-Hartley funds like itself,
as well as such diverse entities as corporate health insurers, health maintenance organizations,
private employers, self-insured employers, and multi-employer union benefit organizations.
The parties do not dispute the manner in which this plaintiff or other
third-party payors operate in making decisions about payments for particular medications. Whenever a
plan member receives a prescription and takes it to be filled, the plan
member must first demonstrate that he or she is covered by a third-party
payor plan. In general, the plan member submits membership information, such as a
prescription insurance card, to the dispensing pharmacy for verification and approval by the
third-party payor. Once the plan member has done so, the dispensing pharmacy verifies
that the prescribed medication is one that the third-party payor has authorized for
purchase. The drugs that each third-party payor has authorized are included within that
third-party payors approved purchase listing, known as a formulary.
Third-party payors do not independently select medications for inclusion in their formularies. Instead,
each third-party payor relies on Prescription Benefit Managers (PBMs) whose functions include placing
prescription drugs on the individual third-party payors formularies. PBMs, in turn, utilize specialized
committees of pharmacists, physicians, and healthcare professionals, which are known as Pharmacy and
Therapeutics Committees (P&T Committees), to develop and maintain the formularies. The P&T Committees
do so by conducting their own evaluation of the effectiveness, safety, and cost
of each available medication.
In performing their function, P&T Committees evaluate a wide variety of available material
bearing on the question of each drugs efficacy and safety. In general, according
to plaintiffs expert, P&T Committees focus on materials referred to as primary information.
That includes published materials reporting on the results of randomized clinical trials; observational
or epidemiological data; meta-analysis, which is a method of combining results of several
studies in order to synthesize and evaluate data; and case reports. At least
some of the published material rests on work done by or for the
manufacturers of the particular products.
P&T Committees also consider information and data that is submitted to them by
each products manufacturer. In many cases, the manufacturer of a product being considered
for inclusion in formularies compiles this information and data and submits it in
a format known as a formulary compendium. Defendant created such compendia in this
case.
The P&T Committees evaluations may result in the inclusion of a product on
a particular third-party payors formulary. The decision to include a medication, however, does
not necessarily result in uniform treatment of that drug in every formulary, as
each operates differently. Formularies are frequently comprised of tiers, with different treatment, for
prescription authorization and payment purposes, accorded to the drugs assigned to different tiers.
In a tiered formulary, some therapeutic drugs are preferred, which may result in
a lower co-payment obligation for the plan member and may result in greater
overall sales of the drug. At the other end of the spectrum, for
purposes of a tiered formulary, the work performed by the P&T Committee might
result in a decision that some prescription drugs are not authorized for purchase
at all.
During the relevant time period, some PBMs relied on open formularies which essentially
included all prescription medications that were approved by the FDA. Even open formularies,
however, involve decisions by P&T Committees that determine how any specific medication will
be treated for purposes of placement. Those decisions may result in conditions relating
to how a third-party payor will cover the cost of a medication.
As a practical matter, each PBM, through the work performed by the P&T
Committee and its creation of the formulary, sets the terms under which the
third-party payor agreed to be responsible for the costs of its members prescriptions.
Plaintiffs expert contends that there is an agreed-upon set of principles and guidelines
governing the practices of third-party payors and PBMs in making these decisions. He
points out that in October 2000, the Academy of Managed Care Pharmacy (AMCP)
published a
Format for Formulary Submission, which is a standardized format for [manufacturers
to submit] product, clinical, and economic data on a new drug.
Defendants expert asserts that in spite of that effort to create a standardized
format, the way in which PBMs operate in evaluating drugs for formulary purposes
varies greatly. He certified that when he conducted his research, he discovered that,
rather than operating in a uniform manner as plaintiffs expert opined, different managed
care plans evaluated Vioxx and accorded it widely different formulary treatment. He found
that because open formularies were common, Vioxx was included in most third-party payors
plans. Some, however, by giving it preferred status, assigned it to a low
co-payment tier. Others placed it in a non-preferred tier where a high co-payment
was required. In other plans, Vioxx prescriptions were essentially discouraged either because pre-approval
was required before a physician could prescribe it or because it could only
be prescribed after other, cheaper drugs had been tried without success. Defendants expert
also certified that different P&T Committees responded to ongoing releases of information about
Vioxx in different ways, with some altering its placement in their formularies. He
asserted that, as a factual matter, there are such divergences among class members
and in how they analyzed the information received from defendant that class certification
is inappropriate.
