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NOT FOR PUBLICATION  WITHOUT  THE
APPROVAL OF  THE APPELLATE  DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT  OF  NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE  DIVISION
DOCKET  NO. A-2772-11T4
JAMES  SMITH,
Appellant,
v.
NEW JERSEY  STATE  PAROLE  BOARD,
Respondent.
March  11,  2013
Submitted March 5, 2013 - Decided
Before Judges Harris and Hoffman.
On appeal from the New Jersey State Parole Board.
James Smith, appellant pro se.
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Jeffrey  S.  Chiesa,  Attorney  General,  attorney  for  respondent                         (Lewis A.
Scheindlin,  Assistant  Attorney  General,  of  counsel;  Shirley  P.  Dickstein,
Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff  James  Smith  appeals  from  the New Jersey  State  Parole  Board's  December
21,  2011  final  decision denying  parole  and establishing  a  future  parole
eligibility  term  (FET)  of  sixty  months.  We  affirm  the denial  of  parole,  but
reverse  and remand  for reconsideration  of  the FET.
I.
In  April  1970,  after  pleading guilty  to  the July  5,  1969  shotgun  murders  of
two Camden  police  officers,  Smith  was sentenced  to  two consecutive  terms  of
life  imprisonment.1  At  the time  Smith  committed  these  crimes  he  was twenty-one
years  old;  in  late  March  2013,  he  will  turn  sixty-five  years  old.  Smith  has
been  continually  incarcerated  for almost  forty-four  years.
During  his four-decade  incarceration,  Smith  was cited  on  three  occasions  for
engaging in  prohibited  acts,  only  one of  which  was a  serious  "asterisk"
infraction.  See N.J.A.C.  10A:4-4.1(a)  ("Prohibited  acts  preceded by  an  asterisk
(*) are
considered  the most  serious  and result  in  the most  severe  sanctions  [].").  The
last  discipline,  meted  out in  March  1997,  was for "being  in  an  unauthorized
area."  See N.J.A.C.  10A:4-4.1(a)(.402).
The December  21,  2011  denial  of  parole  was the seventh  time  Smith  had failed  to
win release  after  becoming eligible for parole  for the first  time  in  1993.  At
Smith's  fifth  and sixth  parole  proceedings,  in  October  2007  and July  2009,  the
Parole  Board  denied  parole  and established  FETs  of  thirty-six months.
As  part  of  the present  parole  review,  Smith  underwent  a  mental  health
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evaluation  in  January  2011.  That  evaluation  reported a  2007  pre-parole
evaluation  with  a  "[m]edium  risk  of  reoffending." A  2004  evaluation  indicated  a
"[l]ow/moderate  risk  of  reoffending." The  2011  evaluation  noted:  "The  inmate
scored  26  on  the  [standardized Level  of  Service  Inventory-Revised  test].  Based
on  a  sample  of  inmates  studied  in  New Jersey,  this  indicates  a  medium  risk  for
recidivism  with  a  28% chance  of  re-arrest  and a  21% chance  of  reconviction
within  two years  of  release."  Additionally, it  concluded,  "this  inmate  appears
to  be  a  low to  medium  risk  for future  violence."2
In  May  2011,  a  two-person  panel  denied  parole.  It  declared,  "The  [p]anel  has
determined  a  substantial  likelihood  exists  that  you would  commit  a  new crime  if
released on  parole  at  this  time."  Although noting  six mitigating  factors, the
panel  check-marked  the following  reasons  for denial:
Prior  criminal record  noted.
Nature  of  criminal record  increasingly  more  serious.
Prior  opportunity(ies)  on                                                                                 .  probation/parole                                          .  .  .  has
(have)  failed  to  deter  criminal behavior.
Prior  opportunity(ies)  on                                                                                 .  probation                                                 .  .  .  has  (have)
been  violated in  the past.
                                                                                                            Prior  incarceration(s)  did not deter  criminal behavior.
Insufficient  problem(s)  resolution.  Specifically                                                                                                                      [X]  Lack
of  insight  into  criminal  behavior;                                                                                                                                   [X]  Minimizes
conduct;                                                                                                    [X]  Other[:]  Inmate  has  not  gained  any
additional  comprehension  of  his  crime  and  behavior after  so
may  years.  He  continues  to  focus  on  himself.  He  states  —
the  biggest  what  if  is  "If  I  wasn’t  there"                                                          ——  Not  ever
considering  that  maybe  it  might  be                                                                     —  "If I  didn't  pull  the
trigger.   If   I   didn't   shoot   the   officer[s]   or   if  I
controlled  my  rage."
