(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for
the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please
note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).
Argued October 20, 1997 -- Decided January 29, 1998
GARIBALDI, J., writing for a unanimous Court.
The issue in this appeal is whether individuals injured by hit-and-run motorists must satisfy the
verbal threshold pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:6-70(n) in order to recover noneconomic damages from the
Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund (“Fund').
On July 2,1991, while on her way to work, Jesenia Jimenez, a pedestrian, was struck by a car. The
car stopped only momentarily, allowing Jimenez to catch a glimpse of the driver, but did not stop. Jimenez
got up and walked to her bus stop, where she caught a bus and went to work. Within minutes of arriving,
she told her employer of the incident. Because Jimenez was complaining of pain, her employer took her to
the hospital where emergency room physicians treated her with ice packs and analgesics and released her.
Subsequently, Jimenez sought treatment with a chiropractor, who referred her to a neurologist for
tests related to her continuing headaches. The neurologist concluded that Jimenez would continue to suffer
chronic periodic episodes of muscle spasm following physical or stressful events.
Thereafter, Jimenez filed suit against the Commissioner of Insurance (Commissioner) and the
Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:6-78. The Commissioner and the Fund filed a
motion for summary judgment, asserting that the claim should be dismissed because Jimenez failed to
present sufficient evidence of injuries satisfying the verbal threshold, as required by N.J.S.A. 39:6-70(n)
(Section 70(n)). The trial court denied that motion and held, as a matter of law, that the verbal threshold
did not apply.
A jury trial on the liability portion of the case resulted in a judgment against the unknown tortfeasor,
holding that person one hundred percent responsible for the accident and Jimenez's injuries. Thereafter, on
the scheduled date of the damages trial, defendants moved for a one-day adjournment due to the
unavailability of their medical expert. The trial court denied the motion and the jury returned a verdict in
favor of Jimenez. A judgment was entered, which also required the Fund to pay personal injury protection
(PIP) benefits to Jimenez.
The Commissioner and the Fund appealed, and the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's
denial of the Funds's summary judgment motion. The panel specifically concluded that the verbal threshold
does not apply to persons injured by hit-and-run motorists. The panel also held that the trial court had
abused its discretion in denying the one-day adjournment and, therefore, remanded the case for a new trial
on damages.
The Supreme Court granted the Commissioner's petition for certification.
HELD: Claimants injured in hit-and-run accidents must satisfy the verbal threshold to recover noneconomic
damages from the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund.
1. Although the purpose of the Fund is to “provide a measure of relief to persons who sustain losses
inflicted by financially irresponsible or unknown owners and operators of motor vehicles,” it was never
intended to make every claimant whole or to compensate all accident victims. (pp. 4-8)
2. As part of its design to reduce automobile insurance premiums in the State of New Jersey, the Legislature
enacted the Verbal Threshold Law, which allows persons who choose the verbal threshold option to recover
for noneconomic losses only for those personal injuries that fit into one of nine specified categories. (pp. 8-9)
3. As the victim of a hit-and-run driver, Jimenez's only recourse for recovery is to the Fund, and that
recovery is governed by the provisions of the Fund Act. (pp. 8-11)
4. Because courts faced with the question of whether victims of hit-and-run accidents must satisfy the verbal
threshold have reached different conclusions and because each interpretation is plausible, the intent of the
Legislature must be deduced. (pp. 11-12)
5. Since the enactment of the Fund Act, the Legislature has continuously sought to preserve the Fund's
assets. (pp. 12-13)
6. The history of the Fund Act demonstrates the Legislature's intent to treat claimants injured in hit-and-run accidents and claimants injured by known uninsured drivers alike. (pp. 13-14)
7. Courts have been reluctant to construe the language of the Fund Act strictly, particularly where the words
could be read as creating a distinction between the two classes of claimants. (pp. 15-16)
8. Courts have repeatedly stressed their role in protecting the assets of the Fund against fraud and abuse
because, in essence, the judiciary is the guardian of the trust monies represented by our statutory Funds. (p.
