SYLLABUS
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).
Joan Marino v. Larry L. Marino et al (A-18-08)
Argued January 6, 2009 -- Decided September 24, 2009
HOENS, J., writing for a majority of the Court.
In this appeal, the Court must interpret the provisions in the New Jersey Cemetery Act of 2003, N.J.S.A. 45:27-1 to -38, governing interment, N.J.S.A. 45:27-22, and disinterment, N.J.S.A. 45:27-23 in a dispute between a decedent's surviving spouse and children about decedent's final resting place. Specifically raised is the question of whether the statutory provision that invests a surviving spouse with the authority to designate a place of interment, absent a contrary written declaration, also gives the spouse primacy in demanding disinterment notwithstanding statutory language to the contrary.
Plaintiff Joan Marino married the decedent Larry Marino, Sr. in 1982. Decedent had two children from a prior marriage and four children with Joan. When decedent died in October 2005, two of his children with Joan were still minors. The other four, all defendants in this litigation, were two adult children from his prior marriage, Larry Jr. and Brett, and two of his adult children with Joan, Jennifer and John. During the final years of the marriage, the relationship between Joan and decedent had deteriorated, although the couple had not formally separated or divorced. Decedent's will appointed Larry Jr. and Jennifer as co-executors. The will did not contain instructions in respect of where decedent wanted to be buried. Larry Jr. consulted an attorney who advised him that, as co-executor, he was authorized to decide questions concerning the disposition of his father's remains. Larry Jr. and Jennifer believed that their father wished to be buried in a cemetery plot owned by defendant Dorothy, decedent's mother. That plot is where Dorothy eventually will be buried and is also near where decedent's father is buried. Joan wanted decedent to be buried in a plot in the same cemetery that she and decedent had acquired through her mother and where she intends to be buried in the future. The plot is near her family's plots and is located about forty feet away from decedent's family's plots.
In a meeting two days after the death, the adult children informed Joan that they were unanimous in their desire to accommodate their father's wish to be buried in his mother's plot. Although Joan asserted that she had the right to decide as the surviving spouse, Larry Jr. countered that the authority rested with the co-executors. On October 27, 2005, decedent was buried in the plot owned by his mother and near the one where his father is buried. While Larry Jr. claims that the parties reached a compromise, Joan contends Larry Jr. threatened to bar her from the funeral home and services if she did not capitulate.
Eight months after the burial, in June 2006, Joan filed a Verified Complaint and Order to Show Cause seeking authorization from the Chancery Division to disinter decedent's remains and rebury them in the plot that she preferred. A Chancery judge presided over two days of hearings, wherein numerous witnesses testified about the state of the marriage and decedent's expressed desires regarding his final resting place. On November 29, 2006, the court issued its written opinion based on two essential findings of fact. First, the court found that Joan had not voluntarily agreed to allow decedent to be buried where he was, having been unduly pressured to give in under overwhelming circumstances. Second, the court found that decedent's clear intention was that his remains be buried near his father's plot, that he did not want to be buried near Joan's family's plot, and that, once buried he would not want his remains disinterred.
Applying the law to those findings of fact, the trial court acknowledged that because decedent had not appointed anyone in the will to decide the disposition of his remains, Joan, the surviving spouse, was authorized to make that decision. Nevertheless, the court determined that the issue was whether the remains should be disinterred rather than who was initially empowered to act. The court considered the disinterment statute controlling, noting that the interment statute requires compliance with a decedent's preference only if it is expressed in the will while there is no similar limitation on the court's equitable power to decide the question of disinterment. The court denied Joan's application, concluding that decedent's preference for burial was paramount and that his desire to be buried with his family, coupled with the desire not to be disinterred, should be enforced despite Joan's contrary wishes.
On appeal, a majority of the Appellate Division reversed, concluding that Joan should be able to disinter the remains and move them to the plot of her choosing. According to the majority, decedent had not made his wishes known through a testamentary provision; therefore, Joan, as his surviving spouse, had the right to decide his burial site and defendants had violated that statutorily-protected right. The majority reasoned that the disinterment statute, although silent about the effect to be given to a decedent's expression of intent, should be read in pari materia with the interment statute. That analysis led the majority to conclude that, in matters relating to disinterment, a spouse's interest should be outweighed only by a testamentary expression of decedent's intent. According to the majority, the trial court erred in giving primacy to decedent's intent and that a balancing of Joan's statutory right and defendants' actions in depriving her of that right was sufficient to overcome the general preference against disinterment. Judge Stern dissented, reasoning that the majority had erred in using the in pari materia analysis. In Judge Stern's view, the two statutory sections should be read independently of each other. In addition, the dissent found that the trial court's decision was based on substantial credible evidence in the record and resulted from the proper application of relevant legal principles and statutory principles.
Defendants appealed to the Supreme Court as of right based on the dissent in the Appellate Division.
HELD: The plain language of the statutory provisions relating to interment and disinterment expresses that a different regulatory scheme applies to each; therefore, the Appellate Division erred in determining that the provisions must be read in pari materia.
1. The subject of burial has been addressed by our Legislature since 1851. In the most recent legislative enactment, the Cemetery Act of 2003, the language of the disinterment provision demonstrates several clear differences between it and the provision governing interment. First, there is a strong preference against disinterment. Second, the authority to disinter is not vested in the surviving spouse alone, as it is in the interment provision, but rather is given to the "surviving spouse, adult children and the owner of the interment space," who must give their authorization both jointly and in writing. Third, the power of the court to act in a manner contrary to the statute is expressly preserved. (Pp. 10-19)
2. The role of the Court in statutory interpretation is to determine and effectuate the intent of the Legislature. If the plain language of a statute is unclear or is susceptible to more than one interpretation, courts may look to extrinsic sources to assist in interpreting the meaning of the statute. A tool of statutory construction provides that statutes are to be considered in pari materia when they relate to the same person or thing, to the same class of persons or things, or have the same purpose or object. In an effort to make statutes harmonious, a court must avoid straining to make consistent statutes to which the Legislature's choice of words demonstrates a contrary intent. In attempting to find harmony, the majority of the appellate panel overlooked the obvious intention of the Legislature to approach interment and disinterment differently, resulting in the panel substituting its view of what would be consistent. Evidence of the Legislature's intent that the disinterment statute be read as a separate mechanism can be found in its plain language, in the legislative history, and in its common sense application. (Pp. 19-26)
3. The language of the disinterment statute expresses a legislative preference against disinterment and makes plain that the surviving spouse's wishes are not paramount. The statutory position is reduced from a position of having primary authority to inter to one of sharing authority to disinter equally with all surviving adult children. When viewed in accordance with the disinterment statute, the trial court was entitled to weigh the views of decedent along with those of all the survivors. The preference about burial attributed to decedent was also the preference of all the surviving adult children. Seen in that context, Joan's preference was insufficient as a matter of law. (Pp. 26-31)
Judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED.
JUSTICE RIVERA-SOTO, dissenting, is of the view that because the surviving spouse never validly waived her statutory rights and the original interment was procured either by fraud or mutual mistake in violation of clear and unambiguous legislative dictates, the majority's reasoning, albeit correct, is irrelevant. Further, the result reached by the majority rewards the wrongdoer, a result that runs counter to this Court's lengthy equitable traditions and, more importantly, its fundamental obligations. Justice Rivera-Soto dissents for those reasons and substantially for the reasons expressed in the majority opinion of the Appellate Division.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LONG, LaVECCHIA, ALBIN and WALLACE join in JUSTICE HOENS' opinion. JUSTICE RIVERA-SOTO filed a separate dissenting opinion.