The panel suggested that Smith participate in "[i]nstitutional programs geared toward criminal behavior";
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"[b]ehavior modification"; and "[o]ne to one counseling."
A third member was added to the panel to compute Smith's FET. In August 2011, the panel determined
that a sixty-month FET was appropriate for the following reason: "Extended FET to provide enough time to
address concerns of the panel since last denial we noted no infractions." Later, in September 2011, the
panel wrote, "it is clear that [Smith] continue[s] to remain a substantial threat to public safety."
Furthermore, it stated:
The  three-member  Board  panel  believes  that  during  [Smith's]  forty-one  (41)
years of incarceration [he has]:
                                                                                                                               been unable to identify the causes of  [his] violent behavior, therefore    failing to
                                                                                                                               develop adequate insight into [his] violent personality characteristic; and
                                                                                                                               failed  to  develop adequate insight into  [his] criminal personality characteristic.
During                                                                                                        [the]  hearing                                                                                            [he]  provided  only  generic,  obvious  and  formulaic
statements  to  the  Board  panel  such  as                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       [he]  committed  the  murder  of  two
uniformed  police  officers  because                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              [he  was]  "young"  and  "stupid." Such
explanations  by                                                                                                               [him]  demonstrate                                                                                                                                 [he]  still  cannot  sufficiently  explain the
underlying  motivations  that  impelled                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           [him]  to  react  in  a  deadly  and  violent
manner; and
been unable to demonstrate true remorse and empathy for the two officers that
[he] murdered. By altering the true facts and circumstances of the events of July
5, 1969, specifically by falsely asserting that the officers fired the initial shot, you
have led the three-member Board panel to conclude that you have an apathetic
and indifferent attitude towards your deadly actions.
Citing the same rationales expressed by its panels, the full Parole Board affirmed the denial of parole and
sixty-month FET on December 21, 2011. This appeal followed.
II.
On appeal, Smith presents the following points for our consideration:
POINT  I:  THE  DECISION  OF  THE  PAROLE  BOARD  TO  DENY  PAROLE  AND
IMPOSE  A LONGER FUTURE ELIGIBILITY TERM THAN PREVIOUSLY  IMPOSED,
WITHOUT ANY NEW, NEGATIVE INTERVENING FACTORS, IS A VIOLATION   OF
DUE PROCESS AND MUST BE REVERSED.
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POINT II: APPELLANT HAS BEEN DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF DUE
PROCESS  BY  THE  BOARD'S  FAILURES  TO  PROVIDE  HIM  WITH  ANNUAL
REVIEWS, PURSUANT TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE CODE.
POINT III: THE NEW JERSEY PAROLE BOARD'S UNFETTERED DISCRETION TO
DEVIATE  FROM  ADMINISTRATIVE  GUIDELINES  WITH  NO  SET  TIMETABLE
ALLOWS AN ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS AND MECHANICAL OPERATION OF THE
STATUTE    WHICH    RESULTS    IN    VIOLATIONS    OF    THE    STATUTES,
CONSTITUTIONS OF NEW  JERSEY AND  THE  UNITED STATES, AND    REQUIRES
REVIEW BY THIS COURT.
We are unpersuaded by Smith's arguments, except for those addressed to the duration of the FET.
The principles governing judicial review of decisions of the Parole Board are well settled, making our task
quite limited. It is "grounded in strong public policy concerns and practical realities." Trantino v. N.J. State
Parole Bd. (Trantino V), 166 N.J. 113, 200 (2001). "The decision of a parole board involves 'discretionary
assessment[s] of a multiplicity of imponderables . . .                                                             .'" Id. at 201 (alteration in original) (quoting
Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 10, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2105, 60 L. Ed. 2d
668, 677 (1979)). "To a greater degree than is the case with other administrative agencies, the Parole
Board's decision-making function involves individualized discretionary appraisals." Ibid. (citing Beckworth v.
N.J. State Parole Bd., 62 N.J. 348, 358-59 (1973)). Consequently, we may reverse the Parole Board's
decision only if it is "arbitrary and capricious." Ibid. Furthermore, we do not disturb the Board's factual
findings if they "'could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence in the whole record.'"
Id. at 172 (quoting Trantino v. N.J. State Parole Bd. (Trantino IV), 154 N.J. 19, 24 (1998)).
Applying that deferential standard of review, we find no basis to disturb the Parole Board's decision to deny
parole in this case. The decision to deny parole was not arbitrary and capricious and was supported by
ample evidence, including that Smith is serving two consecutive life sentences, he exhibited insufficient
insight into his violent personality characteristics, and he minimized his conduct that resulted in the
convictions. See N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.11.