16)
9. To construe the Fund Act to require only victims of uninsured drivers to meet the verbal threshold, and
not those of hit-and-run accidents, would encourage those injured by uninsured drivers to claim that they
were injured in a hit-and-run accident, and would discourage those injured in hit-and-run accidents from
making reasonable efforts to ascertain the identity of the vehicle involved. (pp. 16-17)
10. Eliminating the verbal threshold for hit-and-run claims would deplete the Fund because the
Commissioner cannot exercise his right of subrogation against unknown tortfeasors. (pp. 17-18)
11. Requiring eligible hit-and-run claimants to satisfy the verbal threshold furthers the Legislature's goal of
eliminating minor personal injury automobile negligence cases from the court system and furthers the Fund
Act's goal of providing limited relief to claimants to prevent those injured from having to absorb the entire
economic loss. (pp. 18-19)
Judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED to the trial
court for reconsideration of the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment.
CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES HANDLER, POLLOCK, O'HERN, STEIN and
COLEMAN join in JUSTICE GARIBALDI's opinion.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-
25 September Term 1997
JESENIA JIMENEZ,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
WILLIAM BAGLIERI, JOHN DOE
(name being fictitious),
ABC CORP. (name being fictitious)
and MATERIAL DAMAGE ADJUSTMENT
CORP., as servicing carrier
for the MARKET TRANSITION FACILITY,
Defendants,
and
SAMUEL FORTUNATO, COMMISSIONER
OF INSURANCE AND UNSATISFIED
CLAIM AND JUDGMENT FUND BOARD,
Defendants-Appellants.
Argued October 20, 1997 -- Decided January 29, 1998
On certification to the Superior Court,
Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported
at
295 N.J. Super. 162 (1996).
Jeffrey L. Love argued the cause for
appellants (Beattie Padovano, attorneys).
Douglas D. Burgess argued the cause for respondent
(Bross, Strickland & Burgess, attorneys).
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
GARIBALDI, J.
This appeal presents the issue of whether individuals
injured by hit-and-run motorists must satisfy the verbal
threshold pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:6-70(n), to recover noneconomic
damages from the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund (Fund or
UCJF). We conclude the Legislature intended that claimants
injured in hit-and-run accidents must satisfy the verbal
threshold to recover noneconomic damages from the Fund.
On July 2, 1991, while on her way to work, plaintiff Jesenia Jimenez was struck by a car. The car slowed momentarily, allowing plaintiff to catch a glimpse of the driver, but did not stop. Plaintiff got up and walked to her bus stop, where she caught a bus and went to work. Within minutes of her arrival, she told her employer about the incident and he told her to call the police. Plaintiff's employer then took her to the hospital because she was complaining of a headache, dizziness, and leg and back pain. The hospital took x-rays and found no fractures. The emergency room physicians treated her with ice packs and analgesics for her head, back, and leg pain, and released her.
Subsequently, plaintiff sought treatment from Dr. Gary Bozian, a chiropractor. He treated her with massage therapy and spinal stimulation, and eventually referred her to Dr. John Burger, a neurologist, for tests related to her continuing
headaches. Dr. Burger concluded that plaintiff would continue to
suffer chronic periodic episodes of muscle spasm following
physical or stressful events.
Based on a witness's partial identification of the license
plate, plaintiff filed suit against William Baglieri, as the
operator of the vehicle that had injured her. Plaintiff also
named Samuel Fortunato, State of New Jersey Commissioner of
Insurance (Commissioner), and the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment
Fund Board as defendants pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:6-78. Plaintiff
sought medical expenses from the Fund and personal injury
protection benefits from the Material Damages Adjustment
Corporation (MDA), the servicing carrier for Baglieri's insurance
provider. After it was established that neither Baglieri nor his
car were involved in the accident, the Law Division granted
summary judgment in favor of Baglieri and MDA.
The Commissioner and the Fund filed a motion for summary
judgment, asserting that the claim should be dismissed because
plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence of injuries
satisfying the verbal threshold, as required by N.J.S.A. 39:6-70(n) (Section 70(n)). The court denied that motion and held as
a matter of law that the verbal threshold did not apply.