C.
Central to plaintiffs class action assertions is its argument that defendant engaged in
a fraudulent marketing campaign that induced, or was intended to induce, all third-party
payors to accord Vioxx preferred status in their formularies. Plaintiff argues that if
defendant had disclosed the adverse information about which it was aware concerning the
safety and efficacy of the drug, plaintiff and the other class members either
would not have authorized its inclusion in their formularies or would have placed
it in a tier that would have discouraged consumers from purchasing it, and,
therefore, would have reduced the amounts that third-party payors authorized for reimbursement of
the drugs cost to plan members. Defendant argues that this argument amounts to
nothing more than a fraud on the market theory that cannot be sustained
in accordance with our law.
II.
In seeking class certification,
See footnote 2
plaintiff relied on the following definition of the proposed
class, as set forth in its complaint:
All third-party payors in the United States of America, who have paid any
person or entity for the purchase of the prescription drug Vioxx (rofecoxib) since
May 1, 1999. Third-party payors include any non-governmental entity that is (i) a
party to a contract, issuer of a policy, or sponsor of a plan,
which contract, policy, or plan provides prescription drug coverage to natural persons, and
is also (ii) at risk, pursuant to such contract, policy, or plan, to
purchase or pay for all or part of the cost of prescription drugs
dispensed to natural persons covered by such contract, policy, or plan. Excluded from
the Class are (1) employees of defendant, including its officers or directors; (2)
plaintiffs counsel; and (3) the Judge of the Court to which this case
is assigned.
It is against this definition of the proposed class that we must consider
the analysis of the Law Division and of the Appellate Division supporting the
certification of a nationwide class of plaintiffs.
A.
We begin with a brief review of the standards that govern class action
certification. We have recently addressed, in a different context, this Courts historical class
action jurisprudence.
See Iliadis v. Wal Mart Stores, Inc.,
191 N.J. 88 (2007).
As we pointed out in
Iliadis, class action certification is governed by
Rule
4:32-1. That
Rule includes both general,
see R. 4:32-1(a), and specific,
see R.
4:32-1(b), requirements.
Iliadis,
supra, 191
N.J. at 106. The central question before us,
as in
Iliadis, is whether the putative class raises questions of law or
fact common to the members of the class [that] predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.
R. 4:32-1(b)(3).
As we have previously held, the analysis of these aspects of the
Rule
must be rigorous.
See Iliadis,
supra,
191 N.J. 106-07 (quoting
Carroll v. Cellco
Pship,
313 N.J. Super. 488, 495 (App. Div. 1998) (quoting
Gen. Tele. Co.
of the Sw. v. Falcon,
457 U.S. 147, 161,
102 S. Ct. 2364,
2372,
72 L. Ed.2d 740, 752 (1982))). Moreover, our review includes searching
beyond the pleadings [to gain an ] . . . understand[ing of] the
claims, defenses, relevant facts, and applicable substantive law.
Id. at 107 (quoting
Carroll,
supra, 313
N.J. Super. at 495).
In
Iliadis,
supra, we explained the meaning of predominance, referring to the importance
of an analysis of the number, and more important the significance of common
questions.
191 N.J. 108 (citing
Carroll,
supra, 313
N.J. Super. at 499). We
noted as well that a court must decide whether the benefit from the
determination in a class action [of common questions] outweighs the problems of individual
actions.
Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting
In re Cadillac V8-6-4 Class Action,
93 N.J. 412, 430 (1983)). Finally, we noted that predominance requires, at [a] minimum,
a common nucleus of operative facts.
Ibid. (quoting
In re Cadillac,
supra, 93
N.J. at 431).
We recognized, as well, that there is no requirement that individual issues be
absent,
ibid. (citing
Varacallo v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
332 N.J. Super. 31, 45 (App. Div. 2000), or that the common issues dispose of the
entire dispute,
ibid. (citing
Strawn v. Canuso,
140 N.J. 43, 67 (1995),
superseded
on other grounds by,
L. 1995,
c. 253, § 10 (codified at
N.J.S.A. 46:3C-10),
as recognized in Nobrega v. Edison Glen Assocs.,
167 N.J. 520 (2001)). Nor
does predominance require that all issues be identical among class members or that
each class member be affected in precisely the same manner.
