SYLLABUS (This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). John Bardis and Helen Bardis v. First Trenton Insurance Co. (A-110-07) Argued November 17, 2008 -- Decided June 10, 2009 HOENS, J., writing for the Court. In this appeal, the Court addresses three questions. First, the Court addresses whether, in a jury trial arising out of Underinsured Motorist (UIM) coverage, the insurer should be identified as the defendant. Second, the Court considers whether, in the UIM trial, evidence that the insurer authorized payment of Personal Injury Protection (PIP) benefits is relevant to whether there is a causal connection between the accident and the claimed injuries. Third, the Court focuses on whether, in the unusual circumstances of this dispute, the UIM carrier's disavowal of knowledge of the sources of payments for the medical treatment of plaintiff's injuries deprived plaintiff of a fair trial. On February 13, 1997, plaintiff John Bardis was injured when his automobile was involved in a three-car accident caused when a vehicle driven by Joseph Bologna hit the vehicle behind Bardis's, pushing it forward. At the time of the accident, Bardis was insured by defendant First Trenton Insurance Company. The dispute is complicated by the fact that the February 1997 incident was neither Bardis's first, nor his last, automobile accident. At the time of the February 1997 accident, Bardis had degenerative disc disease and a significant history of neck, back, and shoulder complaints. Consequently, there was a continuing series of MRI and other studies and treatment performed on Bardis, which formed much of the basis for the dispute at trial. There was no question that Bologna was the cause of the February 1997 accident, and Bardis settled with him for the full extent of his $15,000 insurance policy. There was also no question raised by First Trenton about the medical treatments that Bardis underwent after the February 1997 accident, all of which were covered under the PIP provisions of his insurance policy. Nor did First Trenton decline to cover, as part of Bardis's PIP benefits, the cost of back surgery performed on Bardis in 2003. It is that surgery, however, that has become the focal point of the dispute between the parties in this appeal. Bardis asserts that the surgery performed in 2003 was causally related to the February 1997 accident. First Trenton, at the UIM trial, contended that in fact it was not. Bardis made two applications prior to or during trial. First, he requested that the judge advise the jury that First Trenton was the defendant rather than referring to Bologna, the tortfeasor, as if he were the defendant. The trial judge denied the application. Second, Bardis asked for permission to call and question Susan Wetherell, a First Trenton employee, about her review of the PIP claims and the basis on which she had authorized their payment. Bardis asserted that Wetherell's evaluation of his claims and her authorization of the payment of PIP benefits to pay for his medical treatment was probative of causation. The trial court granted that request. However, as a result of that ruling, the parties stipulated to the substance of the testimony that Wetherell would have given in place of her appearance at trial as a witness, referring to her by name and describing her as a "representative of the defendant." Counsel for First Trenton, who the jury had been told represented the tortfeasor Bologna, then commented in closing that neither he nor Bologna knew Wetherell and questioned whether her decision to pay for treatment of the injuries was relevant to causation. After the jury returned its verdict in favor of defendant, Bardis appealed. In its published opinion, the Appellate Division expressed its view that "under the circumstances it would have been better to tell the jury, subject to an appropriate instruction, that the carrier was the defendant," but concluded that the trial court's contrary decision was an appropriate exercise of discretion. The panel concluded that the trial judge had erred in permitting evidence of PIP payments, both because those payments were not relevant and because Wetherell was not competent to testify about causation of the injuries. Although critical of the closing argument by defense counsel essentially disavowing knowledge of those payments, the panel reasoned that because the stipulation was inadmissible, those comments did not deprive plaintiff of a fair trial. The panel therefore affirmed the verdict in defendant's favor.  The Supreme Court granted certification and thereafter granted amicus status to the Association of Trial Lawyers of America-New Jersey (ATLA-NJ). HELD: The Court concludes that there are strong reasons supporting the rule that the Underinsured Motorist (UIM) litigation proceed in the name of the tortfeasor rather than the insurer, that these reasons ordinarily militate in favor of identifying the defendant in the trial by using the name of that tortfeasor, and that the decision to identify the UIM insurer as the defendant instead remains a matter left to the sound discretion of the trial judge should circumstances dictate. The Court further concludes that payment of PIP benefits for treatment of an injury is irrelevant to the question of causation of that injury. In addition, the closing argument by counsel disavowing his and the actual tortfeasor's knowledge about the insurer's employee and her decisions to make PIP payments had the capacity to confuse the jury, and its admission constituted reversible error. 