A jury trial on the liability portion of the case resulted
in a judgment against the unknown tortfeasor, holding that person
one hundred percent liable for the accident and plaintiff's
injuries. The damages portion of the case was set for trial on
October 13, 1995; however, it was rescheduled for November 1,
1995 because plaintiff's attorney was involved in an automobile
accident. On November 1, 1995, defendants moved for a one-day
adjournment because their medical expert was unavailable to
testify on the rescheduled trial date. The court denied the
motion. The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff in the
amount of $25,000. On November 17, 1995, judgment was entered on
behalf of plaintiff in the reduced amount of $15,000 pursuant to
N.J.S.A. 39:6-73. Subsequently, an amended judgment was entered
pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:6-69, requiring the Fund to pay personal
injury protection (PIP) benefits to plaintiff.
Defendants appealed, and the Appellate Division affirmed the
trial court's denial of the Fund's summary judgment motion. The
panel, relying on Rivera v. Fortunato,
285 N.J. Super. 168 (Law
Div. 1996), concluded that the verbal threshold does not apply to
plaintiffs injured by hit-and-run motorists.
295 N.J. Super. 162
(1996). The court also held that the trial court had abused its
discretion in denying the one-day adjournment, and therefore, the
court remanded the case for a new trial on damages.
We granted the Commissioner's petition for certification,
148 N.J. 461 (1997).
In 1952, as part of an automobile insurance reform package, the Legislature enacted the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund Law, L. 1952, c. 174 (codified at N.J.S.A. 39:6-61 to -91) (Fund
Act),See footnote 1 to provide for the establishment, maintenance, and
administration of a fund for the payment of damages for personal
injuries or property damage arising out of accidents involving
uninsured or unknown owners of automobiles. Only claimants who
are statutorily qualified under N.J.S.A. 39:6-62 may recover
benefits under the Fund. A “qualified person” is defined as one
who lacks recourse to uninsured motorist benefits under an
applicable insurance policy. N.J.S.A. 39:6-62. Benefits are
provided to two classes of individuals, those injured by known
uninsured motor vehicles, N.J.S.A. 39:6-69, and those injured by
hit-and-run drivers, N.J.S.A. 39:6-78.
That plaintiff is a “qualified person” to recover benefits
under the Fund Act is undisputed. The issue is whether, as a
victim of a hit-and-run driver, she is subject to the verbal
threshold requirements established in N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8. The
Commissioner asserts that Section 70(n) applies and, therefore,
for an eligible claimant injured in a hit-and-run accident to
recover noneconomic damages from the UCJF, he or she must have
suffered an injury that satisfies the verbal threshold.
Plaintiff asserts, however, that Section 70(n), and thus the
verbal threshold, is limited in application to cases involving
known uninsured drivers, and does not apply to accidents
involving hit-and-run motorists. To resolve that issue, we first
review the Legislature's intent in enacting the Fund Act and the
verbal threshold.
The purpose of the UCJF is to “provide a measure of relief to persons who sustain losses inflicted by financially irresponsible or unknown owners and operators of motor vehicles, where such persons would otherwise be remediless.” Dixon v. Gassert, 26 N.J. 1, 5 (1958); Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 279 (1961); Corrigan v. Gassert, 27 N.J. 227, 233 (1958). “The [L]egislature created the Fund 'to provide the kind of protection a liability insurance policy would provide.'” Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund Bd. v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 138 N.J. 185, 189 (1994) (quoting Esdaile v. Hartsfield, 245 N.J. Super. 591, 595 (App. Div. 1991)) (citations omitted). However, the Fund was never intended to make every claimant whole or to compensate all accident victims; rather, it was intended to “offer some measure of relief to those who come within the class intended to be protected, to prevent a claimant from being forced to absorb the entire economic loss caused by the accident.” Ibid. The amounts recoverable from the Fund consist of basic PIP coverage, see N.J.S.A. 39:6-86.1 and -86.4, and recovery for bodily injury and property damage not covered by PIP, limited to $15,000 per person, $30,000 per accident for bodily injury and amounts in
excess of $500, but not more than $5,000, for property damage per
accident, N.J.S.A. 39:6-69.