See Fiore v.
Hudson County Employees Pension Commn,
151 N.J. Super. 524, 528 (App. Div. 1977).
We also explained in
Iliadis the meaning of the
Rules
requirement that a
class be superior to other methods of adjudication.
Iliadis,
supra, 191
N.J. at
114. The superiority requirement involves a comparison with alternative procedures,
ibid. (quoting
In
re Cadillac,
supra, 93
N.J. at 436), to evaluate both fairness and efficiency
of the class action proceeding.
We there reiterated the basic principles that govern the decision concerning whether a
particular proposed class meets the criteria for superiority. In part, we noted that
our analysis demands (1) an informed consideration of alternative available methods of adjudication
of each issue, (2) a comparison of the fairness to all whose interests
may be involved between such alternative methods and a class action, and (3)
a comparison of the efficiency of adjudication of each method.
Id. at 114-15
(quoting
In re Cadillac,
supra, 93
N.J. at 436 (quotation omitted in original)).
More specifically, in
Iliadis, we identified as important to the superiority analysis a
consideration of the class members lack of financial wherewithal.
Id. at 115 (quoting
Saldana v. City of Camden,
252 N.J. Super. 188, 200 (App. Div. 1991)).
In such circumstances, we have expressed a concern that, absent a class, the
individual class members would not pursue their claims at all, thus demonstrating superiority
of the class action mechanism.
See ibid.;
Muhammad v. County Bank of Rehoboth
Beach,
189 N.J. 1, 17 (2006),
cert. denied,
127 S. Ct. 2032,
167 L. Ed.2d 763 (2007).
In
Iliadis,
supra, we also referred, in part, to the significance of plaintiffs
having nominal claims, 191
N.J. at 115 (citing
Varacallo,
supra, 332
N.J. Super.
at 52), and to the role of class actions as an equalizing mechanism
between adversaries of vastly different resources,
id. at 115, as a part of
the considerations that bear on the superiority analysis. To be sure, we also
evaluated the available alternative dispute resolution forum, the importance of uniformity of outcome
and the impact of differing statutes of limitations,
see id. at 116, in
concluding that, in
Iliadis, a class action was indeed the superior adjudicatory mechanism,
see id. at 117.
Finally, in
Iliadis, we addressed the question of whether a class action would
be unmanageable. Recognizing that rejection of a proposed class for reasons relating to
its manageability is disfavored,
ibid., we nevertheless acknowledged that some proposed class actions
may present management issues of such magnitude that certification should be withheld,
see
id. at 118. It is in light of this recent reiteration of the
fundamental principles that guide certification of class actions generally that we must consider
the issues presented in this matter.
B.
In granting the motion for class certification, the Law Division concluded that the
proposed class met the prerequisites for predominance and superiority. The courts conclusion about
predominance rested on two related considerations.
First, the motion court concluded that the facts relating to defendants marketing campaign,
its suppression of adverse information, and its behavior in working to have Vioxx
included in formularies were common to all members of the proposed class of
third-party payors. Even though the court recognized that the decision of any particular
P&T Committee, PBM, or third-party payor about adding this product to the formulary
or about its placement in the formulary was an individual one, the court
concluded that facts relating to the marketing campaign itself and the information distributed
by defendant to those decision-makers was common to all class members. Second, the
court found that common questions of law predominate because its choice of law
analysis led it to conclude that New Jerseys Consumer Fraud Act (CFA),
N.J.S.A.
56:8-1 to -166, should apply to all members of this nationwide class.
The motion court also found that a class action would be superior to
other methods of affording relief to all potential plaintiffs, including being superior to
pending federal multi-district litigation raising some, if not all, of the same claims.
That conclusion was, in essence, a logical extension of the courts decision about
the predominance of common questions of fact and law.
In a published opinion, the Appellate Division affirmed.
