SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
A-1336-99T3
JACQUELINE THOMAS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
SECOND BAPTIST CHURCH OF
LONG BRANCH,
Defendant-Respondent,
and
CITY OF LONG BRANCH,
Defendant.
___________________________________
Submitted October 31, 2000 - Decided February 15, 2001
Before Judges Skillman, Conley and Lesemann.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Monmouth County, MON-L-2253-98.
Lawrence, Leslie & Kain, attorneys for
appellant (Wesley M. Kain, on the brief).
Methfessel & Werbel, attorneys for respondent
(Martin R. McGowan, Jr., on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SKILLMAN, P.J.A.D.
Plaintiff was a member of the congregation of defendant
Second Baptist Church of Long Branch. On December 22, 1996, a
friend drove plaintiff to the church to attend Sunday morning
services. Plaintiff got out of the car carrying a Bible and
began walking along a sidewalk abutting the church. As she
neared the front of the church, plaintiff tripped on a raised
metal grate and fell, suffering a knee injury.
Plaintiff brought this personal injury action against the
church and City of Long Branch. After the completion of
discovery, the church moved for summary judgment, contending that
plaintiffs' claim was barred by the Charitable Immunity Act,
N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7 to -11.
The trial court granted the church's motion, stating in a
brief oral opinion:
Plaintiff accepts that the movant, the Second
Baptist Church, is a nonprofit organization
organized exclusively for religious purposes.
She contends, however, that when the accident
occurred she was not a beneficiary of the
works of the charity apparently because she
had not yet entered the church.
It is, however, undisputed that she was
in fact on her way to church when she tripped
and fell on the sidewalk. . . .
. . . .
. . . She was for all intents and
purposes a beneficiary of the religious
experience at the Second Baptist Church of
Long Branch, that is, she was a member of the
church and was on her way to a regularly
scheduled service when the accident occurred.
It has now been well established that
immunity extends to persons injured following
their attendance at religious services, . . .
sometimes in the parking lot, sometimes on
the steps, but in each instance while leaving
church.
There's just no logical reason to
distinguish such decisions from the factual
pattern involved here, . . . where the
plaintiff was on her way to church when she
fell.
The court subsequently granted a motion for summary judgment
filed by the City of Long Branch.
Plaintiff appeals solely from the summary judgment granted
to the church. We conclude that the trial court correctly held
that the Charitable Immunity Act bars plaintiff's claim, and
affirm.
N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7(a) provides in relevant part:
No nonprofit corporation, society or
association organized exclusively for
religious . . . purposes . . . shall . . . be
liable to respond in damages to any person
who shall suffer damage from the negligence
of any agent or servant of such corporation,
society or association, where such person is
a beneficiary, to whatever degree, of the
works of such nonprofit corporation, society
or association; provided, however, that such
immunity from liability shall not extend to
any person who shall suffer damage from the
negligence of such corporation, society or
association or of its agents or servants
where such person is one unconcerned in and
unrelated to and outside of the benefactions
of such corporation, society or association
. . . .
N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-10 states that the Charitable Immunity Act "shall
be deemed to be remedial and shall be liberally construed."
This court has construed these statutory provisions to
immunize a church from a personal injury claim by a church member
who trips and falls while exiting the church after attending
services. Monaghan v. Holy Trinity Church,
275 N.J. Super. 594,
598-99 (App. Div. 1994); Bixenman v. Christ Episcopal Church
Parish House,
166 N.J. Super. 148, 152 (App. Div. 1979); Vitolo
v. St. Peter's Church,
118 N.J. Super. 35, 36-37 (App. Div.),
certif. denied,
60 N.J. 285 (1972). The evident rationale of
these decisions is that a church member is "a beneficiary, to
whatever degree," N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7(a), of the church's religious
mission not only during the period when church services are
actually being conducted, but also while the member is entering
or leaving the church to obtain the benefit of those services.
Plaintiff seeks to distinguish this line of decisions on the
ground that they all involved persons who suffered personal
injuries on church property, while she tripped and fell on a
"public sidewalk" abutting the church. However, a church's
entitlement to immunity from a personal injury action brought by
one of its members does not turn on the nature of the church's
interest in the property where an accident occurs. Instead, it
turns on the reason for the member's presence on the property,
which in this case was attendance at a church service. Thus,
plaintiff was a beneficiary of the church's religious works when
she tripped and fell as she walked down the sidewalk toward the
church to the same degree as if the accident had occurred on the
walkway between the sidewalk and the entrance to the church.
This conclusion is supported by the Court's statement of its
holding in Brown v. St. Venantius Sch.,
111 N.J. 325, 337 (1988)
-- the case extending sidewalk liability to churches and other
charitable organizations -- "that a charitable organization may
be liable in tort to a nonbeneficiary for its failure to maintain
an abutting sidewalk." (Emphasis added.) The Court's limitation
of a charity's liability for a dangerous condition of a sidewalk
"to a nonbeneficiary" constitutes an implicit recognition that a
sidewalk liability claim is subject to the same immunity from
claims of "beneficiaries" as any other type of tort claim against
a church or other entity entitled to the protections of the
Charitable Immunity Act.
We recognize that plaintiff could have suffered personal
injuries from a trip and fall on the sidewalk abutting the church
if she had used the sidewalk to walk to a store or some other
destination unrelated to attendance at church, and that the
church would not be immunized from liability under such
circumstances. However, plaintiff would not in that event have
been "a beneficiary, to [any] degree" of the church's religious
mission at the time of the accident. Her presence on the
sidewalk would have been the same as that of any member of the
general public who uses a sidewalk abutting a church for a
purpose "unrelated to . . . the [church's] benefactions."
Although it may appear somewhat anomalous for a church's
entitlement to charitable immunity to turn on the reason for a
person's presence on a sidewalk abutting the church, this is
simply a reflection of the fact that a church member may be
within a church's benefactions at certain times but at other
times have the same relationship to the church as any other
member of the general public.
Affirmed.