To be eligible for Fund benefits, claimants must comply with
numerous procedural requirements. See, e.g., N.J.S.A. 39:6-65
and -80. The Fund Act contains separate sections governing
hearings for those injured by known uninsured drivers from whom
damages cannot be recovered, N.J.S.A. 39:6-70, and for those
injured in hit-and-run accidents, N.J.S.A. 39:6-78. For hit-and-run accidents, the Fund Act provides that “no judgment against
the Commissioner shall be entered unless the court is satisfied,
upon the hearing of the action,” that: (a) the plaintiff has
given the Board written notice of intent to make a claim within
the time permitted by N.J.S.A. 39:6-65, (b) the injuries are not
covered by workers' compensation laws, (c) the plaintiff was not
the owner of an uninsured motor vehicle at the time of the
accident or operating an automobile in violation of an order of
suspension or revocation, (d) the plaintiff has a cause of action
against the operator or owner of the hit-and-run vehicle, (e) all
reasonable efforts have been made to identify the vehicle and its
owner, and (f) the action is not brought on behalf of an insurer
under the circumstances prohibited by N.J.S.A. 39:6-70(1).
N.J.S.A. 39:6-78(a)-(f); Rivera, supra, 285 N.J. Super. at 172.
The hearing requirements in N.J.S.A. 39:6-70 for accidents
involving known uninsured automobiles are similar to the
provisions of N.J.S.A. 39:6-78. There are, however, requirements
for victims of known uninsured drivers that are unique to those
accidents. Such claimants must first recover a judgment against
the driver of the automobile and execute on that judgment before
seeking payment from the Fund. N.J.S.A. 39:6-70(h)-(k). Because
the victim of a known uninsured driver, unlike the victim of a
hit-and-run driver, is seeking a judgment against a known person,
that additional requirement is self-explanatory.
During the past three decades, the Legislature has passed several statutes intended to reduce New Jersey's ever-increasing automobile insurance premiums. See New Jersey Automobile Reparation Reform Act (No-Fault Act), L. 1970, c. 70, subsequently amended by L. 1972, c. 203 (codified at N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1 to -18); New Jersey Automobile Insurance Freedom of Choice Act and Cost Containment Act of 1984, L. 1983, c. 362, § 2 (Cost Containment Act); and the “Verbal Threshold Law.” L. 1988, c. 119 (codified at N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8 and 8.1).
In 1988, the Legislature enacted the Verbal Threshold Law, which requires those purchasing automobile insurance to choose between two types of coverage for recovery for noneconomic losses resulting from automobile-related injuries. N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8; Oswin v. Shaw, 129 N.J. 290, 297 (1992). The verbal threshold option allows recovery for noneconomic losses only for those
personal injuries that fit into one of nine specified
categories.See footnote 2 N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8a; Shaw, supra, 129 N.J. at 297.
The traditional tort option, on the other hand, permits
unrestricted recovery of noneconomic damages. N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8b.
An insured who elects the tort option pays a higher premium in
return for the unlimited right to sue. N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8.1a;
Shaw, supra, 129 N.J. at 297. An insured who fails to select a
form of coverage is deemed to have chosen the verbal threshold.
N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8.1b; Shaw, supra, 129 N.J. at 297.
As originally enacted, the verbal threshold applied to all
insureds who did not elect the tort option, and to PIP claimants
lacking any insurance, such as pedestrians or passengers. New
Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., supra, 138 N.J. at 188. In 1990, N.J.S.A.
39:6A-8b was amended to provide that claimants who are not
required to purchase automobile insurance, such as passengers and
pedestrians who do not own vehicles or who are not immediate
family members of vehicle owners, such as plaintiff in this case,
are no longer deemed to have chosen the verbal threshold. Sumner
v. Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund,
288 N.J. Super. 384, 388
(App. Div. 1996). Accordingly, had plaintiff been struck by a
known insured driver, she would not have been subject to the
verbal threshold and would have recovered damages from the
tortfeasor driver's insurance company. However, as the victim of
a hit-and-run driver, plaintiff's only recourse for recovery is
to the Fund, and that recovery is governed by the provisions of
the Fund Act.