See Intl Union of Operating
Engrs Local # 68 Welfare Fund v. Merck & Co.,
384 N.J. Super. 275 (App. Div. 2006). Applying an abuse of discretion standard to the motion
courts factual determinations,
see id. at 283 (citing
In re Cadillac,
supra, 93
N.J. at 436-39), and utilizing a de novo standard of review in evaluating
the courts analysis of the questions of law,
see id. at 284 (citing
Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan,
140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)),
the appellate panel concluded that certification of a nationwide class was appropriate,
see
id. at 281.
The panel noted that defendant concedes that there are some common issues and
that the proposed class meets the basic prerequisites for class certification set forth
in
Rule 4:32-1(a).
See id. at 285. In the panels analysis, then, the
only questions were, in accordance with
Rule 4:32-1(b)(3), whether common questions predominate [and
whether] a class action would be superior to other methods of adjudicating this
controversy.
Ibid. In addressing whether these criteria for class certification have been met,
the appellate panel based its decision, in large part, on its conclusion that
our CFA could be applied to all members of the class,
see id.
at 305, and that therefore common questions of law would predominate.
In addition, although recognizing and cataloging the individual decision-making processes engaged in by
the PBMs and, therefore, by the many potential class members,
see id. at
282-83, the appellate panel decided that there were also common questions of fact,
see id. at 292. As a part of that analysis, the panel reasoned
that the CFAs ascertainable loss requirement need not be proven by each class
member individually, but could be proven on a class-wide basis through expert testimony.
See id. at 291. Recognizing that a nationwide class action that applies a
single states law to all claims is rare,
id. at 303, and that
this class will undoubtedly present management problems,
id. at 304, the appellate panel
nevertheless concluded that neither of those concerns militated against certification of this class,
see id. at 305-06.
C.
Defendant moved for leave to appeal, raising three essential arguments. First, defendant contends
that the Appellate Division erred in concluding that, in accordance with choice of
law principles, the CFA can apply to a nationwide class. Second, defendant asserts
that plaintiffs theory that it can meet the CFAs ascertainable loss on a
class-wide basis amounts to a fraud on the market theory which this Court
has previously held cannot apply outside the strict parameters of securities fraud litigation.
Finally, defendant suggests that the appellate panel erred in concluding that a class
action is superior to other mechanisms readily available to members of the class.
Plaintiff urges us to conclude that the Appellate Divisions analysis is entirely correct.
First, plaintiff argues that its evaluation of our choice of law principles was
sound, with the result that the nationwide application of our CFA to all
class members is appropriate. Second, plaintiff asserts that the CFAs ascertainable loss component
may be met on a class-wide basis through expert proofs that need only
establish some causal relationship between the defendants acts and the injuries suffered by
the members of the class. Further, plaintiff rejects defendants contention that this method
of proof equates with a fraud on the market theory. Finally, plaintiff suggests
that a class action is indeed a superior mechanism for achieving a remedy.
We granted defendants motion for leave to appeal and we also granted leave
to submit amicus curiae briefs to a large and diverse number of entities.
IV.
Although the parties have suggested that the choice of law analysis, and the
corollary decision to apply our CFA to all members of the nationwide class,
was the lynchpin for class certification and should therefore be the essential focus
of this appeal, we do not adopt that approach. Rather, we address this
class action certification, as we have others, by analyzing more generally the assertions
about predominance and superiority.
In doing so, we note that defendant concedes that there are some common
questions. To be sure, there is no disagreement about the fact that, whatever
its specifics, defendants marketing plan and withholding of adverse information did not vary
as among potential consumers. Nor is there any difference in the facts as
they relate to the FDA warning letters or the drugs eventual withdrawal from
the market. We confront in this appeal, however, two essential questions. First, we
consider whether those facts, even were we to agree that our CFA could
be given nationwide application to all class members,
See footnote 3
constitute common questions of fact
or law that predominate. Second, we consider whether a class action is superior
to other available mechanisms for redress of the claims raised by plaintiff.
A.
Our analysis of the fact questions, however, is intertwined with our consideration of
the questions of law asserted to be common. If we were to agree
with the appellate panel that our CFA could appropriately be applied to all
members of this nationwide class, the proofs that our CFA would require, in
and of themselves, demonstrate an overall lack of predominant common questions. We reach
this conclusion for reasons that arise from the CFA itself.
