JEFFREY M. ROSENBERG and
JONI L. ROSENBERG,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK, FA
and WASHINGTON MUTUAL, INC.,
Defendants-Respondents.
_____________________________________________
Argued March 10, 2004 Decided March 22, 2004
Before Judges Conley, Wecker and Weissbard.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Civil Division, Burlington County, Docket No.
BUR-L-00314-03.
Marc L. Ackerman argued the cause for appellants (Brodsky &
Smith, attorneys; Mr. Ackerman and Evan J. Smith, on the
brief).
Jeffrey J. Greenbaum argued the cause for respondent (Sills
Cummis Radin Tischman Epstein & Gross, attorneys; Mr. Greenbaum, of counsel; Mr. Greenbaum
and Steven R. Rowland, on the brief).
The opinion of the court is delivered by
CONLEY, P.J.A.D.
In May 2000, plaintiffs obtained a thirty-year, $225,000 loan from defendant Washington Mutual
Bank, FA (WMBFA), which they used to buy a vacation home. They agreed
to a type of adjustable rate mortgage (ARM) which offers several different types
of payment options. At some point they stopped making payments and, in January
2003, filed a Superior Court, Law Division action against WMBFA and defendant Washington
Mutual, Inc. (WM). The complaint seeks injunctive relief and damages for alleged consumer
fraud violations and breach of contract. The crux of their complaint is that
the billing statements, sent to them by WMBFA
See footnote 1, are deceptive. Specifically, as characterized
in their appellate brief:
the Complaint does not allege that [WMBFA] is not entitled to charge interest
on a mortgage, nor does it allege that [WMBFA] is not entitled to
account for negative amortization on a loan, let alone be prohibited from collecting
deferred interest or increased principal from its customers. Rather, the Complaint takes issue
with the manner in which [WMBFA] advises its customers of the amount due
each month and the effect such a monthly payment will have on [WMBFA's]
New Jersey customers, including Plaintiffs. The Complaint further alleges that [WMBFA's] Monthly Loan
Statement is deceptive in the manner it is presented to Plaintiffs and the
class.
The focus of their state law claims, then, is upon WMBFA's billing disclosures,
or alleged lack thereof. Concluding that federal law preempted these claims, the trial
judge granted defendants' motion to dismiss. Although the parties engage in a discussion
of a plethora of federal and other state law, we think it plain
that the precise focus of plaintiffs' claims,
i.e., WMBFA's billing disclosures, has been
expressly preempted. Even if not preempted, we see nothing deceptive, inaccurate or fraudulent
in the billing statements to support consumer fraud or breach of contract claims.
Accordingly, we affirm.
Plaintiffs' complaints are occasioned by the type of interest and loan repayment plan
they agreed to. Although the principal amount of the loan was $225,000, plaintiffs
were advised in large, bold print, in the "Adjustable Rate Rider" (ARR) that
was incorporated into the mortgage and signed by them, that:
THIS RIDER CONTAINS PROVISIONS ALLOWING FOR CHANGES IN MY INTEREST RATE AND MY
MONTHLY PAYMENT. MY MONTHLY PAYMENT INCREASES WILL HAVE LIMITS WHICH COULD RESULT IN
THE PRINCIPAL AMOUNT I MUST REPAY BEING LARGER THAN THE AMOUNT I ORIGINALLY
BORROWED, BUT NOT MORE THAN 125% OF THE ORIGINAL AMOUNT (OR $281,250.00). MY
INTEREST RATE CAN NEVER EXCEED THE LIMIT STATED IN THE NOTE AND RIDER.
A BALLOON PAYMENT MAY BE DUE AT MATURITY.
The ARR explains that the interest rate is tied to an index. The
index is the twelve-month average "of the annual yields on actively traded United
States Securities" and is compiled by the Federal Reserve Board. Each month, WMBFA
adds 2.75% to the index and that total is plaintiffs' interest rate until
the next month, when the calculation is redone and a new rate is
determined. The ARR also contains a "cap" provision, which provides that that maximum
possible interest rate under this system is 11.5%.
Changes to the actual monthly payment, however, occur on a different schedule. According
to the ARR, under most circumstances the monthly payment will remain within 7.5%
above or below the previous monthly payment. Because of this limit, the ARR
recognizes that plaintiffs' "monthly payment could be less or greater than the amount
of the interest portion of the monthly payment that would be sufficient to
repay the unpaid principal . . . owe[d] at the monthly payment date
in full on the maturity date in substantially equal payments." In situations where
the payment is less than the recalculated monthly interest, the difference is added
to the principal of the loan and accrues interest (Negative Amortization). In cases
where the payment is more, the excess payment is applied to reduce the
principal (Accelerated Amortization).
This system is subject to further limitations. Should the situation arise where plaintiffs
are "underpaying", the additions to principal are capped at 125% of the original
principal. In the event that the principal would otherwise exceed 125% of the
original principal, plaintiffs would be required to pay a new monthly payment notwithstanding
the aforementioned 7.5% rule. This new monthly payment would be "an amount which
would be sufficient to repay [the] then unpaid principal in full on the
maturity date at my interest rate in effect the month prior to the
payment due date in substantially equal payments." The monthly payment calculation is revisited
every five years and adjusted without regard to cap limitations.