We turn now to an examination of the critical section of the Fund Act, Section 70(n), which provides:
In order to recover for noneconomic loss, as defined in section 2 of P.L. 1972, c. 70 (C. 39:6A-2) for accidents to which the benefits of section 7 and 10 of P.L. 1972, c. 198 (C. 39:6-86.1 and C. 39:6-86.4) [PIP benefits] apply, the injured person shall have sustained an injury described in subsection a. of section 8 of P.L. 1972, c.70 (C. 39:6A-8) [the verbal threshold].See footnote 3
Section 70(n) is included in the portion of the Fund Act that relates to known uninsured drivers. However, Section 70(n) explicitly states that an injured person must have sustained an injury described in N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a) (i.e., satisfy the verbal threshold) "[i]n order to recover noneconomic loss . . . for accidents to which the benefits of . . . section . . . 39:6-86.4 apply." Section 39:6-86.4 deals exclusively with hit-and-run claimants and contains the requirements that hit-and-run claimants must meet to recover PIP benefits. Notwithstanding the reference to a section applicable only to victims of hit-and-run accidents, plaintiff asserts that the inclusion of Section 70(n) in the section governing known uninsured drivers, rather than in the separate section controlling hit-and-run accidents, indicates the Legislature's intention to subject only those claimants injured by known uninsured vehicles to the verbal threshold. We disagree.
Co.,
499 U.S. 244, 250-51,
111 S. Ct. 1227, 1231-32,
113 L. Ed 2d 274, 283 (1991)) (alterations in original). And, “[i]n the
absence of specific guidance, our task is to discern the intent
of the Legislature not only from the terms of the Act, but also
from its structure, history and purpose.” Martin, supra, 141
N.J. at 285 (quoting Fiore v. Consolidated Freightways,
140 N.J. 452, 471 (1995)). Ultimately, “[i]t is not the words but the
internal sense of the law that controls.” Roig v. Kelsey,
135 N.J. 500, 516 (1994) (quoting Wollen v. Fort Lee,
27 N.J. 408,
418 (1958)). Also, in interpreting the Fund Act, we must bear in
mind that “[t]hat which is clearly implied is as much a part of
the law as that which is expressed.” Giles v. Gassert,
23 N.J. 22, 35 (1956).
Since its enactment, the Legislature has continuously sought
to preserve the Fund's assets. In 1972, the Legislature amended
the No-Fault Act. L. 1972, c. 203. "One of the motivating
thrusts behind the 1972 reform package was the extraordinary
pressures on the . . . Fund by reason of the claims of
individuals injured by uninsured motorists." Craig & Pomeroy,
supra, § 1:2-4 (b)(3). Because that statutory scheme failed to
slow the increase in premium rates, the Legislature enacted the
Cost Containment Act, L. 1983, c. 362, § 2. The primary goal of
that Act, of which Section 70(n) was a part, was to bring about
“long sought after reductions in premiums for New Jersey
motorists.” Statement of Governor Thomas H. Kean on signing Bill
No. A-3981 (Oct. 4, 1983).
In 1988, the Legislature enacted the Verbal Threshold Law.
To protect the assets of the UCJF and to reduce the number of
lawsuits, the Legislature included the requirement in Section
70(n) that Fund claimants must satisfy the verbal threshold.
See, e.g., Oswin v. Shaw, supra, 129 N.J. at 318 (holding that
the purpose of the verbal threshold and no fault statute is "to
reduce the amount of litigation and to hold down the cost of
premiums”); Governor's Reconsideration and Recommendation
Statement, 3-4 (Aug. 4, 1988)(finding verbal threshold's
“essential purpose [is] closing the door to all lawsuits except
those involving bona fide serious injuries”).
The history of the Fund Act also demonstrates the Legislature's intent to treat claimants injured in hit-and-run accidents and claimants injured by known uninsured drivers alike. When originally enacted, the Fund Act contained a $200 monetary threshold that applied only to hit-and-run cases. L. 1952 c. 174 § 18. In 1958, the Fund Act was amended to eliminate certain “inequities and objectionable features.” Sponsor Statement to Assembly Bill No. A422 (Mar. 31, 1958). Among the changes, the Legislature amended N.J.S.A. 39:6-78 to eliminate the $200 threshold applicable only to actions involving hit-and-run accidents, resulting in both classes of claimants being treated the same. Subsequently, in 1972, with the enactment of the No Fault Act, the Legislature continued to treat both classes of
claimants the same by making PIP benefits available to both. See
N.J.S.A. 39:6-86.1 and -86.4.
The Legislature's desire to treat both classes equally is
further supported by looking at the requirements for the two
classes of claimants to collect from the Fund set forth in
N.J.S.A. 39:6-70 and -78. In those sections only section 70(n)
"does not on its face appear to be sui generis to uninsured
motorist claims [and] is neither restated nor incorporated by
reference in [the sections] governing hit-and-run claims."