The CFA imposes liability on any person who uses: any unconscionable commercial practice,
deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, or the knowing, concealment, suppression, or
omission of any material fact with intent that others rely upon such concealment,
suppression or omission.
N.J.S.A. 56:8-2. Consumer fraud violations are divided broadly into three
. . . categories: affirmative acts, knowing omissions, and regulatory violations.
Cox v.
Sears Roebuck & Co.,
138 N.J. 2, 17 (1994). Thus, to state a
CFA claim, a plaintiff must allege three elements: (1) unlawful conduct . .
. ; (2) an ascertainable loss . . . ; and (3) a
causal relationship between the defendants unlawful conduct and the plaintiffs ascertainable loss.
N.J.
Citizen Action v. Schering-Plough Corp., 367
N.J. Super. 8, 12-13 (App. Div.),
certif.
denied,
178 N.J. 249 (2003).
Our statute essentially replaces reliance, an element of proof traditional to any fraud
claim, with the requirement that plaintiff prove ascertainable loss.
See Thiedemann v. Mercedes-Benz
USA, LLC,
183 N.J. 234, 246 (2005); Sheila B. Scheuerman,
The Consumer Fraud
Class Action, Reining in Abuse by Requiring Plaintiffs to Allege Reliance as an
Essential Element, 43
Harv. J. on Legis. 1, 25-30 (2006) (surveying different requirements
for proof of traditional fraud element of reliance in consumer fraud statutes nationwide).
Our analysis requires us to consider, in light of the requirements of our
CFA,
See footnote 4
what questions of fact or law are common and whether those questions
predominate in the sense required for certification of a class. In addressing this
aspect of the appeal, the parties rely on different parts of the record.
We begin with a brief recitation of the particular facts that each party
asserts are relevant to the question of predominance.
Plaintiff argues that we should focus on the facts relating to the conduct
engaged in by defendant in marketing its product and in withholding important information
about the products risks from the FDA and the public. In doing so,
plaintiff asserts that all of the facts relating to defendants behavior and its
marketing campaign are common to all class members. Moreover, plaintiff argues that each
member of the proposed class received the same information and was a target
of the same deceptive campaign.
Defendant argues that we should instead consider the facts that relate to the
members of the class more generally. As such, defendant points out that the
essence of the claims must be that each class member was injured individually
when it decided, based on defendants allegedly fraudulent conduct, to include Vioxx in
its formulary and, more to the point, when it paid for the drug
purchased by plan members in its home state. Defendant further suggests that because
each class member made that evaluation at different times and based on different
criteria and because each reacted differently with regard to formulary placement even after
the facts that allegedly prove the fraud became known, there are overwhelmingly individual,
rather than common, questions of law and fact. This fundamental dispute about focus
forms the heart of the debate on appeal.
Although the record does not identify the members of the proposed class, other
than the named plaintiff, with any precision, the available information makes it plain
that they are a diverse group of entities. More important to our analysis,
however, plaintiff does not suggest that each of these proposed class members, receiving
the same information from defendant, reacted in a uniform or even similar manner.
Rather, the record speaks loudly in its demonstration that each third-party payor, relying
on PBMs and P&T Committees, made individualized decisions concerning the benefits that would
be available to its members for whom Vioxx was prescribed. The evidence about
separately created formularies, different types of tier systems, and individualized requirements for approval
or reimbursement imposed on various plans members and, to some extent, their prescribing
physicians, are significant. That evidence convinces us that the commonality of defendants behavior
is but a small piece of the required proofs. Standing alone, that evidence
suggests that the common fact questions surrounding what defendant knew and what it
did would not predominate.
B.
Nationwide application of our CFA would create a further consideration important to our
analysis of predominance. As a part of its argument, plaintiff asserts that the
common facts surrounding defendants marketing scheme created an effect on the price of
Vioxx such that the ascertainable loss element of our CFA may be proven,
on a class-wide basis, by reliance on expert analysis alone. Defendant urges us
to conclude that plaintiffs approach cannot demonstrate ascertainable loss as required by our
CFA because it amounts to a fraud on the market theory.