Because Smith's crimes were committed in 1969, he was entitled to release on parole unless the Parole
Board determined by a preponderance of the evidence that there is "a substantial likelihood" that he would
commit a crime if released on parole. Trantino V, supra, 166 N.J. at 126; see N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.53(a);
N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.10(a). Unless "there exists in the reviewing mind a definite conviction that the
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determination below went so far wide of the mark that a mistake must have been made," N.J. State Parole
Bd. v. Cestari, 224 N.J. Super. 534, 547 (App. Div.) (quoting 613 Corp. v. Div. of State Lottery, 210 N.J.
Super. 485, 495 (App. Div. 1986)), certif. denied, 111 N.J. 649 (1988), the Parole Board's decision will
prevail. We find no such mistake in this case, at least regarding the question of whether Smith should have
been released on parole. Where, as here, the decision concerns a prediction as to an inmate's future
behavior, a prediction fraught with subjectivity, our jurisprudence mandates broad discretion in the Parole
Board's decision-making process. Puchalski v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 104 N.J. Super. 294, 300 (App. Div.),
aff’d, 55 N.J. 113 (1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 938, 90 S. Ct. 1841, 26 L. Ed. 2d 270 (1970).
We do not share the same view regarding the length of the FET. The exercise of discretion involved in
setting an FET,
like the exercise of discretion in granting or denying parole, is not unbridled. It is limited by statute and
regulations. N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.56 provides, in pertinent part:
a. The board shall develop a schedule of future parole eligibility dates for adult
inmates  denied  release  at  their  eligibility  date.  In  developing  such schedule,
particular emphasis shall be placed on the severity of the offense for which he
was denied parole and on the characteristics of the offender, such as, but not
limited  to, the prior criminal record of the inmate  and  the need for   continued
incapacitation of the inmate.
b.  If  the  release  on  the  eligibility  date  is  denied,  the  board  panel which
conducted  the  hearing  shall  refer  to  the  schedule  published  pursuant  to
subsection a., and include in its statement denying parole notice of    the    date of
future  parole  consideration.  If  such  date  differs  from  the  date  otherwise
established  by  the  schedule,  the  board  panel  shall  include  particular reasons
therefor.
The schedule of presumptive FETs established by the parole Board and the standards for deviation
therefrom are set forth in N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.21. The standard FET for murder is twenty-seven months,
which may be increased only if it is "clearly inappropriate due to the inmate's lack of satisfactory progress in
reducing the likelihood of future criminal behavior." N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.21(d).
Thus, where N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.56(b) requires "particular reasons" for an FET "date [that] differs from the
date otherwise established by the schedule," the decision must be capable of judicial review. We have
several analytical problems with the FET's duration as set by the Parole Board. First, there is no logical
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explanation for why, at this time, an increase in Smith's FET was required. We do not suggest that the
Parole Board must pay slavish fidelity to the FETs set by earlier Parole Boards, but the current decision
must, at least, explain why a much longer FET is now required. It is not a sufficient explanation that as
Smith's incarceration lengthens without insightful progress, so too must his FET increase in duration. Also,
at the very least, the Parole Board must reconcile the present sixty-month FET with the increasingly shorter
FETs imposed throughout the history of Smith's seven parole applications.
Moreover, the Parole Board has not explained the effects, if any, of Smith's aging, his overall health, and
the circumstance that he is wheelchair-bound. These are significant factors that must be addressed in any
analysis of recidivism. The duration of the FET must be reasonably and rationally related to reduction of the
risk of recidivism that justifies denial of parole. On remand, the FET should be reconsidered, and explained
in a way that avoids conclusory statements, while hewing to the objective facts in the record.
Reversed and remanded for reconsideration of the FET in conformity with this opinion. We do not retain
jurisdiction.3
1  At  the  time  of  sentencing,  Smith  had  never  been  convicted  of  any offense  as
an  adult.  He  had,  however, several  juvenile adjudications,  the last  when  he  was
thirteen years  old.
2  The  report  also  stated,  "Inmate  Smith  does  have  a  significant  number  of
serious  physical difficulties  as  he  is  limited  to  a  wheelchair.  He  noted  he  has
significant   cardiac   difficulties,   back   problems,   high   blood   pressure  and
diabetes."
3  We  reject  Smith's  other  arguments,  including  his due process  claims  and
grievances  about  the purported  lack  of  annual  reviews, as  being  wholly  without
merit.  R.  2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
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