Rivera, supra, 285 N.J. Super. at 176. Although it could be
argued that its placement signals a desire to apply Section 70(n)
solely to victims of known uninsured drivers, ibid., we believe
that the Legislature's purpose was to treat both classes of
claimants the same. Indeed there is no indication that the
Legislature intended to treat the two classes of claimants
differently. Nor is there any reason why the Legislature would
subject victims of known uninsured drivers to the verbal
threshold, while excluding victims of hit-and-run accidents from
the verbal threshold. From the Fund's perspective such a
distinction is unjustifiable. It makes no sense. Neither the
victim of a hit-and-run driver nor the victim of a known
uninsured driver is able to recover benefits from the tortfeasor
who caused the accident. Because the intent of the Legislature is
to treat the two classes of claimants alike, we see no reason to
impose an arbitrary distinction between them.
Courts have been reluctant to construe the language of the Fund Act strictly, particularly where the words could be read as creating a distinction between the two classes of claimants. For example, in Giles v. Gassert, supra, this Court held that a provision for extending the thirty-day period for filing a notice of claim because of incapacity applied to actions involving hit-and-run accidents and to accidents involving known uninsured drivers. 23 N.J. at 31. Although the language of the statute supported the argument that the extension was limited to accidents involving known uninsured drivers, we stated: “Deferment of notice for physical disability where the tortfeasor is known and not where he is unknown would be illusory, a wholly arbitrary distinction not at all in keeping with the spirit and the indubitable reason and policy of the statute.” Id. at 33.
Similarly, in Serkes v. Parsekian, 73 N.J. Super. 344, 348 (1962), the Law Division held that the guest exclusion clause of N.J.S.A. 39:6-70 was applicable to hit-and-run accidents, even though that clause was neither restated nor incorporated in N.J.S.A. 39:6-78. In rejecting the claim that by placing the guest exclusion clause in the section governing accidents involving known uninsured drivers the Legislature intended to limit its application to accidents involving known uninsured vehicles, the court concluded: “To summarily so confine the application of the 'exclusion clause' would be to disregard the essential legislative policy.” Ibid. The court explained that
the failure of the Legislature to include the exclusion clause in
N.J.S.A. 39:6-78 was more likely due to the Legislature's failure
to foresee the exclusion clause's applicability to hit-and-run
accidents than to a desire to treat hit-and-run claimants
differently. Ibid.
Courts have repeatedly stressed their role in protecting the assets of the Fund because “[i]n essence, the judiciary . . . is the guardian of the trust monies represented by our statutory Fund.” Szczesny v. Vasquez, 71 N.J. Super. 347, 358 (App. Div. 1962); Garcia v. Snedeker, 199 N.J. Super. 254, 261 (App. Div. 1985). In Giles, supra, we stated “[t]he statute is to be liberally construed to advance the remedy, due regard being had to the protection of the Fund against fraud and abuse and to the fulfillment of the essential legislative policy.” 23 N.J. at 34. We have also stressed that the Fund was not intended to make every claimant whole, but was intended to provide limited relief to prevent a claimant from being forced to shoulder the entire loss caused by the accident. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., supra, 138 N.J. at 189.
Rather than protecting the Fund from fraud and abuse, we are convinced that plaintiff's proffered interpretation would encourage fraud and abuse. Under plaintiff's construction of the Fund Act, claimants injured by known uninsured drivers who do not satisfy the verbal threshold cannot recover for noneconomic
damages, whereas claimants injured in hit-and-run accidents can
recover without limitations. That construction might encourage
those injured by uninsured drivers to claim they were injured in
a hit-and-run accident, and would discourage those injured in
hit-and-run accidents from making reasonable efforts to ascertain
the identity of the vehicle involved. That result would not only
be contrary to our responsibility to protect the Fund from fraud
and abuse, but also would vitiate N.J.S.A. 39:6-78(e)'s
requirement that claimants take reasonable efforts to ascertain
the identity of the driver and owner of the vehicle.
Moreover, eliminating the verbal threshold for hit-and-run
claims would deplete the Fund because the Commissioner cannot
exercise his right of subrogation against unknown tortfeasors.