We need only briefly address this aspect of the dispute. Our CFA does
not require proof that a consumer has actually relied on a prohibited act
in order to recover. In place of the traditional reliance element of fraud
and misrepresentation, we have required that plaintiffs demonstrate that they have sustained an
ascertainable loss. Most recently, in
Theidemann,
supra, we discussed at length the meaning
of this concept and its importance to CFA litigation.
Fraud on the market is essentially a creature of federal securities litigation.
See
Kaufman v. i-Stat Corp.,
165 N.J. 94, 97 (2000). In that context, plaintiffs
who purchased securities are permitted to demonstrate that they were damaged simply because
defendant engaged in behavior otherwise prohibited and there was a change in price.
See ibid. The theory therefore presumes reliance.
See Basic Inc. v. Levinson,
485 U.S. 224,
108 S. Ct. 978,
99 L. Ed.2d 194, (1988);
Blackie,
supra, 524
F.
2d at 906 (explaining rationale for permitting fraud on market theory
in securities fraud litigation);
see also Finkel v. Docutel/Olivetti Corp.,
817 F.2d 356,
359-62 (5th Cir. 1987) (limiting fraud on market theory to specified varieties of
securities fraud claims),
cert. denied, 485
U.S. 959, 108
S. Ct. 1220, 99
L. Ed.2d 421 (1988).
We have rejected the fraud on the market theory as being inappropriate in
any context other than federal securities fraud litigation.
See Kaufman,
supra, 165
N.J.
at 97-98. Therefore, to the extent that plaintiff seeks to prove only that
the price charged for Vioxx was higher than it should have been as
a result of defendants fraudulent marketing campaign, and seeks thereby to be relieved
of the usual requirements that plaintiff prove an ascertainable loss, the theory must
fail.
See N.J. Citizen Action,
supra, 367
N.J. Super. at 15-16 ([P]laintiffs must
nonetheless plead and prove a causal nexus between the alleged act of consumer
fraud and the damages sustained.).
Plaintiff argues that it should be permitted to demonstrate class-wide damages through use
of a single expert who would opine about the effect on pricing of
the marketing campaign in which defendant engaged. To the extent that that plaintiff
intends to rely on a single expert to establish a price effect in
place of a demonstration of an ascertainable loss or in place of proof
of a causal nexus between defendants acts and the claimed damages, however, plaintiffs
proofs would fail. That proof theory would indeed be the equivalent of fraud
on the market, a theory we have not extended to CFA claims.
The significance of plaintiffs planned approach to proof of ascertainable loss is clear.
To the extent that plaintiff proposed, and the Appellate Division authorized, the use
of a single expert to establish this critical CFA proof element so as
to create a common question of fact or law that would bear on
the predominance analysis, our rejection of the theoretical basis for that proof mechanism
removes it as a potential common question entirely.
C.
Finally, we address a further, fundamental, question relating to the proposed class. In
short, defendant argues that, under any circumstances, certification of a class as defined
by plaintiff cannot be appropriate. Focusing on the relatively large sum of damages
that this plaintiff contends it has individually sustained as a result of defendants
marketing of Vioxx, defendant argues that a class action is not appropriate. Whether
we regard this as an attack on the superiority prong of the test
or as a general question about the propriety of certification for this proposed
class in general, it has independent merit.
We reach this conclusion based on our recent analysis of class actions as
expressed in our
Iliadis decision. Although we need not repeat any of the
more general matters to which we there adverted, it is the differences between
the proposed class members here and those in
Iliadis that requires us to
reach a different result in this matter than the one we reached there.
In
Iliadis,
supra, we considered claims raised by a proposed class of individual
hourly wage earners, numbering in the thousands.
See 191
N.J. at 95. The
essential theory of recovery asserted on behalf of that putative class rested on
allegations of corporate-wide policies designed to deny the individuals compensation for relatively small
units of time that they worked under circumstances when they were, by company-wide
contract terms, entitled to be paid.
See id. at 95-96, 115-17. The amount
that any individual worker might ultimately or potentially recover in damages was small.
See id. at 115. The class numbered in the thousands.
See id. at
95. Individually, they would be greatly disadvantaged in any effort to pursue their
claims against a large corporate defendant.
See id. at 104-05. We concluded that,
in accordance with well-established principles governing class actions, the
Iliadis class should be
certified.