Each month, WMBFA sent a loan statement to plaintiffs. The complaint includes the
February 7, 2002, statement. It plainly shows how the adjustable rate and optional
payment plans operate. We reprint that statement on page 6 so that the
reader can easily see its clarity:
Washington Mutual
- Customer Service - (800) 282-4840
TDD - For the Hearing Impaired - (800) 735-2922
Mon - Fri 7:00 am
- 8:00 pm
Sat 8:00 am - 1:00 pm
www.WaMuHomeLoans.com
Loan Statement
Statement Date: February 7. 2002
Activity Since: January 11, 2002
Loan Number: 0036961852
JEFFREY H ROSENBERG 55,735 HS
JONI L ROSENBERG
428 BALLYTORE CIR
WYNNEWOOD PA 19096-2354
2001 Year End Information:
Interest Paid S17.7S6.39
Property Taxes Paid $7,188.65
Please refer to your Annual Interest Statement for complete year end information.
See Reverse Side For Additional Information
Current Loan Information
Property Address:
6602 Atlantic Ave
Ventnor City NJ 08406
Principal Balance
Escrow Balance
Interest Rate
$222,884.26
$1,330.94
6.23100%
Activity Summary Payment Due Information
Activity is from January 11. 2002 to February 7, 2002 Next Payment Due Date
03/01/02
Current Payment Total Amount Due 1,870.31
Principal 227.06 Total Amount Due $1.870.31
Interest 1,210.94
Escrow 722.53
Total Amount Received $2,160.53
To avoid late charges of $57.39, we must receive your payment by 03/16/02
during our business hours.
Escrow/Other Activity './."'..''
Year-To-Date Information
Property Taxes Paid
Option 2: Interest Only
Avoids deferred interest by paying the minimum amount due, plus the additional interest.
Payments remain manageable, with no change in your principal balance for the month.
Option 3: Fully Amortized Payment
Pays all the interest due, reduces your principal in an amount sufficient to
pay off your loan on schedule.
Option 4: Faster Equity Build-Up
Calculated to amortize your loan based on a 15-year term from the first
payment due date, resulting in substantial interest savings.
The option you selected may not be available if the payment for that
option would be less than the minimum due. The amount shown on the
statement for "Current Total Due" will be the minimum amount due.
WMBFA is a federally chartered savings association. See Washington Mut. Bank, FA v.
Superior Court,
115 Cal. Rptr 2d 765, 770 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002); Moskowitz
v. Washington Mut. Bank FA,
768 N.E.2d 262, 263 (Ill. App. Ct.), app.
denied,
786 N.E.2d 186 (Ill. 2002). It is, therefore, subject to the regulatory
authority of the federal Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS). Turner v. First Union
Nat. Bank,
162 N.J. 75, 87 (1999). That federal entity draws its authority
from the Congressional enactment of the Home Owners' Loan Act (HOLA), 12 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1461-1470. See
12 U.S.C.A.
§1464(a); Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de
la Cuesta,
458 U.S. 141, 161,
102 S. Ct. 3014, 3026,
73 L.
Ed.2d 664, 680 (1982); Turner v. First Union Nat. Bank, supra, 162
N.J. at 88 (noting the observation in Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n
v. de la Cuestan, supra, 458 U.S. at 161, 102 S. Ct. at
3026, 73 L. Ed.
2d at 680, that "it would have been difficult
for Congress to give the [Federal Home Loan] Bank Board [,OTS' predecessor agency,]
a broader mandate.").
Congress specifically authorized OTS to preempt state laws affecting the operations of federal
savings associations. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1463(a), 1464(a). OTS has done so. 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(a)
provides:
Occupation of field. Pursuant to sections 4(a) and 5(a) of the HOLA,
12 U.S.C. 1463(a), 1464(a), OTS is authorized to promulgate regulations that preempt state laws
affecting the operations of federal savings associations when deemed appropriate to facilitate the
safe and sound operation of federal savings associations, to enable federal savings associations
to conduct their operations in accordance with the best practices of thrift institutions
in the United States, or to further other purposes of the HOLA.
To enhance safety and soundness and to enable federal savings associations to conduct
their operations in accordance with best practices (by efficiently delivering low-cost credit to
the public free from undue regulatory duplication and burden), OTS hereby occupies the
entire field of lending regulation for federal savings associations. OTS intends to give
federal savings associations maximum flexibility to exercise their lending powers in accordance with
a uniform federal scheme of regulation. Accordingly, federal savings associations may extend credit
as authorized under federal law, including this part, without regard to state laws
purporting to regulate or otherwise affect their credit activities, except to the extent
provided in paragraph (c) of this section . . . .