It would also result in more lawsuits and court congestion,
resulting in increased costs that ultimately will be passed on to
New Jersey insureds. Assets of the UCJF consist of assessments
levied by the Commissioner against insurers writing motor vehicle
policies in New Jersey, "in the proportion that the net written
premiums of each bear to the aggregate net direct written
premiums of all insurers." N.J.S.A. 39:6-63(d). All insurers
doing business in New Jersey are informed annually of their
assessed contribution to the Fund. Ibid. If, after receiving
the assessed amounts, the Fund lacks sufficient assets, the
Commissioner reassesses the insurers. Ibid. If the Fund is
depleted by hit-and-run claimants seeking noneconomic damages,
insurers will be assessed greater amounts by the Commissioner.
The insurers undoubtedly will attempt to recoup those costs by
passing them on to insureds.
“In the interpretation of a statute our overriding goal has consistently been to determine the Legislature's intent in enacting a statute.” Roig, supra, 135 N.J. at 515. “It is the obvious reason of a law that gives it life, not the strict, literal sense of terms.” Giacobbe v. Gassert, 29 N.J. 421, 425 (1959). “[S]tatutes are to be read sensibly rather than literally.” Roig, supra, 135 N.J. at 515 (quoting Schierstead v. Brigantine, 29 N.J. 220, 230 (1959)). “The inquiry in the ultimate analysis is to determine the true intention of the law; and, to this end, the particular words are to be made responsive to the essential purpose of the law.” Wollen, supra, 27 N.J. at 418.
"From the inception of the no-fault statutory scheme, the Legislature intended to eliminate minor personal-injury automobile-negligence cases from the court system." Roig, supra, 135 N.J. at 510. See Statement by Governor Kean on Senate Bill No. 2637 (1988) (at N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.4). Requiring eligible hit-and-run claimants to satisfy the verbal threshold furthers that goal and also furthers the Fund Act's goal of providing limited relief to claimants to prevent those injured from having to absorb the entire economic loss. Even if eligible hit-and-run claimants do not satisfy the verbal threshold, they still receive
PIP benefits, see N.J.S.A. 39:86.4, and recover for bodily injury
and property damage not covered by PIP, see N.J.S.A. 39:6-69.
We are convinced the Legislature did not intend to exempt
eligible claimants injured in hit-and-run accidents from
satisfying the verbal threshold. If the Legislature disagrees
with our construction of the Fund Act, it may, of course, enact
clarifying legislation.
Although we decide that plaintiff must satisfy the verbal threshold, we express no opinion on whether plaintiff's injuries satisfy the threshold. The Commissioner moved for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff's injuries did not satisfy the verbal threshold, and the trial court denied the motion, holding that the verbal threshold did not apply. We therefore remand to the Law Division for reconsideration of the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment.
The judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed.
CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES HANDLER, POLLOCK, O'HERN, STEIN, and COLEMAN join in JUSTICE GARIBALDI's opinion.
NO. A-25 SEPTEMBER TERM 1997
ON APPEAL FROM
ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court
JESENIA JIMENEZ,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
WILLIAM BAGLIERI, et al.,
Defendants,
and
SAMUEL FORTUNATO, etc., et al.,
Defendants-Appellants.
DECIDED January 29, 1998
Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING
OPINION BY Justice Garibaldi
CONCURRING OPINION BY
DISSENTING OPINION BY
Footnote: 1On the same date, the Legislature enacted the Motor Vehicle Security-Responsibility Law, L. 1952, c. 173 (codified at N.J.S.A. 39:6-23 to -57), to assure
"financial responsibility for damages caused by automobile accidents." Cynthia M. Craig
& Daniel J. Pomeroy, New Jersey Auto Insurance Law, § 1:2-2 (1997 ed.) (Craig &
Pomeroy).
Footnote: 2 The nine categories are:
death; dismemberment; significant disfigurement; a fracture; loss of a fetus;
permanent loss of use of a body organ, member, function or system;
permanent consequential limitation of use of a body organ or member;
significant limitation of use of a body function or system; or a medically
determined injury or impairment of a non-permanent nature which
prevents the injured person from performing substantially all of the
material acts which constitute that person's usual and customary daily
activities for not less than 90 days during the 180 days immediately
following the occurrence of the injury or impairment . . . .