See id. at 120-21.
It was, perhaps, the quintessential example of facts and circumstances that would support
class-wide relief. In particular, we noted that the specifics of the manner in
which the defendant was alleged to have accomplished its goal of diminishing the
compensation otherwise due the class members, the small amount that any one class
member would be due, and the large number of class members for whom
relief would otherwise not be practically available, all militated in favor of a
conclusion that the common issues predominated and the class action mechanism was superior
to any other forum for relief. We did not depart, in that analysis,
from our traditional class action jurisprudence, but stayed squarely within its ordinary parameters.
It is in light of that background that we cannot escape the vast
differences between that appropriate use of the class action device and the present
inappropriate one. Unlike the individual wage earners there, plaintiff and, by extension, all
of the members of the class, allege that they have been damaged in
large sums. Unlike those hourly wage earners, plaintiff and the other third-party payors
are well-organized institutional entities with considerable resources. Unlike in
Iliadis, here we see
no disparity in bargaining power and no likelihood that the claims are individually
so small that they will not be pursued. In short, we find no
ground on which to conclude that this proposed nationwide class meets the test
for superiority that we have traditionally required.
VIII.
The judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed and this matter is remanded
to the Law Division for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
JUSTICES LONG, LaVECCHIA, WALLACE, RIVERA-SOTO, and HOENS join in this opinion. JUSTICE ALBIN
did not participate.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
NO. A-22 SEPTEMBER TERM 2006
ON APPEAL FROM Appellate Division, Superior Court
INTERNATIONAL UNION OF
OPERATING ENGINEERS LOCAL NO.
68 WELFARE FUND, individually
and on behalf of all others
similarly situated,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
MERCK & CO., INC.,
Defendant-Appellant.
DECIDED September 6, 2007
Justice Long PRESIDING
OPINION BY Per Curiam
CONCURRING OPINION BY
DISSENTING OPINION BY
CHECKLIST
REVERSE AND REMAND
JUSTICE LONG
X
JUSTICE LaVECCHIA
X
JUSTICE ALBIN
X
JUSTICE WALLACE
X
JUSTICE RIVERA-SOTO
X
JUSTICE HOENS
X
TOTALS
6
Footnote: 1
The complaint does not specify whether plaintiff is organized as a New
Jersey corporation, referring instead to the fact that it is organized and operating
in the State of New Jersey. We presume, for purposes of this analysis,
that it qualifies as a consumer as that term is intended in our
consumer fraud statute. We do so in recognition of the fact that the
Consumer Fraud Act, although not defining the term consumer, has been repeatedly recognized
to be remedial legislation which should be construed liberally. See Lettenmaier v. Lube
Connection, Inc.,
162 N.J. 134, 139 (1999); Gennari v. Weichert Co. Realtors,
148 N.J. 582, 604 (1997); Joe DEgidio Landscaping v. Apicella,
337 N.J. Super. 252,
258 (App. Div. 2001). Although one might argue that the relationship between plaintiff
and defendant is more attenuated than the traditional consumer role as contemplated by
the Consumer Fraud Act, we leave for another day the question of the
Acts scope in light of our analysis of the other issues before us.
Footnote: 2
Because the complaint was filed in 2003, the federal Class Action Fairness
Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2,
119 Stat. 4, codified as amended
at
28 U.S.C.A.
§§1453, 1711-1715 (2006), does not apply to any aspect of
our analysis.
Footnote: 3 As the appellate panel noted, certification of a nationwide class is rare,
Intl Union, supra, 384 N.J. Super. at 303, and application of the law
of a single state to all members of such a class is even
more rare. Although defendant advances strong arguments in support of its appeal from
the Appellate Divisions choice of law analysis, in light of our decision on
predominance and superiority, we express no view on the Appellate Divisions choice of
law reasoning or the result it reached as to the applicability of our
law to all members of a nationwide class.
Footnote: 4
In framing the issues for this Court in the motion for leave to
appeal, the parties sought to focus on the choice of law decision that
led to the application of our CFA to all class members. Although they
theorized that it was the application of our CFA itself that created a
common question of law, we do not agree with the premise that reliance
on the CFA necessarily created a common question that meets the test for
predominance.