The preemptive reach of OTS' authority extends not only to state statutory and
regulatory laws but to "any state . . . ruling, order or judicial
decision." 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(a) ("For purposes of this section, 'state law' includes any
state statute, regulation, ruling, order or judicial decision.").
Pertinent to plaintiffs' complaints about WMBFA's billing statements, 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(b)(9) expressly applies
its preemption to:
(9) Disclosure and advertising, including laws requiring specific statements, information, or other content
to be included in credit application forms, credit solicitations, billing statements, credit contracts,
or other credit-related documents . . . .
[Emphasis added.]
While 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(c) refers to state laws, including contract and tort laws,
that are not preempted if "they only incidentally affect" the federally regulated institutions,
OTS has made it clear that the "incidentally affect" analysis becomes critical only
if the types of preempted areas set forth in 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(b) are
not involved. In this respect, it has said:
[T]he first step will be to determine whether the type of law in
question is listed in paragraph (b). If so, the analysis will end there;
the law is preempted. If the law is not covered by paragraph (b),
the next question is whether the law affects lending. If it does, then,
in accordance with paragraph (a), the presumption arises that the law is preempted.
This presumption can be reversed only if the law can clearly be shown
to fit within the confines of paragraph (c). For these purposes, paragraph (c)
is intended to be interpreted narrowly. Any doubt should be resolved in favor
of preemption.
[
61 Fed. Reg. 50951, 50966-67 (Sept. 30, 1996) (emphasis added).]
Here, plaintiffs' state law claims clearly fall within 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(b)(9) as they
assert that WMBFA's billing statements fail to convey, i.e., disclose, to the debtor
that the "total amount due" figure is something other than what one normally
would think of as a "total amount due." By way of either injunctive
relief or monetary damages, plaintiffs seek to insert a form of state regulation
by compelling a different type of billing statement disclosure. Miranda v. Fridman,
276 N.J. Super. 20, 34 (App. Div.), certif. denied,
138 N.J. 271 (1994). See
American Bankers Ass'n v. Lockyer,
239 F. Supp.2d 1000, 1010-12 (E.D. Cal.
2002) (state regulations over disclosures in credit card agreements informing cardholders of the
financial effects of only remitting the minimum monthly payment preempted); Moskowitz v. Washington
Mut. Bank, supra, 768 N.E.
2d at 266 (consumer fraud and breach of contract
claims premised on non-disclosure of a payoff statement fee preempted). Plaintiffs' cited cases
do not involve state actions falling within 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(b)(9), Tuxedo Beach Club
Corp. v. City Fed. Sav. Bank,
749 F. Supp. 635 (D. N.J. 1990);
Morse v. Mut. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Whitman,
536 F. Supp. 1271 (D. Mass. 1982); Gibson v. World Sav. & Loan Ass'n,
128 Cal.
Rptr.2d 19 (Ct. App. 2002) and Fenning v. Glenfed, Inc.,
47 Cal.
Rptr 2d 715 (Ct. App. 1995), and are thus inapposite.
Even were we to conclude that preemption does not exist, plaintiffs' state law
claims are facially meritless. The premise for plaintiffs' complaints about the "total amount
due" figure on the billing statement essentially relates to the "negative amortization" aspect
of their ARM. The mortgage documents which plaintiffs signed clearly explain how this
can occur. In essence, the rate adjustment formula and the payment adjustment formula
are distinct. The difference in the formulas has the effect of placing a
minimum on the payment due each month. The rate adjustment formula, however, can
result in a figure higher than the payment under the payment adjustment formula.
In this situation the minimum protects the mortgagor from having to make an
exorbitant monthly payment. This protection, however, has a cost. The difference between the
minimum amount and the amount which the rate adjustment formula dictates, if higher,
becomes capitalized or added to the principal, and itself begins accruing interest. That
is negative amortization. The ARM also provides additional caps on the adjustment percentage
and total principal which can be permitted to accrue. All of these terms
are plainly apparent in the mortgage documents. The language of the documents is
complex, but not indecipherably so, and they are not voluminous, totaling fourteen pages.
As to the loan statement which plaintiffs assert fails to accurately reflect what
the "total amount due is," it lists and defines the four payment options
and defines each one on the reverse side. The payment stub reflects the
minimum payment as the "Total Amount Due." That this is clear is reflected
by the fact that the value associated with this term is equal to
the value associated with the payment option labeled "Minimum payment due" listed above
the perforated stub. That term is defined on the reverse side of the
loan statement as the minimum amount discussed earlier. The option "Full principal and
interest payment" is defined as the amount necessary to avoid negative amortization. Thus,
while the stub specifies the "Total Amount Due", it has additional blanks where
mortgagors can indicate how much they are actually remitting, and, if they are
paying more than the minimum, where they wish to direct the surplus to
be applied. There is nothing misleading or nondisclosed on the loan statement. The
"Total Amount Due" is clearly the minimum payment required. It is equally clear
that, depending upon variations in the rate adjustment formula, a minimum payment may
trigger negative amortization.
Affirmed.
Footnote: 1
There are no separate claims against WM.