1. Although courts ordinarily identify the real parties in interest in any litigation, and although First Trenton was appropriately named in the UIM complaint as the defendant, that does not answer the question posed by plaintiff about whether the insurer should be identified in the UIM trial by its own name. In other circumstances, the Supreme Court has expressed its concern that references to insurance coverage might distract jurors from a fair evaluation of the evidence, recognizing, as has the Appellate Division, that references to insurance might motivate an award of damages based on a jury's perception of an insurer as having "deep pockets." Similar concerns are voiced in the Rules of Evidence, for example N.J.R.E. 411. Not only are these matters of concern when the tortfeasor is the defendant, but they are relevant as well in the UIM context. In reality, it is the accident and the driver who caused it, rather than the insurer from which plaintiff now seeks a recovery for noneconomic damages, that is in any way relevant to the issues to be decided. The claim against the insurer is a derivative one; the sole focus is on whether the injuries, and the medical treatment that followed, were caused by the accident and, therefore, whether plaintiff is entitled to a verdict to compensate him or her for noneconomic damages that resulted, and none of those facts have to do with the insurer; the identity of the insurer is entirely irrelevant to any issue in the proceeding. Nor is it accurate to say, as does plaintiff, that the trial court's decision to shield the insurer's identity created confusion in the trial. In the context of a UIM claim, in which the identity of the insurer is not relevant to any issue, and in which the jury's decision must focus on the behavior of the actual tortfeasor, the rule advanced by plaintiff carries the greater risk of confusion. The Court thus rejects the request for a rule compelling the insurer in a UIM trial to be identified as the defendant. The Court disagrees with the appellate panel's suggestion that such a rule would be preferable and instead leaves it to the sound discretion of the trial judge to conclude, and to act accordingly, if circumstances in a particular trial suggest otherwise. (Pp. 10-15) 2. By statute, the Legislature has required that "every standard automobile liability insurance policy . . . contain personal injury protection [PIP] benefits for the payment of benefits without regard to negligence, liability or fault of any kind." N.J.S.A. 39: 6A-4. The Court has previously held that this statute advances an important legislative goal of ensuring that persons injured in automobile accidents will receive medical care and that the bills for that care will be promptly paid. In order to achieve this important goal, the Court has understood the PIP statute to afford the "broadest possible coverage." The Legislature has also enacted a statute that makes evidence of amounts paid or collectible pursuant to PIP inadmissible in an ordinary suit for damages arising from an automobile accident. The principal goal of that statute is to avoid double recovery for a loss. Although the Legislature has not extended that prohibition to UIM suits, the underlying logic still pertains. A UIM action is essentially a contract-based substitute for a tort action against the tortfeasor. In theory, then, there should be no different application of the rules governing liability in a UIM case than those that apply in the trial of an ordinary tort action arising from a motor vehicle accident. The prohibition on admissibility of PIP payments should apply regardless of whether the tortfeasor or the plaintiff's own insurer is defending against the claim. The insurer that pays PIP claims in the ordinary course should do so safe in the knowledge that the evidence of that payment will not be admissible in the event that there is a civil suit, in order to avoid creating an incentive to decline payment. The Court therefore agrees with the Appellate Division that the trial court erred in deeming the PIP payments admissible. (Pp. 15-20) 3. Although the Court concludes that the PIP payments were irrelevant to any of the issues that were before the jury in this UIM trial, it cannot avoid the implications that flowed from the trial court's contrary decision. The closing argument to the effect that defendant, and the attorney, had no idea who Wetherell was and why she had elected to make the payments for the medical bills may well have confused the jury and caused it to reach an unjust result. The stratagem inappropriately sought to undo the trial court's ruling about the relevance of those payments. The 2  Court therefore is constrained to reverse the verdict in defendant's favor and remand the matter for a new trial in which the evidence of PIP payments shall be inadmissible. (Pp. 20-21) JUSTICE ALBIN filed a separate, CONCURRING opinion, stating that although he concurs that this case must be remanded for a new trial, in his opinion, the primary error