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This case can also be found at *CITE_PENDING*.
(NOTE: The status of this decision is unpublished.)
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4092-04T24092-04T2
IOANNIS G. ANGELOU,
Plaintiff,
v.
NIKOLAOS VROULIS,
Defendant.
Submitted November 15, 2005 - Decided
Before Judges Lefelt and R. B. Coleman.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Atlantic County, L-311-
1.
George N. Polis, attorney for appellant.
Olu O. Abiona, attorney for respondent.
PER CURIAM
The present dispute involves successive attorneys who claim a right to a contingent fee applied to the net
settlement proceeds of their client, plaintiff Ioannis Angelou, in his personal injury action arising out of a motor
vehicle accident. Angelou is not involved in this appeal.
George N. Styliades, Esq., Angelou's first attorney, recommended that Angelou accept a settlement offer of
$30,000 made by defendant Nikolaos Vroulis on the eve of trial. That amount was not out of line with a previously
rejected arbitration award of $25,000, however, disagreement ensued between Angelou and Styliades and Angelou
either fired Styliades or Styliades voluntarily withdrew due to the client's refusal to cooperate. In any event, the trial
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was adjourned for three months and on the next scheduled trial date, Angelou, then represented by George N.
Polis, was denied a further adjournment. This time, Angelou accepted the $30,000 offer from Vroulis that was still
available. In an order dated January 10, 2003, the court recognized a lien in favor of Styliades against the proceeds
of Angelou's settlement.
Angelou appealed to set aside the settlement and the charging lien, claiming he settled under duress. Under the
terms of the contingency fee agreement, if the attorney had been discharged by plaintiff, he would have been
entitled to his fee; but in the event of the attorney's voluntary withdrawal, the contingent fee agreement provided
as follows:
It is further understood and agreed that upon notification to me (certified, registered or
first-class mail) [named attorney] may withdraw as counsel in the event of my failure to
cooperate or if he concludes in his sole judgment that the claim cannot be successfully
prosecuted. In the event [named attorney] withdraws as my counsel, he agrees that I
will not be obligated to pay him for any professional services that he has rendered, not
including costs and disbursements.
In an unpublished opinion, we dismissed Angelou's appeal to the extent it sought to avoid the settlement, but we
remanded the matter for appropriate proceedings to determine whether Styliades was entitled to the contingent
fee. Docket No. A-3944-02T2 (App. Div. August 20, 2004) (slip op. at 7).
On remand, Judge Perskie found Angelou fired Styliades. Hence, under the terms of the contingent fee agreement,
the one-third fee should go to Styliades. Angelou and Polis appealed and on Styliades' motion to dismiss, this court
again remanded to Judge Perskie directing that he release two-thirds of the net proceeds to Angelou and allow the
dispute between Styliades and Polis to continue.
Judge Perskie considered both retainer agreements and gave both counsel an opportunity to establish their
claimed entitlement to the fee. Judge Perskie determined that Polis failed to submit evidence showing he earned a
fee and again he awarded the one-third contingent fee to Styliades, without allocation of any portion to Polis.
In this appeal, Polis claims that Judge Perskie's ruling (a) did not follow our direction to allocate the fee; (b) is not
based on quantum meruit, as required by the retainer agreement and by LaMantia v. Durst; and (c) respondent
failed to file any submission detailing his time expended and the nature of his services.
Our review of a trial court's factfinding is limited. State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 470-471 (1999); In re Taylor, 158 N.J.
644 (1999); Close v. Kordulak Bros., 44 N.J. 589, 599 (1965). We are not to decide the case as a "court of first instance"
would. Locurto, supra, 157 N.J. at 471 (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146 (1984)). In our review we "give
deference to those findings of the trial judge which are substantially influenced by his opportunity to hear and see
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the witnesses and to have the 'feel' of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy." Ibid. This court is only "to
determine whether the findings made could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence present
in the record." Ibid.
Judge Perskie made a credibility determination that the client, Angelou, fired Styliades. Under the terms of the
agreement, Styliades was entitled to recover his counsel fee calculated on a contingency fee basis. Polis did not
provide any evidence demonstrating that he added value to the settlement. Polis' services consisted of
representing Angelou in his acceptance of an offer that was previously negotiated by Styliades, which remained
viable. Under such circumstances, the judge's determination that Polis has not shown he is entitled to be allocated
part of the contingent fee and awarding Styliades the entire contingent fee are adequately supported by the record.
Affirmed.
(continued)
                                                                                                                        (continued)
5
                                                                                                                        A-4092-04T2
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January 5, 2006
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